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Abstract 
 
 
This study adopted a qualitative approach, comprising in-depth interviews and observations 
at four courts, to examine the perceived legitimacy of the court process among members of 
the public who come into direct contact with the criminal courts. Examining the extent to 
which members of the public, or ‘lay participants’, engaged with the court process provided 
a valuable means of assessing the degree to which the courts are perceived to occupy 
legitimate authority among those that they serve. In this thesis, engagement is 
characterised in one of five ways, ‘active alignment’, ‘passive alignment’, ‘dull compulsion’, 
‘resistance’ and ‘withdrawal’, based upon the extent to which an individual is aligned with, 
and participates in, the court process. The findings point to evidence of weak levels of 
engagement, particularly among court users, such as complainants, defendants and 
prosecution witnesses, who have the least power but most at stake in the process. This is 
indicative of legitimacy deficits which, if unaddressed, limit the degree to which the courts 
can continue to claim to be valid holders of power. The findings suggest that perceptions of 
legitimacy can be cultivated in two ways. This is firstly through the use of lay adjudicators, 
namely juries and lay magistrates, who – despite challenges arising from the visibility of the 
perceived benefits of lay decision-making in practice – were found to confer legitimacy on 
the criminal courts. Secondly, engagement could be cultivated through the presence of 
‘procedurally just’ interactions between court users and those who occupy positions of 
power within the courts. However, the strength of the latter claims, this thesis concludes, 
should not be overstated because in order to fully enhance perceptions of legitimacy there 
is a need to look beyond the confines of the courtroom and towards issues in wider society 
that shape the experiences of court users. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Within the discipline of criminology, the criminal courts occupy largely under-researched 
terrain (Rock, 1993). Criminology as a discipline tends to specialise in research and teaching 
on criminal justice institutions such as prisons and the police – and in particular upon the 
responses of those individuals subject to the authority of these criminal justice agencies – 
but few teaching and research programmes include a substantial focus upon the courts.1  
The lack of attention is surprising due to the relative ease with which cases coming before 
the criminal courts can be observed under the principle of ‘public justice’.2 Research that 
has been carried out in the criminal courts tends to take place in the Crown Court (such as, 
Rock, 1993; Fielding, 2006; Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby, 2015). With the exception of several 
well-known ethnographic studies conducted thirty to forty years ago (such as, Carlen, 1976; 
McBarnet 1981; Darbyshire, 1984), the magistrates’ courts have received much less 
attention (cf. Darbyshire, 1997). 3  
 
This study aimed to address these gaps in criminological understanding by conducting 
empirical research that specifically examined how members of the public, or lay 
participants, understood, perceived and experienced the court process in both the Crown 
and magistrates’ courts. This involved a specific focus upon levels of understanding and 
perceptions of the use of lay adjudicators in the criminal courts – that is, juries and 
                                                     
1
 For example, though the most recent edition of the Oxford Handbook of Criminology (2017) includes 
Chapters focused upon policing (Jones, Newburn and Reiner, 2017) and prisons (Crewe and Liebling, 2017), an 
examination of the criminal courts is confined to a discussion on sentencing (Ashworth and Roberts, 2017).  
2
 For an overview of the theoretical underpinnings of the notion of public justice, also referred to as ‘open 
justice’, see Duff, Farmer, Marshall and Tadros (2007).  
3
 Empirical examinations of the magistrates’ court have increased in recent years (see, for example, Ward, 
2017; Soubise, 2017); however, such studies have tended to focus on procedural or systemic issues facing the 
magistrates’ courts and have not involved empirical research with court users. 
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magistrates – and a broader consideration of how lay participants engaged with the court 
process. A focus upon how lay participants engaged with the court process was thought to 
be of particular value because it provides a window through which to examine the extent to 
which the courts can claim to hold legitimate authority in the eyes of those they serve (cf. 
Tyler, 2006; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012).  
   
1.1 Situating the study within the framework of legitimacy 
 
The power dynamics existing within social structures and criminal justice agencies – along 
with the interplay between forms of formal and informal social control – are an established 
concern of sociologists and criminologists. Classic theoretical discussions of such issues 
include Durkheim’s (1893) study of anomie; which was elaborated upon by Merton (1938; 
1957) in his theorisations on social structure and ‘strain’.  More recently, Foucault (1977) 
charted the growth of the ‘carceral society’ and Garland (2001) spoke of the ‘culture of 
control’ that exists between the State and civil society. Studies of the power structures and 
dynamics that exist in the criminal courts have tended to focus on the means by which 
forms of formal and informal control are achieved in the courtroom setting (see, for 
example, Carlen, 1976; Rock, 1993).  
 
Framing an examination of lay participation in the criminal courts through theorisations of 
legitimacy, however, offers a different way of exploring the power dynamics that 
characterise how members of the public engage with the court process. Proponents of 
legitimacy theory, such as political theorist David Beetham (1991, 2013) and social 
psychologist Tom Tyler (2006), argue that in order for institutions to uphold valid power 
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they need to be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the citizens that they serve. In 
contrast to disciplines such as political theory and social psychology, in which discussions of 
legitimacy are long-established (Tyler, 2006), the concept of legitimacy has only come to the 
attention of criminologists relatively recently (cf. Tankebe, 2013). Since coming to 
prominence the study of legitimacy has received substantial amounts of criminological 
attention; particularly among policing scholars who have tended to focus their attention 
upon measuring the impact of ‘procedural fairness’ – such as, fair decision-making and 
respectful treatment – on perceptions of legitimacy.4  
 
Perhaps one of the attractions that the study of legitimacy offers to criminological scholars 
is that it provides an opportunity to move away from accustomed theoretical and policy 
approaches that have explored the ways in which authorities can secure cooperation or 
compliance among citizens through recourse to instrumental forms of power or control via 
gains and incentives,5 or through the imposition, or threat of imposition, of sanctions.6 The 
study of legitimacy on the other hand, enables the focus to be upon normative modes of 
achieving compliance or cooperation from citizens; such as shared moral or ethical 
standards (see, for example, Hough and Sato, 2011; Tyler, 2011; Beetham, 2013). It is, after 
all, illuminating that the study of legitimacy has come to the fore within criminology at a 
time when crime control policies have undergone a ‘populist’ shift (see Hough and Sato, 
2011). Moreover, because prominent scholars argue that legitimacy can only be achieved if 
citizens display expressed consent for the ‘power-holder’ role occupied by institutions and 
criminal justice actors (Beetham, 1991; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012), this means that 
                                                     
4
 Recent examples of this include Wolfe, Nix, Kaminski and Rojeck (2016) and Skinns, Rice, Sprawson and Woof 
(2017). 
5
 See, for example, Mertonian theorisations on social structure and anomie (Merton, 1938; 1957).  
6
 See, for example, Classical theorisations on deterrence, such as Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1791). 
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‘audience legitimacy’ can be empirically measured by examining the extent to which citizens 
cooperate with, or exhibit a willingness to cooperate with, agencies (Hough and Sato, 2011; 
Roberts and Plesničar, 2015). Importantly, attention has been drawn towards the need for 
empirical research on legitimacy to be able to distinguish between ‘true legitimacy and dull 
compulsion’ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012: 149) or, to put it plainly, to examine ‘what it is 
that sets consensual authority apart from naked power’(Loader and Sparks, 2013: 109).  
Therefore, a focus upon how court users engage with the process helps to make such 
distinctions explicit within an institution that has rarely been the focus of legitimacy 
research.  
 
 
1.2 Lay participation in the criminal courts  
 
Members of the public, collectively known as ‘lay participants’, attend the criminal courts 
for a variety of reasons. This includes as the alleged victim of, or witness to a crime, as the 
defendant accused of criminal wrong-doing, or in order to offer support to a friend or family 
member who is required to attend court. Moreover, because the criminal justice system of 
England and Wales relies heavily on decision-making by members of the public in the form 
of lay adjudication, individuals also attend the court in the capacity of jurors and lay 
magistrates. Finally, members of the public can attend court in a number of other 
capacities, for example, as an observer of proceedings under the principle of ‘public justice’ 
or as a volunteer for a charitable organisation or criminal justice agency with a role in the 
criminal courts, for example the Witness Service. The term ‘lay participant’ is thus used in 
this research in order to describe individuals who participate in the court process as citizens 
as opposed to those who participate because they are being remunerated for their role, 
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such as judges, advocates or court staff. Though broad, this definition enables lay 
participation to be examined within and between groups of citizen who have different levels 
of power and stake in the process. This was regarded as essential to generating a nuanced 
understanding of perceptions of legitimacy in the criminal courts.   For the purpose of this 
study, two main categories of lay participant are under focus. The first group is those who 
attend court in the capacity of complainants, witnesses, defendants and their supporters; 
this group is collectively referred to as ‘court users’. The second group are members of the 
public who attend court as jurors and lay magistrates; collectively referred to as ‘lay 
adjudicators’.  
 
Court users are the main group under study because they occupy the primary ‘audience’ 
upon which to examine perceptions of legitimacy.7 Existing studies involving court users 
have outlined the relatively powerless and marginal status of complainants, witnesses and 
defendants alike (see, for example, Jacobson et al. 2015). While some court users may 
choose to attend court out of their own volition, defendants have no choice in the 
proceedings that are carried out against them; likewise, upon making a statement to the 
police, complainants and prosecution witnesses can be legally compelled to attend court. At 
the same time, court users – particularly complainants and defendants – are likely to have 
much at stake in the outcome of proceedings; be it their liberty (in the case of defendants) 
or the making of a decision on something which may have significantly impacted upon their 
lives (in the case of complainants). Examining court users’ perceptions of legitimacy thus 
generates understanding of the extent to which the courts are regarded as a legitimate 
                                                     
7
 Lay adjudicators, on the other hand, can be regarded as an ‘audience’ but they are also in the unusual 
position of acting as ‘power-holders’ due to their decision-making responsibilities. 
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power-holder among those with least power and most at stake in the process (cf. Benesh 
and Howell, 2001). Research on this subject has scarcely been conducted in the criminal 
courts of England and Wales.8  
 
This study set out to examine court users’ levels of understanding and perceptions of the 
use of juries and magistrates with a view to gaining an understanding of the extent to which 
the use of lay adjudicators could confer legitimacy on the criminal courts.  England and 
Wales is regarded as relatively ‘unique’ in the extent of its reliance on lay adjudicators in the 
administration of justice (Morgan and Russell, 2000; Ward, 2017); despite this, empirical 
research on this topic is relatively scant. Conducting research on the topic of juries is heavily 
circumscribed in England and Wales due to the restrictions imposed under the Contempt of 
Court Act 1981. Empirical research on juries, in this jurisdiction and at an international level, 
is thus often conducted through the use of mock juries (see, for example, Ellison and 
Munro, 2009). Meanwhile, the lay magistracy has been ‘neglected’ by many, including 
successive governments, academia and the media (Darbyshire, 1997). This is an interesting 
anomaly because over 90 per cent of criminal cases are completed in the magistrates’ court 
(Ministry of Justice, 2016a). In-depth empirical studies of the magistracy are relatively 
uncommon, notable exceptions to this include Morgan and Russell’s (2000) study of the 
judiciary in the magistrates’ court and Ward’s (2017) study of the positioning of the 
magistracy within the contemporary landscape surrounding ‘summary justice’. There has 
been hitherto little exploration of how members of the public with least power in the 
                                                     
8
 One notable exception to this is Jacobson et al.’s (2015) study of public’s experience Crown Court; however 
this study examined the Crown Court only and did not include a focus specifically upon engagement or 
perceptions of lay adjudication. 
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process (that is, court users) think about the notion of criminal justice decisions being 
decided upon by other members of the public (that is, jurors and lay magistrates).9  
 
Examining levels of understanding and perceptions of the use of lay adjudicators remained a 
principal aim throughout the study. However, as the research progressed it became 
increasingly apparent – for the reasons that will be set out during the course of this thesis – 
that court users’ perceptions of legitimacy regarding the use of lay adjudicators could not be 
considered in isolation from their broader experiences and perceptions of the court process. 
Overall perceptions of legitimacy, as will be argued, are best examined through the lens of 
how lay participants engage with the court process. The second aim of the study therefore 
sought to examine how lay participants’ levels of engagement in the court process could be 
characterised with a view to understanding the nature of their overall perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the criminal courts. 
 
In addition to examining court users’ levels of engagement in the court process, it was also 
deemed necessary to understand how the second group of lay participant, lay adjudicators, 
perceived and made sense of their own role. This is because existing research on the topic 
of legitimacy has come under criticism for its almost exclusive focus on ‘audience legitimacy’ 
and its lack of focus on perceptions of legitimacy among those in positions of power 
(Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012).10 This aspect of the study relies solely on the views of 
magistrates due to the aforementioned legal restrictions surrounding jury research. 
                                                     
9
 Some research exists into perceptions of lay adjudication among members of the public more broadly. 
However, this is limited to research on public perceptions of the magistracy (Morgan and Russell, 2000; 
Roberts, Hough, Jackson and Gerber, 2012).  
10
 Exceptions to this include Lielbing’s (2004) study of prison officers and recent policing research which has 
examined police officers’ perspectives of self-legitimacy (such as, Nix and Wolfe, 2018). 
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Examining perceptions of legitimacy from the position of lay magistrates has the potential 
to offer unique insight on power-holder notions of legitimacy among those who carry out a 
judicial role in a voluntary capacity.   
 
Further to generating understanding of perceptions of legitimacy in the under-researched 
terrain of the criminal courts, this study is particularly timely because there are indications 
that lay participation in the criminal courts is declining, or at the very least, is at a point of 
transition. Decreasing levels of recorded crime over a twenty-year period (see, ONS, 2018a), 
alongside greater uses of ‘out of court disposals’ (Judicial Office, 2018), have contributed to 
falling caseloads in the criminal courts.11 This has in part led to a wide-scale court closure 
plan which has resulted in the closure of 121 courts and tribunal centres across the court 
estate (Ministry of Justice, 2018a). Meanwhile, the criminal courts are undergoing a number 
of technological reforms that may reduce the need for court users to be physically present 
during proceedings (Ministry of Justice, 2018a).  Finally, the magistracy has shrunk by 
almost fifty per cent in less than a decade (see, Judicial Office 2011; Judicial Office, 2018) 
and there have been repeated calls to limit the remit to trial by jury (Auld, 2001; Leveson, 
2015). The study thus offers insight into how members of the public who are coming before 
the courts engage with it and perceive it as legitimate at a time when the very nature of 
engagement in the criminal courts is at a crucial juncture.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11
 However, this is notwithstanding recent data which indicates an upward lift in recorded crime trends for 
some offence types (see ONS, 2018a). 
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1.3 Aims and Research Questions 
 
 
This study of lay participation in the criminal courts had two main aims. The original aim was 
to examine court users’ levels of understanding and perceptions of lay adjudication with a 
view to assessing the degree to which lay adjudication could confer legitimacy upon the 
criminal courts. However, when it began to emerge that examining court users’ perceptions 
of legitimacy of lay adjudicators would only provide a partial understanding of court users’ 
overall perceptions of legitimacy – because these overall perceptions of legitimacy were 
also influenced by court users’ broader experiences and perceptions of the court process –  
a second aim was introduced.   This was to examine how lay participants’ levels and types of 
engagement in the court process could be characterised in order to gain a thorough 
understanding of the nature of lay participants’ overall perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
criminal courts. The study had four main research questions. The first two research 
questions correspond with the first aim of the study; while the latter two research questions 
concern the second aim of the study: 
 
1. To what extent are court users aware of the roles of lay adjudicators and to what 
extent do they understand these roles? 
 
2. Do each of the two types of lay adjudication help to confer legitimacy on the justice 
system? 
 
3. How can lay participants’ levels and types of engagement with the court process be 
characterised? 
10 
 
 
4. Overall, what are the main factors that support or undermine court users’ 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the justice system? 
 
 
1.4 Methodological approach 
 
 
A qualitative approach was selected as the most suitable means to achieve the above aims. 
The specific approach adopted was a multi-sited ethnography (cf. Marcus, 1995) that 
centred upon in-depth interviews and court observations. The research was conducted in 
four criminal courts in England and involved in-depth interviews with 43 lay participants12 
and observations of 126 court hearings that were carried out, predominantly, over a period 
of 14 months.  
 
Notwithstanding the limits to generalisability and representativeness inherent in carrying 
out qualitative research (see, Bryman, 2012), this approach was thought to be the most 
valuable method for answering the research questions for several reasons. Firstly, a 
qualitative approach is generally recognised as one of the most suitable methods for 
eliciting an in-depth understanding of how individuals perceive, experience and interact 
with the ‘social worlds’ (cf. Rock, 1993) which they occupy. This was regarded as particularly 
important for examining how lay participants engage with the court process and their 
associated perceptions of legitimacy. The use of in-depth interviewing was regarded as an 
                                                     
12
 This included: 17 interviews with complainants and prosecution witnesses, 7 interviews with defendants, 4 
interviews with individuals who had attended court to provide support to a friend or family member 
(hereafter, ‘supporters’) and 8 interviews with lay magistrates. In addition to this a further 7 interviews were 
carried out with Witness Service volunteers. Conducting interviews with Witness Service volunteers provided a 
point of comparison of volunteering experiences with lay magistrates and provided context to some of the 
issues raised by prosecution witnesses. 
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essential means of gaining an understanding of lay participants’ nuanced and subjective 
experiences of the criminal courts and of their understanding and perceptions of lay 
adjudication (cf. Arksey and Knight, 1999). This is especially because in-depth interviewing is 
also regarded as a valuable method for giving ‘voice’ to the views of groups that can be 
considered as marginalised, such as court users (see, for example, Shapland, Willmore and 
Duff, 1985; Goodey, 2005; Jacobson et al. 2015; Carlen, 1976). 
 
The use of ethnographic approaches is common in existing research conducted in the 
criminal courts (see for example, Bottoms and McLean, 1976; Rock, 1993; Fielding, 2006) 
and was thought to be an important overarching approach to adopt in this study. This is 
because it enables the generation of insight into the complex interactional dynamics that 
can be at play within a social setting (cf. Fielding, 2015), such as the criminal courts, and one 
which would help to generate insight into how lay participants engaged with the court 
process. Conducting a multi-sited ethnography at four criminal courts, specifically, enabled 
comparisons to be drawn both between and within the different types of court under study 
(magistrates’ and Crown Courts). 
 
Moreover, the use of a qualitative approach was also thought to be particularly beneficial to 
generate knowledge on the concept of legitimacy. A plethora of studies have examined 
perceptions of legitimacy using large-scale quantitative surveys (see, for example, Sunshine 
and Tyler, 2003; Jacksonn Bradford, Hough et al. 2012; Hough, Jackson and Bradford, 2013; 
Tankebe, 2013). The reliance on such approaches has come under criticism recently for 
insufficiently examining the intricate nature of perceptions of legitimacy (Harkin, 2015) and 
for examining perceptions of legitimacy in relative isolation from the context in which they 
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are generated (Loader and Sparks, 2013; Skinns et al. 2017). This points to the value of 
examining lay participants’ perceptions of the criminal courts through the use of a 
qualitative approach.   
 
 
1.5 Structure of remaining chapters 
 
 
The thesis is structured into seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides a more detailed discussion 
of the basis for framing the study within the concept of legitimacy. The various approaches 
to, and conceptualisations of, legitimacy within the disciplines of political theory, social 
psychology and criminology are examined and the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
existing theories are evaluated. Further to this, Chapter 2 reviews existing literature which 
has examined the roles of complainants, prosecution witnesses and defendants within the 
criminal courts and includes a focus upon existing theoretical studies and empirical research 
regarding the justifications for, and limitations to, the use of lay adjudicators in criminal 
justice decision-making.   
 
Chapter 3 sets out the methodological approach adopted; namely, a multi-sited 
ethnography of four criminal courts which included interviews with an array of lay 
participants and observations of court proceedings. This includes a description of how 
access was negotiated via Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, the Judicial Office and 
Citizens Advice and an examination of the main ethical issues under consideration in the 
study. The various strengths and weaknesses of the approach are critically examined and 
the approach to analysing the rich set of qualitative data that the study generated is 
outlined.  
13 
 
 
 Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are dedicated to a discussion of the study findings. Chapter 4 addresses 
Research Questions 1 and 2 by describing the findings relating to court users’ levels of 
understanding of juries and magistrates before proceeding to examine the factors relating 
to lay adjudication that contribute to enhancing perceptions of legitimacy, and those which 
limit it. Importantly, Chapter 4 also outlines the reasoning behind the assessment that 
perceptions of the legitimacy of lay adjudications cannot be considered in isolation of court 
users’ overall perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal courts. Following on from this, 
Chapter 5 argues that the notion of ‘engagement’ offers a lens through which to examine 
overall perceptions of legitimacy among court users and lay magistrates. The Chapter, in 
consideration of Research Question 3, sets out a continuum for engagement that is based 
upon two axes: the extent to which an individual is aligned with the court process and the 
extent to which they participate in the court process. Five types of engagement are 
identified and critically examined. Chapter 6 considers the factors that can act as a barrier to 
engagement in the criminal courts (and associated perceptions of legitimacy) and those 
which can help to cultivate it, with a view to addressing Research Question 4. Within this 
discussion, particular attention is paid to examining the interplay that exists between the 
‘machinery’ (Jacobson et al. 2015) of the criminal courts and those relating to the specific 
needs of court users and the wider social context in which they are set.   
 
Finally, Chapter 7 sets out the conclusions of the research. This includes a summary of the 
main research findings and how they address the specific research questions. It also 
includes a discussion of the theoretical and policy implications arising from the study and 
makes suggestions for future research programmes. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to position this examination of lay participation in the criminal 
courts within the wider literature. It begins by situating the study within the broader 
theoretical framework of legitimacy by considering existing conceptualisations and 
attendant debates surrounding the study of legitimacy. In doing so, it outlines the potential 
contribution that this study offers in terms of expanding upon emerging theorisations on 
the ‘dialogic’, or interactive, nature of legitimacy in the under-researched terrain of the 
criminal courts (cf. Bottoms and Tanebe, 2012). In line with criticisms of existing 
conceptualisations, which are centred upon the ‘thin’ and predictive nature of large-scale 
quantitative studies of legitimacy (Harkin, 2015; Skinns et al. 2017), I argue that a qualitative 
examination of the ways in which lay participants directly engage in the court process helps 
to make clear the distinction between ‘true legitimacy’ and ‘weak legitimacy’ with regard to 
perceptions of the criminal courts (cf. Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012).  
 
Drawing upon existing theorisations which have stressed that perceptions of legitimacy are 
based upon context and circumstance (Fagan, 2008; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Loader 
and Sparks, 2013; Skinns et al. 2017), the second half of the Chapter outlines the rationale 
for examining perceptions of legitimacy among members of the public who come into direct 
contact with the criminal courts; that is, lay participants. I argue that a particular focus on 
court users’ perceptions of legitimacy is required because they are the main ‘audience’ 
under study and are arguably those with the least power, yet most at stake, in the process 
(cf. Benesh and Howell, 2001).  Moreover, with regard to the specific aim of examining court 
users’ levels of understanding and perceptions of the use of lay adjudicators, the final 
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section considers the origins of lay adjudication and outlines some of the prominent 
justifications for, and associated criticism of, the use of juries and magistrates. Throughout 
the Chapter the various policy initiatives that have a bearing upon the research, and indicate 
its relevance, are also considered. 
 
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings: Legitimacy 
  
The concept of ‘legitimacy’ provides a useful framework for an examination of lay 
participation in the criminal courts. This is because its proponents (such as Tyler, 2006; 
Jackson et al. 2012) have argued that in order for institutions, including criminal justice 
institutions, to operate effectively they need to hold legitimate authority in the eyes of 
those they serve. This means that exploring perceptions of legitimacy among lay 
participants provides a means by which ‘audience legitimacy’ can be empirically examined 
(cf. Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012) in a setting which has been subject to little empirical 
attention from scholars within existing studies of legitimacy. 
 
2.1.1 Legitimacy: origins, definitions and place within the criminological imagination 
 
 Theorisation on the concept of legitimacy has a ‘long history’ (Tyler, 2006: 393) which spans 
a number of disciplines including the social sciences, political philosophy and social 
psychology. Such theorisations initially came to the fore in both the United States and 
United Kingdom during the latter half of the twentieth century in the aftermath of two 
World Wars and various periods of civil unrest and was borne out of a ‘fear that, without 
legitimate authorities and institutions, societies would descend into anarchy and chaos’ 
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(Tyler, 2006: 381). Yet it is only in the last twenty-five years that legitimacy has begun to 
attract considerable attention from criminologists (cf. Tankebe, 2013). Since then, an 
abundance of studies have been spawned into perceptions of legitimacy in the field of 
criminal justice, particularly on the topic of policing (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Loader 
and Sparks, 2013; Roberts and Plesničar, 2015). Before examining how the concept of 
legitimacy can be applied to the particular study at hand, it is first important to examine 
why legitimacy has come to hold such a prominent place within the criminological 
imagination.  
 
Firstly, it is generally accepted amongst leading scholars – such as Beetham (1991, 2013), 
Tyler (2006) and Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) – that in order for institutions to be regarded 
as valid power-holders they must be seen to hold legitimate authority in the eyes of those 
they serve.  Legitimacy thus serves to act as restraint, or to set limits to the ‘naked power’ 
(Loader and Sparks, 2013: 109) of states and institutions. This is described by Beetham 
(2013: 39):  
 
 ‘Legitimacy is not the icing on the cake of power, which is applied after baking is 
complete, and leaves the cake essentially unchanged. It is more like the yeast that 
permeates the dough and makes the bread what it is.’  
 
Central to many arguments is the idea that the presence of legitimacy enhances normative 
forms of cooperation and compliance with states and institutions – such as shared moral or 
ethical standards – rather than forms of power that seek to secure compliance through 
instrumental means, such as by incentive, threat or sanction (Tyler, 2011; Tyler et al. 2013; 
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Hough and Sato, 2011; Hough et al. 2013; Beetham, 2013).13 This has made the study of 
legitimacy particularly important to criminologists who have noted, especially since the 
advent of ‘populist punitiveness’ (Bottoms, 1995), the limited impact of instrumental 
methods in securing compliance (Hough and Sato, 2011). A focus on legitimacy, and the 
impact of this on securing normative cooperation, also helps criminology as a discipline to 
move forward from the criticism it has faced for its extensive focus on why people do not 
comply with the law rather than examining why ‘most people’ comply ‘most of the time’ 
(Tyler, 2006: 375; Bottoms, 2001; Hough and Sato, 2011). Finally, because the study of 
legitimacy entails a focus on how institutional authority is perceived by the members of the 
public it serves, it means that the concept can be subject to empirical testing (Tyler, 2006; 
Hough and Sato, 2011; Roberts, and Plesničar, 2015). This is evidenced in the plethora of 
studies devoted to measuring citizen perceptions of legitimacy among criminal justice 
actors, particularly the police.14 This has perhaps made it particularly attractive to 
criminological researchers and theorists who are familiar with longstanding critiques 
levelled at the limited empirical base for prominent criminological and sociological ‘truisms’ 
(Hough and Sato, 2011: 12), such as Merton’s (1938) theorisation on social structure, strain 
and anomie (Agnew, 2006; Morrison, 2006). 
 
Notwithstanding such claims, the definition and operationalisation of ‘legitimacy’ is 
contested and, despite numerous attempts both within and between the aforementioned 
disciplines, lacks ‘a single consensual position’ (Roberts, and Plesničar, 2015: 34). This 
provides insight as to why the concept has been described as ‘slippery’ (Hough et al. 2013) 
                                                     
13
 Theories concerning the latter, which had been prominent among existing criminological thinking, stemmed 
from Classical theories of deterrence (such as Beccaria, 1764 and Bentham, 1791) and structural theories of 
strain and anomie (such as Merton, 1938; 1957).  
14
 Recent examples of this include Wolfe et al. (2016), Skinns et al. (2017), Nix and Woofe (2018). 
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and ‘elusive’ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012: 168). One of the most prominent legitimacy 
scholars of the last thirty years is political theorist David Beetham (1991, 2013). His work 
offers a useful starting point for a discussion of legitimacy because other notable scholars 
(such as, Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Jackson et al. 2012; Hough 
et al. 2013; Tankebe 2013) have derived, at least in part, their own conceptualisations of 
legitimacy from his work.  
 
Beetham (2013: 16-17) put forward a three-fold model of legitimacy, arguing that an 
institution can be regarded as legitimate to the degree that: 
  
a) ‘it conforms to established rules’: that is, there needs to be a ‘legal validity’ to 
the expression of power that is derived from following the rules; 
b) ‘the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and 
subordinate’; 
c) ‘there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power 
relation’: that is, there needs to be evidence of ‘expressed consent’ of this power 
relationship among those upon which it is enforced. 
 
For Beetham (2013), all three components are required to work together to contribute to 
the legitimacy of an institution. The extent to which each of the components is realised, 
however, is not absolute but to a degree. In order to examine the extent to which the 
criminal courts are regarded as legitimate by lay participants, it is important to pay closer 
attention to these components – legal validity (commonly referred to as ‘legality’), the 
presence of shared beliefs (or ‘shared values’), and expressed consent – and to examine 
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how Beetham’s theorisation has been used to frame other theoretical discussions of 
legitimacy.  
 
Legality 
The first component of legitimacy identified by Beetham is that of legal validity; this is often 
referred to as ‘legality’ or ‘lawfulness’ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013; Hough 
et al. 2013). Legality is something which exists when authorities act in accordance with the 
law, or ‘conform to established rules’, and has often been identified as a main component 
of legitimacy among criminological thinkers (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Beetham, 2013: 
16; Tankebe, 2013; Hough et al., 2013). However, it is of note that less weight has been 
placed upon ‘legality’ in recent years (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Jackson et al. 2015). For 
example, Jackson, Hough, Bradford and Kuha (2015), after having originally presented a 
three-component model of legitimacy which included legality, moral alignment and consent 
(see Hough et al. 2013), presented a revised model of legitimacy comprising only the latter 
two components. This is because they found there to be a high degree of correlation 
between moral alignment (see below) and lawfulness (Jackson et al. 2015). In line with this, 
the present study focuses principally on the second two components of Beetham’s 
theorisation, that of ‘shared values’ and ‘expressed consent’, when examining lay 
participants’ perceptions of legitimacy.  This is because the very premise of dealing with 
alleged offending within the confines of the criminal courts is, as will become clear in the 
Chapters that follow, imbued with an implicit legality. 
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Shared values 
 
The interrelated terms ‘shared beliefs’, ‘shared values’ and ‘moral alignment’ occur 
frequently in discussions of legitimacy both between and within a variety of disciplines 
(Fagan, 2008; Beetham, 2013; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Tyler, 2011; Jackson et al. 2012, 
Hough et al. 2013; Tankebe, 2013; Jacobson, et al., 2015). The concept of shared values – 
particularly shared moral standards – has frequently been identified as a component of 
legitimacy (Beetham, 2013; Jackson et al; 2012; Hough et al. 2013; Jacobson et al. 2015).15 
Beetham (2013) argued that authorities lack legitimacy if the rules of power cannot be 
justified on the basis of shared beliefs. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012: 142) furthered the 
place of shared values within the concept of legitimacy by explaining that shared values ‘set 
limits that define the conditions within which legitimate power may be exercised … as well 
as furnishing those who govern with rules and resources within which they can seek to 
realise certain societal objectives.’  
 
In recent years criminologists have developed the concept of moral alignment –  the 
‘belie[f] that the institution acts according to a shared moral purpose with citizens’ –  within 
conceptualisations of legitimacy (Jackson et al., 2012: 1051; Hough et al. 2013). Jackson et 
al. (2012: 1054) argued that demonstrating moral alignment requires institutions to 
negotiate power in a manner that maximizes consent among citizens, which is important 
because ‘such consent may be more readily granted when people feel that the values [that 
the authority is] upholding accord with their own sense of right and wrong.’ At a broader 
level, it has been argued that the fostering of shared values between institutions and the 
                                                     
15
 However, others regard shared values either as a means by which other components of legitimacy can be 
examined (Tankebe, 2013) or as a social motivation distinct from legitimacy (Tyler, 2011). 
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public can enhance the social capital of communities and promote a civic culture of 
voluntary co-operation with the law (Tyler, 2011; Jackson et al. 2012; Tyler, Jackson and 
Bradford, 2013).   
 
The notions of ‘shared values’, and ‘moral alignment’, are particularly relevant concepts to 
the present study. When examining lay participants’ perceptions of legitimacy, this research 
considers the extent to which ‘shared values’ exist between lay participants and those 
responsible for exerting authority in the criminal courts. This is examined at an overall level 
and also specifically in relation to court users’ perceptions of lay adjudication. This has 
seldom been the focus of existing research. 
 
Expressed consent 
The final condition required by Beetham in order to achieve legitimacy is ‘expressed 
consent’. This is particularly important to Beetham, who is critical of definitions of 
legitimacy – such as that of Weber (1968) – which focus solely upon the public’s belief that 
an institution or State is legitimate. Rather he argued that: 
 
‘Legitimacy is to be equated with people’s … specific actions that publicly express it 
… these are important because they confer legitimacy on the powerful, not because 
they provide evidence about people’s beliefs. They confer legitimacy because they 
constitute public expressions by the subordinate of their consent to the power 
relationship and their subordinate position within it; of their voluntary agreement to 
the limitation of their freedom by the requirements of a superior’ (Beetham, 2013: 
91). 
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Importantly, Beetham’s notion of ‘expressed consent’ has been linked to criminological 
theorisations which have examined the impact of perceived legitimacy on citizens’ felt 
obligation to obey the law and cooperate with legal authorities (Jackson et al. 2012; Hough 
et al. 2013). Social psychologist Tom Tyler, who has written extensively on the subject, has 
argued that legitimacy offers a means by which institutions can obtain citizen obligation to 
obey the law (Tyler, 1990; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2007) or, more broadly, can 
obtain voluntary co-operation among citizens (Tyler, 2011). Legitimacy, therefore, is 
regarded as a key way in which institutions can secure compliance with the law (Tyler, 1990; 
Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2007).  
 
However, others have argued that the association between the perceived obligation to 
obey, or compliance with, the law and legitimacy is not straightforward; people may feel 
obliged to obey the law for reasons other than legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; 
Tankebe, 2013). It is not the aim of the present study to assess the relationship between 
court user perceptions of legitimacy and felt obligation to obey the law in the future. 
Instead this study examines the extent to which an individual lay participant’s direct 
engagement with the court process is indicative of their expressed consent for the authority 
held by the criminal courts.16 Now that the main components of legitimacy relevant to this 
study have been identified and defined, attention is drawn to existing debate over the 
factors that are commonly regarded to shape, or ‘drive’ perceptions of legitimacy (Sunshine 
and Tyler, 2003; Hough et al. 2013).  
                                                     
16
 It is difficult to measure ‘expressed consent’ for the use of lay adjudicators, specifically, because court users’ 
have a limited degree of choice as to whether or not decision-making in their individual case is carried out by 
lay adjudicators.
 
This is described in further detail in Chapter 4. 
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2.1.2 The relative role of process and outcome in perceptions of legitimacy 
 
Further to the discussion of the components required for institutions to be perceived as 
legitimate, an interconnected debate exists surrounding the extent to which perceptions of 
legitimacy are shaped by procedural factors, such as fair treatment and decision-making 
(‘procedural justice’), in comparison to factors relating to outcomes, such as the fair 
distribution of outcomes between different groups in society (‘distributive justice’) and 
perceptions of how well criminal justice actors perform their role (‘effectiveness’). These 
debates are of particular relevance to this study because they suggest that court users’ 
perceptions of lay adjudicators specifically, and the criminal courts more broadly, are likely 
to be influenced by factors relating to both process and outcome.    
 
Procedural justice 
 
Perhaps Tyler’s main contribution to the study of legitimacy is through his development of 
the body of research surrounding procedural justice. Procedural justice is a branch of work 
that has become relatively en vogue in recent years with criminologists in their study of 
legitimacy and compliance with the law (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). In particular, a 
number of studies have sought to examine the impact of procedural justice on perceptions 
of the legitimacy of the police (see, for example, Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Hough et al., 
2013; Jackson et al., 2012; Tankebe, 2013). Proponents of procedural justice theory argue 
that the fairness of the processes and procedures (procedural fairness) deployed by 
institutions in exercising their authority shapes the extent to which they are perceived as 
legitimate (Tyler, 2006; Hough et al. 2013).   
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It is generally accepted that assessments of procedural justice between citizens and 
institutions are made upon two dimensions: fair decision-making and respectful treatment 
(Tyler, 2011; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Fair decision-making, Tyler (2011: 73) explained, 
is based upon the perceived neutrality of the decision-maker, the transparency of the 
process, factuality and giving citizens the opportunity to provide input – or to ‘have their 
say’ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012: 145). Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) argued that the 
independence and competence of the decision-maker, alongside consistency in decision-
making, are also relevant to perceptions of fair decision-making among legal authorities. 
Assessments of the respectful treatment received by citizens relate to factors such as being 
treated with respect, dignity and ‘in a true sense as a human being’ (Bottoms and Tankebe: 
2012: 145; Tyler, 2011).17 The perceived fairness of the decisions made by those responsible 
for administering authority in the courts, generally, and lay adjudicators, specifically, are 
central themes explored by this study; as are court users’ perceptions about the extent to 
which they feel that they have been treated with respect, dignity and consideration by 
professional court actors and lay adjudicators. 
 
Existing research regarding procedural justice and the courts has been mainly been confined 
to large-scale quantitative surveys in the United States (Tyler and Huo, 2002; Rottman, 
2005; Benesh and Howell, 2001; Benesh 2006).18  Benesh and Howell (2001) found that 
aspects of procedural justice, such as being treated with courtesy and the ability of courts to 
                                                     
17
 However, Jacobson et al. (2015) noted that in practice it is difficult to separate out the interconnected 
dimensions of fair decision-making and respectful treatment. 
18
 Notable exceptions include Jacobson et al.’s (2015) study of the public’s experience of the Crown Court in 
England and Wales and Sprott and Greene’s (2010) study of perceptions of procedural justice among young 
defendants in Canada. 
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deal with cases in a timely manner, influenced court users’ levels of confidence in the 
courts. Tyler (2007: 30) identified four principles of procedural justice in the court setting:  
 
a) ‘Voice’: court users should be given the opportunity to ‘tell their side of the story’; 
b) ‘Neutrality’: decisions should be made by neutral decision-makers who follow 
established rules;  
c) ‘Respect’: court users should be treated with respect by all those involved in the 
court process;  
d) ‘Trust’: court users should feel as though they are treated in a sincere and 
considerate manner and feel as though they are listened to and treated without 
prejudice.  
 
In one of the only existing studies which has explored procedural fairness in relation to 
juries, MacCoun and Tyler (1988) found that perceptions of procedural fairness among 
jurors were more important to participants than juror competence and cost considerations; 
though it is possible that such perceptions were based on the notion that fair procedures 
would be likely to lead to accurate decisions. None of the existing court-based research has 
focused on court user perceptions of procedural fairness with respect to the roles occupied 
by juries and magistrates.  
 
Distributive justice and effectiveness 
The other body of theories that have sometimes been included in models of legitimacy are 
focused upon the role of ‘outcomes’, rather than ‘process’, in shaping perceptions of 
legitimacy. The two principal outcome theories in this arena are that of ‘distributive justice’ 
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and ‘effectiveness’. Distributive justice – or distributive fairness – is concerned with the 
fairness of outcomes and particularly that outcomes (such as decisions to prosecute, trial 
verdicts or sentence severity) are fairly distributed between different groups within society 
(Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Hough et al. 2013; Tankebe, 2013). Fagan (2008) explained that 
there are two specific aspects to distributive fairness. Firstly, outcomes should be 
proportionate to the level of wrongdoing and secondly that outcomes should be applied 
consistently and across different groups.  Effectiveness concerns perceptions of how well 
criminal justice agencies, such as the police and the courts, perform their respective duties 
(Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Hough et al. 2013; Tankebe, 2013). This study includes a 
consideration of the extent to which the perceived distributive fairness and effectiveness of 
criminal justice actors and lay adjudicators shapes lay participants’ perceptions of 
legitimacy. 
 
However, it is important to note that there is ambiguity with regard to the relative influence 
of process and outcome upon perceptions of legitimacy. For example, existing policing 
studies have found that though concerns about distributive fairness and effectiveness have 
an impact on legitimacy, the impact is usually less pronounced than that of procedural 
fairness (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Hough et al. 2013; Tyler et al. 2013).  Meanwhile, one of 
the few court-based studies of legitimacy found that though procedural justice 
considerations were important to court users’ perceptions of legitimacy of the court 
process, positive outcomes (such as the verdict in contested cases or the length and 
perceived severity of the sentence in non-contested cases) ‘matter[ed] decidedly more than 
process’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 172). The ongoing debate regarding the relative importance 
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of ‘process’ and ‘outcome’ in perceptions of legitimacy is an area of theoretical uncertainty 
that this study sought to pursue.  
 
 
2.1.3 Criticism: Dialogic legitimacy and beyond 
 
Despite widespread criminological interest in legitimacy in recent decades, existing 
theorisations have been criticised on a number of interrelated grounds; including difficulties 
and disagreement about the definition and operationalisation of legitimacy (Roberts and 
Plesničar, 2015; Harkin, 2015) and the ability of large-scale but ‘thin’ quantitative studies to 
generate sufficiently nuanced accounts of the ‘dialogic’ nature of legitimacy (Bottoms and 
Tankebe, 2012; Harkin, 2015). A review of existing criticism in relation to the study of 
legitimacy helps to lay the foundation for the contribution of the present study. 
 
Bottoms and Tankebe (2012: 168) provided one of the most robust critiques of existing 
criminological study of legitimacy, in which they argued that scholars have become 
preoccupied with the role of procedural justice in shaping perceptions of legitimacy. In 
particular, they asserted that existing criminological accounts were under-theorised, and 
that a thorough conceptualisation of legitimacy required the inclusion of what constitutes 
power-holders’ ‘recognition of the right to govern’, rather than simply ‘audience 
compliance’. The latter had been the focus of much existing research. They therefore 
recommended that future research take into account levels of power-holder ‘self-
confidence’ in their ‘right to govern’ as well as audience legitimacy (p. 154). This provides a 
strong basis for the present study’s specific focus upon how lay magistrates perceive their 
decision-making role within the criminal courts. 
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Crucially, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012: 129) stressed that existing work had failed to 
sufficiently recognise the ‘dialogic’ – or interactive – nature of legitimacy whereby power-
holders make claims to legitimacy which audiences may accept or reject: 
 
‘Legitimacy should not be viewed as a single transaction; it is more like a perpetual 
discussion, in which the content of power-holders’ later claims will be affected by 
the nature of the audience response.’  
 
As a result of this ‘perpetual discussion’, it is asserted that perceptions of legitimacy are 
likely to be dependent upon circumstance. For example, it was argued that the responses of 
those subject to de facto authority – for example, prisoners for whom the imbalance of 
power between themselves and those in power is large – may be one of ‘dull compulsion’: ‘I 
have to do this’ (p. 165). Bottoms and Tankebe concluded that there is a need to be able to 
empirically disentangle ‘dull compulsion’ from ‘true legitimacy’.  Jacobson et al. (2015) 
made some progress with this with respect to their research on public perceptions of 
legitimacy in the criminal courts. They found that defendants’ participation in the Crown 
Court was often one of ‘passive acceptance’.  This represents a weak form of legitimacy but 
one which is stronger than ‘dull compulsion’ – ‘it is the conception that the court system is 
as it is because this is how it has to be, even if there is no clearly or explicitly normative 
aspect to this belief’ (p. 167). The present study aimed to go further in the quest to 
disentangle ‘true legitimacy’ from ‘dull compulsion’, or ‘weak legitimacy’, by examining the 
detail of how lay participants engaged with the court process. The ethnographic nature of 
the study provided a strong foundation for this because it enabled dialogic legitimacy to be 
examined in the direct context in which interactions occurred. 
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This is, arguably, of value because legitimacy theorists have also been criticised for the 
extent of their reliance upon quantitative methods (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Harkin, 
2015; Skinns et al. 2017).  As noted above, the vast majority of studies that have generated 
existing models of legitimacy have done so through the use of large-scale quantitative 
surveys (see, for example, Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Jackson et al. 2012; Hough et al. 2013; 
Tankebe et al. 2013). The reliance on such methods has generated ‘thin’ accounts of 
legitimacy that fail to take into account the context and intricacies of interactions between 
power-holders and audiences (Harkin, 2015: 604; Skinns et al. 2017). Moreover, existing 
studies have tended to focus upon predictive accounts of future behaviour – for example 
the extent to which an individual is likely to comply with the law or cooperate with 
authorities in the future, rather than on the responses of individuals in the present – with 
members of the public who are often not in direct contact with criminal justice agencies 
(Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Harkin, 2015; Skinns et al.2017). This has led to calls for 
research to be conducted using other methods, such as longitudinal surveys (Bottoms and 
Tankebe, 2012) or ‘thicker’ qualitative methods including depth interviewing (Skinns et al, 
2017) and ethnography (Harkin, 2015: 604). The use of qualitative methods in this study 
may bridge some of the methodological gaps that exist in the study of legitimacy. 
 
Overall, this study has the potential to significantly contribute to existing research on the 
topic of legitimacy. It involved conducting research on empirical legitimacy in both an 
under-researched terrain (the criminal courts) and through the adoption of an under-
utilised methodological approach (ethnography). The use of such an approach meant that, 
in addition to generating understanding on perceptions of legitimacy with respect to a 
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specific aspect of the court process – that is, the role occupied by lay adjudicators – data 
was also generated on court users’ direct experience of the court process. This helps to 
build upon discussion of the dialogic nature of legitimacy and is something which, as 
highlighted above, is less visible in existing research on legitimacy. Moreover, as well as 
furthering understanding on court users’ perceptions of legitimacy (audience legitimacy), 
conducting interviews with lay magistrates provided unique insight into power-holder 
perceptions of legitimacy; namely from the perspective of power-holders undertaking 
voluntary judicial positions.   
 
 
2.2 The role of lay participants within the criminal courts 
 
As outlined above, existing theorisations have stressed that perceptions of legitimacy are 
based upon context and circumstance (Fagan, 2008; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Loader 
and Sparks, 2013; Skinns et al. 2017). This provides a basis for assessing perceptions of 
legitimacy by examining levels of engagement among those who come into direct contact 
with the criminal courts; that is, lay participants.  In line with this, it is necessary to explore 
in more detail the existing literature regarding the roles of lay participants in the criminal 
courts. This section begins by examining the literature which has focused upon the roles of 
complainants, prosecution witnesses and defendants in proceedings; close attention is paid 
to the areas of commonality between the roles of different groups of court users. The 
second part of this section focuses upon the roles of lay adjudicators in criminal proceedings 
in order to provide context to the study’s focus upon court users’ understanding and 
perceptions of juries and magistrates. The origins of the jury system and lay magistracy are 
outlined, as is the limited amount of empirical research that has been conducted on the 
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topic of lay adjudication. Particular attention is paid to literature surrounding theoretical 
justifications, and associated criticisms, of the use of lay adjudicators.    
 
2.2.1 Court users: complainants, prosecution witnesses and defendants 
 
 
It is generally agreed that the onset of the adversarial system in the eighteenth century 
contributed to the vastly reduced role played by court users in criminal proceedings. This is 
because developments, such as the introduction of a system of public prosecutions and the 
introduction of legislation that afforded defendants the right to counsel, afforded enhanced 
positions to the judiciary and criminal advocates (Landsman,1990; Langbein, 2003; Rock, 
2004; Hostettler, 2006; cf. Kirby, 2017a). In line with this, research findings suggest that the 
nature of the adversarial system is such that court users – complainants, prosecution 
witnesses and defendants alike – despite being likely to have a great deal at stake within 
criminal proceedings (cf. Benesh and Howell, 2001), occupy a marginal role within the court 
process (see, for example, Carlen, 1976; Shapland and Hall, 2010; Jacobson et al. 2015).  
 
Complainants and prosecution witnesses 
A discussion of the roles of ‘complainants’ and ‘prosecution witnesses’ necessitates that 
brief attention be drawn to the longstanding and widespread debate by politicians, policy-
makers, practitioners and academics about the role of ‘the victim’ in the criminal justice 
system (see Maltravers, 2010; Fairclough and Jones, 2018; Rock, 2004; Doak, 2008; 
Shapland and Hall, 2010). This includes the presence of arguments about the choice of the 
most appropriate term to use to describe an individual who alleges that a crime has been 
committed against them. 
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Legal scholars – and courtroom practitioners – tend to refrain from using the term ‘victim’ 
to describe those alleging criminal wrong-doing, in preference to the term ‘complainant’, 
until there has been a finding of guilt (see Padfield, 2015; Fairclough and Jones, 2018). 
Meanwhile, criminologists and sociologists, such as Shapland and Hall (2010) have argued 
that by not using the term ‘victim’, the individual alleging wrongdoing is ‘reincarnated as a 
witness’ (p. 166) in the court process only to subsequently be required to ‘change identity’ 
(p. 176) in the event that an alleged offence is proven. This is argued to contribute to the 
failure of the justice system to recognise victims who attend court but are not required to 
give evidence; such as those who opt to observe proceedings from the public gallery 
(Shapland and Hall, 2010).19   
 
Nevertheless, the terms ‘complainant’ and ‘prosecution witness’, specifically, have been 
adopted for this study.20 This is not done with the intention of denying such individuals 
‘victim’ status but to enable the specific examination of their experience through the lens in 
which they are brought into the court process; that is, as a ‘complainant’. It is also because 
this study included a focus upon individuals who gave evidence as witnesses but who were 
not the direct ‘victim’ of the alleged offence; namely other kinds of ‘prosecution witnesses’.  
 
Moving on from a discussion of terminology to one pertaining to the broader nature of the 
role occupied by complainants and prosecution witnesses, there has been much critical 
                                                     
19
 This is perhaps a pertinent time to note that it is widely accepted – as successive sweeps of the Crime Survey 
for England and Wales illustrate – that many instances of victimisation are not reported to the police and an 
even smaller proportion of victimisation is brought before the courts (see Maguire and McVie, 2017; ONS, 
2017a). 
20
 It was decided at the outset of this study that, unfortunately, defence witnesses would not be included in 
the sample. This was due to perceived difficulties surrounding the identification of defence witnesses (cf. 
Jacobson et al. 2015). This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6. 
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commentary surrounding constraints placed upon the participation of complainants and 
prosecution witnesses within the court process. Much has been written about the 
difficulties that individuals face when giving evidence. This includes – but is not limited to – 
the formal, unknown and often antiquated physical environment and language of the 
courtroom (Rock, 1993; Shapland and Hall, 2010; Jacobson et al. 2015); being required to 
recount very personal, intimate or distressing matters in an open court environment 
(Shapland and Hall, 2010; Jacobson et al. 2015); the impact of ‘belittling’ or ‘aggressive’ 
cross-examination techniques (Kirby, 2017a: 960; see also, Rock, 1993; Doak, 2008); and not 
being given the chance to provide a narrative account of the incident, or ‘tell their story’, 
when giving evidence (Rock, 1993; Fielding, 2006; Doak, 2008; Shapland and Hall, 2010; 
Jacobson et al. 2015).  
 
Many of these issues arise because complainants and prosecution witnesses in the 
jurisdiction of England and Wales lack decision-making powers and thus their role in 
criminal proceedings is limited to that of ‘information-provider’ (Edwards, 2004). Such 
issues have led to arguments that the court process engenders feelings of ‘secondary 
victimisation’ among complainants and prosecution witnesses (see, for example, Doak, 
2008; Fairclough and Jones, 2018). Moreover, because the State assumes the responsibility 
of prosecuting the case, it has been argued that crimes are effectively ‘stolen’ from 
individual victims (Christie, 1977). This means that complainants and prosecution witnesses 
are not afforded certain ‘rights’,21 such as access to legal representation (see, Rock, 2004; 
Spencer, 2010).  
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 See Doak (2008) for an in-depth account of the framing of victims’ ‘rights’ within politics and practice. 
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As a result of widespread concerns surrounding the ‘bit-part’ (Shapland and Hall, 2010) role 
of complainants and prosecution witnesses in criminal proceedings, the last forty years has 
witnessed a ‘sea-change’ (Rook, 2015) in reforms aimed to improve complainants’ and 
prosecution witnesses’ experience of the court process; particularly for those who are 
regarded as vulnerable. Exhaustive lists of the available provision are provided elsewhere,22 
however, in order to provide context as to the nature of the roles of complainants and 
prosecution witnesses, the main reforms can be summarised as follows. Pivotal legislative 
reform aimed at enhancing the engagement of complainants and prosecution witnesses 
came in the form of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. This enabled 
complainants who were regarded as ‘vulnerable’ (Section 16) or ‘intimidated’ (Section 17) to 
apply to the court to give evidence through the use of special measures. This includes: pre-
recorded evidence in chief; giving evidence via live-link outside the courtroom; giving 
evidence from behind a screen and, for those with communication needs, the use of 
communication aids and giving evidence with the assistance of a registered intermediary. In 
addition to this is the as yet unimplemented provision of giving pre-recorded cross-
examination (Section 28), which has recently been piloted (Baverstock, 2016). Other 
reforms have included: the introduction of Victim Personal Statements in 2001, which 
enable the victim to express their views about how a crime has affected them by providing a 
statement that is read by the decision-maker at the point sentencing;23 the roll-out of the 
Witness Service in 1994 which provides separate waiting areas and support and information 
to witnesses while they are waiting to give evidence; and the (revised) Code of Practice for 
Victims of Crime (Ministry of Justice, 2015) which sets out victims’ entitlements within the 
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 Recent examples include Jacobson and Harlow (2017); Fairclough and Jones (2018). 
23
 For more detail see, Ministry of Justice, (2013a); Roberts and Manikis (2011). 
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criminal justice process. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that many of the above reforms 
afforded to complainants and prosecution witnesses pertain to ‘service rights’, such as the 
provision of support, without altering the ‘fundamental facets of the criminal justice system’ 
(Doak, 2008: 16) or affording any kind of substantive decision-making role to complainants 
and prosecution witnesses (Edwards, 2004; Jacobson et al. 2015).  
 
Finally, it is necessary to consider arguments which have suggested that enhancing the 
provisions available to complainants and prosecution witnesses may come at the expense of 
the due process rights of defendants (or vice versa) in what has been described as a ‘zero-
sum game’ (see, for example, Doak, 2008; Tonry, 2010; Hoyano, 2015). These debates are 
set in the context of the politicised nature of crime control, which has included calls from 
politicians to ‘rebalance the criminal justice system in favour of the victim’.24 However, it 
appears that such concerns may have been ‘exaggerated’ because it has been argued that 
better provisions for one group can be beneficial to all (Doak, 2008: 247); that is, ‘win-win’ 
to both parties (Fairclough and Jones, 2018: 212). This is perhaps particularly so in view of 
the assertion that complainants and defendants often ‘share mutual concerns’ (Doak, 2008: 
248) and arguments pertaining to fallacy of dichotomising ‘victims’ and ‘offenders’ into 
opposing groups due to the overlapping nature of offending and victimisation (Bottoms and 
Costello, 2010; Tonry, 2010).   
 
Defendants 
 
With regard to the role occupied by defendants in criminal courts, it is generally agreed by 
legal scholars (such as, Duff et al. 2007; Owusu-Bempah, 2017) and criminologists (such as, 
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 A number of statements of this nature were made by the New Labour administration. For a full discussion of 
this see Tonry (2010) and Doak (2008).  
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Carlen, 1976; McBarnet, 1981; Jacobson et al. 2015) alike that defendants occupy a marginal 
role in proceedings. This has particular implications with regard to their level of engagement 
in the court process. 
 
Though defendants are usually present throughout the entirety of proceedings against 
them, be it in person or via video-link, it is argued that defendants are effectively ‘incidental’ 
to proceedings (Jacobson et al. 2015: 92) or the ‘seen but not heard’ (Carlen, 1976: 86) 
participant. The formality and ritual of the courtroom environment, including the complex 
and antiquated language used, are commonly cited reasons for a defendant’s 
‘marginalisation’ or ‘powerlessness’ within proceedings (see, for example, Carlen, 1976; 
Rock, 1993; Jacobson et al. 2015). Moreover, it has been argued that the use of the dock, 
particularly a secure glass dock, contributes to a defendant’s ‘captive state’ (Carlen, 1976: 
21) and prevents the individual from being able to adequately hear proceedings or to be 
able to properly communicate with their advocate (Carlen, 1976; Mulcahy, 2011; Mulcahy, 
2013).  
 
Nevertheless, defendants are regarded by some as being the bearers of enhanced ‘rights’ 
within the criminal justice system in comparison to complainants and prosecution witnesses 
(cf. Doak, 2008). For example, defendants are afforded access to legal representation and 
their right to ‘effective participation’ is formally recognised under the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the case law that supports it (Jacobson with Talbot, 2009; Owusu-
Bempah, 2018). However, both of these issues have been subject to debate within the 
academic community. 
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Owusu-Bempah (2018) recently argued that the parameters of ‘effective participation’ for 
defendants are ‘uncertain’. In seeking to address this uncertainty, she drew upon on the 
relevant case law,25 in order to assert that effective participation for defendants requires: 
 
‘A right to a “broad understanding” of the proceedings and a comprehension of the 
“general thrust” of what is said in court … It also includes some specific 
requirements, such as: an understanding of the significance of any penalty which 
may be imposed; an ability to understand what is said by prosecution witnesses; and 
an ability to instruct one’s lawyers.’  
 
Furthermore, the role of legal representation and the extent to which it can enhance or 
stymie a defendant’s participation within the court process has been subject to scrutiny. An 
absence of legal representation, it is argued, contributes towards a defendant’s ‘dummy 
player’ role in criminal proceedings (Carlen, 1976: 69; Baldwin and McConville, 1977; 
McBarnet, 1981).26 The implications arising from a lack of legal representation has returned 
to prominence in recent years as a result of legal aid reforms (Ministry of Justice, 2013b). 
Research by Gibbs (2016) found that unrepresented defendants had a limited 
understanding of rules of evidence and struggled to conduct cross-examination. However, 
legal representation is not necessarily perceived to enhance the role of defendants in 
criminal proceedings. Baldwin and McConville (1977), for example, found that defendants 
often struggled to make their views effectively heard via their legal representative and could 
                                                     
25
 Namely, the judgement in SC v UK20 (2005) 40 EHRR 10.   
26
 This is in contrast to the civil arena, in which Adler (2008) found that the representation ‘premium’, that is, 
the instances in which the applicant or appellant received a better outcome because they were represented, 
accounted for only 5 per cent of cases under study.  
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feel under pressure from their advocate to enter a guilty plea (see also, McConville, 
Hodgson, Bridges and Pavlovic, 1994).  
 
Some of these arguments are set in discussions about whether or not to place more 
emphasis on the participation of the individual defendant or the participation of the 
defence as a party (Duff et al. 2007; Owusu-Bempah, 2018) and are connected to broader 
debates about the extent to which individual defendants should in fact participate in the 
court process. For example, Duff et al. (2007) argued that trials should be ‘participatory’ in 
nature and thus advocated a ‘communicative’ role for defendants in criminal proceedings. 
However, Owusu-Bempah (2017: 2) asserted that ‘it is wrong for defendants to actively 
participate in proceedings against themselves’. This is because ‘obligating’ defendants to 
participate in proceedings circumvents the normative function of the criminal justice 
process, which is to call the State to account for its allegation against the defendant. The 
overriding consensus, nevertheless, appears to be in favour of ensuring that a defendant’s 
participation in proceedings takes place on a voluntary rather than an obligatory basis (Duff 
et al. 2007; Owusu-Bempah, 2017).27  
 
Finally, recent debate has focused upon the quality of provision available to defendants; 
particularly those who are regarded as vulnerable.28 The Criminal Practice Direction 2015 
outlines a number of provisions available for defendants including: the removal of wigs and 
gowns by legal professionals; the use of clear and understandable language; allowing for 
regular breaks in proceedings; and allowing defendants to be seated with a supporter and in 
                                                     
27
 This is not to be confused with a defendant’s presence in proceedings, either in the form of physical 
presence in the courtroom or remotely via video-link, which in the vast majority of instances is obligatory. 
28
 See, for example, Cooper and Norton’s (2017) edited collection on vulnerability in the criminal justice 
system.  
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a position that facilitates communication with their legal representative. In addition to this, 
vulnerable defendants are entitled to apply to give evidence via live-link under the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. However, there has been critical commentary 
surrounding the limited availability of provision for vulnerable defendants in practice. 
Fairclough (2017) found the provision for vulnerable defendants to give evidence via live-
link is seldom used; meanwhile, Hoyano and Rafferty (2017) provided a detailed critique of a 
recent amendment to the Criminal Practice Direction (2016) which states the use of 
intermediaries for defendants with communication difficulties should only be used on ‘rare’ 
occasions. Particular attention has been drawn to the perceived lack of parity in provision 
for vulnerable defendants in comparison to vulnerable prosecution witnesses with regard to 
special provisions (Hoyano and Rafferty, 2017; Fairclough, 2018; Fairclough and Jones, 
2018).  
 
Common themes in existing research with court users 
 
The discussion in the pages above suggests that there are a number of commonalities in the 
roles occupied by complainants, prosecution witnesses and defendants within criminal 
proceedings. This includes those about the extent to which court users can, should and do 
participate in the court process. This is perhaps best encapsulated in persistent findings that 
court users, be it complainants, witnesses or defendants, experience significant degrees of 
marginalisation or powerlessness within the court process. Existing studies have often used 
the ‘court as theatre’ analogy to describe the ‘them and us’ roles occupied by court users 
and legal professionals in the court process (Jacobson et al. 2015). In such discussions it has 
been argued that courtroom professionals – namely the judiciary and advocates – take on 
‘starring roles’ in proceedings while witnesses take on ‘walk-on’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 92) or 
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‘bit player’ (Shapland and Hall, 2010: 163) parts and defendants assume the position of 
‘ever-present-extra’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 83). In a similar vein, court users have been 
described as the ‘outsiders’ of the court process, in comparison to legal professionals, court 
staff and judges who occupy ‘insider’ status (Rock, 1993).  
 
The apparent marginalisation of court users in proceedings provides a strong rationale for a 
study generating understanding on the extent to which the courts are perceived as 
legitimate. This is because it enables perceptions of legitimacy to be examined among those 
who arguably have most at stake yet least power in the process (Benesh and Howell, 2001). 
The extent to which both types of criminal court – Crown and magistrates’ court alike – are 
perceived as legitimate among court users has scarcely been a feature of existing research; 
with the magistrates’ courts being particularly under-researched. Neither has existing 
research included an explicit, or empirical, focus upon court users’ levels of engagement in 
the court process or their levels of understanding and perceptions of lay adjudication. These 
are gaps which this study sought to fill. 
 
Moreover, this research is arguably of value at a time in which the very nature of a court 
user’s role within the process is arguably at a point of transition. The various special 
provisions afforded to court users, which have a bearing upon how court users engage in 
proceedings, have been discussed above. In addition to this, are a number of policy 
developments – many of which are set in the context of fiscal austerity – which suggest that 
an examination of the ways in which court users engage in proceedings is timely from a 
policy perspective. These include widespread court closures (Ministry of Justice 2016b; 
2018a); technological reforms that are likely to impact upon the extent to which court users 
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are required to be physically present during proceedings (Ministry of Justice, 2018a); 
changes to legal aid provision (see Ministry of Justice, 2013b); and efforts to achieve ‘swift 
and sure’ justice by reducing delay and ensuring that cases are handled in an efficient 
manner (Ministry of Justice, 2012; Leveson, 2015).  
 
2.2.2 Lay adjudicators: juries and magistrates 
 
Moving on from a discussion of court users, this section focuses upon the roles of lay 
adjudicators in criminal proceedings. This includes a consideration of the origins of lay 
adjudication, the specific roles of juries and magistrates and empirical research carried out 
on the subject of lay adjudication. Moreover, due to the specific aim of examining how the 
lay adjudicatory role is perceived by court users, substantial attention is devoted to the 
literature which has sought to evaluate the roles of lay adjudicators in criminal proceedings.  
This discussion sets the premise for examining court users’ levels of understanding and 
perceptions of lay adjudication and highlights the sizable gap in knowledge surrounding the 
perceived legitimacy of lay adjudicators among court users. 
 
Origins of lay adjudication 
 
Generally speaking, there are three types of adjudicatory approach in criminal justice 
systems across the world: professional (involving judges), lay (involving members of the 
public) and hybrid (involving judges and members of the public) (Doran and Glen, 2000). The 
criminal justice system of England and Wales is unusual because it relies heavily on lay 
adjudication in the administration of justice (Morgan and Russell, 2000; Lloyd-Bostock and 
Thomas, 2000; Darbyshire, 2014; Ward, 2017). Within this jurisdiction lay adjudication takes 
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the form of lay magistrates in the magistrates’ courts and juries in the Crown Court. Other 
jurisdictions involve lay adjudicators in a variety of ways. For example, other common law 
jurisdictions, such as the United States, rely heavily on the use of juries in trials (Ma, 1998; 
Morgan and Russell, 2000). On the other hand, civil jurisdictions, including European 
countries such as Germany, France and Sweden involve lay adjudicator’s – or ‘lay assessors’ 
– sitting with professional judges to make decisions upon the outcome of cases (Ma, 1998; 
Morgan and Russell, 2000; Voight, 2009).  
 
The use of lay adjudicators in the administration of justice in England and Wales has a long 
history. The signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 provided the formal basis for a trial by jury 
(Blake, 1988: Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, 2000).29  There is some ambiguity with regard to 
the origins of the magistracy; however scholars such as Milton (1967) and Darbyshire (2014) 
agree that though the appointment of ‘keepers of the peace’ originated in the late twelfth 
century, magistrates (formerly Justices of the Peace) first became formally recognised in the 
Justice of the Peace Act of 1361. 
 
There are two levels of criminal court in England and Wales; the Crown Court and the 
magistrates’ court.  The large majority (more than 90 per cent) of cases begin and end in the 
magistrates’ court (Ministry of Justice, 2016a). Within the magistrates’ court cases are 
decided upon either by magistrates sitting in panels of two to three or a district judge 
(formerly known as a stipendiary magistrate) sitting alone. Over ninety per cent of 
magistrates’ court cases are heard by magistrates (Morgan and Russell, 2000).30 At present 
there are approximately 15,003 magistrates in England and Wales, 140 District Judges and 
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 It should be noted that some scholars have questioned the assertion that the Magna Carta specifically 
stipulated that jury trials are a necessary feature of the trial process (see Darbyshire, 1991). 
30
 Unfortunately, more recent figures are not available. 
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92 Deputy District Judges (Judicial Office, 2018). Magistrates are unpaid members of the 
public who receive training to sit in court; they carry out the role on a voluntary basis and 
undertake regular training to sit in court. In contested cases that fall within their 
jurisdiction, magistrates are required to make decisions upon ‘the facts’ of the case; that is, 
it is their duty to make a decision about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If a 
defendant pleads, or is found, guilty, magistrates are required to make decisions about what 
sentence should be imposed if the case falls within their jurisdiction. Magistrates are 
required to carry out 26 half-day sittings per year and are assisted by a legal adviser.31   
 
In Crown Court trials 12 jurors are selected to hear the case. In contrast to magistrates, 
jurors are required to be ‘triers of fact’ only; they make decisions as to the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant but have no input to sentencing decisions. Jurors are members 
of the public who have been selected at random from the electoral register. Anyone on the 
electoral register who is between 18 and 75 is liable for jury service;32 however, some 
people are disqualified from serving on a jury, including those who have recently been to 
prison or served a community sentence.33 In 2017, 179, 600 people ‘were supplied to the 
court’ for jury service. Unfortunately, data is not available as to the total number of jurors 
who went on to serve on a case; however the juror utilisation rate for 2017 was 69 per cent 
(Ministry of Justice, 2018b).34  
 
                                                     
31
 See Morgan and Russell (2000) and Roberts et al (2012) for more detail. 
32
 The upper age limit was raised from 70 to 75 on 1
st
 December 2016. See: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/jury-age-limit-to-be-raised-to-75-in-england-and-wales [accessed 
26.09.18]. 
33
 For more detail, see HMCTS (2017). 
34
 The juror utilisation rate is the number of sitting days divided by the sum of sitting, non-sitting and non-
attendance days. 
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Theoretical justifications for, and associated criticism of, lay decision-making 
Moving on from the origins of lay adjudication, a review of the literature surrounding the 
proposed benefits to, and associated criticism of, the role provides a basis for examining 
perceptions of lay adjudication among court users. There are a number of justifications for 
the use of juries and magistrates within the criminal justice system. The main rationale is 
the democratic function of lay adjudication. Lay adjudication can be regarded as a form of 
‘participatory democracy’, which means that active engagement of citizens is required in 
order for a jurisdiction to be regarded as fully democratic (Pateman, 1970; Morgan and 
Russell 2000). Lay adjudication allows members of the public to participate in the 
governance of society (Mazzone, 2006) and to influence the way in which they are governed 
(Redmayne, 2006). The jury system has been regarded as ‘the most powerful means of 
ensuring that the people rules’ [sic] (Tocqueville, 1895: 127). Moreover, it is asserted that 
allowing members of the community to have an adjudicatory role in the criminal process 
confers normative legitimacy onto the criminal justice system (Diamond, 1990; Morgan and 
Russell, 2000; Crawford, 2004; Mazzone, 2006). This is because lay people can be regarded 
to be more responsive to ‘community norms’ than the government or members of the 
professional judiciary (Diamond, 1990; see also MacCoun and Tyler, 1988). However, little 
has, as yet, been done to examine the empirical legitimacy of lay adjudication; that is, the 
extent to which lay adjudicators are perceived to occupy a legitimate authority among the 
audiences that they serve. This is something which this research aimed to address. 
 
A further stated benefit of the participatory democracy element of lay adjudication is that it 
offers a means by which defendants can receive ‘judgement by peers’ (Morgan and Russell, 
2000; Crawford and Newburn, 2002; Crawford, 2004; Mazzone, 2006). Lay adjudication – 
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particularly in the form of juries – allows defendants to be tried by a cross-section of society 
(Sanders, 2002; Redmayne, 2006). Meanwhile, the magistracy, though less socially 
representative than juries, can act as a ‘democratic bridge’ between the community and the 
courts (Sanders, 2002: 326-327). In addition, magistrates and juries are likely to be less 
jaded or ‘case-hardened’ than professional judges (Morgan and Russell, 2000; Sanders, 
2002; Ipsos MORI, 2011). Instead, lay adjudicators offer a community perspective on justice 
and are likely to provide local justice, borne out of an understanding of concerns impacting 
upon the local areas in which they serve (Morgan and Russell, 2000; Vidmar, 2000).  
 
The panel element of lay adjudication is regarded as beneficial due to the perception that 
‘fact-finding’ is enhanced by the use of a panel of adjudicators deliberating together, rather 
than an individual sitting alone (Sanders, 2002; Mazzone, 2006; Redmayne, 2006). Several 
commentators noted the value that lay adjudication can bring to promoting a sense of 
citizenship among members of the public who act as jurors or magistrates (Redmayne, 
2006; Gastil, Deess, Weiser et al. 2008). The educative role of sitting on a jury or a 
magistrates’ bench is also regarded as a benefit of lay adjudication (Tocqueville, 1895; 
Blake, 1988; Diamond, 1990; Redmayne, 2006; Gastil et al. 2008). 
 
At a broader level, the use of lay adjudicators is thought to serve as a ‘check’ on government 
which may help to guard against oppressive policies and practices (Blake, 1988; Diamond, 
1990; Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, 2000; Vidmar, 2000; Crawford, 2004; Mazzone, 2006; 
Redmayne, 2006). This is connected to the argument that lay adjudicators provide a means 
by which community standards can be brought into the decision-making process (Morgan 
and Russell, 2000; Sanders, 2002; Vidmar, 2000; Redmayne, 2006). For example, ‘jury 
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nullification’ – whereby jurors choose not to apply the law in cases where it is perceived 
that a defendant’s interests are not being protected by the State – has been suggested as a 
way in which lay adjudicators express disquiet about certain laws (Redmayne, 2006). For 
Llyod-Bostock and Thomas (2000: 88), jury nullification is a vital aspect of the democratic 
function of the jury because it gives juries the right to act ‘according to conscience’.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the various benefits of lay adjudication in the administration of 
justice, the use of juries and magistrates has attracted criticism on a number of grounds. 
Some commentators have questioned the extent to which many of the perceived benefits of 
lay adjudication are visible in practice (Diamond, 1990; Hörnle, 2006). The fact-finding ability 
of lay participants has been subject to intense scrutiny. Jurors’ capacity to understand the 
law in complex cases has been questioned (Ma, 1998; Auld, 2001; Findlay, 2001; Lloyd-
Bostock and Thomas, 2000; Redmayne, 2006), as has the ability of magistrates to interpret 
and apply the law (Morgan and Russell, 2000). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
magistrates may defer to ‘court and judicial cultures’ (Morgan and Russell, 2000: 7); in 
particular, it has been suggested that they may be more willing than jurors to accept 
prosecution or police accounts (Vennard, 1981; Darbyshire, 1997; Morgan and Russell, 
2000; Sanders, 2002).  
 
The argument that lay adjudication contributes to the maintenance of a democratic state 
has also been challenged (Sanders, 2002; Hörnle, 2006; Redmayne, 2006; Gibbs, 2014a). 
This is associated with a recurrent critique that lay adjudicators are not, in composition, 
representative of the general population. Lay magistrates are unrepresentative of the 
general population in terms of age, ethnicity and socio-economic status (Darbyshire, 1997; 
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Dignan and Wynne, 1997; Morgan and Russell, 2000; Sanders, 2002; Gibbs 2014a). Judicial 
Office (2018) statistics show that magistrates are fairly evenly balanced in terms of gender 
(55 per cent are female); however, comparing judicial diversity statistics with data from the 
2011 census (Office for National Statistics, 2012) shows that magistrates are more likely 
than the general population to come from white ethnic backgrounds and are also more 
likely to be older than the general population (Judicial Office, 2018). Moreover, existing 
research suggests that magistrates are more likely than the general population to come 
from middle class backgrounds (Dignan and Wynne, 1997; Darbyshire, 1997; Morgan and 
Russell, 2000; Gibbs, 2014a).  
 
The representativeness of juries has been subject to fierce debate (see Darbyshire and 
Thomas, 2008). Darbyshire (2001) argued that juries are insufficiently representative of 
women, ethnic minorities and some occupational groups; whereas Thomas with Balmer 
(2007) found that women were adequately represented among serving jurors and that in 
most courts there was no significant difference between the proportion of serving jurors 
from ethnic minority backgrounds and the proportion of members of the local population 
from ethnic minority backgrounds. However, the highest rates of jury service were among 
those from middle to high-incomes (Thomas with Balmer, 2007). Meanwhile, the ‘random’ 
nature of jury selection has been questioned. In the United States, debates about this have 
tended to centre on the impact that the use of the ‘preemptory challenge’ – whereby 
advocates from the prosecution or defence can challenge the selection of individual jurors 
without having to provide a reason –  can have on the composition of the jury bench 
(Sommers and Norton, 2008; Flanagan, 2015). This is less of a concern in England and Wales 
because the defence right to challenge jurors ‘without cause’ was abolished under section 
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118 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the prosecution are instructed to exercise this right 
‘sparingly and in exceptional circumstances’ (Attorney General’s Office, 2012).  
 
These debates are set in the context of reports of an overall decline in use of both juries and 
magistrates (Ma, 1998; Vidmar, 2000; Crawford, 2004; Mazzone, 2006). There are a number 
of ways in which restrictions have been imposed on the use of juries in England and Wales, 
including widening the remit of cases dealt with by the magistrates’ courts (Blake, 1988; 
Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, 2000) and extending the remit of instances in which jurors may 
be disqualified from service (Blake, 1988). Ma (1998: 91) pointed to the use of hybrid panels 
in European countries and jury reforms in England and Wales in her assertion that 
 
‘The twentieth century has marked a general decline of the impact of lay 
participation on the world scene. There seems to be a shared scepticism about the 
significance and the effectiveness of lay participation in criminal matters. The all-lay 
jury, with the exception of a few countries, has all but disappeared outside the 
common law world.'35  
 
From a policy perspective, the onset of the twenty-first century saw Lord Justice Auld 
recommend that defendants be given the choice to opt for a trial by a judge sitting alone in 
indictable cases and, due to concerns about juror levels of understanding such as those 
outlined above, proposed various limits to jury trials in serious and complex fraud cases 
(Auld, 2001). More recently, the Leveson Review (2015: 87) included an out of scope 
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 However, this does not perhaps present the full picture. Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas (2000: 54 & 91) argued 
that while the use of juries in England and Wales is ‘shrinking’, this is not the case in some other jurisdictions 
such as Russia, where the jury system has recently been implemented or Spain where the use of juries has 
been ‘revived’.  
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observation to remove the right of a defendant to elect a jury trial on the basis that, ‘a court 
not a defendant … should decide how he is tried’.  
 
Empirical indicators of reduced democratic participation are evident in the declining number 
of lay magistrates. The number of serving magistrates was relatively stable in the twenty-
year period from 1990 to 2010 when the total stood at around 30,000 (Ministry of Justice, 
2008; Judicial Office 2011).  However, since the turn of the decade the number of serving 
magistrates has fallen sharply by just under fifty per cent, from 29,270 in April 2010 to 
15,003 in April 2018 (Judicial Office, 2011; Judicial Office, 2018).  The fall in the number of 
serving magistrates coincides with government calls to relieve the magistracy of ‘high-
volume, low-level “regulatory” cases’ (Ministry of Justice, 2013c: 38) and the 
aforementioned court closures (Ministry of Justice, 2016b, 2018a). The Judicial Office 
(2018:13) cited the reason for the fall in the number of magistrates as ‘a consequence of 
falling workload in the magistrates’ courts due to increased use of out of court disposals and 
downturn in recruitment, combined with relatively consistent annual levels of resignations 
and retirements’. The substantial reduction of the number of serving magistrates, in a 
period of less than a decade, points to the value of conducting interviews with lay 
magistrates in order to generate understanding about how they perceive and make sense of 
their role within the justice system.  
 
Overall, this brief summary of the theoretical debates surrounding the use of lay 
adjudicators has highlighted the perceived benefits that lay adjudicators bring to achieving 
participatory democracy. This is particularly in relation to the educative value of serving as a 
lay adjudicator, the potential for lay adjudication to provide a form of ‘judgement by peers’ 
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and the way in which lay adjudication can bring community norms into decision-making and 
act as a ‘check’ on government. However, much of the criticism surrounding the use of lay 
adjudicators reflects the perceived limits to the theoretical benefits of lay adjudication being 
visible in practice. Specific concern has been drawn to the extent to which lay adjudicators 
are representative of the populations they serve and the degree to which lay decision-
makers are adequately able to carry out the fact-finding nature of their role. In view of this, 
the current research explored the extent to which some of these theoretical benefits, and 
associated criticisms, were visible in the responses of court users and, importantly, the 
impact of this on the degree to which lay adjudicators were perceived to confer legitimacy 
on the criminal courts.  
 
Lay adjudication: empirical research 
  
The above section presented the various theoretical debates surrounding the use of lay 
adjudicators in the criminal courts; however, it is also necessary to explore existing empirical 
research into lay adjudication. A review of the literature indicates the limited volume of 
research conducted on the topic of lay adjudication and provides further impetus for 
conducting this piece of research. Empirical research into the role of juries in this country is 
heavily circumscribed due to restrictions under Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 
1981.36 Despite these restrictions, conducting research with juries is not impossible 
(Darbyshire, 2001; Thomas, 2008) and a small amount of research has been conducted with 
serving jurors. These include Warner and Davis’ (2012) study of juror attitudes to 
sentencing, Matthews, Hancock and Briggs’ (2004) study of jurors’ levels of confidence and 
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 This has led to the development of a substantial body of empirical work, both in this and other common law 
jurisdictions, conducted using mock juries (Ellison and Munro, 2009; Tait, 2011). 
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satisfaction in the jury system and Thomas’ (2010) research into the extent to which 
outcomes in jury decision-making are fairly distributed across different ethnic groups (see 
also, Thomas, 2017a).  
 
Empirical research into the role of magistrates is relatively sparse. Darbyshire (1997) 
vehemently argued that lay magistrates have been ‘neglected’ by many; including 
successive governments, academia and the media. This anomaly is interesting because, as 
highlighted above, over ninety percent of criminal cases are completed in the magistrates’ 
court (Ministry of Justice, 2016a). Existing in-depth studies into the magistracy include 
Carlen’s (1976) study of social control in the magistrates’ courts, Darbyshire’s (1984) study 
of the magistrates’ clerk (a role now occupied by legal advisers) and Morgan and Russell’s 
(2000) study of the judiciary in the magistrates’ court. Studies involving the magistracy have 
tended to focus on local court cultures or upon the use of specific types of penalty (Rumgay, 
1995; Hucklesby, 1997; Duff and Leverick, 2002; Birkett, 2016). Perhaps the most significant 
piece of recent research into the magistracy is Ward’s (2017) ethnography of the nature of 
summary justice in the magistrates’ court in which she argued that magistrates occupy an 
increasingly ‘professionalised’ role within the lower courts.  Existing empirical studies have 
not examined the lay roles of juries and magistrates in tandem, nor have they looked at the 
use of juries and magistrates from the perspective of court users. 
 
Within this discussion, it is necessary to consider existing empirical research on the broader 
topic of public attitudes to lay adjudication. Public support for lay adjudication is 
underpinned by the ‘symbolic’ value of the jury (Darbyshire, 1997; Lloyd-Bostock and 
Thomas, 2000; Roberts and Hough, 2011); however, there has been a lack of academic 
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research into public knowledge of and attitudes towards the jury (Roberts and Hough, 
2011). The limited existing research suggests that the use of juries to ascertain guilt in 
criminal trials is very widely supported by the general public (MacCoun and Tyler, 1988; 
Auld, 2001; Bar Council, 2002; ICM, 2010; Roberts and Hough, 2011); however, the reasons 
for this support are unclear (Roberts and Hough, 2011). The present study provides an 
opportunity to shed light upon the factors that underlie, or conversely inhibit, public 
support for the jury.  
 
In contrast to the symbolic value that is often afforded to the jury – ‘the lamp that shows 
that freedom lives’ (Devlin, 1956) – it has been argued that the role of the magistracy is ‘not 
visible to the public’ (Sanders, 2001: 2). Roberts et al. (2012) specifically noted the absence 
of research into public attitudes towards the magistracy. In recent years some research into 
public knowledge and attitudes towards the lay magistracy has emerged, however such 
studies have found members of the public to be ill-informed about the nature of the role of 
lay magistrates (Morgan and Russell, 2000; Sanders, 2001; Roberts et al. 2012). Despite this, 
studies have shown that when provided with information about the nature of the role, 
members of the public display a good level of support for the magistracy (Morgan and 
Russell, 2000; Roberts et al. 2012).   
 
Overall, the limited amount of research on the topic of public understanding and 
perceptions of juries and magistrates suggests that the public hold generally positive views 
about both forms of lay adjudication. However, there is an absence of research that has 
looked at levels of understanding and perceptions of the two forms of lay adjudication 
together. Furthermore, there is scant research that addresses the understanding and 
53 
 
perceptions of those who come into direct contact with juries and lay magistrates: that is, 
court users.37 It is important to examine court users’ levels of understanding and 
perceptions of lay adjudication, specifically, because perceptions of legitimacy are likely to 
be influenced by direct experience and interaction. As Fagan (2008: 139) explained:  
 
‘legitimacy for most people is the aggregation of their experiences, or the 
experiences of those around them, and the emotions they generate.’  
 
This provides a strong basis for the study’s first aim of examining court users’ perceptions of 
legitimacy regarding the use of lay adjudicators and the second aim of examining the extent 
to which lay participants perceive the criminal courts as occupying legitimate authority, 
more broadly.   
 
 
2.3 Concluding thoughts 
 
This Chapter has situated the current study within the wider literature in order to highlight 
the value of conducting empirical research on the subject of lay participation in the criminal 
courts and forms the basis of the discussion taken forward in later Chapters. Positioning the 
research within the conceptual framework of legitimacy offers a strong rationale for this 
study. This is borne out of the argument that in order for institutions to hold valid power 
they need to be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of those they serve (see, for example, 
Beetham, 1991; Tyler, 2006; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012).  In particular, I have suggested 
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 Notwithstanding Sanders’ (2001) research within which 6-8 serving prisoners participated in focus groups 
about their perceptions of the magistracy. Sanders found that offenders can perceive magistrates to be 
inconsistent in decision-making and lack representativeness in comparison to the wider community. 
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that examining the ways in which lay participants engage in criminal proceedings provides a 
means by which the concept of dialogic legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012) can be 
expanded upon within the under-researched environment of the criminal courts.  
 
Existing research which has highlighted the marginalised status of court users – 
complainants, prosecution witnesses and defendants alike – provides a further basis for this 
research. It is, arguably, essential to examine perceptions of legitimacy among those who 
have most at stake yet least power in the process (Benesh and Howell, 2001) and is 
something which existing research with court users has largely failed to address.38 With 
regard to the specific aspect of the study that sought to examine court users’ levels of 
understanding and perceptions of lay adjudicators, a review of the literature suggests that 
despite the heavy reliance on juries and magistrates in the administration of justice, little is 
known about the public’s understanding and perceptions of juries and magistrates and even 
less is known about this from the point of view of court users. This means that the study 
provides an opportunity to generate knowledge both in relation to perceptions of the use of 
lay adjudication in the administration of justice and court users’ perceptions of legitimacy of 
the overall court process.  Moreover, an examination of how lay magistrates perceive and 
make sense of their role provides a unique opportunity to examine perceptions of 
legitimacy among those who occupy power-holder roles on a voluntary basis. 
 
Finally, this Chapter has highlighted that much of the existing research on the study of 
legitimacy has come in the forms of large-scale quantitative studies. These have been 
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 An exception to this is Jacobson et al. (2015) who examined court users’ perceptions of legitimacy in the 
setting of the Crown Court, only. 
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criticised for giving insufficient attention to the impact of context and circumstance upon 
perceptions of legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Harkin, 2015; Skinns et al. 2015). 
Specific attention was drawn to the fact that such studies have also tended to focus upon 
predictive perceptions of legitimacy among members of the general population who may 
have come into little or no direct contact with authorities.  Conducting an ethnographic 
study of legitimacy within the under-researched terrain of the criminal courts provides 
scope for generating a ‘thick’ (Harkin, 2015) account of the extent to which lay participants 
regard the criminal courts as occupying a legitimate source of authority. A full account of 
the methodological approach adopted by this study is provided in the Chapter that follows.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
 
This Chapter provides a discussion of the methodological approach to this study of lay 
participation in the criminal courts. An ethnographic approach involving in-depth interviews 
with lay participants and observations of court proceedings was selected as the most 
suitable means of addressing both the broad aim of examining lay participation in the 
criminal courts and the specific research questions relating to court users’ levels of 
understanding and perceptions of lay adjudication. The study was based at four courts in 
England and involved interviews with 43 lay participants (including court users, magistrates 
and Witness Service volunteers) and observations of 126 court hearings.  In addition to 
providing a detailed description and evaluation of the methods used, this Chapter also 
describes the process for obtaining access to the research sites, explores the various 
overarching and situated ethical considerations relevant to the study and outlines the 
study’s approach to data analysis.  In line with the qualitative tradition within which this 
study is grounded, and to enhance the reflexivity of the study findings, my own position 
within the research is considered. 
 
3.1 Methodological approach 
 
The overall methodological approach adopted by the study is a multi-sited ethnography (cf. 
Marcus, 1995). This primarily involved carrying out in-depth interviews with 43 lay 
participants and observations of 126 court hearings at four courts in one geographic region 
of England.  
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3.1.1 Multi-sited ethnography 
 
An ethnographic approach, set in the qualitative tradition, was selected as the most suitable 
means for studying lay participation in the criminal courts. There are several reasons for 
this. Firstly, as highlighted in the previous Chapter, there is an absence of existing research 
which focuses on either the specific aim of examining court users’ levels of understanding 
and perceptions of lay adjudication or the broader aim of exploring lay participants’ 
perceptions of legitimacy of the overall court process. The use of an ethnographic approach, 
which involves a degree of immersion in the social setting under study (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995; Jirón, 2011), provides a means by which an in-depth understanding of lay 
participation in the criminal courts can be elicited. Moreover, the use of an ethnographic 
approach acts as a valuable ‘method of discovery’ (Fielding, 2015: 321) for under-
researched terrains such as this and befits the interpretivist epistemology within which the 
study is grounded (Bulmer, 1984; Matthews and Ross, 2010). The ethnographic method is 
particularly well suited to court-based research, as evidenced by the fact that the vast 
majority of in-depth accounts of the court setting have adopted this kind of approach (see 
Bottoms and McLean, 1976; Carlen, 1976; Rock, 1993; Fielding, 2006; Jacobson et al. 2015; 
Ward, 2017). However, it should be stressed that because court-based ethnographies, 
including this one, are based around formal court processes and usually involve researchers 
acting as ‘peripheral members’ (Adler and Adler, 1987) of the setting, they tend to be less 
immersive than traditional sociological and anthropological ethnographies that involve 
extended periods of participant-observation (such as Foster, 1995; Hodkinson, 2002). 
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This study adopted a multi-sited ethnographic approach, which involves examining 
‘associations and connections’ across research sites (Marcus, 1995: 96). Specifically, this 
involved conducting interviews and carrying out observations across four courts in one 
region of England. As lay participation spans both the Crown Court and the magistrates’ 
court jurisdiction, it was deemed necessary to conduct the research in at least two sites in 
order to cover both levels of criminal court. It also seemed pertinent to conduct the 
research in more than one geographic area within the region in order to allow for 
comparisons both between type of court and between areas. The use of a multi-sited 
ethnography was thought to be of particular value because it allows connections and 
associations to be made both within and between the types of lay participation and types of 
court under study. There is some disagreement among methodologists as to whether multi-
sited ethnography offers a new approach to ethnography, or whether it is simply a 
‘buzzword’ that has been applied to the existing study of ethnography (Falzon, 2009: 2). For 
example, the majority of the aforementioned court-based ethnographies involved research 
at multiple court sites. However all of these studies, with the exception of Bottoms and 
McClean (1976), focused on only one type of criminal court, usually the Crown Court. The 
term multi-sited ethnography was therefore adopted for this study because it aptly conveys 
both the immersive nature of the research and its focus on the multiple types of lay 
participant and multiple types of criminal court.  
 
An enduring criticism levelled at multi-sited ethnographies is that they offer ‘diluted’ or 
‘shallow’ forms of traditional bounded ethnographies (Falzon, 2009; Candea, 2009; Coleman 
and Hellermann, 2012; Marcus, 2012). However, the relatively small number of sites under 
study in this research, combined with the amount of time spent in the field, meant that the 
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scope for achieving depth was substantial. This is particularly because conducting research 
across four sites within two geographic locations enriches the analytic potential of the data; 
as does the adoption of a reflexive approach to the collection and analysis of data (cf. 
Marcus, 1995).   
 
This study, like others which are qualitative in nature, is limited because its findings are not 
generalisable to the wider population. However, due to its inductive and exploratory nature, 
the study did not seek to offer a representative account of lay participation in the criminal 
courts; nor do the findings seek to be statistically generalisable to courts or lay participants 
across England and Wales. Nevertheless, the study generated rich qualitative data that 
permitted a deeper understanding of court users’ experiences and perceptions of lay 
participation in the criminal courts (cf. Fielding, 2015) and offers an analytically ‘thick’ 
alternative to the large number of existing studies which have examined the study of 
legitimacy using quantitative methods (Harkin, 2015: 604). 
 
The interpretivist nature of study entails a reliance on the ‘subjective’ views and 
interpretations of a single doctoral ethnographer (cf. Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; 
Fielding, 2015). The development of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) through the 
production of ‘comprehensive’ fieldnotes (Wolfinger, 2002) and verbatim interview 
transcripts is one way in which such concerns, and those relating to the perceived ‘shallow’ 
nature of multi-sited ethnography (cf. Falzon, 2009: 9), were addressed. Another crucial 
method of enhancing the validity of the study findings was through adopting a reflexive 
approach to the design, collection, analysis and presentation of data. Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1995) asserted that it is ‘futile’ to seek to remove the effects of the researcher 
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from a study of this nature; instead the impact of the researcher needs to be identified and 
understood in a reflexive manner. Therefore, in addition to the production of 
‘comprehensive note[s]’ (Woolfinger, 2002) of each day spent in the field and producing 
verbatim transcripts of each interview, I also kept a Research Diary which provided an 
immediate account of emerging thoughts, feelings and analytic observations. This was 
referred back to at various points during the analysis and write-up phases of the study. 
 
As part of this reflexive approach, it is important to acknowledge that this study is situated 
within a social science framework rather than a legal one. This means that the study is 
arguably limited due to my lack of legal expertise (both in terms of theory and practice). 
However, this meant that I was able to occupy the position of ‘outsider’ (cf. Becker, 1963) 
within the social world under study; this is something which is often regarded as valuable in 
this type of research. This is notwithstanding my previous experience, from 2011 onwards, 
of conducting empirical research in the criminal courts in the course of my role as Research 
Fellow at the Institute for Criminal Policy Research (ICPR), which is based at Birkbeck, 
University of London.39 Nevertheless, prior to carrying out the present study, my experience 
of carrying out ethnographic research had largely been confined to the Crown Court.   
 
3.1.2 Selection of research sites and overarching access negotiations 
 
It was decided at the outset that two contrasting areas (hereafter known as Amber City and 
Indigo Town) within a single region of England would be selected for study. 40 Within each 
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 See, for example, Jacobson et al. (2015); Wigzell, Kirby and Jacobson (2015); Kirby (2017a). 
40
 The geographic locations under study, along with the research participants, have been given pseudonyms in 
order to help protect the anonymity of interviewees. 
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area a Crown Court and a magistrates’ court was selected, thus providing a total of four 
research sites. This number of research sites was deemed appropriate because it was 
practically feasible and allowed for comparisons to be drawn between court type and area.  
 
Amber City is a densely populated inner-city urban conurbation. A comparatively high 
proportion of residents in Amber City – above the national average for England and Wales – 
are from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds or White Other 
backgrounds. The mean age of residents in Amber City is lower than that of the national 
mean age, which is 39 years. The unemployment rate is higher than the national average. 
Indigo Town, on the other hand, is a provincial town with a population density that is 
slightly higher than the national average. The percentage of residents from BAME 
backgrounds in Indigo Town is lower than the national average; though the proportion of 
residents from White Other backgrounds above the national average. The mean age of 
residents in Indigo Town is similar to national mean age of residents in England and Wales. 
The unemployment rate for Indigo Town is lower than the national average.41 With respect 
to police recorded crime rates, Amber City has a higher than average crime rate; while 
Indigo Town has a lower than average crime rate (ONS, 2017b).  
 
As the below account illustrates, the approach to access to the four court sites was a 
layered one. At the overarching level, approval was required from Her Majesty’s Courts and 
Tribunals Service (HMCTS) – which is an executive branch of government sponsored by the 
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 This section has been compiled using data from the 2011 Census, which is published by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS). See: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-
reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-286262 [accessed 22.07.16]. 
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Ministry of Justice42 – in order to carry out research in each court. This process involves the 
submission of a Data Access Panel (DAP) application and accompanying proposal for the 
methodological approach.43 HMCTS also requests that potential courts be selected prior to 
the submission of an application. 
 
I therefore began the approach to access negotiation by seeking informal permission from 
the Resident Judge at the Crown Court in each of the selected areas in the view that the 
DAP application would be stronger with the support of members of the judiciary in the 
proposed courts. The resident judges of Amber City and Indigo Town both provided ‘in 
principle’ support for the research on the basis that a successful access application was 
submitted to HMCTS. With regard to the selection of magistrates’ courts, in any given area 
criminal cases that are not resolved within the magistrates’ court jurisdiction are sent or 
committed (depending upon the nature of the case) to the Crown Court from one of the 
magistrates’ courts in the local area (the number of magistrates’ courts in the area generally 
depends upon the size of the local area). The two magistrates’ courts under study were 
selected on the basis that they operated as one of the local courts which sent or committed 
cases to the Crown Court under study. The selection of magistrates’ courts was also 
premised in part upon the fact that none of the courts were facing potential closure under 
the HMCTS court closure programme (Ministry of Justice, 2016b).  
 
Once the potential research sites had been selected, and informal support had been sought, 
the DAP application was submitted to HMCTS. This involved the completion of an 
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 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-courts-and-tribunals-service [accessed 18.07.16]. 
43
 Previous experience of submitting research access applications to government bodies, including HMCTS and 
the Judicial Office, had been gained through my role at ICPR. 
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application form, and the submission of an outline of the proposed methodology, which 
detailed the nature of the study and the intended approach. Access was granted, subject to 
some small adjustments (see below for more detail) to the proposed methodological 
approach, in November 2015. The main portion of fieldwork took place over a 14-month 
period in 2016 and 2017. In addition to this further access requests were made to the 
Judicial Office and Citizens Advice in late 2016 to request permission to interview 
magistrates and Witness Service volunteers, respectively. Both requests were successful and 
interviews were conducted with magistrates and Witness Service volunteers in 2017. In 
addition to securing access from the aforementioned central sources, once the study was 
under way regular communication was also required with a number of local gatekeepers at 
the courts under study such as court staff, Witness Service staff and volunteers, and legal 
professionals. The implications of this layered approach to access negotiation are 
considered, where relevant, as the Chapter progresses.  
 
3.1.3 Interviews with court users 
 
In-depth semi-structured interviews were selected as one of the main methods for 
collecting data on levels of understanding and perceptions of lay participation among court 
users. The use of in-depth interviews is widely recognised as a flexible method for eliciting a 
detailed and nuanced understanding of participants’ views (Arksey and Knight, 1999; 
Bryman, 2012). In-depth interviewing is arguably a particularly valuable method for research 
with court users, who can be regarded as marginalised. This is particularly in relation to their 
ability to adequately express themselves within the court process. For example, existing 
research has identified the constraints faced by victims and witnesses in being able to tell 
their story or have a ‘voice’ during court proceedings (Shapland et al. 1985; Goodey 2005; 
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Fielding, 2006; Jacobson et al. 2015); while the passive – ‘ever-present extra’ or ‘seen but 
not heard’ – role of defendants at court has also been documented (Carlen, 1976; Jacobson 
et al. 2015). (Further detail of the semi-structured format of the interviews is provided on 
pages 70 and 71).  
 
Sampling and recruitment 
The difficulties inherent in recruiting court users for interview have been outlined in 
previous research (see McLeod, Philpin and Sweeting et al., 2010) and may help to explain 
recent commentary about the relative scarcity of academic research in England and Wales 
that involves court users (Shapland and Hall, 2010; Padfield, 2015). The approach adopted 
by this study represents a synthesis of two existing court ethnographies which successfully 
recruited court users for interview: Fielding (2006) and Jacobson et al. (2015).44   
 
Court user participants were recruited purposively (cf. Bryman, 2012) from the pool of court 
users attending each court during the timeframe in which the research was conducted. 
Interviews were conducted with adults (those aged 18 or older) only. Once HMCTS had 
granted permission for the research to proceed, access to prosecution witnesses was 
negotiated via the Witness Service at each of the selected courts. The Witness Service 
operates in all Crown and magistrates’ courts in England and Wales. At the time of writing, 
the organisation was run by Citizens Advice. It provides witnesses with a waiting area 
alongside information and support during their time at court.45 Each Witness Service is 
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 Fielding (2006) recruited court users for interview from the pool of court users coming before the court in 
the period under study; Jacobson et al. (2015) recruited complainants and prosecution witnesses for interview 
via the assistance of the Witness Service.  
45
 See: https://blogs.citizensadvice.org.uk/blog/ten-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-witness-service/ 
[accessed 21.07.16] 
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staffed with a single paid manager and a number of volunteers. Support from Citizens 
Advice was elicited at the outset of the study and they subsequently provided me with 
access to the Witness Service waiting area at each court in order to recruit witnesses for 
interview. Defendants were recruited in court waiting areas upon the completion of their 
hearing. The recruitment of defendants in this manner, unfortunately, restricted the 
recruitment of those on remand and those who received custodial sentences. In addition to 
interviews with court users, the study sought to interview a small number of individuals who 
had attended court to support a family member or friend who was appearing in court. The 
sampling and recruitment of ‘supporters’ was conducted alongside the recruitment of 
witnesses and defendants. 
 
The recruitment process involved me approaching court users in their designated waiting 
area and providing potential participants with an information sheet (and accompanying 
consent form) which outlined the study and explained what participation involved; a verbal 
explanation was provided and any questions were answered.46 Potential interviewees were 
then asked to consider whether or not they would like to participate. Those who agreed to 
participate were asked to complete a reply slip which included their name and contact 
details so that I could contact them to arrange an interview for a later date.  
 
It was originally conceived that the majority of interviews would be conducted on court 
premises after the completion of evidence (in the case of witnesses) or completion of the 
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 See Appendices i and ii for copies of the information sheet and consent form provided to participants. Note, 
three separate versions of the information sheet were produced: one for witnesses, one for defendants and 
one for supporters. All of the information provided was the same other than the use of the word ‘witness’, 
‘defendant’ or ‘supporter’ depending on the type of participant. Therefore only one version of the information 
sheet, the ‘witness’ version, has been provided in the Appendix. 
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hearing (in the case of defendants). This was based upon a similar approach being adopted 
in previous studies involving court users (see Fielding, 2006; Adler, 2008). However, when 
reviewing the DAP application HMCTS raised concerns about conducting interviews with 
court users on the day of their court appearance. The approach was thus altered to 
accommodate this with the caveat that the option for ‘same day’ interviewing be retained in 
the event that a court user expressly stated that they would prefer to participate in an 
interview straightaway.  Ultimately, this only happened in one instance and, at the request 
of the participant (a defendant), the interview was carried out via telephone several hours 
after the hearing had ended. All other interviews were conducted at a later date convenient 
to the individual court user. 
 
Aside from this, and in line with Baldwin’s (2008: 378) assertion that conducting court-based 
research is a ‘very tricky undertaking’, a number of difficulties were encountered when 
recruiting court users for interview. A main issue was that the pool of court users eligible for 
recruitment, particularly in the Crown Courts, was smaller than expected. With regard to 
the recruitment of witnesses, there were a small number of occasions on which no 
witnesses attended court on the allotted fieldwork day. Reasons for this included witnesses 
failing to attend court as requested or because trials were at a stage where witnesses were 
not yet, or no longer, required. Of the pool of witnesses who attended court, recruitment 
was constrained for a number of reasons. This included the defendant(s) in the case 
entering a late guilty plea on the day of trial – which meant that the witness was not 
required to give evidence – or, as is discussed in detail below, because the witness was 
regarded as too upset or distressed to be approached about the study. The number of 
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defendants eligible for recruitment in the Crown Court was extremely small.47 The main 
restrictions on eligibility for recruitment in relation to defendants was that a significant 
proportion of defendants were either on remand or sentenced to custody upon the 
completion of the hearing. The majority of defendants approached in the magistrates’ 
courts declined to participate in the study. A further constraint on the recruitment of both 
witnesses and defendants, particularly in Amber City, was that language barriers – evident 
in the court user’s receipt of an interpreter – prevented individuals from being invited to 
take part.48 Drop-out also occurred after the point of recruitment; approximately half of the 
witnesses and defendants recruited for interview did not respond to contact attempts post-
recruitment. Table 3.1, below, provides a break-down of the number of court users who 
were approached, recruited and subsequently interviewed as part of the study.  
 
Overall, 28 court users were interviewed; this includes interviews with 17 prosecution 
witnesses, seven defendants and four supporters.49 This number is lower than the number 
originally anticipated – particularly in relation to defendant interviews – however, overall 
the supervision team agreed that the number of interviews conducted provided a rich set of 
qualitative data that would significantly contribute to answering the research questions; 
particularly given the marginalised, or hard-to-reach, nature of the population under study 
(cf. Croall, 2017). 
 
 
                                                     
47
 Ten days were spent on the recruitment of defendants in the Crown Courts and in total just 7 defendants 
were eligible for recruitment. 
48 Provisions for interviews to be conducted with the aid of an interpreter, due to economic and logistical 
reasons, were not allocated to this study.  
49
 This total includes a pilot interview with a former defendant that was conducted when testing out the 
interview schedule (see below for more detail). 
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Table 3.1 Break-down of court user recruitment 
 
Prosecution witnesses 
(including complainants) 
Defendants Supporters 
No. 
approached  
52 32 5 
No. recruited*  34 12 4 
No. 
interviewed   
17 6** 4 
*‘Recruitment’ was defined as instances in which prospective participants, after reading the information sheet, 
completed the reply slip and returned it to the researcher. 
**Excludes additional pilot interview. 
 
 
Interviewees were fairly split across the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts: 14 were 
recruited while attending the Crown Court and 13 were recruited while attending the 
magistrates’ court.50 Interviewees had attended court in relation to a range of offending and 
alleged offending. Roughly a quarter of interviewees had attended court regarding a violent 
offence, such as assault, ABH or GBH and just under one fifth had attended court in relation 
to an allegation of theft, including fraud and burglary. The remaining interviewees had 
attended court regarding cases including alleged: sexual offending, drug-related offending, 
driving offences and harassment. Just under one-fifth of interviewees had attended court in 
relation to cases involving alleged domestic abuse. However, although the sample included 
court users appearing before the courts in a range of cases, due to the aforementioned 
sampling constraints – such as not recruiting defendants in custody – it is likely to 
underrepresent those appearing before the courts in relation to the most serious of cases. 
 
Six of the 17 prosecution witness interviewees were the complainant; the remaining 11 gave 
evidence in relation to cases in which they were either not the complainant or in which the 
                                                     
50
 The former defendant who participated in the pilot interview had experience of attending both the Crown 
and magistrates’ court. 
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alleged offence did not involve an individual complainant, for example in some fraud or 
drug-related cases. Among the prosecution witness sample, the defendant(s) who the 
witness had given evidence against was found guilty of the main alleged offence in more 
than three quarters of instances. Of the defendant sample, five of the defendants 
interviewed appeared before the court for a trial; three were found guilty and two were 
acquitted. The remaining two defendants appeared at court for sentencing hearings only. Of 
the supporter sample, two attended court to support prosecution witnesses and two had 
attended court to support defendants. The majority of court users interviewed (10 
prosecution witnesses, 5 defendants and 3 supporters) had no previous experience of 
attending court. Five prosecution witnesses had appeared as a prosecution witness on a 
previous occasion, two defendants had appeared in court as a defendant on a previous 
occasion and 3 court users (1 prosecution witness, 1 defendant and 1 supporter) had prior 
experience of serving as a juror.  
 
Demographic characteristics of sample 
Although this study did not seek to obtain a representative sample, it is nevertheless 
important to situate the forthcoming discussion of the study findings within the context of 
the demographic profile of interviewees. Appendix xi provides an anonymised breakdown of 
the main demographic characteristics of court user interviewees. In summary, the majority 
of interviewees were women (17 women were interviewed in comparison to 11 men); this 
means that women were over-represented in the sample in comparison to the national 
population and local populations of Amber City and Indigo Town. Just over two thirds of the 
sample (19 interviewees) were from White British backgrounds. The remaining interviewees 
were fairly evenly split across BAME groups: three were from Black backgrounds, two were 
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from Asian backgrounds, two were of mixed ethnicity; the remaining two interviewees were 
from White Other backgrounds. This means that BAME and White Other groups are 
overrepresented in comparison to the national population but under-represented in terms 
of the local population of Amber City. English was not the first language of five of the 28 
interviewees.51  
 
Court user interviewees were fairly evenly split across age groups; the age range was 18 to 
70 and the mean age was just above the national average at 40 years. In terms of 
occupation, as illustrated in Appendix xi, interviewees were drawn from a wide range of 
occupational backgrounds including managerial and professional roles; skilled trade roles; 
clerical and administrative roles; and hospitality and caring roles. One interviewee was a 
student and three interviewees were retired. This means that the sample, generally 
speaking, had a higher level of employment than both the national average and the local 
populations of Amber City and Indigo Town. 
 
Interview structure and mode 
A semi-structured interview schedule was used for all court user and supporter interviews 
(see Appendix iii). This enabled a broad consistency across topic areas at the same time as 
allowing for the flexibility required of in-depth interviewing (cf. Bryman, 2012). In interview, 
participants were asked to reflect upon topics including their direct experiences of juries 
and magistrates; their views of juries and magistrates; and their perceptions of the wider 
court process. Questions about court users’ direct experiences and perceptions of juries and 
                                                     
51
 All five had appeared in court without the assistance of an interpreter and stated that they were 
comfortable with the interview being conducted in English. 
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magistrates were designed to contribute to the examination of whether or not the two 
types of lay adjudication can help to confer legitimacy on the justice system (Research 
Question 2); while questions about the wider court process sought to draw out discussion of 
what other factors could support or undermine perceptions of legitimacy of the justice 
system, and help to answer Research Questions 3 and 4.  In order to examine levels of 
understanding of juries and magistrates (Research Question 1), in interview, court users 
were asked to describe the role of i) a jury and ii) a magistrate. Upon providing a description 
of the role, participants were then provided with basic information about each of the lay 
adjudicatory roles (see Appendix iv) and asked to discuss their thoughts upon receiving this 
information. 
 
The interview schedule and information cards were piloted with three participants (one 
prosecution witness, one defendant and one individual with recent experience of observing 
a case from the public gallery) in advance of the fieldwork commencing. Two of these 
interviews were conducted face-to-face and one was conducted via telephone. In addition 
to this, and in order to reflect issues emerging from early interviews, some small 
amendments were made to the schedule; such as adjustments to topic order and the 
addition of a small number of questions under the topic of ‘direct experience’ designed to 
give context to participants’ responses to later questions about understanding and 
perceptions. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed in full. (The approach to 
data management is outlined in Section 2.2.4.)  
 
The vast majority of interviews (24 out of 28) took place via telephone at the request of the 
participant; the remaining four court users were interviewed face-to-face. The request to 
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participate in telephone interviews may reflect technological advancements that render 
mobile phone ownership relatively common practice (Trier-Bieniek, 2012; Fielding and 
Thomas, 2016). Methodological texts have raised concerns about the use of the telephone 
as a mode of interviewing in qualitative research, particularly when compared to face-to-
face interviews (Irvine, Drew and Sainsbury, 2012). Concerns have tended to centre around 
perceived difficulties in establishing rapport (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Trier-Bieniek, 2012); 
the loss of visual cues (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; Fielding and Thomas, 2016) and the limits to 
achieving ‘natural’ interactions during telephone interviews (Fielding and Thomas, 2016: 
287). The impact of such issues was minimised in the following ways, and meant that 
subsequently the use of telephone interviewing provided an invaluable means of data 
collection. The building of rapport was strengthened by the fact that I had already met each 
participant at court prior to conducting the interview; a technique which has been found to 
be useful in existing research involving telephone interviewing (Rubin and Rubin, 2005; 
Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004).  Moreover, as the study progressed I became gradually more 
at ease with adopting approaches to mitigate the absence of visual cues. This included my 
reminding participants at the beginning of the interview that they would be given the 
opportunity to pause in order to reflect upon their answers, or by pausing for a few 
additional seconds myself at the end of participants’ responses to ensure that they had 
finished fully answering the question.  
 
Further to this, a number of the stated benefits of telephone interviewing were discernible 
in this study. For example, the use of telephone interviewing was found to be a very flexible 
method for accessing hard-to-reach groups (cf. Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004; Trier-Bienick, 
2012), such as court users. This is because it meant that those who, for practical reasons, 
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were unable or unwilling to participate in a face-to-face interview were still able to 
participate in the research. The use of telephone interviews also acted as a means of 
enhancing researcher safety in the field (cf. Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004).  
 
3.1.4 Observations of court proceedings 
 
In addition to interviews with court users, an integral feature of the approach involved 
observations of court proceedings. Essential to the ethnographic approach is immersion in 
the field under study (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 1995; Bryman 2012); conducting court 
observations was thus regarded as an essential tool to achieve this.  Observations were 
conducted of open-court proceedings (i.e. those which are open to members of the public 
to attend) at the four selected courts. Closed court proceedings, namely those that involve 
young defendants, were not observed due to reporting restrictions set out under Section 49 
of the Children and Young Persons Act 1993. Observations took place from the public gallery 
of each court.  
 
Notwithstanding Baldwin’s (2008: 383) note of caution that observations carried out in an 
open court setting are limited because ‘only the public face of justice’ is presented, the 
observations provided one means by which Research Questions 3 and 4 – which concern the 
characterisation of lay participants’ engagement in the process and the factors that can 
support or undermine court users’ perceptions of legitimacy, respectively – could be 
addressed. Principally, observations provided a way of gaining a ‘lived experience of the 
courthouse’ (Ward, 2017: 19) and a means by which ‘the minutiae of proceedings within – 
and immediately outside – the courtroom’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 18) could be understood. 
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Observations thus enabled interviewee accounts to be contextualised, particularly in terms 
of how court users’ direct experiences of the court process could shape perceptions of 
legitimacy. Observations also facilitated the collection of a rich source of interactional data 
in relation to how lay participants understood and engaged with the court process. In 
addition to observing aspects of proceedings that did occur, observations also generated 
data about what did not happen. This included instances in which reluctant witnesses failed 
to attend court or when trials did not proceed as scheduled for other reasons, such as a 
defendant entering a late guilty plea or because a defendant was not ‘produced’ to the 
court from a local prison. Observations about levels of cooperation with ‘the rules’ of the 
court process further aided the examination of perceptions of legitimacy because they 
provided data about the extent to which ‘expressed consent’ (Beetham, 2013) for the role 
of the justice system was evident or absent in the actions of court users.  
 
Court observations provided a method of gathering contextual data about local and 
temporal features of the court environment. This included data relating to the impact of 
policy imperatives, such as those designed to increase the efficiency of the courts system 
(Ministry of Justice, 2012; Leveson, 2015), and data relating to other contemporary matters, 
such as the identification and treatment of need or vulnerability within the court process.  
Observations of this kind generated data about factors which impacted upon the nature of 
lay participants’ engagement in the criminal courts and data about factors which could 
serve to support or undermine court users’ perceptions of the legitimacy of the justice 
system. 
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Overall 126 hearings across the four courts under study were observed. This included 19 full 
trials, 16 partial trials, 58 sentencing hearings and 33 other hearings (see Table 3.2 for more 
detail). The amount of time spent conducting observations was split fairly evenly across the 
Crown and magistrates’ courts under study, however because magistrates’ court hearings 
are generally much shorter in length than Crown Court hearings, observations conducted in 
magistrates’ courts account for the highest volume of hearings documented. The volume of 
magistrates’ courts observations carried out for this study offers particular insight in view of 
arguments that magistrates’ courts are under-researched in comparison to the Crown 
Courts (cf. Darbyshire, 1997). 
 
It was decided at an early stage that the study would not seek to observe Crown Court trials 
in full. Having conducted a number of pilot observations in the Autumn of 2014, it was 
viewed that observing full Crown Court trials –  due to their length –  would generate an 
extremely large volume of data, much of which was likely to be of limited relevance to the 
overall research questions. Instead, Crown Court observations focused upon aspects of the 
process most likely to involve significant interactions with lay participants.  This included the 
observation of jury selection and empanelment, evidence from witnesses and defendants, 
closing speeches from counsel, judges’ summing up, jury questions, the return of verdicts 
and sentencing hearings. However, one relatively short (three-day) trial which involved an 
allegation of ABH, was observed in full. In contrast, the majority of trials observed in the 
magistrates’ courts were documented in full; however, four partially observed trials have 
been included in the sample. Each of these was included because they contained data which 
was not otherwise present in the sample. For example, one of the partially observed cases 
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provided the only instance in the study in which a defendant gave evidence with the 
assistance of an intermediary.   
 
Decisions as to which cases to observe were usually facilitated by a discussion with the 
Listings Office at the beginning of each fieldwork day and were centred upon the 
recruitment of court users. ‘Comprehensive note[s]’ (Wolfinger, 2002: 90) were made of all 
proceedings under observation; notes were typed-up into full fieldnotes as soon as possible 
after each observation in order to maximise recall and preserve the ‘idiosyncratic [and] 
contingent character’ of individual observations (Emerson et al. 1995). A full outline of all of 
the hearings observed is provided in Appendix xii.  
 
Table 3.2 Breakdown of observed cases 
 Crown Courts Magistrates’ Courts All courts/total 
Full trial 1 18 19 
Partial trial 12 4 16 
Sentencing hearing 11 47 58 
Other hearing 2 31 33 
Total 26 100 126 
 
My presence in each of the courts also gave rise to a number of informal conversations 
about the research with a range of individuals. This included Witness Service staff and 
volunteers, police officers, probation officers, court staff, legal advisers, advocates and 
members of the judiciary. This kind of practice is a longstanding feature of ethnographic 
research (Bryman, 2012; Fielding, 2012); discussions were usually premised upon me either 
being formally introduced to such individuals or through a conversation that arose from 
becoming a familiar face within the court. Insights gleaned from such conversations were 
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not formally included in data collection and analysis but undoubtedly shaped my reflections 
of the field and contributed to the overall ‘analytic density’ (Fielding, 2009) of the study.  
 
3.1.5 Interviews with magistrates 
 
In addition to interviews with court users and observations of court proceedings the study 
also sought to include the voices of lay adjudicators themselves, specifically those of 
magistrates. 52 This was in order to understand how lay adjudicators perceived and made 
sense of their own role with a view to generating further understanding of ‘power-holder’ 
perceptions of legitimacy (cf. Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). In this vein, permission to 
interview 10-12 magistrates was sought from the Judicial Office. This is the standard route 
for seeking permission to access members of the judiciary, in which magistrates are 
included.53 Research access was granted in May 2017, subject to some small adjustments to 
the recruitment approach based on the Judicial Office’s existing experience of facilitating 
research access. 
 
Befitting the ethnographic approach of the study, and due to the relatively small sample 
required, magistrates were recruited purposively from the two magistrates’ courts under 
study. Upon being informed of the successful access request by the Judicial Office, the 
Chairman of the Magistrates’ Association and the Chair of the National Bench Chairman’s 
Forum contacted the magistrates from Amber City and Indigo Town on my behalf and 
invited them to take part in the study. Magistrates who expressed an interest in 
                                                     
52
 Conducting similar interviews with former jurors would have been beneficial – and limitations under the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 do not make this impossible (Darbyshire, 2001; Thomas, 2008) – however, there 
remain legal and practical challenges which rendered this unfeasible for the present study. 
53
 Further detail is available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/publications/judicial-participation-in-research-
projects/ [accessed 21.06.18]. 
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participating were then put into contact with me, via email, in order that the interview 
could be arranged and to enable the opportunity for me to answer any questions 
prospective interviewees had about the nature of the research. Nine magistrates expressed 
an interest in participating and interviews were conducted with eight of these individuals.54 
Six of the eight magistrates participated in a face-to-face interview; two participated in a 
telephone interview. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in a private room within the 
court building or on university premises. Informed consent was gained from magistrates 
through the use of an information sheet and consent form (see Appendices v and vi).  
 
In-depth interviews with lay magistrates were designed to supplement the issues emerging 
from in-depth interviews with court users and to contribute to answering Research 
Questions 3 and 4; that is, the questions concerned with characterising lay participants’ 
engagement in the process – which included the engagement of lay magistrates – and 
understanding the factors that could support or undermine court users’ perceptions of 
legitimacy. In interview, magistrates were asked to reflect upon their motivations for joining 
the magistracy; the benefits they felt that their role brought to the justice system and the 
associated challenges; and their views about how court users perceived and understood 
their work.55 Interviews with lay magistrates were audio-recorded and transcribed in full.   
 
In order to protect the anonymity of interviewees, an individual-level breakdown of the 
demographic profile of magistrates (and Witness Service volunteers) is not provided.56 
                                                     
54
 The ninth individual, though having expressed an initial interest in participating in the study, did not respond 
to further contact attempts. 
55
 A copy of the semi-structured interview schedule is provided in Appendix vii. 
56
 There is a chance that providing an individual-level breakdown, due to the small sample size, could increase 
the risk of the interviewee becoming identifiable to gatekeepers or other interviewees. (This is known as 
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However, the demographic profile of magistrates under study can be summarised in the 
following manner.  Interviews were conducted with three women and five men, all of whom 
were White British. The youngest interviewee was in their forties; the remaining seven were 
in their fifties or sixties. This broadly reflects the national composition of the magistracy in 
terms of gender and age; although women were slightly under-represented in the sample 
(Judicial Office, 2018). Magistrates from BAME backgrounds were particularly under-
represented in – or in fact absent from – the sample; 12 per cent of serving magistrates are 
from BAME backgrounds (Judicial Office, 2018).  Four of the interviewees were retired; the 
occupational background of the remaining four was varied. However, all eight interviewees 
either currently held or had held professional roles.  
 
3.1.6 Interviews with Witness Service volunteers 
 
A final group of lay participants under study were Witness Service volunteers. The nature of 
the aforementioned witness recruitment process meant that I worked in close proximity to 
Witness Service volunteers at each court. This included accompanying volunteers as they 
carried out their duties in order to a) assess whether or not witnesses were of a sufficiently 
comfortable demeanour to be approached about the study; and, if so, b) to facilitate the 
subsequent introduction of the study to the witness. As outlined above, this process often 
led to informal conversations with volunteers about the nature of the volunteer role and 
about the different ways in which witnesses engage with court proceedings. It therefore 
became apparent that conducting a small number of in-depth interviews with Witness 
                                                                                                                                                                     
‘jigsaw identification’ (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2012: 31)). This was not thought to apply to court 
user interviewees due to the larger sample size and because the majority of interviewees were unknown to 
each other. 
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Service volunteers could provide a valuable means by which some of the conversational 
topics could be explored formally and in greater depth, with a view to contributing to 
knowledge in relation to Research Questions 3 and 4.  
 
Witness Service volunteers were recruited purposively (cf. Bryman, 2012) from the courts 
under study. Permission to carry out interviews with volunteers was granted from the 
Citizens Advice Area and Regional Managers in Amber City and Indigo Town. Volunteers 
were sent an invitation to participate in the study on my behalf via an email from the 
Witness Service manager in the participating courts. Those who expressed an interest in 
participating were asked to contact me directly in order for interviews to be arranged. As 
with all other interviews, informed consent was gained from Witness Service volunteers 
through the use of an information sheet and consent form (see Appendices viii and ix).  
 
A total of 7 volunteers were interviewed as part of the study. All interviews took place face-
to-face and were conducted in vacant rooms within the Witness Service offices. In 
interview, volunteers were asked to reflect upon their motivations for volunteering for the 
Witness Service and their views about how witnesses perceived, understood and responded 
to the court process.57 Four of the interviewees were women; three were men. Five 
interviewees were White British; the remaining two were Black British. The youngest 
interviewee was in their thirties, one interviewee was in their fifties and the remaining five 
were over 70. Perhaps in reflection of the average age of the sample, the majority of 
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 A copy of the semi-structured interview schedule is provided in Appendix x. 
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interviewees (5) were retired; the remaining two were volunteering alongside professional 
roles in the charitable and educational sectors.58  
 
 
3.2 Ethical issues  
 
The study received a favourable ethical approval from the University of Surrey Ethics 
Committee. There were various ethical issues of relevance including: the overarching ethical 
principles of obtaining informed consent from interviewees, maintaining participant and 
researcher well-being, confidentiality and the secure use and storage of data. In addition to 
these overarching principles, this section also considers some of the ‘situated’ ethical 
decisions that arose as the fieldwork has progressed (cf. Calvey, 2008) and my own 
positioning within the research.  
 
3.2.1 Informed consent and maintaining participant well-being 
 
Court users, such as defendants and prosecution witnesses, can be considered as 
‘vulnerable’ groups (cf. Goodey, 2005; Jacobson et al. 2015), therefore several steps were 
taken to ensure that the well-being of participants was upheld at the point of recruitment as 
well as both during and post-interview.59 The recruitment of witnesses and defendants at 
court required sensitivity to each prospective participant’s recent experience of the 
                                                     
58
 Unfortunately, there is no available information as to the national demographic profile of Witness Service 
volunteers.  
59
 It should be noted that seeking to define ‘vulnerability’ among court users is recognised as an extremely 
complex task (Jacobson, 2018). For this reason, issues of defining levels of need and vulnerability in the court 
process are explored in further detail in Chapter 6.  
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courtroom; this included taking care to ensure that anyone who appeared visibly emotional 
or distressed by their court appearance was not approached.  
 
Informed consent was gained from all interviewees through the use of an information sheet 
and consent form. The information sheet outlined the purpose of the study and what 
participation entailed, including its voluntary and confidential nature. Court users who 
agreed to participate in an interview were asked to read and complete a consent form 
confirming that they were aware of the purpose of the study, that their responses were 
confidential and that their participation was voluntary. Participants were informed that 
confidentiality would only be broken if a participant disclosed an intention to harm 
themselves or others or admitted to the committal of serious crimes unknown to the police. 
(There were no instances of this.) Consent to digitally record the interview was also 
obtained.  
 
It should be noted that although court user interviews involved participants being asked to 
discuss their court experience within a short period of time following their court 
appearance, the nature of the study was such that the focus of the interview was not on the 
detail of specific (alleged) offences in connection to which people were appearing at court. 
Rather, participants were asked about their experience of the court process and about their 
understanding and perceptions of juries and magistrates. Nevertheless, at the outset of the 
study it was agreed that if a court user participant were to become distressed or upset 
during the interview, I would offer to refer them to a relevant support agency, such as 
Victim Support or Citizens Advice – a practice which I have adopted in previous research. 
Overall, there was one instance in which an interviewee was offered the opportunity to be 
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referred to Victim Support. Upon discussing this with the interviewee, it transpired that she 
was already in contact with Victim Support and other support services; therefore, no further 
action was taken.  
 
As outlined above, interviewees were given a choice between taking part in a face-to-face or 
telephone interview. Enabling participants to make a choice about the mode of interview 
provided a further means of upholding their well-being as it may have allowed participants 
to feel at ease during interview by facilitating the negotiation of any power, status or 
cultural differentials between myself and the interviewees (cf. Arksey and Knight, 1999; 
Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004; Rubin and Rubin, 2012). At the beginning of each interview 
participants were reminded of the voluntary and confidential nature of the interview and 
any questions they had were answered. At the end of each interview, by way of debriefing, 
participants were given the option of selecting their own pseudonym to be used in the 
written account of the research;60 they were also asked if they would like to receive a 
summary of the research findings.  
 
The same ethical principles for securing informed consent, confidentiality and maintaining 
participant well-being were applied to the subsequent interviews conducted with 
magistrates and Witness Service volunteers. All magistrate and Witness Service volunteer 
interviewees were provided with an information sheet which outlined the purpose of the 
study and what participation in the study entailed, including its voluntary and confidential 
nature in advance of their participation in the study. All interviewees were asked to read 
                                                     
60
 For a recent discussion of the use of pseudonyms in social research, see Lahman, Rodriguez, Moses et al. 
(2015). 
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and sign the consent form confirming that they were aware of the purpose of the study, 
that their responses were confidential and that their participation was on a voluntary basis. 
One interviewee declined the request for the interview to be audio-recorded but agreed to 
hand-written notes of the interview being made instead. Participants were given the choice 
of participating in a face-to-face or telephone interview and were also given the option of 
selecting their own pseudonym and receiving a copy of the research findings. 
 
With regard to obtaining informed consent when conducting court observations, it was 
unfortunately deemed impractical and unfeasible to individually alert all those involved in 
proceedings to the presence of an observer due to the disruption that it would cause to the 
formal legal proceedings being observed.61 However in addition to the formal negotiation of 
access, I also carried an information poster (which outlined the nature of the research) into 
courts in which proceedings were being observed.  This was shown to any individual who 
requested information as to my purpose in the courtroom; a verbal explanation was also 
provided and any questions were answered. (This was used on a small number of 
occasions.)  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
61
 As previously noted, observations of legal proceedings are relatively common in existing court-based 
research (see Bottoms and McLean 1976; Carlen 1976; Fielding, 2006; Jacobson et al. 2015; Ward, 2017). 
Consistent with the approach outlined above, it does not appear that any of these existing studies involved the 
gaining of informed consent from each member of the courtroom; this is perhaps due to the public nature of 
open court proceedings. 
85 
 
3.2.2 ‘Situated ethics’ 
 
It is also important to consider some of the ethical considerations that were required in situ 
as the fieldwork progressed. This decision-making process is known as ‘situated ethics’ 
(Duster, 1970; Simons and Usher, 2000; Calvey 2008):  
 
‘It is in the particular cases of the here and now with participants that ethics are 
situationally accomplished … [they are] contingent, dynamic, temporal, occasioned 
and situated affairs.’ (Calvey, 2008: 908 & 912)   
 
Situated decisions were regularly required to uphold the ethical integrity of the study. These 
were principally required in relation to the recruitment of court users, particularly in terms 
of making decisions about who to approach and how. As outlined above, any court user who 
appeared visibly upset or distressed by their court appearance was not approached, 
however an individual’s demeanour was not always static and could change over the period 
within which they were at court. 62 Decisions about approaching witnesses were often made 
in discussion with Witness Service staff and volunteers; complainants in cases involving 
sexual violence or domestic abuse in the Crown Court were often regarded as being under 
too much strain to be approached.  Decisions about approaching defendants were 
sometimes made in discussion with defence advocates but were often reliant on the 
demeanour of the defendant. For example, defendants who were visibly upset, distressed 
or angry about the outcome of their hearing were not approached. Neither were those in 
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 See Jacobson (2018) for a useful discussion surrounding how vulnerability is defined and responded to 
within the court process. 
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cases in which the mental health needs, intellectual capacity, or substance dependency of 
the individual –  as described to the court during the hearing itself –  were such that it was 
deemed that the practice of obtaining informed consent may have been compromised.  
Likewise, while in most instances observation notes were made ‘live’ as the hearing 
progressed, there were a small number of instances in which I chose not to make detailed 
notes until after the hearing had ended. This was usually in cases in which I had been sat in 
the public gallery of a Crown Court in very close proximity to a family member of a 
defendant as the fate of the defendant was announced.  
 
3.2.3 Researcher well-being and positionality 
 
Discussion of the situated nature of ethical decisions leads on to a further ethical 
consideration, that of maintaining my well-being (and safety) as a researcher. This is related 
the wider issue of positionality within the research. My role in the field was largely that of a 
‘peripheral member’ (Adler and Adler, 1987) and was characterised by a sense of 
‘marginalisation’ and ‘loneliness’ that is commonplace in ethnographic research (Fielding, 
2015). In fact, Baldwin (2008: 382) argued that court-based researchers occupy a ‘similar’ 
position to that of court users and ‘may feel a sense of exclusion, estrangement, and 
alienation that is comparable to that experienced by defendants.’ Moreover, Bahn and 
Weatherill (2012) noted the impact that in-situ decision-making, particularly when research 
involves vulnerable groups, can have on the well-being of the researcher. I encountered 
similar experiences during the course of this research. This included when making decisions 
about whether or not to approach court users about the study or when observing cases that 
were perceived to be of a distressing nature.  Nevertheless, the need to carefully manage 
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my own role to uphold the ‘delicate separateness’ (Fielding, 2006: 53) required of court-
based interaction was essential to integrity of the research and the associated detachment 
derived from the experience of ‘marginality’ in the field was, arguably, crucial to the 
research (cf. Fielding, 2016: 325).  
 
Moreover, when thinking about issues of positionality and well-being, particularly when 
negotiating the spatial and temporal aspects of the court environment, I became attuned to 
my own role within what has been described as the ‘them and us’ divide between 
professional court-based actors and court users (Jacobson et al., 2015).63 In being granted 
permission to conduct the study I had access to some of the ‘inner zones’ (Rock, 1993) of 
the court that are largely occupied by professionals, such as the Listing Office. However, I 
also frequently occupied the public areas of the court building, or ‘outer zones’ (Rock, 
1993), that are used by court users; such as entrances and exits to the building, waiting 
areas and the public gallery of individual courtrooms. This meant that I was required to 
move between the two zones and, to some degree within my ‘peripheral’ membership role 
(Alder and Adler, 1987), be mindful of how I might be perceived by professional actors and 
lay participants when carrying out the research. 
 
I took several steps to negotiate this. In addition to carrying with me the aforementioned 
poster which outlined the purpose of the research, I also wore my University of Surrey ID 
badge. This was both so that I could prove my identity if required to by a gatekeeper, or if 
asked to by a court user when outlining the research, and also to signify my independence 
                                                     
63
 A consideration of this was first provided in a paper presented as part of the ‘Courtroom ethnography: Doing 
Justice in everyday legal praxis’ stream at the Socio-Legal Studies Association Annual Conference in April 2017 
(see Kirby, 2017b). A copy of this presentation is available from the author upon request. 
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from the setting under study. When thinking about ‘impression management’ (Fielding, 
2015: 323) I considered how my physical attire may impact upon my position within the 
research setting. Dressing very smartly may have led to my being perceived by court users 
as occupying the ‘inner sphere’ (Rock, 1993) occupied by professionals but dressing too 
casually may have appeared unprofessional to local gatekeepers. I therefore aimed to dress 
in a smart-casual manner; that is, in a similar way to how I would usually dress for a day 
spent working in a university office. Moreover, due to existing research findings that have 
pointed to the ways in which court users are sensitive to – and can feel excluded by – 
displays of ‘chummy relations’ between professional actors within the courtroom (Jacobson 
et al. 2015), I tried to avoid entering into lengthy conversations with professional actors 
about the research in the presence of court users.  
 
A further mechanism for dealing with the interconnected issues of positionality and well-
being was via the use of a Research Diary. The Research Diary is a separate document to 
fieldnotes. It was filled in regularly throughout the fieldwork period, and contained any 
reflections that I had about ‘in-situ’ decision-making in the field, thoughts about progress 
and analytic observations. Completing the Research Diary acted as a source of release for 
the ‘messiness’ and ‘hidden struggles’ of fieldwork and assisted with the process of data 
analysis (Punch, 2012: 92). It also served to enhance reflexivity of the study and, arguably, 
prevented the written account from becoming ‘sanitised’ (cf. Calvey, 2008; Punch, 2012).   
 
Finally, mechanisms to maintain my physical safety were negotiated by conducting 
interviews in public places (such as in an office on university premises), or via telephone, as 
opposed to conducting interviews in the homes of participants. 
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3.2.4 Data security and retention 
 
A final ethical issue of relevance to this study is that of data security. Personal data, in the 
form of name, telephone number and/or email address collected from interviewees for the 
purpose of arranging interviews, is stored in a password-protected file in a secure location 
on the University of Surrey server. Paper-based reply slips and consent forms are stored in a 
locked filing cabinet on secure university premises.  
 
As outlined above, all interviews, with the exception of one, were digitally recorded and 
fully transcribed. Recordings were deleted from the recording device once they had been 
saved and stored securely. In order to help to protect the anonymity of interviewees, any 
use of names, exact dates and/or locations were removed from interview transcripts and 
observation write-ups. When preparing the thesis for publication, careful steps were taken 
to ensure that the anonymity of interviewees was further protected by the use of 
pseudonyms and the removal or ‘masking’ of other contextual features in accordance with 
guidance provided by the Information Commissioner’s Office (2012).    
 
In accordance with the University of Surrey Ethics Committee guidance, all research data, 
such as audio recordings, interview transcripts and observation write-ups, are held for 10 
years from the completion of the study. Research project data, such as consent forms and 
participant contact details, are held for six years from the completion of the study. All digital 
data collected has been placed in a secure location on the University of Surrey server for 
long-term storage. 
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3.3 Analytical approach 
 
The nature of ethnographic fieldwork is such that it involves the production of a voluminous 
source of rich qualitative data, however the analysis of this data can be ‘demanding’ 
(Fielding, 2016: 331) and necessitates that sufficient time and consideration is dedicated to 
this process. The approach to analysis adopted by this study comprised elements of Glaser 
and Strauss’s (1967) grounded theory approach to analysis and Becker’s (1970) ‘sequential 
analysis’. Both approaches are regarded to be of value in the analysis of ethnographic 
research (cf. Hodkinson, 2016; Fielding, 2016) and are well-suited to the interpretivist 
epistemology of the study. 
 
3.3.1 Philosophical underpinnings of analytic approach 
 
 
In his writing on sociological work, Becker (1970: 79) advocated the value of carrying out 
‘sequential’ analysis of qualitative data which is collected over an extended period of time. 
This involves analysis being carried out alongside data collection in a way that enables the 
researcher to ‘work up’ (Fielding, 2016: 331) from the data by reflecting on possible 
meanings arising from initial data gathering in order to guide subsequent data collection. 
Elements of sequential analysis were adopted during this study. The production of Research 
Diary entries throughout the fieldwork process enabled the process of analysis to develop in 
this manner. Analytic thoughts were also generated and recorded in the process of 
transcribing interviews and in the compiling of observation fieldnotes. Carrying out 
sequential analysis during the data gathering process enabled the research to adapt to the 
field under study. In particular, it helped to crystallise the shift in focus from primarily 
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examining court users’ perceptions of legitimacy through the lens of lay adjudication 
(Research Questions 1 and 2), to also include a broader examination of how an individual’s 
engagement with the court process served to shape their overall perceptions of legitimacy 
(Research Questions 3 and 4). Shifts such as these are a common feature of sociological 
studies, particularly those which involve a qualitative approach, as Becker (1970: 80) attests:  
 
‘Researchers frequently discover that the problem they set out to study … cannot be 
studied except in the context of, some other problem they had not anticipated 
studying.’  
 
Adopting a sequential approach to analysis thus facilitated an understanding of how – when 
seeking to examine perceptions of legitimacy – court users’ levels of understanding and 
perceptions of lay adjudication could not be considered in isolation from their overall 
experience of the criminal courts. This is described in further detail in Chapter 4. 
 
The study’s analytic approach was also heavily influenced by the grounded theory approach 
to the research process which was originally developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). It 
involves an inductive approach to the generation of theory; that is, ‘the discovery of theory 
from data’ (Turner, 1981: 225), rather than pre-determined hypotheses (see Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Turner, 1981; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Grounded theory is thought to be of 
particular value in qualitative research, particularly that which involves analysing data 
generated from interview and observations (Turner, 1981). In the period in which Glaser 
and Strauss were writing the development of grounded theory was commended for 
providing an alternative to the dominance of deductive approaches, grounded in a positivist 
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epistemology, in the generation of sociological theory (Turner, 1981; Hodkinson, 2016). 
Grounded theory also provided a clear process for data analysis which was hitherto largely 
absent from qualitative research (Hodkinson, 2016). However, Glaser and Strauss’ model 
has received criticism for being overly prescriptive and researchers attesting to the use of 
grounded theory have been criticised for failing to fully employ the strategies outlined by 
Glaser and Strauss (Hodkinson, 2016).  
 
Due to concerns arising from an ‘orthodoxy of approach’ in Glaser and Strauss’ model, 
Turner (1981:226) outlined a modified approach to grounded theory to aid the practical 
process of analysis for individual researchers. Derived from Glaser and Strauss’ original 
conception, Turner identified nine stages required in the development of grounded theory. 
This includes: developing and saturating categories through the use of open and ultimately 
selective coding; defining categories and applying these definitions to the data; developing 
links between categories and considering under what conditions the links hold; and making 
connections to existing theories, as relevant (Turner, 1981: 231). Due to the 
aforementioned limitations regarding the prescriptive nature of Glaser and Strauss’ 
approach to grounded theory, alongside the fact that this study could not claim to adopt a 
fully inductive approach – none the least because the concept of legitimacy was identified 
as a potentially useful theoretical framework through which to examine lay participation in 
the criminal courts at an early stage in the research process – I elected to analyse my 
dataset using elements of Turner’s (1981) adapted approach to grounded theory. 64 The 
                                                     
64
 Analytic approaches which involve incorporating ‘selective features’ of the grounded theory approach are 
relatively common in ethnographic research (Hodkinson, 2016: 98). 
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following section outlines how I applied elements of Turner’s approach to my dataset in 
order to expand upon existing theorisations of legitimacy.  
 
3.3.2 Illustrating the process of analysis: Conceptualising the ‘continuum of engagement’ 
 
Qualitative approaches have been criticised for a lack of transparency in the process of data 
analysis (Turner, 1981; Hodkinson, 2016), therefore the remainder of this section provides 
an illustration of the process of data analysis in this study. This is achieved by outlining a 
specific strand of analysis and subsequent theoretical development: the process by which 
the continuum of engagement, and its application to the study of legitimacy, emerged. This 
strand of analysis has been selected in order to illustrate the ‘messy degree of complexity’ 
(Turner, 1991: 240) involved in qualitative data analysis and, perhaps more importantly, 
because the development of the continuum of engagement (the findings of which are 
presented in Chapter 5) is arguably the main theoretical contribution of this study.  
 
As outlined above, the process of analysis began while the fieldwork for the project was 
underway. The main form of analysis at this stage was in the writing of analytic thoughts in 
my Research Diary and compiling analytic observations alongside the transcription of 
interviews and writing of observation fieldnotes. At the end of the fieldwork period, before 
beginning to analyse the dataset, I spent time thinking about analytic themes that had 
emerged from the data collection phase of the project and devised an initial list of 15 codes.  
Those that relate to the association between ‘engagement’ and ‘legitimacy’ included: 
‘understanding’, ‘normative cooperation’, ‘instrumental compliance’ and ‘moral alignment’.  
These a priori codes became the first codes of the dataset (cf. Silver and Lewins, 2014). 
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Interview transcripts and observation write-ups were analysed together with the aid of the 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software package, MAX-qda. 
 
 Once all interview transcripts and observations had been uploaded to MAX-qda, I began the 
process of open coding, which involves coding each paragraph of data, in order to begin to 
develop categories (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Turner, 1981). In addition to the 
development of the initial categories outlined above, further codes developed during the 
open coding phase of analysis that have a bearing upon engagement included: ‘expression’, 
‘acceptance of status quo’, ‘challenge to status quo’ and ‘rejection of status quo’.  
 
Definitions were developed for each category and revised where necessary; particularly at 
the early stages of analysis when the overall framework was at the initial stages of 
development. The use of definitions is particularly important in the process of grounded 
theory because it helps to generate ‘a deeper and more precise understanding of the nature 
of the phenomena being examined’ (Turner, 1981: 236).  As the analysis progressed, 
categories were added, renamed, recoded or merged where necessary to allow further 
distinctions to be made or to resolve any areas of overlap. For example, the initial code 
‘support’, defined as ‘reference to support received from practitioners or others’, was 
merged with the code ‘information’ to form the code ‘support and information’ due to 
instances of overlap between the two codes.  
 
A memo was written at the end of each day spent analysing data in order to record the 
analysis process. This included making a note of any revisions that had been made to the 
coding framework or thoughts about the potential further development required, 
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depending upon how the analysis progressed. Memos were also written for each individual 
category in order to develop links and make connections between categories and to record 
how categories had evolved over time. Areas of contradiction, particularly those which 
occurred within the same case – for example, within a single interview transcript – were 
highlighted and linked through the use of the hyperlink function in MAX-qda (see Silver and 
Lewins, 2014). This feature enabled areas of contradiction to be viewed alongside each 
other. 
 
Gradually, as the analysis progressed open coding was superseded by selective coding, 
particularly as the categories became saturated. At around two thirds of the way through 
the process of data analysis, at which point all interviews and around one third of 
observations had undergone initial coding, I began to make connections between the coding 
frame and existing conceptualisations of legitimacy. In particular, an association was 
beginning to emerge between an individual’s engagement based on their alignment with 
and participation in the court process, and their perceived legitimacy – in terms of ‘shared 
values’ and ‘expressed consent’ (Beetham, 1991) – of the courts. In this vein, an overarching 
category termed ‘spectrum of engagement’ was developed with the following five sub-
categories to reflect different types of engagement in the court process:  
 
 Active - meaningful   
 Passive - aligned 
 Passive - acceptance 
 Reluctant - resistant  
 Withdrawal  
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The process of analysis continued – that is, existing data were re-coded and yet to be coded 
data were coded – until all of the data had been coded along these categorisations. This 
analysis served to form an initial version of the ‘continuum of engagement’ outlined in 
Chapter 5. At this stage, this ‘spectrum’, rather than ‘continuum’, was viewed as a linear 
typology comprising the five aforementioned types of engagement and an initial draft of the 
Chapter was produced on this basis. However, upon producing this draft, two main issues 
became apparent. The first was that construing ‘active’ engagement – originally defined as 
‘active, meaningful participation in the court process’ – in terms of whether or not it was 
‘meaningful’ was problematic because of the difficulties in defining and conceptualising the, 
arguably subjective, term ‘meaningful’. Moreover, the term ‘meaningful’ was deemed to be 
insufficiently specific to the task of discerning an individual’s level of alignment with the 
process. Secondly, the category ‘reluctant- resistant’, though providing an accurate 
depiction of an individual’s weak alignment with the court process, failed to capture the 
differences in levels of participation between those who lacked alignment with the court 
process but participated in a ‘passive’ manner with those who lacked alignment with the 
court process but participated in an ‘active’ manner. Upon further inspection of the data 
and theoretical refinement it was judged that the original development of the typology did 
not adequately capture the distinction between levels of alignment and levels of 
participation. This was resolved by mapping the categories in the typology onto quadrants 
within two axes: alignment and participation. The five main categories were redefined, and 
data were recoded, as follows: 
 
 Active aligned (formerly, ‘active meaningful’) 
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 Passive aligned (with ‘passive acceptance’ representing the weakest form of passive 
alignment) 
 Dull compulsion (representing data previously coded as ‘reluctant-resistant’ but in 
which participation was passive) 
 Resistant (representing data previously coded as ‘reluctant-resistant’ but in which 
participation was active) 
 Withdrawal 
 
The process by which the ‘continuum of engagement’ was developed and refined – through 
‘constant comparison’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) in the development of category definitions 
and the coding and recoding of data in order to establish the ‘conditions under which the 
links hold’ (Turner, 1981: 231) – provides a concrete example of how the process of 
conceptual development emerged. All full depiction of the conceptualisation of the 
continuum of engagement is provided in Chapter 5; this includes a graphical illustration of 
the axes and a definition of each category within the continuum. However, it is perhaps 
useful at this stage to note the way in which elements of existing theory have been 
expanded upon in order to generate an original contribution to conceptualisations of 
legitimacy. Two of the categories used to form the continuum, ‘passive acceptance’ and 
‘dull compulsion’, are derived from existing conceptualisations of legitimacy; Jacobson et al. 
(2015) and Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), respectively. Drawing upon this existing work 
enabled the theoretical conceptualisation of legitimacy to be expanded upon; particularly 
regarding Bottoms and Tankebe’s influential concept of dialogic legitimacy.  The process by 
which this was achieved acts as a form of ‘hermeneutic elaboration’ (Fielding, 2009: 436) 
and is further examined in Chapter 5.  
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3.4 Concluding thoughts 
 
This Chapter has examined the methodological approach to this study of lay participation in 
the criminal courts. It provided an exploration of the methods selected for the study and the 
various rationales for their use, including how these relate to the specific research questions 
under study.  The Chapter also outlined the layered approach to access negotiation and 
explored the overarching and in-situ ethical considerations relevant to the research. This 
included by reflexively examining my own position within the research through the lens of 
the ‘them and us’ divide between professional court actors and court users (cf. Jacobson et 
al. 2015). The final section of the Chapter examined the study’s approach to data analysis, 
which comprised elements of sequential analysis (Becker, 1970) and grounded theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967), by providing an illustration of the process of a specific strand of 
analysis; that which concerns the theorisation of the continuum of engagement, presented 
in Chapter 5.   
 
The use of an ethnographic approach was deemed to be the most valuable means of 
generating understanding of the subjective realities of those experiencing the court process 
in order to achieve both the original aim of generating knowledge of court users’ 
understanding and perceptions of the use of lay adjudicators and also the broader aim of 
understanding lay participants’ overall perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal courts. 
The research was greatly facilitated by the level of access afforded to the study, not only 
from overarching bodies such as HMCTS, the Judicial Office and Citizens Advice, but also the 
local gatekeepers in each of the courts – such as court staff and the Witness Service – who 
provided assistance throughout the fieldwork period.  
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The study has a number of limits, particularly in relation to the lower than anticipated 
number of interviews conducted with defendants. Meanwhile, the ‘self-selecting’ nature of 
the interview sample means that the sample may be more likely to represent those with the 
strongest views (Bryman, 2012). Nevertheless, the challenges presented in the recruitment 
of court users reflect both existing difficulties encountered in carrying out this type of 
research and the inherent difficulties that the courts face in bringing cases to fruition (cf. 
Jacobson et al. 2015). Moreover, the problems encountered, in fact, provided valuable 
insights as to the ways in which court users engaged with the court process. 
 
Overall, the 43 interviews conducted with lay participants along with the substantial data 
generated from the observation of 126 court hearings produced a rich volume of qualitative 
data. This has facilitated the generation of an in-depth and nuanced account of lay 
participation in the criminal courts, which has informed the following Chapters.  
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Chapter 4: Lay adjudication: understanding, perceptions and the 
question of legitimacy 
 
The original aim of this thesis was to examine perceptions of juries and magistrates from the 
viewpoint of court users in order to assess the extent to which lay adjudication is able to 
confer legitimacy onto the criminal courts. In order to assess the degree to which lay 
adjudication confers legitimacy on the criminal courts (Research Question 2), it was first 
necessary to look at the extent to which the twenty-eight court users interviewed were 
aware of, and understood, the roles occupied by juries and magistrates (Research Question 
1). Court user interviewees tended to have a good grasp of the main function of the jury; 
however, in line with previous studies, understanding and knowledge of the magistracy was 
more limited. The study findings indicate that court users support the use of both types of 
lay adjudicator in the administration of justice.  It appears that perceptions of lay 
adjudication are influenced by a range of common themes or factors, including: the 
composition of juries and magistrates; the level of responsibility afforded to lay 
adjudicators; and the extent to which lay adjudicators are regarded as impartial and 
competent decision-makers. These factors have a bearing on the extent to which lay 
adjudication can promote or inhibit perceptions of legitimacy in the criminal courts. 
Importantly, however, it is stressed that court users held nuanced and sometimes 
ambivalent views regarding lay adjudicators, and that the use of lay adjudication should be 
considered as just one of a myriad of features that served to shape court users’ overall 
perceptions of legitimacy in the criminal courts.  
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4.1 Levels of understanding and awareness of lay adjudication 
 
In order to fully examine court users’ perceptions of the use of lay adjudication, the extent 
to which court users understood the roles occupied by juries and lay magistrates was 
explored. Understanding of lay adjudication was examined by asking court users, in 
interview, to describe the role of juries and magistrates. Upon doing so, interviewees were 
provided with information about each of the lay adjudicatory roles and asked to discuss 
their thoughts upon receiving this information.  
 
 
4.1.1 Understanding and awareness of juries 
 
Though juries are regarded as the ‘pillar’ of the criminal justice system (Roberts and Hough, 
2011: 247), little is known about levels of understanding of the jury among members of the 
public, generally, and court users, specifically. The vast majority of interviewees were able 
to talk with relative confidence about the role of the jury, particularly in relation to its fact-
finding and decision-making function. For example, interviewees often consistently 
described the role of a jury as being to listen to the evidence and to make a collective 
decision about whether or not a defendant is guilty or not guilty. This suggests a recognition 
of the jury’s twin role of ‘fact finder’ and ‘decision-maker’ and is illustrated in the following 
quotations: 
 
‘They are 12 impartial people that listen to the evidence and try and make a decision 
as to whether they think the person is guilty or not.’ (Sian, prosecution witness)  
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‘My understanding of juries is like they are members of public sitting on the court 
hearing, before the judge; they’ve got to give the verdict.  Members of public are 
juries, they decide about who is guilty or not guilty.’ (Usman, defendant) 
 
Even those with more limited knowledge about the role of juries were able to describe the 
basic decision-making function of a jury; ‘I thought they were the people that sit and make a 
decision for the judge’, said complainant interviewee Aylin. Only one participant, defendant 
interviewee Irenka, was not able to describe the role of a jury in any form; she attributed 
this to being from an Eastern European country which does not have a common law system.  
 
Court users tended to be less confident in their descriptions of some of the specific aspects 
of jury service, such as the process of juror selection and eligibility. A substantial proportion 
of interviewees described jurors as being selected at random: ‘It’s just 12 random people off 
the streets I believe, isn’t it? Well not off the street but you get summonsed by letter’, said 
Natalie, a complainant. Few were aware of the mechanism for selection. Defendant 
interviewee, Martin, was one of the small number of interviewees who was aware that 
juries are selected via the electoral register: 
 
 ‘As the film says [they are] just 12 angry men. 12 working class, 12 members of the 
public selected from the electoral register.’  
 
 Limited knowledge of the process for juror selection is perhaps unsurprising given that only 
a quarter of court user interviewees reported ever having been called for jury service. This 
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corresponds with existing findings from the US which showed that the majority of 
respondents (just under 60 per cent) were not aware of the means by which jurors are 
selected (Oliver and Wolfinger, 1999; Knack, 2000).  
 
The majority of court users correctly estimated that 12 jurors are selected to hear the case 
in Crown Court trials; estimates from other interviewees ranged from 6 to 20. However, a 
number of those who did state that 12 jurors were selected to hear the case were often 
hesitant or uncertain in their response; ‘I think it’s 12, I’m not sure’, said Gloria, who had 
attended court to support her grandson. 
 
Comments about perceived eligibility for jury service tended to be in line with, or varied 
only slightly from, current practice. The most commonly given reason for potential exclusion 
was thought to be the possession of a criminal record; other stated reasons for potential 
exclusions included: those with mental health issues; those aged under 18; those working in 
a profession which may compromise their position as a juror; or those who are known to 
individuals involved in the case. All of which are grounds, or potential grounds, for 
exclusion.65 Such responses highlight a correspondence between court users’ expectations 
of juror eligibility and current practice. However, interviewees often caveated responses to 
questions about the selection and eligibility process with phrases such as ‘I’m guessing’, ‘I 
                                                     
65
 Having a criminal record alone does not prevent participation in jury service, however an individual with a 
criminal record is excluded from serving upon a jury if, for example, he or she is currently in prison, has ever 
been sentenced to a significant period of imprisonment (5 years or more), or if, in the last 10 years, he or she 
has served a custodial sentence, a suspended sentence or a community order. In relation to grounds for 
exclusion for those with mental health issues, an individual can be disqualified from jury service if he or she is: 
liable to be detained under the Mental Health Act 1983; residing in a hospital under the Mental Health Act 
1983; subject to a guardianship order or a community treatment order under the Mental Health Act 1983; or 
lacks the mental capacity to serve as a juror. See HMCTS (2017) for further detail.  
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assume’ or ‘I’m not sure’, indicating a higher level of uncertainty in their response to such 
questions in comparison to those about the core role and function of a jury.  
 
Nevertheless, a strong level of understanding of the core function of the jury was displayed 
by the vast majority of the interviewee sample; who, as outlined in the previous Chapter, 
together comprised a range of demographic backgrounds. This suggests that the role of the 
jury is well within the realm of public consciousness. To many court users, an understanding 
of the function of the jury was part of their ‘everyday’ knowledge and understanding of the 
workings of society. There is very little existing research about public knowledge and 
understanding of the jury system, perhaps precisely because such knowledge and 
awareness is regarded as assumed among members of society. When asked about where 
they thought their knowledge about juries came from, responses included ‘it was in the 
back of my mind’ (Viv, prosecution witness) and ‘I think it’s common knowledge – no one 
has told us or taught us, it’s something we just hear’ (Frank, supporter). It is also perhaps 
indicative of the ‘symbolic’ value that the jury holds in the eyes of members of the public 
(Devlin, 1956; Darbyshire, 1997; Hough and Roberts, 2011). 
 
This ‘everyday’ or ‘common’ understanding about the role and function of juries appeared 
to stem from one or more of a number of influences including: the media; friends and 
family; education and experience. Court users tended to regard the media as a primary 
source of information about the role of juries, particularly due to the high volume of 
fictional courtroom dramas produced in the United Kingdom and United States. ‘It’s too 
much CSI, isn’t it?’ laughed Gemma, a prosecution witness, upon being provided with the 
information in Information Card A and realising that she had given a fairly detailed and 
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accurate account of the workings of the jury system. She also reflected upon the 
prominence with which Crown Court cases are reported on in the news media, in 
comparison to the magistrates’ court in which she appeared, and how this impacted upon 
her level of understanding: 
 
‘The Crown Court seems to be on the news a lot more. There’s a lot more kind of 
coverage of it. Obviously big cases seem to be there, so there’s quite a lot that you 
see. … It is probably a bit of a television influence and also like newspapers and stuff 
like that, so I probably picked up bits from there.’  
 
Gemma was not the only court user who reflected upon the extent to which fictional and 
non-fictional court-based television programmes impacted on levels of awareness of juries. 
For example, prosecution witness Evelyn stated:  
 
‘I’ll be honest with you, for me, I like watching Law & Order [laughs]. The TV 
programmes all have 10 to 12 people on a jury. … Honestly I’ve never ever set foot in 
[a Crown] court in my life, I haven’t got a clue –  just watching those programmes 
Law & Order, The Bill, all those programmes.  
 
However, as well as providing court users with an awareness about the role of the jury, 
fictional media had the potential to provide individuals with an inaccurate picture. For 
example, when asked about the jury selection procedure, a couple of respondents described 
a selection process more akin to the US system, where advocates have an influential role in 
106 
 
the selection of the eventual jury panel due to the use of the preemptory challenge. This is 
illustrated in the following quotation from prosecution witness Candice:  
 
‘I believe each barrister gets to choose – and I don’t know if it’s TV telling me that – 
but I believe that it comes down to the barristers get[ting] to select a certain amount 
[of jurors] after they get selected randomly.’  
 
Court users also described how everyday conversations they had entered into with friends 
or family members impacted upon their awareness of the jury. This was described by 
complainant Zara: 
 
‘Growing up, school, parents. I think my mum told me about the jury service ages 
ago. Usually someone will be called into jury in a family, so you know, you just learn 
about it as you grow, gradually.’  
 
Few interviewees reported feeling that formal education had impacted upon their 
awareness of the jury role. Those that did tended to have gained this knowledge as a result 
of further, or higher, education. Belle, for example had completed an AS level Law 
qualification and was able to describe the jury role in detail; while Suzie was the only court 
user interviewee in possession of a Law degree. She felt that this, along with other 
aforementioned sources, such as family and the media, was the strongest influence on her 
awareness of the jury role: 
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‘I just I think I probably knew [about the jury] growing up – because it’s quite a topic 
of conversation. And if anyone talks about a trial in any kind of respect there 
normally is an argument if you are, you know, for or against a jury and then I went 
and did a Law degree. And then my favourite film became 12 Angry Men [laughs]. … 
Probably most of my in-depth knowledge comes from my Law degree.’  
 
The most likely educational forum for school children to receive teaching on the roles of lay 
adjudicators is in the subject of ‘Citizenship’, which is a statutory educational requirement 
for all secondary school children. Although the National Curriculum guidance for Citizenship 
does not stipulate a specified learning requirement in relation to lay adjudication, teaching 
of this topic may fall under the following areas of required teaching, as outlined in the 
Citizenship syllabus: 
 
 ‘the nature of rules and laws and the justice system, including the role of the police 
and the operation of courts and tribunals’ 
 ‘the legal system in the UK, different sources of law and how the law helps society 
deal with complex problems’  
 ‘parliamentary democracy and the key elements of the constitution of the United 
Kingdom, including the power of government, the role of citizens and Parliament in 
holding those in power to account, and the different roles of the executive, 
legislature and judiciary and a free press’  
(Department for Education, 2013, pp. 2-3). 
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Citizenship was introduced as a statutory requirement for secondary school pupils (aged 11-
16) in the National Curriculum in 2002, meaning that around two thirds of court user 
interviewees, due to their age, would not have undertaken formal teaching on the subject. 
Moreover, due to the lack of requirement for teaching on lay adjudication specifically, it is 
not clear whether the small proportion of interviewees who should have undertaken 
Citizenship education would have received teaching on the workings of the jury system. This 
is in contrast with the United States where children receive education about the jury system 
at school (Vidmar, 2000).  What is clear is that participants in this study did not attribute 
their understanding of the jury system to education received at the primary or secondary 
level. These findings support those of Matthews et al. (2004) who found that levels of 
knowledge and perceptions about the criminal justice system among serving jurors were 
often strongly influenced by the media, and to some extent by family and friends, but were 
rarely influenced by the education system. 
 
Experience, perhaps understandably, contributed to court users’ levels of awareness of 
juries. Several court users attributed their awareness of the juror role, at least in part, to 
their direct experience of attending court. In some instances the individual had attended 
court in the course of their occupation. For example, supporter Frank had attended both the 
Crown Court and magistrates’ court as a witness on previous occasions due to his former 
role as a security guard. Meanwhile, Natalie reflected that she had ‘greater knowledge than 
other people possibly just through [the] experience’ of attending court as a complainant.  
 
Overall, the responses of court users indicate a high degree of understanding of the core 
function of the jury. This was evident both among those who were recruited via the Crown 
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Court and those who were recruited via the magistrates’ court.66 This awareness stemmed 
from a number of sources including the media, discussions with friends and family and 
direct experience of the court process. Importantly, the findings provide support for the 
argument of the ‘symbolic’ value held by the jury (Devlin, 1956; Darbyshire, 1997; Hough 
and Roberts, 2011), as indicated by the place it occupies within the public consciousness.  
 
4.1.2 Understanding and awareness of lay magistrates 
 
In contrast to the strong level of understanding of juries, court users’ levels of 
understanding and awareness of the magistracy were much more mixed. It was not 
uncommon for court users to find it difficult, or to be unable, to describe the role of a 
magistrate when asked in interview: 
 
‘I don’t know … I’m not sure … I don’t know if it is higher than the Crown Court, I 
don’t, I really don’t understand about magistrates, I really don’t to be honest with 
you.’ (Gloria, supporter) 
 
‘I have no idea, the only thing that I sort of think I know is that the Crown Court is for 
more serious crimes than the magistrates’ court.’ (Jake, prosecution witness) 
 
                                                     
66
 However, it is perhaps of note that the small number of interviewees who displayed a limited level of 
understanding of the jury were recruited via the magistrates’ court and did not have prior experience of 
attending the Crown Court.  
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In other instances, descriptions of the role of magistrates were partial, or in the words of 
Roberts et al. (2012: 1081), ‘sketchy’. This is illustrated in the following quotation from 
prosecution witness Sandrine: 
 
‘I think a magistrate is – there’s no jury – it’s for much more minor offences, I think. 
And it’s just put before the magistrate and he makes, I think he makes a decision, I 
think – I don’t actually know – I think that’s what he does. I’m not really sure what 
happens in a magistrates’ court.’  
 
Those who displayed some knowledge of the magistracy tended to be familiar with the 
decision-making function and summary nature of the role but were often unclear about 
other aspects of the role. Sandrine, for example, was unfamiliar with the group nature of 
the decision-making task.  
 
Magistrates were often described by court users as ‘judges’. For example, when asked to 
describe the role of a magistrate, supporter Theresa responded: ‘Oh, well, when you say 
magistrate, you mean a judge?’  Although magistrates are indeed ‘judges’ in the sense that 
they are members of the judiciary who make judgements on the outcome of cases and 
applications, the notion of a ‘magistrate’ as a ‘judge’ appeared to be more connected to the 
perception that magistrates are qualified legal professionals or, in the words of prosecution 
witness Evelyn, ‘specialists’. Prosecution witness Gemma stated: ‘I’d presume [a magistrate] 
would be a lawyer or a solicitor – that would be my kind of presumption off the top of my 
head.’ In a similar vein defendant Martin specifically described how he did not think 
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someone from his own occupational background, a railway worker, would be able to 
assume the role of a magistrate: 
  
‘I thought [a magistrate] was like a lay person who’s been in some way a solicitor or 
a councillor or something like that, in a previous life and now they’ve got to a stage 
where they are giving something back. … I know they get paid, but I think it’s, I don’t 
know a bit of a part-time job. It’s something they might do a couple of days a week, a 
bit like consultant surgeon or something, in the sense that they would work a little 
bit, that’s how I see it. … You’d have to have some kind of degree or something, I 
wouldn’t have thought that if I looked up [at the bench] there’d be an old railway 
man sitting there.’ 
 
Upon being provided with Information Card B, it was not uncommon for court users to be 
surprised to hear of the voluntary, and unpaid, nature of the magistrate role. This is well-
illustrated in the responses of Jake and Martin to receiving this information: 
 
‘I didn’t know any of it. One bit that surprised me is that magistrates are members of 
the public that are trained. I thought it would have to be somebody like a fully legal 
representative or something.’ (Jake) 
 
’So you or me can be a magistrate? That is a surprise … So perhaps there are railway 
men o[n] there somewhere! [Laughs]’ (Martin) 
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In line with the perception that magistrates occupied a ‘specialist’ role, only three 
participants – before being provided with information – demonstrated an awareness that 
magistrates sit with the assistance of a legally qualified adviser.  
 
These findings correspond with existing research on levels of understanding of the 
magistracy among members of the public. A third of respondents in Roberts et al.’s (2012) 
study thought that magistrates were part-time professional judges or criminal justice 
professionals. Likewise, over one third of respondents in Sanders (2001) study thought that 
magistrates were paid and a third of respondents in Morgan and Russell’s (2000) study were 
of the view that magistrates were required to have a formal legal qualification. Taken 
together, these findings strongly indicate that the role of the magistrates does not occupy a 
firm position in the public consciousness, particularly in comparison with that of juries, and 
that this is even the case amongst those who have direct experience of attending court. 
Moreover, it lends some support to those who have argued that magistrates occupy a 
‘professionalised’ (Ward, 2017: 99) or ‘quasi-professional’ (Dignan and Wynne, 1997: 196) 
role in the criminal justice system because magistrates tended to be regarded as 
professionals by the uninformed court user. This should be considered in the context of 
arguments about the overall professionalisation of magistrates’ justice due to the increase 
in the number of district judges appearing in the magistrates’ courts in the last forty years 
(cf. Seago, 2000).  
 
However, a good level of knowledge of magistrates was demonstrated by around a third of 
court users. These interviewees were able to describe key aspects of the magistrate role 
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including its lay nature. For example, complainant Natalie described the role of magistrates 
in the following manner: 
 
‘Erm, now I’ve had this conversation with someone quite recently actually. Now I 
believe that again they are not necessarily qualified in law or anything like that, I 
think they are just normal people again. I don’t know how they, what criteria they 
have to apply, but again my understanding is they are not qualified either, they are 
just random people. I think they have to be of a certain profession, possibly, but not 
necessarily. You know like a judge that you get in the Crown Court, obviously he’s 
you know quite high up and qualified, as I imagine anyway, but I don’t think it’s quite 
the same level with the magistrates.’  
 
Nevertheless, even those respondents who were able to describe the core features of the 
magistrate role often did so with some uncertainty, as Natalie’s response illustrates. 
Corresponding with the findings of Roberts et al. (2012), none of the court users were well-
informed as to the selection and appointment process for lay magistrates. Most were not 
able to say how magistrates were appointed. In terms of eligibility, as with juries, the most 
commonly stated exclusion proffered was being in possession of a criminal record; others 
suggested that magistrates were likely to be of a particular standing in the community:  
 
‘You probably have to be perfect. And like never have had debt or something … Do 
they have to be like a community leader or something?’ (Suzie, complainant) 
 
114 
 
‘I think they are leading members of a community, like the elders in villages in other 
countries. They are respected, they’ve never been in trouble, they are upstanding 
citizens, kind of the people we can aspire to be like that have contributed to society 
at large in a positive kind of a manner.’  (Iumi, prosecution witness) 
 
Official guidance on eligibility for the magistracy states that magistrates are required to be 
of ‘good character’ and that it is ‘unlikely’ that an individual will be taken on as a magistrate 
if he or she has been: 
 
1. ‘found guilty of a serious crime’ 
2. ‘found guilty of a number of minor offences’ 
3. ‘banned from driving in the past 5 to 10 years’ 
4. ‘declared bankrupt’67 
 
Therefore – as with juror eligibility – a criminal record would not necessarily exclude an 
individual from joining the magistracy, however depending on the nature and/or frequency 
of conviction(s), it is likely to make joining the magistracy more difficult.68 Comments from 
interviewees about the magistracy being made up of ‘upstanding citizens’ are reflected, in 
part, in the guidance which states that in addition to ‘good character’, lay magistrates are 
required to demonstrate qualities such as ‘social awareness’ and ‘maturity and sound 
                                                     
67
 See: https://www.gov.uk/become-magistrate/can-you-be-a-magistrate [accessed 14.09.17]. 
68
 Chambers, McLeod and Davis (2014: 53) have argued that the imposition of such guidance means that ‘the 
magistracy is weighted against ex-offenders’. 
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temperament.’69 As with juries, court users’ views about eligibility to join the magistracy 
tended to be in line with current practice.  
 
Those with a stronger level of understanding of the role of magistrates tended to be those 
more familiar with magistrates and their work, for example, through knowing a magistrate 
or through having experience of attending the magistrates’ court. Six court users referred to 
knowing a magistrate, usually in the form of a friend or family member. Alex, a defendant 
with previous experience of the magistrates’ court and whose mother is a magistrate, was 
able to describe the role of a magistrate in some detail: 
 
‘Well are they supposed to be a lay person. That kind of means someone who’s just a 
member of the community, I guess. So, a cross-section of the community, different 
ages, different ethnic backgrounds and they are not legally trained. Well they get the 
magistrate training, which is probably guidelines, I don’t know – I’ll have to ask my 
mum but I think she’s got loads of books of guidelines but she hasn’t got any legal 
knowledge. [Laughs] Yes, and they are supposed to be representatives of the 
community, I think. And three of them sit.’  
 
Direct experience of attending the magistrates’ court could contribute to participants’ levels 
of knowledge about the magistrate role. For example, the defendant Holly described how 
her solicitor explained the role of magistrates to her upon her asking why the magistrates in 
her case ‘weren’t wearing them funny wigs’: 
                                                     
69
 There are six qualities in total which, in addition to the above, include: ‘understanding and communication’, 
‘sound judgement’ and ‘commitment and reliability’ (Judicial Office, 2017: 2). 
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‘Like I say it was my first experience and when I went I would have just called them 
judges. It was only they weren’t wearing them funny wigs [that] I actually asked my 
solicitor like “What are they? Why’s there three of them?”’ 
 
However, experience did not necessarily equate to increased levels of awareness. 
Interviewees who had attend the magistrates’ court did not display visibly higher levels of 
understanding of the magistrates’ courts than those who had attended the Crown Court. In 
fact, those with weaker levels of understanding of the magistracy were fairly evenly split 
between court users recruited from the Crown Court and those recruited from the 
magistrates’ courts. Meanwhile, not all respondents who knew, or knew of, a magistrate 
displayed a good level of awareness of the role; and some of the more experienced court 
users had limited levels of knowledge about the magistracy. For example, former police 
officer Geoff was unaware that lay magistrates are not required to be legally qualified or 
that the role is unpaid. This was despite having attended the magistrates’ court on a 
number of occasions due to his former role. 
 
As with juries, education was rarely cited as a factor contributing to levels of understanding 
of magistrates. Again, only those who had received further or higher education in Law, 
namely Suzie and Belle, cited their education as contributing to their level of understanding 
of magistrates.  Importantly, several court users’ with limited levels of knowledge of the 
magistracy attributed this to a lack of public awareness of the role, providing support to 
Sanders (2001:2) assertion that the magistracy is ‘not visible to the public’. In stark contrast 
to the ways in which court users’ awareness of the jury was influenced by the media, no 
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respondents referred to the media as having a role in contributing to their awareness of the 
magistracy. Dominic, a prosecution witness, even joked: ‘No TV programme is made about 
boring magistrates’ cases, are they?’ The lack of visibility of the magistrates’ court, 
particularly in media depictions of the courts, contributed to McBarnet’s (1981: 195) 
assertion that ‘the magistrates’ court is a theatre without an audience’. Crucially, she 
argued that this is due to an ‘ideology of the triviality’ of the magistrates’ court; that is, that 
magistrates’ justice is interpreted as ‘trivial’ by the public, media and criminal justice actors, 
rather than because the cases before the courts are actually ‘trivial’ in nature. The lack of 
public visibility of the magistrates’ court is particularly striking given that, as previously 
highlighted, the vast majority of criminal cases are heard in the magistrates’ court. 
 
Prosecution witnesses Candice and Evelyn, reflected upon how the lack of visibility of the 
magistracy may impact on both awareness, and representativeness, of the magistracy:  
 
‘It’s not something you hear in a conversation. … So yeah we just assume these are 
legal[ly] qualified representatives. And you think they’d get paid for it as well, 
definitely. … If you are trying to get the general public, it’s not known, information is 
not out there. It’s not recognised – I didn’t know.’ (Candice) 
 
‘I suppose again knowledge is power; I suppose a lot of people probably aren’t 
aware that they don’t need to have got this highly specialised training to be a part of 
[the magistracy]. … I suppose it’s probably not publicised well in the volunteering 
sector either because if I didn’t have this conversation with you I wouldn’t know 
that. So it’s probably not publicised enough, unless you are in that group, in that 
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group of people of work. I don’t think it’s something out there that normal lay 
persons know. I know a lot of people that does volunteering but I don’t know anyone 
personally that does volunteering in the magistrates’ sector.’ (Evelyn) 
 
Magistrate interviewees were asked about their views on the extent to which their role is 
understood by members of the public and court users. The dominant response among 
interviewees was that understanding of the magistracy among both members of the public 
and court users is poor. As magistrate Sam explained: 
  
‘Oh they don’t understand it at all. I think, even to be honest, when they are in our 
courts they don’t understand that we are a lay magistracy. … I don’t think the 
general public has a clue frankly … I think they just think we are the judge, they often 
call you “Your Honour”; it depends how educated they are or whether they have 
ever had any interface. But I honestly think most members of the public, if you ask 
them what a magistrate was, they would be able to tell you they are some sort of 
judge, they would probably think they were qualified in some way.’  
 
Interestingly, magistrates’ responses to this question, as the above quotation from Sam 
indicates, tended to reflect the ways in which their role was understood – or perhaps, more 
aptly, misunderstood – by court user interviewees.  
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4.1.3 Summary: understanding and awareness of lay adjudication 
 
Overall, the findings presented above suggest that levels of understanding of juries are 
relatively strong but understanding is much more mixed in relation to the magistracy. 
Generally speaking, court users – across both types of criminal court – displayed a strong 
degree of familiarity with the core function of the jury; that is, to act as ‘fact-finders’ and to 
collectively come to a decision upon the outcome of cases. Strong levels of understanding of 
the jury were exhibited by court users across a range of demographic characteristics 
including age, gender and ethnicity. However, this study has replicated findings of existing 
research which have shown that levels of understanding of the magistracy are weak. There 
were no clear differences in levels of understanding of the magistracy based upon age or 
gender; however, a slightly higher proportion of those from BAME and White Other 
backgrounds displayed weaker levels of understanding of the magistracy. The implications 
of this will be further examined as the Chapter progresses.  Moreover, one of the most 
salient points to emerge is the finding that even those with experience of attending the 
criminal courts – over two-thirds of interviewees had attended the magistrates’ court on at 
least one occasion – were ill-informed as to the basic premise of the magistrate role, 
namely, that decision-making tasks are carried out on a voluntary and unpaid basis by those 
who are not required to be in receipt of legal training. It is important to highlight this 
contrast between the ‘symbolic’ presence of the jury in the public consciousness in 
comparison to the lower levels of ‘visibility’ of magistrates before moving on to examining 
perceptions of the two types of lay adjudicator.   
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4.2 Perceptions of lay adjudication and the question of legitimacy 
 
The centrality of the position occupied by juries and magistrates in the criminal justice 
system means that it is important to explore the extent to which members of the public 
perceive their role and function as legitimate. The perspectives of court users, specifically, 
were sought because it has been argued that in order for institutions to be afforded the 
‘right to govern’, they must be perceived as legitimate by the audiences they serve (Bottoms 
and Tankebe, 2012: 168). In particular, existing research suggests that perceptions of 
legitimacy are influenced by direct experience and interaction (Benesh and Howell, 2001; 
Fagan, 2008). 
 
This section focuses upon how court users perceived the use of juries and magistrates by 
examining the aspects of lay adjudication which court users expressed support for and those 
which inhibited this support. A detailed consideration of court users’ perceptions of the 
value of, or limits to, lay adjudication enables perceptions of legitimacy to be examined. This 
is because doing so provides an indication of the extent to which lay adjudication accords 
with the ‘shared values’ of court users. The presence of ‘shared values’, as previously 
outlined, is regarded as one of the core components of legitimacy (see Beetham, 2013; 
Jackson et al. 2015).70   
 
                                                     
70
 The other core component of legitimacy salient to this study, that of ‘expressed consent’, is difficult to 
ascertain due to court users’ limited degree of choice as to whether or not lay adjudicators were used in their 
case.
 
This means that there is little ‘specific action’ an individual court user can take during the court process 
to ‘publicly express’ support or dissent for the use of lay adjudicators (cf. Beetham, 2013: 91).  Assessments of 
legitimacy which are based upon both the presence of ‘shared values’ and ‘expressed consent’ are presented 
in the remaining Chapters.   
 
121 
 
Overall, the vast majority of court users expressed support for the use of magistrates and 
juries in the administration of justice, particularly at trials; however, this support was often 
dependent upon the extent to which it was perceived that just and impartial decisions could 
be brought about by a group of lay individuals.  
 
4.2.1 Factors which help to confer legitimacy on the justice system  
 
Findings from interviews with court users suggest that interviewees value the use of lay 
adjudicators in the criminal courts. Most participants, when asked in interview, expressed 
the view that juries and magistrates play an important role in the administration of justice. 
More than two thirds of interviewees stated that it is important for the courts in England 
and Wales to have magistrates; an even higher proportion – more than three quarters – 
stated that it is important for the courts to have juries.  The qualitative nature of the study 
enables the factors that underpin such expressions to be teased out and understood in 
greater depth. The findings suggest that court users held a number of interlinking beliefs 
about the use of lay adjudicators that accord with longstanding rationales for lay 
adjudication, such as those outlined in Chapter 2. This is indicative of the presence of 
‘shared beliefs’ between the State (as power-holder) and court users (as the audience) with 
respect to the use of lay adjudication. These include the perceived value of group decision-
making by a cross-section of lay people in contributing to impartial decision-making; the 
importance of lay adjudication in representing the ‘voice’ of society; and the benefits of lay 
decision-making in achieving summary justice.  
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Group decision-making 
 
Interviews with court users suggest that one of the strongest ways in which lay adjudication 
helps to confer legitimacy on the criminal courts arises through group decision-making. 
Support for the group decision-making function of lay adjudicators was expressed by the 
majority of interviewees across a range of demographic backgrounds. Court users were 
asked whether or not they thought it was important to involve members of the public in 
criminal justice decision-making. The below quotations provide just a few examples of the 
high level of regard expressed for the group aspect of the lay adjudicatory function: 
 
 ‘You’ve got 12 people all coming together to discuss their different views, if you’ve 
only got one person, you know, that might listen to a trial it will just be their 
decision. But I think with 12 people you get a good overview, people have different 
ideas of things and I think that’s better’. (Sandrine, prosecution witness) 
 
‘It’s not one person’s view. 12 people have to agree on the information that’s 
presented and if they can’t all agree then I guess there’s reasonable doubt.’ 
(Dominic, prosecution witness) 
 
 ‘Hopefully you would get a better outcome because more people are involved in it. 
You know, more people, sort of pitching in and trying to understand something and 
coming from differing viewpoints’. (Sian, prosecution witness) 
 
The above quotations point to the importance that court users place on the deliberative 
function of lay adjudication in reaching a just decision. Court users were very supportive of 
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the role of a group of lay people deciding the outcome of trials. When asked to answer a 
hypothetical question as to their preferred decision-maker in trials, only three respondents 
(two female complainants and one male prosecution witness) stated that they would like 
trials to be heard by a judge sitting alone. The use of jury decision-making in Crown Court 
trials, specifically, was very widely supported by the majority of interviewees. With regard 
to decision-making by a smaller group of individuals, as in the case of magistrates, court 
users were generally supportive. However, in line with the arguments put forward by 
scholars such as Mazzone (2006), some questioned whether decision-making by a smaller 
group of people is as valuable as decision-making by a panel of twelve people. This is 
indicated in the comments of supporter Frank: 
 
‘I believe that you have to have at least 12 people’s point of view on that particular 
instance. If one person decides whether they are guilty or not, I don’t think that’s fair 
at all. 71  Some people have different ideas, some people can relay them ideas to 
others so they may change their mind and stuff like that. If you just have two or 
three people then the chances are that they could come up with the wrong 
decision’.  
 
Interestingly, the following quotation from Connor, a defendant who was found guilty of 
dangerous driving by a jury, illustrates how his strong degree of support for the group 
decision-making function of the jury withstood the experience of a negative outcome. When 
                                                     
71
 This is the first of several occasions in this Chapter in which an interviewee refers to an aspect of criminal 
justice decision-making as being ‘fair’ or otherwise. It was often difficult to disentangle the meaning behind 
interviewees’ references to ‘fairness’. However, natural justice scholars such as Binmore (2005) would argue 
that this is because, as members of society, our ‘fairness program (sic.) is almost innate and runs well below 
the level of consciousness’ (p. 16).    
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given the hypothetical choice in interview of his preferred decision-maker in a future 
criminal trial, Connor continued to state a preference for the jury, despite having 
experienced a negative outcome. He also expressed support for the lay function of the 
magistracy. However, the most important factor in Connor’s choice of decision-maker was 
the number of people involved in the decision-making process, rather than the specific type 
of adjudicator:  
 
‘I think [I would prefer] a jury because 12 people are better than up to three 
independent people. So I still think I would have gone to Crown Court’.  
 
Nevertheless, although interviewees tended to be less emphatic about the group decision-
making function of the magistracy in comparison to juries, decision-making by a smaller 
group of magistrates was still preferable to some than having the outcome (at trial or in 
sentencing) decided by a lone decision-maker. As prosecution witness, Dominic, 
commented: ‘It’s good that there are three [magistrates], because then it’s not just one 
person – it’s fairer.’  
 
However, it should be stressed that comments such as these did not mean that court users 
were unsupportive of decision-making by a single professional judge. In fact, court users 
were often very supportive of the role of judges at the point of sentencing, particularly at 
the Crown Court. Notwithstanding this, the above discussion is indicative of the wide level 
of support for decisions that require a determination of guilt being carried out by a group of 
lay people. 
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Decision-making by a cross-section of the public 
 
A second aspect of lay adjudication that was highly regarded by court users is the ‘lay’ 
function of the decision-making role. Court users were very supportive of the notion of 
involving ‘normal people’ (Connor), ‘Joe public’ (Dominic) and ‘everyday people’ (Belle) in 
criminal justice decision-making:  
 
‘[It’s] what the British legal system is based on: being judged by your fellow 
members of the community … it’s just fairer.’ (Alex, defendant) 
 
The perception that lay adjudicators come from diverse backgrounds and a cross-section of 
society, served as a strong legitimising factor to the function of lay adjudicators. This is 
illustrated in the following quotation from defendant Jon:  
 
 ‘There are 12 people, so you have 12 different point of views, 12 different 
backgrounds. As it was in [my] case, different cultures, as well was involved – so 
[people from] different parts of the world. And it’s easier when you have 12 people 
in charge of discussing the case … [they are in] one place so everybody can say their 
point of view from a different language, in the light.’   
  
These findings are very similar to those produced by Matthews et al. (2004: 46) who found 
that ‘justice through diversity’ was the most influential factor upon juror levels of 
confidence in the system. Generally speaking, juries were regarded by court users as being 
representative of society, particularly due to the ‘random’ nature of the selection process, 
which was very important to perceptions of legitimacy among court users: 
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‘A random jury, stops any illegal findings. … I mean, you couldn’t really have a court 
case without a jury, I don’t think. It’s important to get 12 individual people’s opinions 
of another person.’ (Theresa, supporter)  
 
The ‘random’ nature of jury selection was on occasion contrasted with the way in which 
magistrates are selected. Interestingly, though responses from court users pointed to a 
(correct) assumption that magistrates were less likely to be from diverse demographic 
backgrounds than jurors, levels of representativeness alone did not appear to negatively 
impact on perceptions of the magistracy. Moreover, magistrates were perceived by some, 
particularly those with experience of this type of lay adjudicator, as likely to be more diverse 
than members of the paid judiciary. Broadly speaking, this appears to be a fairly accurate 
perception. Recent figures indicate that magistrates are more diverse than members of the 
paid judiciary in terms of gender (55 per cent of magistrates are female compared to 29 per 
cent of judges) and ethnicity (12 per cent of magistrates are recorded as being from BAME 
backgrounds in comparison to 7 per cent of judges); however, the picture in relation to age 
is more complex, with those aged 50 and over being overrepresented among both 
magistrates and judges (see Judicial Office, 2018).  
 
Impartiality and independence 
 
The above beliefs – group decision-making by a cross-section of members of the public – tie 
in with established justifications for the role of lay adjudicators, particularly ‘participatory 
democracy’. Proponents of participatory democracy advocate the importance of citizen 
participation and representative decision-making in everyday matters in society; that is, 
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those which extend beyond the remit of voting in elections (Pateman, 1970). However, 
none of the court users in this sample – unlike jurors in Matthews et al’s (2004) study – 
directly referred to the democratic benefits of lay adjudication. This is quite striking 
considering that the value of participatory democracy in criminal justice decision-making 
has been subject to much theoretical consideration but little empirical analysis. Instead, the 
three above factors – i) group decision-making; ii) by a cross section; iii) of ‘normal people’ – 
together serve to confer legitimacy on the criminal courts by helping to promote the 
impartial and independent nature of the justice system. The importance of impartiality in 
the lay adjudicator role was expressed by court users from a range of demographic 
backgrounds and was evident in court users’ descriptions of the fact-finding role of the jury. 
This is illustrated in the quotations from prosecution witnesses Candice and Sandrine: 
 
‘They are there to give a completely non – what’s the word – judging opinion … they 
are there with literally no opinion of the person or the person who’s bringing the 
crime against them. … They are not there for anybody.’ (Candice) 
 
‘They have to discuss it all and decide on the outcome. Discuss it all and not be 
judgemental and just really try and come out with the right outcome.’ (Sandrine) 
 
The notion of impartiality acts as a fundamental way in which lay adjudication is able to 
confer legitimacy on the criminal justice system, particularly because lay adjudicators could 
be regarded as independent from the parties involved in the case, from the courts and, at a 
wider level, from the State. This benefit was described by a substantial proportion of 
interviewees, for example: 
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‘They need a system of some sort that’s of a neutral kind of view because judges and 
what not, they come across people every day and they pass decisions which may not 
be just and which may be on prejudices that they have themselves. They have seen 
people in and out of the system every day, and how they may come across and what 
not. So I think it is good to have an independent view of things from normal people.' 
(Connor, defendant) 
 
 ‘You get a kind of fair division, no one knows each party and, you know, it’s just a 
number of people who are literally just going there and making up a group choice 
about the situation. Kind of like a third eye to the case, I think it’s quite good, quite 
important.’ (Zara, complainant) 
 
These comments lend support to some of the theoretical justifications of lay adjudication; 
namely that lay adjudications can play a role in acting as a check on institutions and the 
government (Blake, 1988; Diamond, 1990; Mazzone, 2006; Redmayne, 2006) and that their 
role acts as a counter-balance to those of criminal justice professionals or judges who can 
be regarded as ‘routinised’ or ‘case-hardened’ (Diamond, 1990; Morgan and Russell, 2000; 
Sanders, 2002).  
 
Lay adjudicators as ‘in touch’ with society 
 
The role that lay adjudicators play in acting as a ‘democratic bridge’ (Sanders, 2002: 326-
327) between the government and the community was evident in the comments of a 
number of court users. This was both in terms of lay adjudicators being perceived as less 
129 
 
jaded than legal professionals but also as being more ‘in touch’ or ‘in tune’ with the 
concerns of wider society. This is reflected in supporter Theresa’s assertion that ‘most 
crimes are committed towards members of the public so they should therefore have their 
say [about] somebody being caught and tried for it.’  
 
In this regard, lay adjudicators are arguably more able to represent the interests of society 
and ‘inject community values’ (Vidmar, 2000: 19) or ‘community norms’ (Diamond, 1990: 
194) into decision-making. They may also be less bound by the need to demonstrate an 
unwavering commitment to the rule of law than are legal actors. The potential value of this 
role is well-described in the following quotations: 
 
‘I think it’s a fairer approach to have involvement from your peers and from people 
in your community… it plays a massive, massive part in justice really and in a lot of 
the legal world it is not about justice if we are all really honest with each other. And 
actually I think [by] involving members of the public, and people of the community … 
there is much more focus then on the justice of the situation rather than the legality 
– I think that’s an important role.’ (Suzie, complainant) 
 
‘Sometimes what’s legally wrong may not be seen as wrong in the eyes of the public. 
… The public could have a very different opinion as to what’s legal, what’s right, 
what’s not right and, you know, [that] may not correspond with what’s actually right 
in the law.’ (Iumi, prosecution witness) 
 
130 
 
Comments such as these, though relatively infrequent, indicate an alignment with the 
perceived benefits of ‘jury nullification’; that is, when jurors choose not to apply the law in 
cases (see, Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, 2000; Redmayne, 2006).  
 
The reciprocal nature of the relationship between lay adjudicators injecting social norms or 
community input into the criminal courts and lay adjudicators themselves benefitting from 
the educational aspects of the role, or aspects of the role that promote citizenship, was 
recognised by a small number of court users. This included complainant, Belle, who voiced 
her enthusiasm about potentially being asked to serve on a jury in the future: 
 
‘I would definitely take it on. Because I feel like it’s a bit like serving our – I know it 
sounds really weird –  but it’s like serving our country because you are going to court 
and making sure like the right people get convicted.’ 
 
 However, despite the plethora of commentary documenting the educative and citizenry 
value of acting as a lay adjudicator (Tocqueville, 1895; Blake, 1988; Diamond, 1990; 
Redmayne, 2006; Gastil et al. 2008), the educative role of lay adjudication was not 
something that emerged strongly from the interviews with court users.  
 
 
Summary Justice 
 
Court users’ comments about the societal, or community, input that magistrates can bring 
to low-level decision-making tie in with a core way in which magistrates, in particular, were 
thought to confer legitimacy in the justice system. It was clear from the responses of a 
substantial proportion of court users, particularly women and those from White British 
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backgrounds, that magistrates were regarded as occupying a legitimate place in the criminal 
courts because of the perceived cost-effective nature of having magistrates deal with low-
level cases:  
 
‘I like the split between Crown and magistrates’. We don’t need a juror for 
everything; for every Tom, Dick and Harry who’s stolen a pen from Woolworths.’ 
(Suzie, complainant) 
 
‘It would take pressure off the Crown Court for more minor crimes. … You can’t have 
people going to court for using a mobile phone in a car at the Crown Court. I mean 
the courts would be full up, you wouldn’t be able to get all the people through the 
system would you?’ (Anita, prosecution witness) 
 
Magistrates, therefore, could be regarded as a ‘first port of call’ (Viv) for dealing with cases 
at the lower end of the spectrum in terms of seriousness, which has the effect of relieving 
the strain upon the Crown Court.   
 
The extent to which the perceived cost-saving benefits of the magistracy are evident in 
practice is unclear (Morgan and Russell, 2000; Crawford, 2004; Ipsos MORI, 2011). Similarly, 
comments on the benefits of the magistracy in dealing with less serious or minor cases 
require a note of caution in view of McBarnet’s (1981) concern about the fallacy of 
presenting magistrates’ justice as ‘trivial’. It is of note that responses of this nature were 
voiced more frequently by those who had attended the Crown Court in comparison to those 
who had attended the magistrates’ court. Nevertheless, what is significant here is the extent 
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to which court users frequently presented this pragmatic justification for the value of the 
magistracy. Court users often strongly favoured decision-making by a large group, however 
several felt that this was not feasible in every circumstance, and in this vein, magistrates 
were regarded by court users as ‘jury-substitutes’ (Sanders, 2002: 331) whose role could be 
justified by the perceived economic benefits that it brought about.  
 
4.2.2 Barriers to conferring legitimacy on the justice system 
 
Though lay adjudication can help to confer legitimacy on the justice system, for example by 
providing a mechanism by which independent and impartial criminal justice decision-making 
can be carried out by a group of ‘normal people’ who represent a cross-section of society, 
there were a number of factors which limited the extent that lay adjudication was regarded 
as legitimate by court users. Interestingly, respondents did not tend to fall into groups of 
those who were exclusively in support of lay adjudication, or a type of lay adjudicator, and 
those who were against it. Instead, often participants’ responses were peppered with 
elements of the two. Some, who were generally supportive of lay adjudication or aspects of 
lay adjudication, often qualified their responses with the perceived limits to it and those 
who expressed less support for lay adjudication, or a type of lay adjudicator, were also often 
able to refer to some of the potential advantages. This points to the particular strength of 
carrying out qualitative research on this topic because the process of conducting in-depth 
interviews enabled the nuanced nature of participants’ perceptions of lay adjudication to be 
brought into view.  
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These findings chime with other pieces of socio-legal research which have examined public 
perceptions of the law or aspects of the criminal justice process. For example, in their study 
of perceptions of the jury system among serving jurors Matthews et al. (2004: 52) found 
that: 
 
‘Jurors responses were complex, often combining the factors that both promoted 
and undermined their confidence. … Those who expressed considerable support for 
the jury system did so with qualifications and those whose confidence was 
diminished because of jury service (considerably fewer), recognised the qualities and 
the strengths of jury trials. There were many instances where tensions and 
ambivalence were evident.’  
 
In a similar vein, Ewick and Sibley’s (1998) qualitative study of how members of the public 
construct ‘meaning’ of and from the law found that their participants’ conceptions of 
legality contained inherent contradictions. Paying close attention to instances of 
contradiction, they argued, is important because rather than being a reflection of a 
‘methodological problem’ or of ‘cognitive deficiencies of individual speakers’ (p. 51), they 
instead help to illustrate that legal consciousness is a process which involves a number of 
‘common’ or ‘collective’ features (p. 247). This reasoning can be applied to the findings of 
this study: though interviewees sometimes displayed contradictory or ambivalent accounts, 
a number of common themes emerged with regard to the perceived benefits of and limits 
to lay adjudication.72 These themes help to guide the discussion below; however, close 
                                                     
72
 Moreover, court users’ accounts resonated with wider theoretical debates on the topic. 
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attention is also drawn to the areas of nuance, ambivalence and contradiction which shaped 
interviewees’ accounts. 
 
Juror levels of understanding 
 
A central area of concern, which could limit the extent to which court users regarded the 
role of lay adjudicators as a legitimate source of authority, was perceived deficiencies in the 
levels of knowledge, expertise and understanding of lay adjudicators and how this may 
impact upon their decision-making abilities. Court users, though generally very supportive of 
the use of jurors due to their lay status, sometimes questioned whether or not jurors have 
the ability to understand some of the legal or evidential complexities presented in trials. 
This is highlighted in the following quotation from prosecution witness Geoff: 
 
‘I think [in] some of these more complex cases I think there should be a 
reconsideration of whether juries are the most suitable. Because they struggle to 
keep up with the detail, you know, [as a former police officer] I’ve been into trials 
and we’ve sort of had, you know, 45 boxes of paperwork, you know, and during the 
trial you are going to weed through all those papers. And the jury, of course, you see 
them glazing over, you know. So yeah, I think certainly some cases you should 
consider whether jurors are the most suited to the task.’  
 
The following response from Alex, a former defendant, provides an example of the nuanced 
views participants could have about the value of lay adjudicators. Alex was positive about 
the diverse groups from which jurors are drawn, but questioned the extent to which lay 
people are equipped to comprehend the complexities that can be involved: 
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‘It’s double-edged because you need to have a fair kind of balance and 
representatives of society but most people haven’t got any legal knowledge ... the 
language and the detail and some of the complexities of what is going on, most of 
the general public haven’t got a clue what the hell is going on. Especially with 
forensics and DNA and even the judges and the legal people may not understand 
fully. … So it’s good and bad. I think you need to have a representation of a 
community. You need to have different people, different backgrounds; classes, ages, 
stuff like that. But I just think most people won’t understand fully what’s going on, 
the ins and outs of the cases.’  
 
Concerns about juror understanding led some court users to suggest means by which levels 
of understanding among jurors could be increased. Alex, for example, suggested that juries 
could be assisted, like magistrates, by a legal adviser. Prosecution witness Dominic, who 
expressed similar reservations, suggested that juror selection could be tailored depending 
on the type of case to ensure that those with technological or financial expertise were 
included in the jury pool. Others, such as prosecution witness Evelyn, suggested that jurors 
may benefit from training in order to carry out their adjudicatory role: 
 
‘[Juries] are not a bad idea as long as I think there should be some training to 
undertake to fill that post. You are making a big decision about somebody’s life. You 
know whatever the decision is made that decision is going to affect that person’s life, 
whether it would be short term or long term. It would be good that, you know, you 
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are going in to have an insight of what it is you’re expected to do … some training I 
think would be helpful.’  
 
These comments indicate a degree of affinity between concerns identified by the literature 
in relation to levels of juror understanding, particularly in complex cases (Ma, 1998; Auld, 
2001; Findlay, 2001; Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, 2000; Redmayne, 2006), and those of court 
users. Court users’ concerns about levels of understanding of juries in complex cases, which 
were raised by court users from varied demographic backgrounds, suggests that there may 
be a degree of support for policy developments which have sought to restrict the right to 
trial by jury, particularly in complex cases (such as Auld, 2001). These findings also indicate 
that court users are supportive of the lay role of juries but that perceptions of legitimacy 
could be enhanced if jurors were to be supported in their role. Meanwhile court users, 
though often surprised that magistrates are not required to undergo formal legal training, 
did not tend to express concern about the extent to which magistrates were able to 
understand the legal proceedings. Much more disconcerting for court users, as is discussed 
further below, is that magistrates are not required to undergo formal legal training; 
particularly given the amount of power the adjudicatory role brings.   
 
Limits to representativeness  
 
As highlighted in the section above, the representativeness of lay adjudicators was one of 
the strongest factors which contributed to enhanced perceptions of legitimacy in the 
adjudicatory role. However, some court users thought that there may be limitations to the 
extent to which lay adjudicators reflect a cross-section on the population. The notion of 
‘random selection’ from the electoral register was central to court users’ sense that jurors 
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represent a cross-section of society. However, a small number of court users questioned the 
extent to which selection from the electoral register is truly representative. Prosecution 
witness Suzie reflected upon the fact that not all members, or sections, of society may be 
equally likely to register to vote: 
 
‘I’m not saying this is anybody’s fault, it’s not a complaint against jury service but I 
don’t think it’s a real representation of society. I think there are a pool of people that 
are more likely to turn up for jury service, that are more likely to be on the electoral 
roll … So you do end up with a cross-section of slightly more, well not necessarily 
middle-class but certainly you end up with more employed people and people that 
care about certain things. There’s a lot of society that aren’t on the electoral roll – 
for one reason or another or they just don’t care about stuff like that. They don’t 
want to vote or they don’t think it’s important or whatever it is, and then they are 
not actually in that pool. … I mean if you are struggling to put food on the table are 
you really going to care about filling in a piece of paper to put you on the electoral 
roll? No you are not.’  
 
This discussion ties in with existing research findings in relation to juror composition which 
has found that the highest rates of jury service are by those from middle to high-incomes 
while unemployed and retired people are underrepresented (Thomas with Balmer, 2007).  
 
With regard to diversity within the magistracy, a number of court users were of the view 
that magistrates may be likely to be of white ethnicity and from older, more affluent and 
better educated sections of society: 
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‘It brings up so many like assumptions about people and stereotypes but you tend to 
think that people that can maybe afford to do that kind of job for no money or can 
get through the application process might have been slightly better educated, more 
wealthy members of society. I mean, that could be totally wrong, but that would be, 
you know, my stereotype.’ (Sian, prosecution witness) 
 
‘I can’t imagine that there’s a huge amount of diversity, [that] would be my kind of 
perception and obviously the whole of the magistrates in my case were mostly 
White British. I would imagine that somebody from a different ethnic background 
that was giving evidence, or even was a defendant, would possibly find it more 
difficult not being judged by their peers – [that] would be my kind of perception of 
it.’ (Gemma, prosecution witness)  
 
Gemma’s response points to the difficulties that arise in the ability of the magistracy, in its 
current composition, to fulfil one of the most frequently cited theoretical justifications of its 
role, that of participatory democracy, and is something which has been levelled as a critique 
of the magistracy on a number of occasions (Dignan and Wynne, 1997; Sanders, 2002; 
Gibbs, 2014a). Comments about the composition of the magistracy should be considered in 
the context of the lack of public visibility of the magistracy (Sanders, 2001), evident in the 
overall poor levels of knowledge about the magistracy, discussed above.  
 
Achieving a representative composition among both the magistracy and jury has important 
implications for the legitimacy of the justice process and was important to interviewees 
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across a range of demographic backgrounds. Importantly, when discussing issues of 
representativeness, court users sometimes referred to limitations in the extent to which 
juries and magistrates comprised individuals from their own demographic backgrounds. For 
example, defendant Connor, a young Black British man, described the jury in his trial as 
‘How do you say it? Probably of a background that is not the same as mine.’ He went on to 
outline the importance of ensuring a representative composition of juries in terms of age73 
and ethnicity. However, Connor was most passionate about ensuring that juries comprise 
individuals from a range of socio-economic backgrounds:   
 
‘I think a jury should, may be not have a set number, but have guidelines that it 
should be mixed to a certain degree. Not only ethnicity, I mean age group, I mean 
social background – people of a wealthy background and people from a poorer 
background – so it is fair, you know.  Because people from a richer background or 
from a certain background might not have the same experiences and same life 
lessons as someone from a different background who may be able to relate and get 
their point across so I think it is good to have a varied jury. Whether if they are all 
black or all white, it doesn’t matter, I think social background is more important than 
ethnicity, in my opinion because, you know, you go through different things in life 
and you see different things.’  
 
                                                     
73
 From Connor’s perspective there were an insufficient number of jurors in his trial from younger age groups. 
In contrast, several other interviewees – from a range of age groups – expressed ambivalence about the lay 
adjudicator role, particularly the role of magistrate, being occupied by young adults. Reservations tended to 
centre upon concerns about whether or not young adults had the necessary, in the words of defendant Jon, 
‘life experience’ to fulfil the role.  
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In a similar vein, complainant Aylin alluded to her own experience when describing the need 
for magistrates to be from a range of backgrounds in order to have an adequate grasp of the 
needs and experiences of court users within their community:  
 
‘I think because we are in such a diverse society … I would think yeah, it would be a 
diverse background of people that would come in [to the magistracy]. You know, 
different cultured people. … [Because] some cultures can explain harassment to 
their families more easily because of their culture and the way they, you know, 
interact … So maybe the insight that you get from different diverse backgrounds in 
such a service would kind of give a more insight on how that person’s been affected. 
You know, it’s easier to go and ask for help [in some communities] but if you can’t 
ask for help that’s worse, and someone who is Muslim, for example, would 
understand that – “Oh yeah it’s difficult to bring out these discussions and stuff” – 
but if you don’t know about the religion then it’s a bit harder to understand how 
much the struggle is.’  
 
Alyin’s comments highlight the significance of achieving a representative composition of 
juries and magistrates in terms of culture and religion, as well as the commonly cited 
demographic characteristics of age, gender, ethnicity and socio-economic status. 
 
Scope for bias and partiality 
 
While some court users spoke of the potential ways in which representativeness among lay 
adjudicators could be limited, this did not tend to be regarded as a strong source of 
concern. More concerning to court users was the extent to which threats to partiality or bias 
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could occur among individual lay adjudicators. Given that one of the most strongly 
legitimising features of the lay adjudicatory role is the perceived impartiality and 
independence that the role brings, it follows that potential for bias or partiality could limit 
the extent to which court users perceived the role as legitimising. In relation to jurors, there 
were some concerns that individuals could bring wider prejudices and stereotypes from 
society to the role. This was described by complainant Belle and defendant Connor:  
 
‘I think [juries are] good, it’s a good idea but you never know who you are going to pick. 
So you could pick someone who’s like racist or sexist and that could influence.’ (Belle) 
 
‘What the legal system wants the jury to be… is an independent panel of people, or 
peers as it was, who listen to the evidence that’s put forward and make a decision on 
the defendant’s guilt or not. But I think obviously, in realistic terms, it’s people from 
different backgrounds, social classes and what not, who come into the courtroom with 
their prejudices – some with and some without – and that’s it, innit? … I think there is, 
the system tries to be unbiased but everyone has their own prejudices or what not. I 
think it is a good thing where, you know, it is normal people who are making a decision. 
But people, at the end of the day, are people – I’m a human being, I try not to [but] you 
have your own prejudices – it is just one of them things.’ (Connor)  
 
In addition to bias being brought into the role through prejudice or stereotyping among 
individual jurors, three court users – all of whom had experience of being a defendant – 
voiced concerns about bias in the form of persuasive individual jurors shaping the eventual 
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decision of the group. Defendants in Fielding’s (2006) study of offences against the person 
cases in the Crown Court expressed similar views.  
 
Court users’ reservations about individual bias or prejudice impacting on the decision-
making role are also reflected by the fact that very few participants (three out of the 28 
interviewees) expressed a preference for decision-making by a lone professional judge at 
the point of trial. With regard to potential for bias in the magistracy, several court users 
expressed suspicion about the factors which may influence magistrates to apply for the 
position and the impact this could have on impartial decision-making: 
 
‘I think a jury is fairer because there is a larger number of people and because they 
are selected at random from the electoral register. And I think perhaps volunteers 
isn’t necessarily the fairest way – I’m talking about magistrates … the nature of it 
being voluntary strikes me as being odd’ (Peter, complainant) 
 
‘[Jurors] are people that are from a varied background and, you know, if they are 
being asked to come as well, they are not choosing themselves to be in that situation 
which is very important because if you want to be involved in something like that 
you have an agenda. You are interested maybe because you are very passionate 
about convicting people, or something, or having justice, which you know, that’s not 
really the place I think you should be coming from. I think [a jury] is just more of an 
innocence. … Whereas if I’m putting myself forward for it, I’d question the motive 
behind that and then how I’m selected.’ (Candice, prosecution witness) 
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Concerns around partiality in the magistracy, thus, tended to centre on court users 
questioning the voluntary nature of the role and the motivations of those who apply for the 
position. However, the opposite was true for other interviewees, some of whom thought 
that the voluntary nature of the magistrate role might ensure that lay adjudicators were 
enthusiastic about, and engaged in the role, and thus increase the validity of the decision-
making. This was contrasted with concerns about apathy among jurors, whose degree of 
choice about serving as a lay adjudicator is much more constrained, and the perceived 
negative impact this could have on their engagement in the decision-making task. This is 
illustrated in the following quotation from defendant, Martin:  
 
‘If I had my choice [of decision-maker in a trial], mine would be magistrates. … I 
consider a trial by jury a lottery in the sense that I might get 12 people [who] you 
know just don’t really want to be there, they’ve been called to something that might 
be an inconvenience to their lives. … So I would prefer somebody like a magistrate 
who’s chosen to be there rather than someone in a jury who’s forced to be there. … 
I’d hate someone sitting in a jury playing on their mobile phone, Candy Crush, or 
whatever and not paying attention.’ 
 
Regardless of the specific source of bias or partiality, the preceding discussion draws 
attention to court users’ sensitivity to instances of bias occurring within the role of lay 
adjudicator; the presence of which could undermine their support for lay adjudication.  
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Responsibility and power  
 
Concerns about bias or partiality leads on to a final factor that could limit the extent to 
which lay adjudication was perceived as legitimate by court users. This is in relation to the 
level of responsibility, and power, afforded to lay adjudicators. Interviewees frequently 
commented upon the degree of power that lay decision-makers have and of the perceived 
gravity of the decision-making task upon the lives of court users. This is illustrated in the 
following quotation from complainant, Aylin: 
 
‘It has negative sides and positive sides: having a whole group of people that live in 
the same society, speak the same language and want the good for their community, 
want to make decisions, sounds good but then on the other side, are they fit enough 
to make those decisions? … I agree that the public do get involved making decisions 
but maybe in terms of legal sense it’s different because it is a higher level, you know, 
you are affecting someone’s life and making decisions [that] change the way their 
life goes. Maybe it’s a bit more harder to say “Well, they should be involved”; maybe 
there are more negative aspects that can affect decision-making.’  
 
Comments imbued with an ambivalence about the degree of responsibility and power held 
by lay adjudicators were present among interviewees from a range of demographic 
backgrounds and included those who had attended the Crown and magistrates’ courts in 
relation to a variety of offence types, such as violent offences, fraud and harassment. 
Unease or ambivalence with regard to the level of responsibility of the role was often 
particularly evident in court users’ responses when asked how they would feel about 
occupying the role of juror or magistrate. Levels of interest in performing the lay adjudicator 
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role were relatively low; just over one third of interviewees expressed an interest in being a 
juror and less than one fifth of interviewees expressed an interest in being a magistrate. 
Interestingly, all interviewees who expressed an interest in becoming a magistrate were 
recruited via the magistrates’ court; that is, none of the interviewees recruited via the 
Crown Court expressed an interest in being a magistrate. The responsibility involved in the 
decision-making task was not something that many court users relished:  
 
‘You’d be frightened of making a wrong decision … I think now I’d probably be 
frightened [for] whoever’s in the dock – you’re the one that’s deciding about his 
future’ (Meg, supporter) 
 
‘No, I think it would be too much, it’s too much pressure for someone like me to 
have to decide someone’s fate and stuff like that, I wouldn’t like that responsibility.’ 
(Holly, defendant) 
 
‘I don’t know – I just feel like I don’t want to be responsible for someone’s life or 
have the authority to affect someone in such a serious way, it’s not my personality, I 
just don’t feel comfortable being that responsible over someone, having that 
power.’ (Alex, defendant) 
 
Court users expressed discomfort about the potential emotional impact not only in the 
decision-making task but also in the process of hearing cases. A number of interviewees 
spoke of how they would struggle to leave their feelings behind in the courtroom. It was not 
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uncommon when asked how they would feel if called for jury service, for court users to raise 
particular concerns about the type of case they may be required to hear: 
 
‘I work in a job [midwifery] that’s bringing life into the world, so generally I have 
quite a happy life and as awful as it sounds, you know, hearing the awful things that 
go on day in and day out is just not my personality really. I don’t think it would do 
me very well.’ (Gemma, prosecution witness) 
 
‘I’m the kind of person that would take on everyone’s problems very seriously. I 
would just keep thinking of it all day. I don’t think I could separate it from my private 
life; some people can do, I know I can’t.’ (Irenka, defendant) 
 
In contrast with their own relative powerlessness in proceedings, court user interviewees 
thus tended to be particularly attuned to, and to some degree ambivalent about, the levels 
of power bestowed upon lay adjudicators.  
 
Court users were sometimes most ambivalent about the level of power, or responsibility, 
conferred upon lay adjudicators because they do not receive formal legal training. The 
above discussion illustrated a degree of unease felt by court users regarding the extent to 
which jurors are able to understand and comprehend legal proceedings. Interviewees often 
also expressed a note of caution about the decision-making function of lay magistrates in 
this regard. This is illustrated in the following quotation from complainant, Suzie: 
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‘Do you want to know my thoughts on [magistrates]? I think it is a very bizarre way 
that our criminal justice system works that we have lay people being advised on law. 
I get the reasoning behind it, maybe it’s more of a community act, like kind of 
grasping the social norms of those communities but I find it very odd and I’m not 
convinced that somebody without legal training should really be sat in such a 
position of power in the criminal court. … If you are going to sit in a position of 
power in a legal scenario, I think you should be a judge and have gone through legal 
training and have been a lawyer and have that background. And I understand that 
they are advised on points of law and all that kind of stuff but sometimes it’s not 
about points of law, it’s about more than that.’  
 
This provides a further example of court users’ conflicting views about the role of lay 
adjudication: Suzie was supportive of the lay role in the sense that it brings ‘social norms’ or 
community input into decision-making – this is also illustrated in her comments about the 
role of lay people in bringing a sense of ‘justice’ to the situation on page 129 – but she was 
very uneasy about the level of responsibility given to those who are not required to hold a 
formal legal qualification. Similar comments were also made by several court users in 
respect to juries. Natalie, a complainant in a case involving sexual violence, made the 
following comments: 
 
‘I think [jurors] are people that may not necessarily have experience in that 
situation; the lawyers and people that work in the law they study and have 
qualifications, you know, and they’ve studied for a long time. And in my personal 
experience I feel that [jurors, who] might not necessarily understand the situation, 
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or may make a judgement or what not, are making a decision that affects my life as 
well as the other people that are involved and I just don’t know if that is quite right.’  
 
These comments suggest that court users, as those with the most at stake and least power 
in criminal proceedings (Benesh and Howell, 2001), can feel uneasy or ambivalent about the 
level of power given to those without formal legal standing and that, conversely, legal 
qualifications and professional expertise equate to a legitimate source of authority. This is 
reflected in the level of support articulated for the paid judiciary. Judges were often 
regarded as a legitimate source of authority in sentencing decisions. When asked about 
their preferred choice of sentencer, over two thirds of court users expressed a preference 
for judges to oversee sentencing decisions: 
 
‘Oh it would be a judge all day long wouldn’t it? … If I was being sentenced by 
somebody I’d want them to have a very extensive law background. … Yeah, I don’t 
really like the idea of Joe Blogs sending me to prison.’ (Jake, prosecution witness)  
 
‘You just feel a bit more secure when you know it’s a judge because they’ve got the 
legal knowledge, they’ve got the criminal knowledge, they know exactly what 
harassment is … you feel a bit safer, I think, … than just people from the community. 
I just think in my point of view, the judge will end up being a bit more in my 
positives, because as I said because of the legal status really’. (Aylin, complainant) 
 
Furthermore, while court users were often very supportive of lay adjudication at the point 
of trial, a small number of interviewees voiced unprompted support for the inclusion of a 
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judge – alongside lay adjudicators – at all stages of criminal proceedings. This is described by 
defendant Holly: 
 
‘I think that the jury is a good idea. The magistrates, obviously my experience was 
good; I just think with the jury they obviously entitle the guilty or the non-guilty and 
then it’s down to the judge to give his final word which would be the sentencing – 
and I do feel that that should be the same sort of thing in the magistrates’. … I just 
think it’s people’s lives. Do you know what I mean? It’s people’s livelihoods that are 
in the hands of people that although … they’ve had training and stuff like that it’s not 
the right amount of training to a judge or even a solicitor or lawyer, do you know 
what I mean?’   
  
The level of support for judges ties in with the findings of existing research. Matthew’s et al. 
(2004) found that judges elicited high levels of confidence among serving jurors; while 
Jacobson et al. (2015) found that Crown Court judges were largely perceived to be impartial, 
polite and respectful by victims, witnesses and defendants. Comments from court users, 
such as Holly, are indicative of support for hybrid decision-making between legal 
professionals and lay adjudicators. This study did not set out to specifically examine court 
users views of hybrid decision-making involving a panel of lay adjudicators and a 
professional judge, akin to those offered in civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany. 
However, the above comments point to the potential for support for hybrid decision-making 
among members of the public. The scope for hybrid decision-making in the criminal courts 
in England and Wales was raised mostly recently by the Auld Review (2001). It has also 
attracted some support from scholars such as Sanders (2002) who advocated panels 
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comprising a district judge and two lay magistrates in the magistrates’ courts in contested 
trials, bail hearings and sentencing hearings at the more serious end of the spectrum.  
 
4.2.3 Lay adjudication, legitimacy and the wider criminal justice process 
 
Findings from interviews with court users suggest that overall, despite the aforementioned 
challenges, lay adjudication serves to confer legitimacy in the criminal courts. Having 
outlined the main factors that can support and undermine the use of lay adjudicators in the 
criminal courts, this is perhaps a useful juncture to tease out some of the main similarities 
and differences regarding perceptions of lay adjudication based upon the demographic 
characteristics of the sample and other salient factors, such as the type of court attended by 
the interviewee and the type of alleged offence under consideration by the courts.74  
 
Lay adjudication was regarded as an important feature of the criminal justice system by 
most interviewees. Juries were held in a slightly higher esteem than magistrates. As 
highlighted above, more than three quarters of interviewees stated that the role of juries 
was important; this proportion was slightly lower with regard to lay magistrates (at just over 
two thirds). Interestingly, however, support for the magistracy was stronger among those 
who were recruited via the magistrates’ court; the vast majority of interviewees (more than 
three quarters) recruited via the magistrates’ court thought that it is important for the 
courts to have magistrates – this proportion fell to just over half for those who were 
recruited via the Crown Court. While it is difficult to draw clear conclusions about 
perceptions of lay adjudicators based upon the type of court attended by individual court 
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 However, it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations of doing so due to the small sample size under 
examination, comprising twenty-eight interviews with court users. 
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users – because around a third of interviewees had attended the Crown or magistrates’ 
court on a previous occasion – these findings suggest that direct experience of the 
magistrates’ court enhances perceptions of the magistracy.   
 
No clear differences emerged in relation to perceptions of lay adjudication based upon the 
offence type for which individual court users appeared at court. However, several broad 
themes emerged on the theme of offence type in court users’ discussions. For example, 
those who voiced concerns about juror levels of understanding in cases often referred 
specifically to jurors encountering difficulties in understanding fraud cases. Meanwhile, 
magistrates were spoken of positively for dealing with offences described as ‘minor’ or 
‘petty’, such as driving offences or shoplifting; while several interviewees spoke of the 
importance of reserving juries for more serious offence types such as, sexual violence and 
murder.  
 
In terms of variation in perceptions of lay adjudicators based upon the demographic 
characteristics of the sample, there were no clear differences in overall perceptions of lay 
adjudicators based upon gender or age. However, in relation to the latter a higher 
proportion of those aged thirty-five and over regarded magistrates as important compared 
to those aged under thirty-five. Conversely, a higher proportion of those aged under thirty-
five regarded juries as important compared to those aged over thirty-five. The most salient 
finding based upon the demographic characteristics of the sample concerns ethnicity. There 
was a very high degree of support for the use of both types of lay adjudicator among those 
from BAME and White Other backgrounds. All except one of the interviewees from BAME 
and White Other backgrounds regarded juries as important; all interviewees from BAME and 
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White Other backgrounds regarded magistrates’ as important. Higher degrees of 
ambivalence about the magistracy emerged among White British interviewees. This finding 
is interesting considering that levels of understanding of the magistracy were slightly higher 
among White British interviewees in comparison to those from BAME and White Other 
backgrounds. The implications of this are explored further in the conclusion to this Chapter. 
 
However, before concluding this Chapter two final themes are worthy of consideration. The 
first involves further examination of how perceptions of lay adjudication can be linked to 
existing theorisations on the concept of legitimacy. As highlighted in Chapter 2, perceptions 
of legitimacy are regarded as being reliant upon a number of ‘drivers’ or ‘antecedents’. In 
particular, existing theorists have sought to ascertain the extent to which perceptions of 
legitimacy are driven by factors relating to process, such as procedural justice, and/or 
outcome, such as distributive justice and effectiveness.  
 
Perceptions that can be framed within the procedural justice tradition were discernible at a 
number of points in the above discussion. For example, court users’ concerns about the 
extent to which lay adjudication offers an independent and impartial form of justice are 
clearly situated within Tyler’s (2007) framing of the role of ‘neutrality’ in achieving 
procedurally fair decisions. In relation to the impact of outcome upon perceptions, the 
discussion of court users’ responses regarding the value of the magistracy in achieving 
‘summary justice’ is related to concerns surrounding effectiveness; while the perceived 
benefits of group decision-making in helping to achieve the fairest outcome are situated 
within the distributive justice tradition.  However, the complexity of the above responses is 
illustrative of the difficulties of separating notions of process and outcome. Decision-making 
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by an impartial group of lay people was regarded as both being a procedurally fair form of 
decision-making and one which was likely to contribute to achieving distributive justice. 
That is, not only did both process and outcome ‘matter’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 172) but, in 
the minds of court users, fair processes were perceived to enhance the likelihood of fair 
outcomes. These findings extend the tentative conclusions drawn by MacCoun and Tyler 
(1988) who found that procedural fairness of jurors was valued among citizens, in part, 
because it was perceived to enhance the accuracy of decision-making.   
 
Moreover, the nuanced nature of responses suggest that it is important to focus not simply 
upon the factors that can ‘drive’ or inhibit perceptions of legitimacy but on the degree to 
which certain aspects of lay adjudication confer legitimacy in the criminal courts. A number 
of court users who expressed support for the use of lay adjudicators – or perhaps more 
accurately, aspects of the lay adjudicatory process – did so in relatively emphatic terms.  
Complainant Peter stated that juries are ‘the fairest way to get justice’; while supporter 
Frank commented ‘I didn’t know [about magistrates] before but now I know that I think it’s 
a great idea’. On the other hand, also discernible in the accounts of several court users was 
the presence of a relatively benign acceptance of lay adjudication – particularly in relation to 
aspects of lay adjudication that interviewees’ did not necessarily agree with. This is evident 
in the following quotations:   
 
‘The jury system for me is the one that, I don’t know if you’d say it’s old hat, but it 
definitely needs reviewing … and I’m sure if you went to court and changed it 
everyone would be up in arms. Before you say “get rid of it”, you’ve got to have an 
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alternative, and until someone’s got an alternative, that’s what you’ve got to live 
with.’ (Martin, defendant) 
 
‘Hmmm I don’t know [about the magistracy]. Because it is functioning, there must be 
a reason that they exist.’ (Peter, complainant) 
 
Thus among these respondents lay adjudication was accepted for one of two reasons: i) 
because it was regarded as better than the ‘alternative’ (Sanders, 2002: 329), or ii) due to an 
implicit acceptance that the courts must ‘be this way for a reason’. Such responses indicate 
a degree of fatalism (cf. Blumberg, 1969; Jacobson et al. 2015) as to the role of lay 
adjudicators and are associated with an ‘implicit legitimacy’ (Fielding, 2006: 7) being 
afforded to the courts rather than a strong, or ‘true’, sense of legitimacy (cf. Bottoms and 
Tankebe, 2012). This points to the value of regarding legitimacy as fundamentally ‘dialogic’ 
in nature rather than simply as a concept with antecedents that require isolation and 
measurement (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). 
 
The acceptance that the courts operate in the manner that they do ‘for a reason’ is closely 
connected with Jacobson et al.’s (2015: 191) observation that court users perceive the 
courts as ‘a vast criminal justice machine that operates by its own unstoppable and 
inevitable logic’ and leads on to a final factor of note in this Chapter. This is of the potential 
limits to the extent that lay adjudication can, in isolation, promote perceptions of legitimacy 
in the criminal justice process. Assessing the extent to which lay adjudication could confer 
legitimacy on the courts was, from the outset, a primary aim of this study. This Chapter has 
highlighted the multiple ways in which lay adjudication does, in fact, confer legitimacy on 
155 
 
the criminal courts, however findings from interviews with court users suggest that other 
aspects of the court process can impact upon the extent to which the criminal courts are 
perceived as legitimate. In interview, it was not uncommon for court users to respond to a 
question about lay adjudication with a comment about another aspect of their experience 
of the court process. For example, when asked for her perspective about whether the jury in 
her case were able to understand, prosecution witness Sian responded: 
 
‘Did they understand what was said? Yes. Obviously, there’s a lot that you are not 
allowed to say, which is frustrating. Because, I don’t know if this is of any use, but 
the CPS [had] ruled that a lot of the evidence was going to be heard. And then it 
turned out that the paperwork hadn’t been handed over to the defence so only one 
count was allowed to be heard.’  
 
As the above quotation illustrates, Sian responded with a one-word answer of ‘Yes’ to the 
question posed but proceeded to discuss a further point that had a bearing upon her 
perceived legitimacy of the process, her frustrations that the jury were only able to hear 
evidence about the singular charge under consideration. The role of the court user as a ‘tiny 
part’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 191) in an unfamiliar and powerful social system was also 
apparent in the response of complainant Aylin. When asked about her level of 
understanding of the magistracy, she described the way in which she struggled to absorb 
the information provided to her about this by the Witness Service because of the 
nervousness she was feeling in the lead up to giving evidence:  
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‘I mean when you say “magistrates’ court”, you know you just think “OK - ‘court’”, 
you know, you get a judge, you get a jury … When you are going through the process 
people explain it to you [but] because you are so anxious you don’t really listen as 
much as you normally would. So I think that might be the reason why I couldn’t quite 
catch it.’ 
 
In sum, court users’ levels of understanding and perceptions of lay adjudication cannot be 
considered in silo from their overall experience of the criminal courts. That is, perceptions of 
lay adjudication act as just one constituent, or group of constituents, in court users’ 
interaction with the ‘vast machine’ of criminal justice. It is therefore important to pay close 
attention to the other factors which can shape perceptions of legitimacy among court users.  
This is addressed in the Chapters that follow primarily by focusing upon the ways in which 
lay participants engage with the criminal courts. It is argued that the ways in which lay 
participants engage with the criminal courts acts as an important indicator of their 
perceptions of the overall legitimacy of the criminal courts. This is because examining how 
individuals engage with the process provides a means by which two of the core components 
of legitimacy, ‘shared values’ and ‘expressed consent’, can be considered. 
 
 
4.3 Concluding thoughts  
 
This Chapter has examined levels of understanding and perceptions of lay adjudication 
among court users. The findings suggest that despite mixed levels of understanding of the 
157 
 
roles of lay adjudicators, generally speaking, the use of juries and magistrates enhances 
perceptions of legitimacy in the criminal courts. 
 
Levels of understanding were stronger in relation to the function of the jury than the 
magistracy. This reflects the ‘symbolic’ value of the jury and the presence it holds within 
public consciousness. This is in stark contrast to the less ‘visible’ role of the magistracy, 
despite the fact that over 90 per cent of criminal cases are heard in the magistrates’ court 
(Ministry of Justice, 2016a). The lack of visibility of the magistracy has a number of 
implications. Firstly, if members of the public are unaware of the lay nature of the 
magistracy they are perhaps less likely to consider applying for the position because they 
are not aware that they are eligible to do so. This point is particularly salient given that 
levels of understanding of the magistracy were slightly weaker among those from BAME and 
White Other backgrounds and has implications for the representativeness of the magistracy. 
Secondly, a lack of awareness of the role of magistrates has the potential to undermine 
some of the core justifications for the system. For example, if court users are not aware of 
the lay nature of the magistrate role, this could in turn impact upon the extent to which lay 
adjudication performed by magistrates is perceived as a form of ‘trial by peers’. A further 
implication concerns the role that formal education might play in both improving levels of 
understanding, and correspondingly increasing the representativeness, of the magistracy 
and the jury. The findings from this study suggest that, at present, formal education appears 
to play a very limited role within this. 
 
Nevertheless, the findings suggest that in the main both forms of lay adjudication function 
to enhance perceptions of legitimacy in the criminal courts. At an overarching level this was 
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indicated by the fact that more than two thirds of interviewees were of the view that 
magistrates play an important role in the administration of justice; this proportion increased 
to more than three quarters with respect to juries. In-depth analysis of interviewees’ views 
indicated that support was grounded in the perceived value of group decision-making by a 
cross-section of lay people in contributing to impartial decision-making; the importance of 
lay adjudication in representing the ‘voice’ of society; and benefits of lay decision-making in 
achieving summary justice. 
 
The notions of ‘community’ or ‘local’ justice were largely absent from, or incidental to, court 
users’ discussions as to the perceived benefits of lay adjudication; as were specific 
discussions of the potential ‘democratic’ benefits of lay adjudication. This is in contrast to 
much of the literature which points to the perceived benefits of lay adjudication in this 
regard (Pateman, 1970; Dignan and Wynne, 1997; Morgan and Russell, 2000; Vidmar, 2000; 
Matthews et al., 2004). It may reflect the relative powerlessness of court users in criminal 
proceedings, or wider issues regarding levels of engagement and fragmentation in society 
(see, for example, Putman, 1995, Young, 1999), which will be returned to further in the 
following Chapters. It was very uncommon for court users to expressly challenge the overall 
premise of lay adjudication, and those that did usually challenged an aspect of it – such as 
the absence of legal qualifications among magistrates or questions of understanding among 
jurors – rather than lay adjudication as a whole. None of the court users interviewed wholly 
rejected the current administration of criminal justice; that is, that which involves both lay 
and professional adjudicators. 
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Factors which served to undermine the legitimacy of lay adjudication, in correspondence 
with the literature, tended to centre upon the extent to which the perceived benefits of lay 
adjudication are achievable in practice. For example, court users valued the notion of 
decisions being carried out by members of the public from a cross-section of society but 
sometimes questioned the extent to which this could be achieved. In a similar vein, court 
users were of the view that lay adjudication could bring a higher degree of impartiality and 
independence into the system but were sensitive to arenas in which, in practice, scope for 
bias could occur.  This suggests that in order to enhance perceptions of legitimacy, effort is 
required to ensure that the benefits of lay adjudication, such as decision-making by a group 
of lay individuals who represent society at large, can be maximised in reality. This includes 
by ensuring that lay adjudicators represent a cross-section of society based upon a variety 
of demographic characteristics including age, gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, 
sexuality, religion and culture.  
 
The status quo of decision-making in the Crown Court was largely accepted, which may in 
part reflect higher levels of understanding about the nature of decision-making in this 
jurisdiction; however, concerns were raised about the extent to which jurors are able to 
understand complex proceedings. There may, thus, be scope for consideration about the 
most suitable approach when levels of understanding are at their weakest, for example, in 
very complex cases. Acceptance for the status quo with regard to decision-making in the 
magistrates’ court was less clear; this may in part be due to the opacity surrounding 
magistrates’ court proceedings and the more limited levels of understanding of the 
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magistracy.75 The use of a group of lay magistrates to decide upon the outcome of cases, 
particularly trials, was valued by the majority of participants; however, arguments were 
raised about the need to include legal professionals in the decision-making process, 
particularly at the sentencing stage. This is illustrative of a disjuncture between the 
perceptions of court users and current practice, not only in relation to the sentencing 
powers of magistrates but also with regard to the role of the district judge, who can at 
present hear both trials and sentencing hearings while sitting alone. While these findings 
suggest support for the latter, they raise questions about the potential level of support for 
the former among court users. These are important questions to consider given the level of 
respect court users afforded to the gravity of the decision-making task. It is, nevertheless, 
notable that the findings of this study indicate that perceptions about the type of decision-
maker in the criminal courts are not a zero-sum game between lay adjudication on the one 
hand and professional adjudication on the other. 
 
Finally, although these findings indicate that lay adjudication does confer legitimacy on the 
criminal courts, lay adjudication often appeared to be just one factor, in a myriad of others, 
that shape perceptions of legitimacy. Court users’ broader perceptions of legitimacy are 
examined through the lens of ‘engagement’ in the Chapters that follow.   
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 It is, however, noteworthy that experience of attending the magistrates’ courts – which arguably has the 
effect of increasing its ‘visibility’ in the eyes of individual court users – appeared to have a positive impact on 
interviewees’ perceptions of the magistracy. 
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Chapter 5: A continuum of engagement for lay participation in the 
criminal courts  
 
In the previous Chapter it was argued that the use of lay adjudicators can help to confer 
legitimacy on the criminal courts. Notwithstanding this, findings from interviews with lay 
participants and observations of court proceedings suggest that there are a number of 
wider factors at play when examining the extent to which the criminal courts are perceived 
as legitimate. In this Chapter, in examining Research Question 3, I argue that the ways in 
which people engage with the court process acts as a lens through which to understand 
perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, it is claimed that the extent to which a lay participant 
engages with the court process illustrates the degree to which the individual perceives the 
courts as legitimate.  
 
The main aim of this Chapter, therefore, is to specify how engagement can be construed 
and characterised empirically by focusing upon the engagement of the two main groups of 
lay participant under study: court users (specifically, complainants, prosecution witnesses 
and defendants) and lay adjudicators.76 I argue that engagement in the criminal courts takes 
place along a continuum which consists of two axes: alignment and participation. Based 
upon this continuum, engagement is characterised in one of five ways: ‘active alignment’, 
‘passive alignment’, ‘dull compulsion’, ‘resistance’ and ‘withdrawal’. ‘Active aligned’ 
engagement represents the strongest form of engagement while ‘withdrawal’ represents 
the weakest form of engagement. High degrees of engagement are indicative of strong 
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 As will be described below, the discussion of ‘lay adjudicators’ largely pertains to lay magistrates due to the 
absence of empirical data collected on the engagement of jurors.  
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perceptions of legitimacy; conversely, low degrees of engagement are indicative of weak 
perceptions of legitimacy. Conceptualising engagement in this manner enables Bottoms and 
Tankebe’s (2012) influential concept of ‘dialogic’ legitimacy to be elaborated upon within 
the under-researched setting of the criminal courts. This is because it allows us to 
distinguish ‘true’ legitimacy from ‘weak’ legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012: 149) and 
to further understand what sits in between these two extremes. The study’s qualitative 
approach is of particular importance here because it enabled a focus on the minutia of 
interactions between lay participants and the courts in the context in which they occurred. 
Examining such relations ‘in situ’ is regarded as a particularly valuable tool for furthering 
knowledge on the concept of legitimacy (Loader and Sparks, 2013:109; Skinns et al. 2017).   
 
5.1 Defining ‘engagement’ and the place of legitimacy  
 
It is first important to explain what is meant by the term ‘engagement’. The consideration of 
engagement is situated in the broader sociological tradition of symbolic interactionism 
(Becker, 1963), and focuses primarily upon how individual lay participants interact with, and 
respond to, legal authorities and the court system. For the purposes of this study, 
engagement is defined as comprising two main dimensions: alignment and participation.  An 
individual’s level of alignment with the courts is based on the degree to which the 
individual’s involvement in the process is based upon normative cooperation. An individual 
with a high degree of alignment is likely to cooperate with the courts on a voluntary basis; 
an individual with a low degree of alignment is unlikely to cooperate with the courts on a 
voluntary basis. The response of the latter is likely to be one of either i) a refusal to 
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cooperate or ii) compliance that is borne out of instrumental motivations, such as fear of 
the imposition of a sanction for non-cooperation.   
 
An individual’s level of participation in the court process consists of two main features: 
understanding and expression. Understanding is defined in terms of the degree to which lay 
participants are able to understand the specific aspects of the court process, such as the 
language used and procedural features, and at a broader level how the individual ‘makes 
sense of’ (cf. Ewick and Silbey, 1998: 226) their own role within the process. Expression is 
defined in terms of the extent to which individuals can and do communicate with those in 
the courtroom and with the wider criminal justice system. Expression can be both verbal, 
for example in the asking or answering of questions, and non-verbal, for example by passing 
a note to an advocate or refusing to respond to an order or request.  
 
Figure 5.1.1 Defining ‘engagement’ in the criminal courts 
 
 
Defining engagement in this manner provides a lens through which to understand the 
extent to which the courts are perceived as legitimate. This is because a focus on alignment 
represents the extent to which ‘shared values’ exist between the courts and lay participants; 
while an examination of participation represents the extent to which individuals accord the 
courts ‘expressed consent’ to govern. The concepts of ‘shared values’ and ‘expressed 
consent’ comprise two of the core features of legitimacy, as agreed upon by prominent 
thinkers in the field of legitimacy across disciplines, such as criminology, political science 
+ = Engagement Participation 
(understanding + 
expression) 
Alignment 
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and psychology (see, for example, Tyler, 2011; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Beetham, 2013; 
Jackson et al; 2015).77 Moreover, an examination of engagement serves to illustrate the 
‘dialogic character’ of legitimacy that exists between the power-holder (the courts) and its 
audience (court users) (cf. Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012: 159) by providing a means by which 
to distinguish strong perceptions of legitimacy from weak perceptions of legitimacy.  
 
5.2 A continuum of engagement  
 
Findings from the empirical research conducted for this study suggest that levels of 
engagement among individual lay participants takes place along a continuum that is made 
up of two axes: alignment and participation. Based upon this continuum, engagement can 
be characterised in one of five ways: ‘active alignment’, ‘passive alignment’, ‘dull 
compulsion’, ‘resistance’ and ‘withdrawal’. Each of the five types of engagement is 
described below; a graphical representation of this continuum is provided in Figure 5.2.1. It 
should be noted that an individual’s level of engagement is characterised by a degree of 
fluidity: engagement does not necessarily remain constant and can vary at different points 
in time. However, broadly speaking the engagement of some groups of lay participant, such 
as magistrates, is fairly static: that is, engagement remains fairly constant in one quadrant of 
the continuum. In order to frame the discussion, the typology underlying the quadrants is 
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  Jackson et al’s (2015:137) assertion that legitimacy comprises the ‘two connected beliefs’ of ‘consent’ and 
‘moral validity’ is of particular note to this argument. However, in contrast to Jackson et al. (2015), the term 
‘moral’ has been eschewed in the discussion of alignment in favour of a broader consideration of ‘shared 
values’. This is because, as illustrated as the Chapter progresses, an individual’s level of alignment with the 
court process can depend upon shared ‘morals’ between the individual and the courts but this was not always 
the case. An individual’s degree of alignment with the process was often also dependent upon the presence of 
other shared beliefs which extend beyond the realm of morality. With regard to the third component of 
legitimacy outlined by Beetham (2013), that of ‘legality’, in line with the discussion in Chapter 2 surrounding 
the anticipated difficulties in measuring perceptions of ‘legality’ within the legal setting of the criminal courts, 
it is perhaps useful to note that none of the lay participants under study explicitly questioned the legality of 
proceedings. This perhaps best represents a sense of ‘implicit legitimacy’ (Fielding, 2006: 7) by lay participants 
that the criminal courts act in a lawful manner.    
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discussed and some relevant methodological observations are noted; after this the Chapter 
moves on to considering how and where different lay participants can be placed along the 
continuum. The reason for presenting the continuum of engagement at the outset of the 
Chapter before describing the spread of data along the continuum is to ensure that the 
conceptualisation is presented in as coherent a manner as possible.78  
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 Further detail of the process of analysis is provided on pages 90-97 of Chapter 3. 
Figure 5.2.1: A continuum of engagement in the criminal courts
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5.2.1 Types of engagement 
 
Active aligned: This represents the strongest form of engagement because it denotes a 
willingness to be involved which is based on voluntary, or normative, cooperation with the 
courts. The individual lay participant is able to fully understand and make sense of their role 
in the process, holds a good degree of understanding about aspects of the court process and 
can express him or herself where necessary.  
 
Passive aligned:  This pertains to lay people who participate in the process in a passive way, 
but one which is aligned with the overall authority of the courts. This means that the 
operation and function of the courts corresponds with the shared values of the lay 
participant and their participation is based on normative cooperation. Expression among 
‘passive aligned’ lay participants is likely to be limited and such participants may understand 
some but not all aspects of the criminal justice process. Passive acceptance (cf. Jacobson et 
al. 2015) is the weakest form of passive alignment. Passive acceptance occurs when an 
individual lay participant displays a basic level of alignment with the courts and their 
function. This means that there is a degree of acceptance of the courts and their function 
but one which only just passes into the top half of the ‘aligned’ axis. Consequently, 
interactions with the court lack meaning; that is, the individual may have a limited ability, or 
desire, to understand proceedings or express him or herself. 
 
Dull compulsion: Lay people whose engagement in the court process is characterised by 
‘dull compulsion’ (cf. Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012) are those for whom co-operation with 
the court process is solely for instrumental reasons. This means that the function of the 
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courts does not accord with the shared values of the lay participant, yet the individual does 
ultimately participate due to the threat, or imposition, of a sanction. Interactions with the 
court are constrained; expression is likely to be limited, absent or coerced and the individual 
may have a minimal ability, or desire, to understand.  
 
Resistance: Engagement that is characterised by resistance occurs when an individual’s 
degree of alignment with the courts is weak: the courts and their function do not 
correspond with the shared values of the individual. In addition, the individual’s 
participation in the process is expressed in terms of active resistance to the function of the 
courts; this may be a feature of a lack of understanding, but this is not necessarily the case. 
Examples of resistance, for instance, include a lay participant who participates by being 
present but refuses to ‘follow the rules’ (cf. Beetham, 1991; Jacobson et al. 2015) of the 
court or who does not act as an ‘information-provider’ (Edwards, 2004) to the court in the 
manner requested. 
 
Withdrawal: The final form of engagement identified is, in fact, the absence of engagement. 
Withdrawal represents the failure of individual lay participants to attend court when asked 
or ordered. This means that there is both a lack of normative cooperation and a lack of 
cooperation that is instrumentally motivated, namely to avoid a potential sanction. The 
understanding of specific aspects of the court process is negated due to the lay participant’s 
absence; here expression is either missing or the lay participant’s withdrawal takes the form 
of expressed rejection of the function of the courts. 
 
168 
 
5.2.2 Methodological note  
 
Before moving on to describe the types of engagement displayed by lay participants, it is 
first necessary to make a small number of methodological observations regarding the 
development of the continuum of engagement. This is with reference to the relative role of 
interview data and observational data in devising the continuum. Conducting interviews 
with lay participants enabled a discussion of interviewees’ understanding, perceptions and 
experiences of lay adjudication and the wider criminal justice process. This makes it possible 
to examine the extent to which individual interviewees were aligned with, and participated 
in, the court process. The vast majority of interviewees engaged in the court process in a 
manner which displayed an alignment with the courts and their function. Magistrates, as 
will be discussed in detail below, engaged in a predominantly ‘active aligned’ manner; 
meanwhile the dominant form of engagement among court user interviewees – that is, 
complainants, prosecution witnesses and defendants –  was ‘passive alignment’ (this 
includes ‘passive acceptance’). A handful of court user interviewees engaged in an ‘active 
aligned’ manner; only a minority of court user interviewees exhibited ‘dull compulsion’ or 
‘resistance’. High levels of alignment may in part be a feature of the self-selecting nature of 
the sample (cf. Bryman, 2012) because those with some degree of alignment with the court 
process were arguably more likely to volunteer to participate in an interview in comparison 
to those with weak levels of alignment.   
 
The engagement of court users in observed cases can also be mapped on the continuum. 
Analysis of the observational data generated more frequent instances of ‘dull compulsion’ 
and ‘resistance’ than the interviewee sample and thus facilitated a stronger 
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conceptualisation of these categories in the ‘unaligned’ half of the axis. Importantly, 
observations also elicited instances of ‘withdrawal’, which would not have been visible had 
the interviews been the only method of data collection. This is because only court users who 
participated in the court process by at least being present, could be approached for 
interview. Nevertheless, analysis of the observational data comes with the notable caveat 
that levels of alignment could be difficult to ascertain using observations alone, particularly 
if the individual concerned only displayed a limited degree of interaction with the court 
process.  
 
Despite these methodological constraints, this brief discussion has sought to highlight the 
complementary way in which using different types of data, in the form of interviews and 
observations, facilitated a deeper understanding of the process by which lay participants 
engage with the court process. As Fielding (2009: 435) argued:  
  
‘By using research designs that employ different methods to capture different 
aspects of the phenomenon, drawing samples purposively so as to contrast the 
perspectives of different groups and so on, multiple method research can act as a 
corrective to analytic tunnel vision. It is a way to achieve “analytic density.”’ 
 
The data presented in the remainder of the Chapter provides examples from both 
interviews and observations in order to illustrate the types of engagement displayed by lay 
participants. This is with the exception of the discussion of engagement of lay magistrates, 
which is largely derived from interview data. In addition to the use of interview quotations 
and short descriptions of observations, provided to describe the varying levels of 
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engagement among court users, four observed cases are described in detail (see Boxes 5.1-
5.4) in order to highlight the nuance of interactions under focus. 
 
5.3 Types and levels of engagement among lay participants in the criminal courts 
 
The remainder of this Chapter examines engagement both within and between each group 
of lay participant in order to assess where individuals can be placed along the continuum. It 
begins by looking at levels of engagement among those with the highest degree of control in 
proceedings and least at stake – that is, lay magistrates, and concludes by examining levels 
of engagement with the lowest degree of control and most at stake, that is court users.  
 
5.3.1 Lay adjudicators 
 
The main type of lay adjudicator under focus in this section is lay magistrates. This is 
because, as highlighted in the introduction, magistrates are the main lay adjudicator under 
study. Examining levels of engagement of lay magistrates is important because it enables a 
consideration of power-holder perceptions of legitimacy from the perspective of members 
of the public who volunteer their time to carry out such a role. A consideration of this 
nature is largely absent from both existing studies of the magistracy and existing studies on 
the topic of legitimacy.  
 
The role of lay magistrates can, generally speaking, be characterised by a strong degree of 
‘active alignment’ with the criminal courts. The role is entirely voluntary; lay magistrates are 
under no obligation to carry out the role. Magistrates choose to apply for the position and 
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then undergo an appointment and selection procedure which can take up to two years 
(Gibbs, 2014a). Once appointed magistrates are required to undertake training and sit for a 
minimum of 26 half day sittings per year.79 Exploring the reasons behind an individual’s 
decision to join the magistracy helps to enable a better understanding of the degree of 
alignment between magistrates and the courts.  
 
The eight magistrates interviewed for this study became aware of, and subsequently 
entered, the role in a variety of ways. Several had become aware of the magistracy from a 
young age, either through having a family member or friend who was a serving magistrate 
or through visiting a magistrates’ court on a school trip. Two interviewees had experience of 
a parent who had served as a magistrate which contributed to their own decision to join 
magistracy; for one becoming a magistrate acted in part as a ‘tribute’ to the interviewee’s 
mother and was akin to following a ‘family tradition’ for the second interviewee. Others 
became aware of the role, and then applied, after seeing an advertisement about the 
magistracy. One interviewee had attended the local magistrates’ court to obtain a license to 
serve alcohol at a community event and applied after seeing the position advertised in the 
court waiting area.  Two magistrates became aware of the role after being approached by a 
friend who suggested they think about applying for the position. (In one instance, this was a 
friend who was a serving magistrate; in the other it was a friend who was a member of the 
legal profession.) One magistrate had first become aware of the role after appearing in the 
                                                     
79
 For further detail of the training available to magistrates see: https://www.magistrates-
association.org.uk/training-magistrates [accessed 01.12.17]. Magistrates’ training has been subject to debate 
among commentators, Davies (2005: 113) argued that the level of training provided has contributed to a 
‘professionalisation’ of the magistracy; Gibbs (2014b), on the other hand, argued that there is insufficient 
training provided to the magistracy. Morgan and Russell (2000: 74) asserted that it is a ‘moot point’ as to 
whether lay magistrates have ‘some training’ or are ‘highly trained’ but note that magistrates are in receipt of 
more training in the twenty-first century than at previous times. 
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Youth Court as a young defendant (the individual was subsequently acquitted), however, 
this individual was motivated to apply for the position after witnessing a crime in the local 
area. 
 
Occupying the role of lay magistrate is, in many ways, an embodiment of ‘voluntary 
cooperation’ (Tyler, 2011) with the criminal justice system and the findings from this study 
indicate that magistrates were motivated by a strong sense of alignment with the courts 
and their function. As magistrate interviewee David described:  
 
‘I spent my life travelling the world [for work] and the more countries I visited, the 
more I became aware just how privileged we are to be here and to live here. And 
how much the rest of the world would say “actually, we’d quite like that as well”. 
With that came a feeling about wanting to put something back and this was just 
something that interested me … and something which was worth preserving.’  
 
A sense of alignment with the courts is also denoted by the relatively high retention rates 
associated with the role. Davies (2005) estimated that many magistrates were likely to 
spend at least 10-20 years in the post. Among the serving magistrates interviewed for this 
study, the minimum length of service was four years; the longest serving magistrate had 
more than twenty years’ service. Six of the eight interviewees had been in the role for more 
than 10 years and half had been in the role for more than 15 years. It is possible that the 
self-selecting nature of the sample meant that those interviewed comprised individuals who 
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were likely to be highly committed and thus long-serving.80 However similar findings are 
also present in existing studies. Ward (2017) noted that the majority of the 33 magistrates 
who participated in her study had served for between 10 and 20 years; while the average 
(mean) length of service in Gibbs’ (2014a) study of 56 magistrates was 11 years. High levels 
of commitment to the role were also evident in the extent to which those interviewed 
contributed time and effort beyond the required 26 half-day sittings. The majority of 
interviewees either: had experience of sitting in a number of jurisdictions, such as, in 
addition to the adult magistrates’ court, the youth court or the family court81; held, or had 
held, senior positions in the magistracy, such as serving as Chair of the panel in one of the 
above three jurisdictions; or were involved in wider activities for the magistracy such as 
training activities or community engagement events.  
 
In a similar vein, the findings from interviews suggest that motivations for carrying out the 
role were also rooted in magistrates’ connections to wider society.  Several interviewees 
spoke of the importance of ‘giving something back’ to society by carrying out the volunteer 
role. This is described in the following quotation from magistrate Lewis: 
 
‘I wanted to give back something to the community because my children had just 
finished university, I had just changed jobs because up until then, I was working … 
hundred-hour weeks, 90-hour weeks, and all of a sudden I had time. As I started to 
look around, things like with various charities but also I was looking at a magistrate 
                                                     
80
 It may also reflect issues arising from recent falls in the recruitment of magistrates. (See Gibbs, 2014a, for 
more detail.) 
81
 Sitting in the youth or family court requires a commitment of sitting for a minimum of 35 half day sittings 
per year. See: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/who-are-the-judiciary/judicial-
roles/magistrates/ [accessed 01.12.17]. 
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and I thought I could bring my experience to this and I think it would be a good way 
of paying back the community with all the things I’ve had from it over the years.’ 
 
In this sense, as well as displaying a strong degree of alignment with the criminal justice 
system, magistrates also tended to demonstrate a high level of engagement and investment 
in wider society. Similar findings are also present in existing studies of the magistracy. Gibbs 
(2014a: 17-8) found that magistrates were motivated to join the magistracy in order to ‘give 
back to society’ and were part of the ‘civic core’ of society who, in addition to the 
magistracy, carried out other voluntary activities. Ward’s (2017: 77) description of 
magistrates interviewed for her study closely chimes both with findings from Gibbs’ (2014a) 
study and with several of the above quotations: 
 
‘There was an implicit sense that they were lucky enough to be in this position, and 
along with the privilege of having time to spare, replies came within the general 
theme of wanting to contribute to society.’  
 
The notion of ‘giving something back’ as a motivation for a volunteer role is commonly cited 
in existing volunteering literature, which includes volunteering in the wider criminal justice 
system and beyond (see, for example, Jacobson, Skrine, Kirby and Hunter, 2014a; 
Narushima, 2005). Indeed in this study, several Witness Service volunteers interviewed 
spoke of the ways in which the role enabled them to contribute to society or their local 
community. As interviewee Rita commented: ‘I think we as a group are doing some good in 
the community in an area which I think is very neglected.’ 
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It seems that the idea of ‘giving back’ was a reciprocal relationship. That is, carrying out the 
voluntary role of magistrate (or Witness Service volunteer) promoted engagement in wider 
society by enhancing existing levels of social capital among individual volunteers, such as by 
bringing them into contact with diverse sections of the community and engaging in wider 
society at a point at which their level of inclusion in society was at a point of transition. For 
example, two interviewees had joined the magistracy when they were undertaking full-time 
care of their young children. Meanwhile, magistrate George reflected upon how his 
engagement with the role, and connection to wider society, had shifted over the course of 
his time as a magistrate: 
 
‘When I was working and first became a magistrate it was all about making a 
contribution and all that sort of stuff. Then it became very much … a relief to get 
away from the corporate world [I worked in] … and do something completely 
different: you felt like you were making a contribution and [had] a new set of people 
to engage with. Now I have retired in many ways it has replaced that camaraderie 
and that sense of belonging that I would have had in employment – even though I’m 
not employed – with a new set of co-workers and all that sort of thing.’   
 
In a similar vein, several of the retired Witness Service volunteer interviewees spoke of the 
benefits that the volunteer role brought to their individual sense of continued engagement 
in society. For example, volunteer Billy stated: ‘I didn’t want to be sitting down at home and 
doing nothing, so I just applied … I enjoy doing it since I can communicate with the 
witnesses.’ 
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Moving on from the perceived value of ‘giving back’ as a motivation for joining the 
magistracy, interviewees often also spoke of being particularly motivated by the challenging 
nature of the role. This is well-illustrated by the following quotation from magistrate Josh: 
 
‘At the time [of applying] I thought about what I could do from a volunteering 
perspective but what I wanted to do was something that would utilise the skills that I 
have as a [business] professional. But, also something that would be a more 
challenging use of my time and my skills, so that’s why I felt it was a good option for 
me; as opposed to doing something like working in a soup kitchen [or] working down 
at the Red Cross shop on a Saturday. I wanted something that was very 
complementary and more challenging and not something that was everyone’s first 
idea of a volunteer option.’  
 
The perceived value of carrying out a challenging, yet rewarding, role was further described 
by David and Lewis: 
 
‘You actually ma[k]e a difference. So that is why I do it. … You are trying to do the 
right thing, and on the information you have, you make your decision. So, the appeal 
process we are quite happy with as well: so if you have made a decision and that is 
wrong for whatever reason, you can learn from that.’  (David) 
 
‘When I go home, and I feel that the person has had a fair trial, we’ve listened, I feel 
good. And it is very difficult … to send someone to prison, that is very difficult, you 
are taking the liberty away, that’s only rare, that doesn’t happen very often. But if it 
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is the right thing to do because of the evidence you have heard then that is also OK. 
But it is not very nice for the person to have their liberty taken away. But, you know, 
you shouldn’t have done whatever you did in the first place.’ (Lewis)  
 
A perception of the challenging nature of the magistrate role is perhaps what distinguishes 
the role of magistrates from that of other voluntary positions in the criminal justice system. 
Witness Service volunteers’ sense of reward was often centred upon feeling able to provide 
help or support to individuals during what could be a distressing or upsetting experience. 
Witness Service volunteer Stan, for instance, when discussing what motivated him to carry 
out the role stated: ‘Purely and simply turning up and feeling that if you weren’t there, 
these people would have a more difficult experience – simple as that’. 
 
Much like participants in Ward’s (2017) study of the magistracy, all of the magistrates 
interviewed either held or had held professional positions in their working lives. 
Interestingly several interviewees, such as Josh (above), noted that they had deliberately 
selected the magistrate role above other volunteering activities due to the perceived 
challenging nature of the decision-making role and it being one which allowed them to 
apply the expertise and skills gained in their careers to a voluntary role. However, the above 
responses from magistrates David and Lewis, also indicate that interviewees were able to 
take satisfaction from making what they considered to be the ‘right’ decision, or as the 
below quotation from Josh outlines, the ‘best’ decision: 
 
‘What I always say to people is that I don’t believe that we make the right decision 
every day. … I am not naïve enough to think that the decision that we have made is 
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the right one, I think we do the absolute very best we can with the information. We 
do genuinely work hard to make sure that we make the right decision and when you 
can have a positive impact, either on a defendant by giving them the opportunity to 
try and change their lives or improve, and or potential for complainants and victims 
in cases, that’s rewarding in itself because you are trying to help society more 
widely.’  
 
These comments are particularly important in helping to elaborate upon the under-
researched terrain of power-holder legitimacy (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). This is because 
they allow us to glean valuable insight as to the ways in which perceptions of doing the 
‘right thing’ (David and Lewis), or the ‘very best we can’ (Josh), contributes to an individual’s 
‘self-belief … [in] the moral rightness of their own claims to exercise power’ (Bottoms and 
Tankebe, 2012: 162). Not only do these responses point to the high degree of alignment 
interviewees afforded to the courts, they are also imbued with a concern for reaching the 
best outcome for those with the most at stake and lowest degree of control over the 
outcome; that is, court users (cf. Benesh and Howell, 2001). This was further reflected upon 
by magistrate Sarah, who spoke of the emotional costs and benefits of such decision-
making: 
 
‘It is very rare you take stuff home with you; there are times – and actually I think it 
is good, I think it is good – there are things that do profoundly affect you and then 
you have the odd sleepless night. I don’t think that’s a bad thing; I think it shows you 
are a decent person, that it can and does affect you.’  
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This quotation can be situated in the literature surrounding ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 
1983), the performance of which requires ‘the management of feeling to create a publicly 
observable facial and bodily display’ (Hochschild, 1983: 7). Emotional labour is usually 
applied to the workplace in the fulfilment of paid employment and is termed as such 
because it is ‘sold for a wage and therefore has an exchange value’ (Hochschild, 1983: 7, 
emphasis in original). It seems that for lay magistrates, such as Sarah, the rewarding nature 
of occupying such a challenging role, rather than financial gain, is represented by the 
‘exchange value’ required in the performance of emotional labour. Ward (2017: 90) noted 
that magistrates in her study performed emotional labour by ‘rationalising’ difficult 
decisions, such as imposing a custodial sentence, through regarding the decision as ‘the 
right thing to do’. A similar process can be observed in several of the above quotations from 
magistrates in this study.  
 
Moving on from a discussion of the high levels of alignment displayed by interviewees, in 
order to fully examine magistrates’ engagement, it is also important to explore their levels 
of participation. Generally speaking, magistrates can be said to participate ‘actively’ in 
courtroom interaction, albeit within the confines of their role. Magistrates’ understanding 
of the matters at hand is aided by the assistance of a legally qualified adviser who provides 
assistance to lay magistrates with matters of law.  Magistrates, like paid judges, are able to 
refer to guidance provided in the ‘bench book’ relevant to the court at which they are 
sitting, for example the ‘adult court bench book’ (see Judicial College, 2017) when sitting in 
the adult court, and Sentencing Guidelines relevant to the offence on which they are 
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passing sentence.82 Understanding is also likely to be aided by the training received and the 
educational background of magistrates. Unfortunately, there is an absence of official data 
on the educational background of magistrates; however, findings from existing research 
suggest that magistrates are likely to be drawn from relatively well-educated backgrounds 
(Dignan and Wynne, 1997; Ward, 2017).83  
 
In terms of formal ‘expression’, magistrates’ levels of expression in the courtroom are 
constrained in order to allow ‘court users to experience the legal process as fair, impartial, 
and legitimate’ (Roach-Anleu and Mack, 2005: 593). Magistrates in Roach-Anleu and Mack’s 
study of emotional labour in the magistracy in Australia, where the role is paid and is one 
which requires individuals to have acquired formal legal qualifications, spoke of the 
importance of balancing the need to engage with individual court users while also 
‘maintaining social distance and avoiding over-identification with them’ (p. 608). This is also 
necessary for lay magistrates and members of the paid judiciary in England and Wales. 
Formal expression by magistrates in the courtroom is limited to announcing the decisions 
they have made and the reasons for such decisions (known as ‘pronouncements’84) on 
applications, trial verdicts and sentencing decisions, and asking questions of court users, 
court staff and legal professionals at various points in proceedings. However, the quality of 
expression plays an important role within this. Several magistrate interviewees outlined the 
ways in which they felt able to actively engage with courtroom participants within the 
constraints of their role. As Sarah explained: 
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 Available at: https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/the-magistrates-court-sentencing-guidelines/ [accessed 
01.12.17] 
83
 Participants in this study were not expressly asked for details of their educational background. 
84
 For further details see Judicial College (2016). 
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‘We have court users who have needs … I had someone in court, a defendant, who 
[had] real problems, even though the person was deemed fit to plead and everything 
else. [I] treated the person with kid gloves – very careful – because, you know, it’s a 
difficult, emotional, traumatic situation for them. You try and make it as comfortable 
as possible, bearing in mind it is not a comfortable place, you treat people with as 
much dignity as possible.’ 
 
Such considerations can be located within the literature on procedural justice (such as Tyler, 
2007) and highlight a recognition among interviewees of the importance of treating court 
users with respect and consideration.85 Though their role is constrained, lay magistrates are 
arguably the lay participant most able to express themselves in court proceedings. The 
reasons for this will become more evident as the Chapter progresses. 
 
Notwithstanding the relatively high levels of engagement among magistrates, interviews 
with magistrates highlighted several ways in which the ‘active aligned’ engagement of 
magistrates could be challenged. This is particularly in relation to aspects of the role that 
were deemed to be ‘frustrating’, a term which was used by five of the eight interviewees. 
This, arguably, signifies a degree of ‘passive acceptance’, or in some instances ‘resistance’, 
to certain aspects of the court process. For example, when asked about ‘dissatisfying’ 
aspects of their role several interviewees commented upon operational constraints within 
the court process, such as perceived failures of administrative staff or legal professionals to 
adequately prepare and present cases or to prevent instances of (avoidable) delay. Others 
                                                     
85
 The role that procedural justice can play in fostering engagement in the criminal courts is discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 6. 
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described the way in which they perceived that their role had changed over time. This 
included undertaking work beyond the immediate courtroom environment, such as 
responding to emails.  Within such responses was a sense – or in some instances an explicit 
statement – that magistrates could feel that their engagement in the criminal courts was 
undervalued. This was by both those responsible for administering justice and by wider 
society. This is well-illustrated in the following quotation from Mag: 
 
‘I think that there’s quite a large portion of the public who don’t have a particularly 
good opinion of magistrates. When I first joined … I was really proud to say I was a 
magistrate, I don’t tell people now. … I think we are seen in the same bracket as tax 
inspectors and police officers who are “just out to give us points when we drive”.’ 
 
This sense of an ‘undervaluing’ of the participation of lay magistrates echoes findings from 
the House of Commons Justice Committee (2016) who reported on the presence of ‘low 
morale’ within the magistracy. Indeed, several interviewees made reference to what could 
be described as instances of ‘withdrawal’ among magistrates; that is, of individuals leaving 
the role because they had become unhappy or dissatisfied with it. As Josh explained: 
 
‘I do think that what’s happened over the last few years is that magistrates are 
treated more like a resource that can be turned on and off and I think there is a 
danger that they are going to start to attract either the wrong types of people or, as I 
know within my own court is true, we have lost some very experienced magistrates 
because there is a whole body of research around how you motivate volunteers and 
how you capitalise on their skills and experience and I think the judiciary sometimes 
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forgets that. And magistrates can be left feeling unvalued. And that has, certainly in 
my court, led to resignations. I think that that can be a loss to the system.’  
 
It is not possible to comment further on reasons for withdrawal in the magistracy because 
only serving magistrates were interviewed for this study; none of whom expressed an overt 
desire to withdraw from the role. However, in the context of a magistracy which has shrunk 
by almost fifty per cent since 2010, it is possible that insights can be gleaned from some of 
the above comments that go beyond commonly cited reasons for falls in the size of the 
magistracy, such as falls in caseload (Judicial Office, 2018).  
 
A note about jurors 
In order conclude the discussion of engagement among lay adjudicators, the extent to 
which the continuum of engagement could be applied to jurors is briefly examined. The 
limitations of applying this conceptualisation to jurors are acknowledged due to the absence 
of an empirical investigation of juror levels of engagement. However, this section considers 
the ways in which the findings of the scant existing empirical studies of juror perceptions – 
namely, Matthews et al. (2004) – along with statistical data regarding jury service, can be 
applied in order to help extend the theoretical development on the subject of engagement 
among lay adjudicators in the criminal courts. 
 
It is likely that the engagement of individual jurors can be situated within each quadrant of 
the continuum. Individual jurors can be described as ‘active aligned’ in instances in which 
there is a good degree of normative cooperation with the role. This is likely to be the case 
for jurors who express positive motivations upon receiving a jury summons, despite the 
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involuntary nature of the role. For example, approximately half of the jurors in Matthews’ et 
al. (2004) study described feeling ‘enthusiastic’ or ‘very enthusiastic’ about being called for 
jury service. During a trial, active participation is indicated by jurors who take notes, ask 
questions or nominate themselves as jury ‘foreman’. Passive alignment is likely to be 
present among jurors who attend court out of a sense of normative cooperation towards 
the role, but who do not participate actively in the manner described above. Matthews et 
al. (2004: 26) found that jurors participating in their study reported normative motivations 
for participating in jury service, such as ‘moral duty’. Interestingly twenty per cent of 
respondents expressed indifference about carrying out the role – evident in responses such 
as ‘it didn’t bother them’ or ‘it had to be done’ (Matthews et al. 2004: 26). This is indicative 
of a degree of ‘passive acceptance’ among some jurors. 
 
However, due to the relatively involuntary nature of the jury role, it is also likely that 
participation among some jurors is characterized by ‘dull compulsion’, or even ‘resistance’, 
particularly if the main motivation for participation is borne out of a desire to avoid 
sanction. Motivations for participation are likely to vary depending upon the circumstances 
of the individual juror. Just under one third of the serving jurors who participated in 
Matthews’ et al. (2004: 25) study expressed reluctance about carrying out the role. Finally, 
withdrawal by jurors is arguably represented by the failure to respond to a jury summons. In 
2017, approximately 12 per cent of individuals issued with a jury summons failed to respond 
(see Ministry of Justice, 2018c).86  
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 A further 29 per cent were excused from jury service (Ministry of Justice, 2018b). 
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5.3.2 Complainants and prosecution witnesses 
 
As highlighted in the Literature Review, there has been much policy development in the last 
thirty years which has sought to challenge the ‘walk-on’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 92) or ‘bit 
player’ (Shapland and Hall, 2010: 163) role of complainants and prosecution witnesses in 
the court process. Efforts have focused upon promoting participation by enhancing an 
individual’s ability to ‘give best evidence’. This is most evident in the introduction of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 which implemented provision for vulnerable 
or intimidated witnesses to give evidence through the assistance of ‘special measures’.87 
Notwithstanding such shifts, arguments persist that complainants and prosecution 
witnesses find it difficult to fully participate in court proceedings due to difficulties in levels 
of understanding and limits to the extent to which they are able to express themselves 
(Fielding, 2006; Jacobson et al. 2015; Kirby, 2017a). Existing research has seldom directly 
examined levels of alignment among complainants and prosecution witnesses.  In this study, 
levels of engagement, comprising alignment and participation, among prosecution 
witnesses and complainants varied across different points on the continuum, ranging from 
‘active alignment’ to ‘withdrawal’.  As will be illustrated below, only a small proportion of 
complainants and prosecution witnesses, either in interview or in the observed cases, 
displayed ‘active aligned’ engagement with the court  process. ‘Passive alignment’ was the 
dominant form of engagement among interviewees; however, weak levels of engagement 
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 For recent overviews of the available provisions see Jacobson and Harlow (2017); Marchant (2017) and 
Wurtzel and Marchant (2017).  
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were common among complainants and prosecution witnesses in observed cases with  just 
under two thirds of witnesses exhibiting ‘dull compulsion’, ‘resistance’ or ‘withdrawal’. 88 
 
Active alignment 
‘Active alignment’ with the court process was evident in the responses of a handful of 
complainants and prosecution witnesses interviewed. For example, Iumi described how he 
was motivated to give evidence in a case of drink driving by a sense of ‘civic duty … just a 
normal thing anybody is expected to do’. This denotes a degree of alignment with the 
function of the courts. Interestingly, Iumi spoke of how his contact with the volunteers at 
the Witness Service reinforced both his normative motivations for attending court as a 
witness and the degree to which he felt able to participate in the process: 
 
‘[It] was a bit of a surprise that they were so welcoming and such nice people being 
so helpful … The way they, in a very welcoming way, explained to me how everything 
is going to happen and how it works, I felt really kind of, you know, humbled. That 
these people who are so old are being so useful to the court, shall I say, to get the 
baddies off the street, or just from the good side of being senior citizens. And, yeah, I 
felt great. When I went into the court I felt great to be part of it and to participate in 
it.’  
 
A high degree of alignment was also displayed by the prosecution witness Dominic, who 
gave evidence in a case of fraud against a former colleague: 
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 It should be noted that the proportions provided in this section exclude observed cases in which it was not 
possible to determine the individual’s level of engagement; this accounted for around one sixth of cases 
involving complainants and prosecution witnesses.  
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‘When we caught the guy and had him arrested I put my name down because I was 
dead keen to make sure he was nailed because – one what he had done to us – but 
also the amount of pain he caused [me] internally. … So when the courts wrote to 
me [saying] “Would you be happy being a witness?” – I said “Yes, definitely.”’ 
  
As the above quotation shows, Dominic felt aligned to the prosecution process; this was in 
part due to the impact that that offence had upon his own life and on the company for 
which he worked. Once at court, he felt able to participate actively, despite being required 
to present what, in his view, was quite ‘complex’ information: 
 
‘I guess that was my job to try and present [the evidence] in a simple way … The 
judge was very clear. And if I explained something, I guess for his understanding, he 
would clarify – “so that means this, this and this” and I’d go “yes” or “no, actually it 
means this”. … Which is good because it made me think about how to rephrase or to 
make it even clearer and obviously that’s what he’d do for the jury, and for himself, I 
guess.’  
 
Other prosecution witnesses and complainants attended court as a result of incidents that 
had a much more personal impact upon them. Belle, for example, was a complainant in a 
sexual assault case at the magistrates’ court. Her engagement with the court process could 
be described as strong, both in her alignment with the court process – ‘I just wanted to see 
that person be prosecuted for what he did’, she explained – and because she felt able to 
actively participate in proceedings. The latter is illustrated by the fact that, after giving 
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evidence from behind a screen, Belle opted to sit in the public gallery to hear the remainder 
of the case. She described this as: 
 
‘quite nerve-wracking because obviously I had to hear his side. I just sat there, 
listened to what he said, and he was just ridiculous. It was quite empowering being 
there … It wasn’t like I was like scared of him, I felt like I was strong, and I could face 
him and … I was in control.’ 
 
‘Active alignment’ was also discernible among complainants and prosecution witnesses in a 
handful of observed cases. For example, the notion of alignment as an expression of civic 
duty was evident in the response of a prosecution witness in the observation CCPT12; her 
participation could also be described as ‘active’. In this case, the witness had reported her 
long-term neighbour to the authorities for fraudulently claiming disability benefits. The 
witness had travelled some distance from her home town to give evidence at court. She was 
smartly dressed and clearly spoken when giving evidence and responded to several of the 
assertions put forward by the defence advocate in a firm tone. Importantly,  when asked 
about her reasons for reporting the alleged offence she stated that she was an ‘avid 
supporter’ of Help the Heroes – a charity which provides support to those experiencing 
injuries and illnesses in the aftermath of serving in the armed forces – and that she didn’t 
want to see people ‘taking advantage of the system’ by falsely claiming benefits.  
 
Meanwhile, observation MCFT01 involved an alleged assault against a police officer outside 
a club. One of the prosecution witnesses, a doorman at the club where the incident 
occurred, displayed ‘active aligned’ engagement with the court process. The witness’s active 
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participation was displayed by instances of unbroken speech when giving evidence – in 
response to this the prosecutor, on occasion, asked the witness to ‘pause’ or provide further 
clarity. He also guided the court through his interpretation of the CCTV footage of the 
incident. The witness’s level of understanding of the court process may have been aided by 
the fact that the prosecutor asked for a few minutes to speak to the witness both before he 
gave evidence, in order to explain the process to him, and at the end of his evidence, in 
order to thank him for coming to court. During his evidence, the witness exhibited a strong 
degree of alignment with the criminal justice process. This was arguably shaped by the 
witness’s own profession and evident in his repeated assertion that the defendant had 
thrown a ‘cheap shot’ at the police officer by hitting him when the officer’s back was 
turned. The witness reiterated this at the end of his evidence-in-chief when the prosecutor 
asked him if there was anything further he would like to say. He stated that doormen have 
‘quite a strong code’: ‘cheap-shotting’ a police officer goes against this.   
 
The presence of ‘active alignment’, as highlighted in the above quotations from 
interviewees and descriptions of observed cases, is indicative of a high degree of perceived 
legitimacy for the courts. This is because the individual’s strong degree of engagement with 
the court process represents the presence of i) ‘shared values’, in the form of a strong level 
of alignment between the individual and the court, and ii) the presence of ‘expressed 
consent’, in the form of voluntary and active participation in the court process.  
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Passive alignment 
The engagement of complainants and prosecution witness interviewees, however, more 
often took the form of ‘passive alignment’. Interestingly, this response was particularly 
prevalent among prosecution witnesses who did not have a personal connection to, or stake 
in, the case at hand.  This includes interviewees who had witnessed an offence, or alleged 
offence, occurring in a public place (such as the street) or as part of their occupational role. 
‘Passive aligned’ witnesses tended to demonstrate an overall sense of alignment with the 
authority of the courts yet often described their feelings about their participation in the 
court process as ‘nerve-wracking’ (such as Anita and Evelyn) or ‘scary’ (such as Zara). This 
was often because giving evidence meant entering an environment, or social world, that 
was unknown to them (cf. Jacobson et al. 2015). Levels of expression among such witnesses 
could be limited due to the nature of their role as ‘information-provider’ (Edwards, 2004) 
and in some instances levels of understanding were partial or incomplete.  Prosecution 
witness Anita provided a stark example of this. Anita explained that though she ‘didn’t 
mind’ giving evidence at court, when initially asked to attend court by the police, she had 
not understood that she would be required to give evidence: 
 
‘The phone call from the police was very brief – “Could I attend the next day?” and I 
didn’t fully understand what I was going for. … Being a bit naïve, I didn’t really think 
it was for the actual trial. So, I just thought I was going along, go through my 
statement with the police and check any like any questions or anything that the 
police or the prosecution would have. So, when I went the next day … I went to go 
straight into the courtroom, thinking there’d be some people to have a chat with 
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about my statement, and realised it was the actual trial going on! … I wasn’t entirely 
aware that I was actually going to be giving evidence at the trial.’ 
 
For others this lack of understanding was at a broader level and represented a lack of 
familiarity with the court process and environment. Evelyn, for example, had never 
attended a court prior to being called as a prosecution witness in a magistrates’ court case 
of theft. She described her experience of entering the courtroom as follows:  
 
‘I suppose for me as well, not ever going into a courtroom [before], it was not so 
daunting: I imagine[d], a big [court] like you know like what you see on telly. But it 
wasn’t, it was like a really smallish, intimate room, so it wasn’t too overwhelming 
once I got in there; [I] could see what the layout was. Even though the [Witness 
Service] show you on this picture, you know, in reality it didn’t look so daunting to be 
honest. … I’d never been in the room before so I went in and sat down, they were 
like “no”; I should have stood up until they told me to sit down.’  
 
Though passive alignment was the dominant form of engagement displayed by complainant 
and prosecution witness interviewees, exhibited by more than half of the interviewee 
sample, passive alignment was only discernible among a small number of prosecution 
witnesses in observed cases. One example of this arose in case MCFT16 in which a woman 
had witnessed an assault committed by one of her neighbours against his partner. The trial 
took place almost one year after the alleged incident and the witness was the only person to 
give evidence in the case. The alleged victim had refused to become involved in legal 
proceedings from the outset. The defendant was absent from the trial; the district judge 
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overseeing the case had ruled to try the case in his absence after the prison in which he was 
being held on remand for other matters had failed to produce him to the court. (The issue 
of ‘withdrawal’ among court users is further described below.)  
 
When giving evidence, the witness giggled nervously at points and seemed to find it difficult 
to understand some of the legal conventions involved in the trial process. For example, 
though she had been given permission to refer to her statement to aid her memory, the 
witness struggled to understand that she was not supposed to read out passages directly 
from the statement and was reminded about this by the prosecutor on various occasions. 
Therefore, though the witness displayed a good level of alignment with the court process, 
evident in her voluntary cooperation with the court process despite the length of time the 
case had taken to come before the court, her participation – due to her limited degree of 
understanding and expression – is best described as passive. Interestingly, the witness’s 
overall alignment with the court process was seemingly acknowledged by the judge who, at 
the end of her evidence, stated: ‘We thank all witnesses for coming because we can’t 
perform our function if people don’t come’. 
 
Engagement among other witnesses, however, could more aptly described in terms of 
‘passive acceptance’. This is because, generally speaking, a level of alignment with the court 
process was manifested in their voluntary cooperation with the court process, however, 
there was some reticence, or ‘fatalism’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 194) about doing so. This is 
illustrated in the below quotation from prosecution witness interviewee Sandrine: 
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‘I was quite nervous about it. Didn’t really like to have to do it but I did.  I’d rather 
have not have done it but I had to do it. At the time I was quite surprised that I had 
to give evidence, but you know I did – it was nerve-wracking. … I didn’t like it; but it 
was what I expected.’ 
 
Other witnesses demonstrated a ‘passive acceptance’ about certain, though not all, aspects 
of proceedings. For example, the below quotation from Aylin, a complainant in a case of 
harassment, illustrates how her high degree of alignment regarding being required to attend 
court, and her wish to actively participate, did not lead to her then feeling able to fully 
engage with proceedings. This is because the structural aspects of the court process, such as 
the legal constraints imposed on ‘story-telling’ (cf. Fielding, 2006), limited the extent to 
which Aylin felt able to express herself.   This resulted in her displaying a degree of ‘passive 
acceptance’ of her overall role within the court process:  
 
‘I mean generally, in terms of my case, I found the answer that I wanted, so you 
know he was found guilty so for me that’s like you know, proving my case and 
getting a release for the last [several] years of my life. … But in terms of my evidence, 
… I think I could have maybe been listened to a bit more, in terms of witnessing. I felt 
like when I came out of the [court] I felt like I couldn’t explain myself, like I felt like I 
didn’t get to explain anything where everything was so general. …When I did get to 
hear the end verdict I was relieved, you know, I did thank the [magistrates] to myself 
and I was completely happy but I was scared before all that happened because I was 
like “Well, I didn’t get to explain myself and how much it affects me and how 
paranoid I’m getting in my own life. Or how I’m not being able to move on”. Maybe 
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it is because I was just witnessing my own case … I don’t really know the court 
service, but I was there as a witness and not the actual person which kind of felt a bit 
weird anyway.’  
 
Alyin’s description of acting as a ‘witness’ rather than ‘the actual person’ in a case in which 
she had been the subject of victimisation provides a vivid depiction of what Shapland and 
Hall (2010: 166) describe as victims being ‘reincarnated’ as witnesses by the court process. 89 
Instances of fatalism or reticence that characterise ‘passive acceptance’ suggest that the 
individual affords the courts an ‘implicit’ (Fielding: 2006: 6) rather than ‘true’ (Bottoms and 
Tankebe, 2012) sense of legitimacy.   
 
Dull compulsion 
In other instances, prosecution witnesses and complainants demonstrated an overt 
reluctance to attend court. This is illustrated by the following quotations from interviewees 
Gemma and Jake: 
 
‘I’d spoken to the Witness Team. [They] called me and I’d said to them at that point, 
“Is there any way I can not have to do this?” … [They] just kind of said that because 
I’d given a statement, that obviously it was important to attend court because I’d be 
summoned … [So] because I’d given a statement, obviously I’d signed that statement 
with my name on it and everything, I was under the impression that I couldn’t then 
not attend.’ (Gemma) 
                                                     
89
 Moreover, Fielding (2006) found that the limits to expression can have a particularly profound impact upon 
complainants giving evidence in cases of alleged domestic or sexual violence.    
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‘At first, well when I was asked to make a statement about the offence, I was told 
that I wouldn’t need to attend court. And then all of a sudden it was “If you don’t 
attend court, there’ll be a summons out for your arrest and you will be forced to.” 
And I was like “Well that’s not what was explained to me at all”. So right from the 
word go, I was a little bit annoyed. … I actually had an argument with the [Witness 
Care Officer] and he no longer wanted to speak to me. … I think it would be a lot 
better if [witnesses] didn’t feel guilt tripped into coming by being threatened with 
summons.’ (Jake) 
 
Both Gemma and Jake attributed their reasons for attending court as not being borne out of 
their own normative choice but due to a threat of sanction by the courts. In this vein their 
engagement with the courts was based upon a very weak level of alignment with the courts.  
 
For engagement to be characterised by ‘dull compulsion’, weak levels of alignment combine 
with participation that is passive. The latter was manifested in instances in which once at 
court, the witness’s participation was limited to solely acting as ‘information-provider’ 
(Edwards, 2004) in response to questions asked during the course of evidence giving.  This is 
indicative of weak perceptions of legitimacy because ‘shared values’ are largely absent and 
‘expressed consent’ is constrained because the individual’s participation is borne out of the 
threat of sanction. Engagement of this nature was discernible among witnesses in around 
one sixth of the cases observed and was also evident during my time spent with the Witness 
Service at each court for the purposes of recruiting witnesses for interview.  For example, 
observation CCOH02, which began as a trial but was ultimately aborted after the defendant 
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entered a guilty plea during the prosecution case, involved a prosecution witness who had 
attended court but did not want to give evidence. The witness, who worked in the area in 
which the defendant had lived and had seen the alleged incident (involving the possession 
of a firearm) had written a statement to say that he did not wish to give evidence. The 
judge, upon reading the statement, commented ‘he clearly doesn’t want to give evidence at 
all.’ Nevertheless, the witness did reluctantly give evidence and was thanked by the judge 
for doing so. A further example of a prosecution witness displaying ‘dull compulsion’ 
towards the court process is outlined in Box 5.2 (pp. 199-200). 
 
In some instances prosecution witnesses only gave evidence after being summonsed to 
attend.90 Examples of reluctance were common in cases where the defendant and 
prosecution witness were known to each other and, particularly, where the allegation was 
set in the context of domestic abuse. It had not been the aim of this study to include a focus 
upon a specific offence type or category.  However, the prevalence of cases involving 
domestic abuse in which the complainant or prosecution witnesses’ engagement was 
characterised by ‘dull compulsion’, or as will be outlined below, ‘resistance’ or ‘withdrawal’, 
means that offending, or alleged offending, that involved domestic abuse requires further 
attention.  
 
Cases involving alleged domestic abuse form approximately 16 per cent of cases brought 
before criminal courts; 88 per cent of these cases are completed in the magistrates’ court 
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 Prosecution witnesses can be summonsed to attend court under the Section 169 of the Serious Organised 
Crime and Police Act 2005 if the following conditions are met: i) if the individual is due to give evidence that is 
likely to be ‘material evidence’ and ii) if the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for the witness 
to give evidence. See also: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/warning-and-phasing-witnesses  [accessed 
15.01.18]. 
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(CPS, 2017). The most recent data available at the time of writing show that the conviction 
rate for prosecutions involving domestic abuse is 76 per cent; 91 per cent of these were the 
result of the defendant entering a guilty plea. Of the 31 per cent of cases that involved a 
contested plea the conviction rate was 53 per cent. In cases which did not result in a 
conviction, ‘victim issues’ – defined by the CPS as to include ‘victim retractions, victim non-
attendance and where the “evidence of the victim does not support the case”’ – were cited 
in more than half (54 per cent) of cases (CPS, 2017; A11).  The difficulties involved in 
bringing cases before the courts are reflected in the extensive legal guidance produced by 
the CPS with respect to the prosecution of cases involving domestic abuse. This includes 
guidance on how to proceed in cases in which the complainant fails to cooperate with, or 
disengages from, the prosecution process.91 Six of the eight magistrate interviewees 
referred, without being prompted, to the difficulties associated with the prosecution of 
cases involving domestic abuse. This is described in the following quotation from Mag: 
 
‘There are things that can be done [if a prosecution witness does not want to give 
evidence]; the prosecution can, and in fact and often it is fairly regularly given 
automatically before the trial even starts so the previous hearing, you can issue a 
witness summons. But realistically if the witness fails to turn up, the witness nearly 
always will be the alleged victim: are you actually going to send the police to arrest 
somebody who is the alleged victim of some form of abuse? Of course you are not. 
So there is very little we, by the time that it gets to our courts, can do. … Often you 
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 CPS (undated) Domestic Abuse Guidelines for Prosecutors: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-
guidance/domestic-abuse-guidelines-prosecutors [accessed 15.01.18]. 
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find that they have rekindled their relationship. And the whole nature of domestic 
abuse is a bullying one.’ 
 
Mag’s comments about the difficulties in compelling complainants in cases involving alleged 
domestic abuse points to the ways in which a reluctance to attend court can extend beyond 
one of ‘dull compulsion’ and have a bearing upon how, and even if, the individual engages 
with the court process. This will become apparent in the following discussion of ‘resistance’ 
and ‘withdrawal’. 
 
Resistance 
In just under one quarter of observed cases involving prosecution witnesses, the witness’s 
weak level of alignment with the court process manifested itself in engagement that took 
the form of active resistance to the court process. Resistance could take several forms and 
was particularly evident during court observations. Observation MCPT04 involved an 
allegation of assault between a female complainant and her male partner. The complainant 
gave evidence in open court – after having declined to enter a special measures application 
– while her partner sat in the secure dock opposite her. When giving evidence, the 
complainant stated that she was drunk at the time of making the allegation and that the 
allegation was untrue. She continued to state this after the prosecution had successfully 
entered an application that allowed the complainant to be cross-examined by the Crown 
about the sections of her statement that did not correspond with her evidence in court; this 
is known as a ‘hostile witness’ application.92 A similar sequence of events took place in 
observation MCFT18, a detailed description of which is provided in Box 5.1. Both cases 
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 Applications of this nature can be made under the Criminal Procedure Act 1865. 
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ultimately resulted in the case against the defendant being dropped at the close of the 
prosecution case. 
 
Box 5.1: A ‘resistant’ complainant in a domestic abuse case (MCFT18) 
The defendant (D) was alleged to have assaulted his wife, the complainant (C), in their home 
during an argument. C attended court after being summonsed. When giving evidence she 
initially stated that ‘something did happen’ but said that she did not wish to proceed with 
the prosecution. When questioned by the prosecutor, C became increasingly vague, stating 
that the incident was a ‘blur’, and often said that she couldn’t remember certain events. The 
prosecutor entered a hostile witness application to allow her to cross-examine C about the 
parts of her evidence that did not correspond with her statement. This was rejected by the 
magistrates; however they approved an application to allow C to read her statement to the 
court. The statement had been hand-written by a police officer and signed by C. When 
asked to read out her statement, C first said that she had retracted it and then stated that 
she could not read the officer’s handwriting. The court agreed that the police officer in the 
case could take C outside and read the statement to her. When C returned to the witness 
box after having had the statement read to her, she continued to state that she ‘could not 
remember’ certain aspects of her statement. A second hostile witness application was 
entered by P; this was again rejected. However, P successfully entered an application that 
allowed C’s statement to be admitted as evidence; the magistrates were given this to read.  
 
D was unrepresented, however an advocate had been appointed by the court to cross-
examine C. In cross-examination the defence suggested that C was the aggressor and that 
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she had, in fact, punched D. C stated that she ‘couldn’t remember’. At the end of her 
evidence, C opted to listen to the remainder of the case from the public gallery. She sat in 
the small public gallery with her mother, who had attended court with her, and with D’s 
family members. 
 
At the end of the prosecution case, D – with the assistance of the legal adviser – entered a 
half-time (Galbraith) submission of ‘no case to answer’. This was accepted by the 
magistrates who stated that they were of the view that C was ‘vague, inconsistent and quite 
unsure’ in her evidence and therefore a jury, if properly directed, would not be able to 
convict D. Upon being told he could leave the dock, D approached C in the public gallery and 
they shared a long hug. D, C and their families left the courtroom together. 
 
If a witness does not attend court after being issued with a summons, it is possible for the 
court to issue a warrant under S97(3) of the Magistrates Court Act 1980.93 However, CPS 
guidance states that a warrant should only be issued as a ‘last resort’ in order ‘to assist 
attendance at court and not to penalise or criminalise complainants’;94 there were no 
examples in this study of a warrant being issued in relation to witness participation. 
Nevertheless, the threat of sanction – arising from either warning a witness that a summons 
may be issued, the issuing of a summons or the threat of arrest arising from the power to 
issue a warrant – arguably served to have a negative impact on the extent to which some 
witnesses engaged with the process. The operation of a system which encourages 
instrumental compliance rather than voluntary forms of cooperation is, thus, illustrative of a 
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 Under S97(2) of this legislation it is also possible to issue a warrant without a summons having first been 
issued. 
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 CPS (undated) Domestic Abuse Guidelines for Prosecutors: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-
guidance/domestic-abuse-guidelines-prosecutors [accessed 15.01.18]. 
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degree of friction or strain in the legitimacy dialogue that exists between the State and 
members of the public. This point is particularly salient in the Case Study presented in Box 
5.2, where a prosecution witness’s seeming reluctance to give evidence stood in stark 
contrast to the trial judge’s view that giving evidence is a ‘public duty’ rather than a ‘lifestyle 
choice’.   
 
In other instances, the ‘complainant’ demonstrated resistance by refusing to occupy the role 
assigned to them by the court. For example, in two instances the alleged victim acted as a 
defence witness. The first instance was a case (MCPT02) in which a woman had observed a 
dispute between her neighbours, a married couple, that had resulted in the male partner 
allegedly assaulting his wife. The witness reported the incident to the police and gave 
evidence for the prosecution, however when approached by the police the complainant 
denied that she had been assaulted. She did not cooperate with the prosecution at any 
stage in the process and ultimately gave evidence as a defence witness. The other case in 
which the alleged victim refused to play this role was not set in the context of domestic 
abuse and is described in Box 5.2.   
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Box 5.2: A ‘resistant’ complainant and a prosecution witness displaying ‘dull compulsion’ 
in a Crown Court trial (CCFT01) 
The defendant (D) was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH), after 
having allegedly punched and kicked his friend, the alleged complainant (C), several times. 
The offence was alleged to have occurred in the street and was witnessed by two passers-by 
(W1 and W2) who called the police. 
 
W1 gave evidence on the second morning of the trial. W2 was also due to give evidence that 
morning, however, when he had not attended court by the late morning, the prosecutor 
stated that she would no longer be calling him. The trial judge responded sternly:  
 
‘Are you serious? …If you want a witness summons you can have one … If he made a 
statement he is required to give evidence … Being a witness is not a lifestyle choice 
… it is a public duty and that is an end to it’.  
 
W2 was contacted over the lunch period and informed that a summons would be issued. 
W2 subsequently attended court and gave evidence that afternoon.  
 
D opted to give evidence. He stated that he and C had spent the afternoon drinking and that 
he had been trying to help an intoxicated C get home. He denied assaulting C. C did not 
make a statement to the police at the time of the incident and appeared in court to give 
evidence for the defence. He stated that the injuries he sustained were the result of falling 
over when he returned home and not as the result of the actions of D.  
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When summing up to the jury, the judge stated that this was an ‘unusual case’ because the 
alleged victim had given evidence for the defence. However, she directed the jury that the 
decision to bring a case is that of the prosecution not of the alleged victim – ‘the 
prosecution is brought in the name of the Queen … in order to keep public order on our 
streets’– and informed them that it is possible for a prosecution to be proved even if the 
alleged victim provides a ‘contradictory account’.   
 
The jury spent approximately two hours deliberating and returned a unanimous verdict of 
‘not guilty’.   
 
Withdrawal 
A final form of engagement embodied by prosecution witnesses is, in fact, a form of non-
participation: it is that of ‘withdrawal’. This type of engagement was displayed by just under 
a quarter of complainants and prosecution witnesses in observed cases. The generation of 
data of relating to withdrawal was facilitated, in part, by the methodological approach 
adopted. Being present in the Witness Service offices in order to recruit witnesses, and 
opting to observe the range of hearings coming before the courts on selected fieldwork 
days, meant that in addition to being aware of when witnesses (and defendants) did attend 
court as scheduled, I also became aware of instances in which individuals did not attend as 
anticipated. This type of response from court users has rarely been a focus of existing 
empirical research. Existing studies of court user participation (such as Fielding, 2006; 
Jacobson et al. 2015) have focused primarily upon observing ‘effective’ cases; that is, those 
in which the trial proceeded in full.  
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Withdrawal by complainants and prosecution witnesses was commented upon by several of 
the Witness Service volunteers and magistrates interviewed. ‘It’s very common’ for a 
witness not to turn up said Witness Service volunteer, Mary, ‘it happens most days that I 
come in’; while Witness Service volunteer Joe noted ‘we get quite a lot of people not 
turning up’. Withdrawal – as with dull compulsion and resistance – was particularly common 
when the alleged offence was one relating to domestic abuse. In all of the observed cases in 
which there was withdrawal by complainants and prosecution witnesses, the alleged 
offence(s) involved domestic abuse. Moreover, magistrate interviewees who commented 
upon disengagement or withdrawal among prosecution witnesses, tended to speak of this in 
relation to cases involving domestic abuse.  As Josh described: 
 
‘Every day that we sit, unfortunately now you are likely to come across cases that are 
either flagged as domestic abuse or domestic violence and one of the powers that 
we have as a magistrate is that we can either issue witness summons or witness 
warrants or we can simply ask for the witnesses to attend. And oftentimes in cases 
of domestic abuse or violence you will hear that the complainant is unwilling to 
attend, he or she is likely to make a withdrawal statement, or you find that on the 
day of the trial that they are absent from the trial. … It is not uncommon for those 
cases to either get adjourned off to another date or the case collapses and simply 
falls away because of a lack of evidence.’   
 
Withdrawal by witnesses took a number of forms. In some cases, the alleged victim – as 
with complainants in observations MCPT02 and CCFT01 – had not cooperated with the 
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authorities from the outset. This occurred in cases in which the alleged offence had been 
reported by a member of the public who had witnessed an incident which concerned them 
and called the police. As highlighted above, in observation MCFT16, the sole prosecution 
witness was a neighbour of the defendant who had called the police after seeing him push 
his partner; the alleged victim had told the investigating police officers that she had been 
pushed over but declined to make a statement about the incident. However, more 
frequently instances of withdrawal occurred after the complainant had, at least initially by 
contacting the police, shown a degree of cooperation with, or sought some recourse from, 
the authorities.  
 
Without having conducted interviews with such witnesses it is not possible to determine the 
precise reasoning for the withdrawal. In some instances, the alleged complainant provided a 
reason for non-attendance which was ultimately accepted by the courts, such as an illness. 
Nevertheless, on occasion, the presentation of a valid reason for non-attendance included 
an undertone of reticence or reluctance about the forthcoming appearance. In observation 
MCOH04, a case involving the alleged sending of ‘revenge porn’, the complainant, who had 
been in a relationship with the defendant, had told the prosecution that she was ill and 
would not be able to attend. However, when applying for an adjournment the prosecutor 
noted that she had previously indicated a reluctance to attend court. Meanwhile, in the 
period between being charged and the scheduled trial, the defendant had been remanded 
to custody after having broken the terms of his bail conditions by communicating with the 
complainant on a number of occasions; this included contacting her about the forthcoming 
court appearance. In making his application to adjourn the prosecutor stated that the 
206 
 
complainant ‘is living on the edge of this defendant and has disobeyed court orders because 
they aren’t working for her’. 
 
On other occasions the complainant’s desire to withdraw from the court process was stated 
plainly, for example, through the completion of a ‘withdrawal statement.’ Complainants and 
prosecution witnesses are able to state their desire to withdraw from the case by entering a 
‘withdrawal’ or ‘retraction’ statement to the police. However, because the case is brought 
by the Crown rather than the individual, a declaration of intent to withdraw by the 
complainant does not necessarily mean that the charges will be dropped.95 In observation 
MCOH03 it was noted that the complainants and prosecution witnesses (all of whom were 
members of the same family) had stated at an early stage in proceedings that they did not 
wish to continue. However, the case proceeded to trial and was only abandoned when the 
complainant and another prosecution witnesses failed to attend despite having been sent a 
summons. Two further prosecution witnesses had attended court but their engagement was 
characterised by such ‘resistance’ that the prosecutor had come to the view that he could 
not compel them to give evidence. The prosecutor informed the court that the witnesses 
had told him that ‘they do not want to give evidence and will refuse to give evidence’ and 
that he had even observed them leave the Witness Service in order to speak to the 
defendant. Magistrate interviewee, Jennifer, reflected upon the difficulties that authorities, 
namely the CPS, face when coming to decisions about whether to ‘compel’ a witness to 
attend court or to follow the witness’s desire to withdraw from the process: 
                                                     
95
 When considering how to proceed in cases in which a witness has entered a withdrawal statement the 
prosecution is required to consider: the nature of the allegation, the complainant’s reason for wanting to 
withdraw; details of whom the complainant has discussed the case with; and whether any civil or family 
proceedings are, or are likely to be, in progress. See: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/domestic-abuse-
guidelines-prosecutors [accessed 15.01.18]. 
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‘Historically what would happen was that if someone put in a withdrawal statement 
the Crown would withdraw, but then there’s been such a level of criticism about the 
severity or the psychological [impact that] the Crown Prosecution Service flipped a 
little bit. And now they do a risk assessment. So, if someone does a withdrawal 
statement, they do a risk assessment and they decide whether they will continue or 
not. … I would say in the domestic setting it is actually not that uncommon to have 
people who are compelled to come to court. But it must be very difficult.’ 
 
This was a consideration clearly in the mind of the trial judge in observation CCOH01 who 
decided to adjourn a trial involving domestic abuse after the complainant – a woman who 
was more than eight months pregnant and who was said to have mental health difficulties – 
had failed to attend court on the day of trial. In doing so he noted his concerns about the 
court asking a heavily pregnant woman, or potentially a woman who had recently given 
birth, to give evidence and stated that consideration should be given to the complainant’s 
perspective about whether or not the case should proceed. 
 
What is particularly evident from these instances of withdrawal – regardless of the stage in 
the process – is that participation could not be encouraged for either normative or 
instrumental reasons. Complainants in criminal cases, and perhaps particularly those which 
involved domestic abuse, are likely to have much at stake in engaging with the court process 
yet very little control over the outcome (cf. Benesh and Howell, 2001). The above findings 
indicate that one of the few opportunities that complainants in such cases have to gain 
control over proceedings is by refusing to engage at all. ‘Withdrawal’ thus represents a very 
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weak level of perceived legitimacy in the courts because it denotes the absence of both 
‘shared values’ and ‘expressed consent’.  
 
5.3.3 Defendants 
 
At the outset of this discussion it is important to acknowledge that the extent to which 
defendants are able to engage in proceedings is limited because their participation is, 
necessarily ‘obligatory’ (Owusu-Bempah, 2017: 74). This is because once arrested and 
charged, it is not within the power of a defendant to stop the case against them progressing 
through the criminal justice system, although – unless they are on remand – they might 
withdraw by not attending court. In the vast majority of cases the defendant is required to 
‘participate’ by being present (either in person or via video-link) and, usually at the very 
least, by providing their name and other relevant personal details and entering a plea. 
Though a defendant’s engagement in the process necessarily involves instrumental or 
enforced compliance, this does not mean that a defendant’s engagement in the criminal 
courts necessarily occurs without elements of normative cooperation. 
 
Among each of the defendants interviewed for this study, a degree of alignment could be 
discerned. However, as outlined above, this may in part reflect the self-selecting nature of 
the sample in that those who had some alignment with the process may have been more 
likely to want to take part in the study. It is also of relevance that all of the defendants 
interviewed had few, or no, previous convictions. The differences in participation between 
seasoned defendants and those for whom it is their first appearance have been well-
documented in previous studies (Carlen, 1976; Bottoms and McClean, 1976; Jacobson et al. 
2015). Due to the small sample of defendants interviewed for this study (7), examples have 
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also been drawn from the observational data when characterising defendants’ levels of 
engagement in the criminal courts.  
 
Active aligned 
Engagement by defendants in this study could rarely be characterised as ‘active aligned’. 
The reasons for this are set out below. Firstly, however, it is essential to highlight the small 
number of instances in which defendants displayed a degree of active alignment.  Martin, 
who stood trial in the magistrates’ court, was the only defendant interviewee who engaged 
in the court process in a manner that could be clearly identified as active aligned. He had 
little experience of attending court as a defendant other than a small number of 
appearances for low-level matters in his youth. Though he stated that he found the 
experience of attending court ‘nerve-wracking’ and ‘daunting’, Martin described how giving 
evidence, and feeling as though he was listened to, helped him to participate fully in his 
trial: 
 
‘I was just so relieved to be there, to be able to talk, I felt like I was talking a million 
miles an hour. Because I didn’t want to forget anything. … that’s why they kept 
telling me to slow down a bit. The first time [the magistrate] slowed me down it gave 
me time to breathe … I felt that she was putting me at ease.’ 
 
Being told to ‘slow down’ or ‘pause’ is a common instruction to witnesses and defendants 
when giving evidence and was used regularly in the cases observed. Some court users found 
it difficult to follow this instruction; however Martin’s comments suggest that he found this 
useful. Moreover, though acknowledging that his view may reflect the fact that he was 
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subsequently acquitted, Martin’s comments are indicative of a strong degree of alignment 
with the courts. They also show how his direct experience of the court process strengthened 
his alignment with the courts: 
 
‘I didn’t feel like the judicial system was on my side when I went in there and I felt it 
was very much on my side when I left so it felt kind of good … You know when they 
say it all comes out in the wash or whatever, I felt this did all come out in the wash 
and it’s all OK now. But going in I was, you know when you think “Oh it’s a fix up 
here” or “someone’s not going to say something, they are not going to listen to me.” 
But I have to say I was shocked how much they did listen to me and how much they 
did understand what went on. You just wonder sometimes [that magistrates think] 
“Oh come on get on with it I want to go and have my tea”, you know what I mean? 
There was a little bit of that but they did let me have my say and put their tea on the 
back burner, which was really nice for me.’  
 
In only a very small proportion of observed cases, four in total, was active alignment 
discernible among defendants. One example of this came in the form of sentencing hearing 
MCSH06 (see Box 5.3), which involved direct communication between the defendant and 
the district judge overseeing the case. During the hearing the judge and the defendant 
spoke about the defendant’s problems with alcohol and the recent steps he had taken to 
address this, including engaging with treatment services and re-establishing contact with his 
adult children. Though the hearing was relatively short, the likely benefit that the defendant 
gleaned from being able to directly engage with the judge and participate in his hearing was 
indicated when the defendant thanked the judge for ‘remembering’ him.  A similar style of 
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interaction was observed in a small number of other hearings (such as, observation 
MCOH07), particularly those which involved a defendant who had problems with alcohol or 
substance misuse.96 Such interactions provide illustrations of the ways in dialogue between 
power-holder and audience, in this case the judge and the defendant, respectively, can 
enhance an individual’s level of engagement in the court process.  
Box 5.3 Power-holder and audience dialogue in a magistrates’ court sentencing hearing 
(MCSH06) 
This was a sentencing hearing for a case of theft in which the defendant (D), a man with 
problems with alcohol, had pleaded guilty to stealing a small number of clothing items from 
a retail store. D was on licence for a previous offence at the time of the theft. The case had 
appeared before the court the previous month, however, the district judge (J) had deferred 
the sentencing hearing because the treatment service that D had been due to engage with 
had not been able to see him by the date of the hearing. The defence provided submissions 
during which it was stated that D had now accessed treatment services, had registered for a 
place on a carpentry course and was residing in a hostel. Before sentencing the defendant, J 
communicated directly with D about his progress. For example: 
 
J: First of all, well done. Secondly, how do you feel coming to court today [compared 
to] last time 
 
D: Much better 
 
                                                     
96
 Such styles of communication are associated with the body of work surrounding ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’. 
Proponents of these theories argue that therapeutic interactions can help to enhance the rehabilitative 
potential of penal interventions (see, for example, Wexler, 2000). 
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J also asked D if he’d been able to make contact with his adult children, to which D replied 
that he had. Upon sentencing D to a community order with a rehabilitation activity 
requirement, the following exchange ensued:  
 
J: Well done, you’ve shown willing, I’m not going to lock you up. … If you lapse again 
and come back we can look at the reasons for it … But, ultimately we need to give 
shop owners protection. 
 
D:  ‘Thank you very much for remembering me’. 
 
Moreover, both of the above examples of defendants’ ‘active aligned’ engagement arguably 
highlight the ways in which perceptions of legitimacy can be enhanced by an individual’s 
direct interaction with those responsible for exerting authority. This is discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 6. 
 
Passivity: alignment, acceptance and dull compulsion 
The notion that defendants occupy a ‘passive’ role in the criminal justice process is well-
documented (Carlen, 1976; Bottoms and McClean, 1976; Baldwin and McConville, 1977; 
McBarnet, 1981; Jacobson et al. 2015) and has led to the role of the defendant being 
variously described as that of ‘ever-present extra’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 83), ‘dummy player’ 
(Carlen, 1976: 69) or ‘non-participa[nt]’ (Baldwin and McConville, 1977: 83).97 Passivity was 
the dominant form of participation among defendants in this study, displayed by more than 
                                                     
97
 However, it is important to note Bottoms and McLean’s (1976: 59) observation that sometimes displays of 
passivity among defendants, such as the adoption of a conforming or unassuming stance within the 
courtroom, can be borne out of a ‘strategic’ decision by a defendant who takes the view that their 
representative will ‘put [the case] across better’. 
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three quarters of defendants in observed cases. Three forms of passivity have been 
identified for the purposes of this study. These are: passive alignment, passive acceptance 
and dull compulsion. All represent a form of passive participation; however an examination 
of an individual defendant’s alignment with the courts allows a distinction to be drawn 
about the way in which individuals can be said to engage with the process.  
 
Most defendants who participated in an interview displayed engagement characterised by 
‘passive alignment’. This type of engagement was also displayed by a small proportion of 
defendants in the observed cases. That is, the individual defendant, though being relatively 
passive in their participation of the court process, for example by having limited levels of 
understanding or means by which to express themselves, displayed an alignment with the 
overall authority of the courts.  Defendant interviewee Holly had been convicted via a 
private prosecution that was brought due to an offence committed in the course of her 
employment.  Due to the fact that the legal documentation surrounding the case was sent 
to her former work address rather than to her home address, Holly was not aware of the 
charge against her until she read about the conviction when it was reported in the local 
press. Upon reading of the conviction Holly contacted a solicitor and the court and 
requested that her case be re-heard. She pleaded guilty to the offence, though it was stated 
in mitigation that she had been very surprised to find out that her actions had been illegal, 
and received a fine. Holly described feeling ‘nervous’ and ‘embarrassed’ about her court 
appearance. She did not actively participate in the proceedings against her – though she 
stated during interview that her advocate had explained various aspects of the process – 
however her strong degree of alignment with the courts was illustrated by the pro-active 
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steps she had taken to resolve the case once she found out it had been heard in her 
absence:  
 
‘I just think the [magistrates] could see it for what it was, I think they could obviously 
see that it was misjustice – with them dealing with it in my absence. I think they 
could see that I done the right thing obviously after seeing my name in the 
newspaper … At the end of the day, they didn’t have my address, I walked into the 
court and I gave my name, I gave my date of birth, I gave my address. There could 
have been a point where this would never have caught up with me and I could have 
just sat there. They took it all into account that I am a genuine person that I’m not 
someone that’s trying to scam some sort of system or, you know what I mean, I’m 
not in there for a burglary or something that’s awful.’  
 
Holly’s latter comments also indicate a very strong degree of alignment with one of the 
overarching functions of the courts: that is, to convict those guilty of committing offences. 
Jacobson et al. (2015: 171) observed similar accounts from defendants interviewed in their 
study and argued that such responses ‘imply, at the very least, some belief that the courts 
are justified in setting out the punishments for those who break society’s laws, even when 
they themselves are the recipients of punishment.’ Moreover, Holly’s engagement provides 
a good example of the way in which engagement occurs along a continuum. This is because 
she, arguably, hovers at the border between ‘passive alignment’ and ‘active alignment’. 
Though presenting a high degree of alignment in the process, her degree of participation 
was mixed; she displayed a good degree of understanding in the court process, however, 
ultimately her degree of expression during her sentencing hearing was very limited.  
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The engagement of defendant Jon could more clearly be described as ‘passive aligned’. 
Though he demonstrated a degree of alignment with the authority of the courts, aspects of 
his participation were limited. This was particularly so in relation to the ways in which Jon 
felt that he was not provided with sufficient opportunity to express himself:  
 
‘The justice system works quite good – I wouldn’t change anything. Maybe just if 
there is a case as there was in my situation that the person would have a bit more 
time to prove his innocence. Maybe that would help him or help the jury to 
understand him. Or know him better. … Say 10 minutes where you can see how the 
person speaks and behaves, and gives evidence, it may help for them to decide’. 
 
English was not Jon’s first language, nor did he appear in court with the assistance of an 
interpreter, however he did not attribute his difficulties in expression as being borne out of 
language difficulties.98  
 
The common response of defendants in the sentencing hearings observed was one of 
passivity. Without interviewing a larger number of defendants appearing in such cases it is 
not possible to explore in detail whether this response was one of ‘passive alignment’, 
‘passive acceptance’, or ‘dull compulsion’, however all three responses were discernible in 
observations conducted during this study. In a small number of cases it was possible to 
detect an element of ‘passive alignment’ in the way in which defendants responded to the 
                                                     
98
 For a recent examination of defendant participation in cases which a defendant is assisted by an interpreter, 
see Aliverti and Seoighe (2017). 
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sentencing process. A defendant in a theft case, who had appeared before the court on 
numerous occasions, responded ‘yeah, fair enough’ when a sentence of six months custody 
was imposed (case MCSH43). In other instances, the defendant apologised to the court for 
committing the offence; 'I know I done wrong and I'm going to get a [driving] ban and I 
accept that and I am sorry’ said the defendant in case MCSH24. Such responses indicate an 
‘implicit legitimacy’ (cf. Fielding, 2006: 7) afforded to the courts among ‘passive aligned’ 
defendants. 
 
Responses of this nature however, were relatively infrequent and ultimately engagement 
characterised by ‘passive acceptance’, or even ‘dull compulsion’, occurred more frequently. 
This may, in part, reflect the nature of sentencing hearings. At the point of sentencing, 
defendants have either pleaded, or been found, guilty. They are simply required to provide 
the court with their name and date of birth and, for those who have decided to plead guilty, 
to enter or confirm their plea. Sentencing hearings, particularly in the magistrates’ court, 
are relatively short and those observed tended to last within the region of fifteen to thirty 
minutes. Several days’ fieldwork were spent at magistrates’ courts in courtrooms that were 
primarily hearing ‘guilty anticipated pleas’ – known colloquially as ‘GAP courts’ – during 
which much of the court’s time was spent presiding over sentencing hearings. The court 
waiting areas on these days were very busy, particularly in the morning, and cases were 
often dealt with in relatively quick succession. 
 
 ‘Passive acceptance’ at the point of sentencing was manifest in instances in which a 
defendant had accepted their guilt – or their decision to plead guilty – and attended court 
to simply ‘get it over’ with (Carlen, 1976: 29; Bottoms and McClean, 1976: 67; Jacobson et 
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al. 2015: 92).99 This kind of response was reflected in the comments of the defendant 
Martin, when comparing his recent appearance at the magistrates’ court for a trial with a 
previous occasion in which he had attended the court for sentencing: 
 
‘[The earlier sentencing hearing] seemed less daunting, I think because you knew 
you’d done it and you knew you were just going in there to find out what your fine 
was … This [time] was different for me in the sense that I never done anything so I 
found that really, a bit nerve-wracking’.  
 
Darbyshire (2011: 199) described the accepting, or resigned, way in which defendants turn 
up to court at their allotted time ‘often with their bags packed in readiness to be sent to 
prison’, as being akin to ‘Turkeys voting for Christmas’. A response similar to this was 
illustrated in observation CCSH09. The defendant in the case, a man who had been found 
guilty of historic sexual offences, arrived at court on the morning of the hearing smartly 
dressed and carrying a packed suitcase. He remained silent as the hearing progressed and 
did not react when the judge imposed a sentence of several years’ custody. In another case 
(MCOH06), heard in the magistrates’ court, the defendant had decided to enter a late guilty 
plea to offences relating to harassment. Before entering the dock to enter his plea the 
defendant hugged his girlfriend, who had attended court with him, and told her that he 
loved her. He said he was doing so ‘just in case’ he was sent to custody. (The case was 
subsequently adjourned for a pre-sentence report.)  
                                                     
99
 That a defendant’s resignation or fatalism about their appearance before the courts is manifest in comments 
such as ‘wanting to get it over with’ or ‘forget about’ is common within the existing courts literature (Carlen, 
1976; Bottoms and McClean, 1976; Jacobson et al. 2015). This notion was further encapsulated in this study by 
the fact that several defendants, when declining the opportunity to take part in a research interview about 
their experiences, stated that the reason they did not wish to take part was because they ‘just wanted to 
forget about’ (or a variant thereof) their court appearance.  
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Participation grounded in passive acceptance was also indicative of a defendant’s struggle 
to understand, or express themselves adequately, during proceedings. In case MCFT02 the 
defendant (D) was found guilty at trial of breaching a non-molestation order that prohibited 
him from contacting his former partner (offence 1). He was subject to a conditional 
discharge at the time at which offence 1 was committed. Therefore, being found guilty of 
offence 1 meant that D was also in breach of the conditional discharge (offence 2). Upon 
being convicted of offence 1, D – who was unrepresented – was charged with offence 2. 
When the legal adviser (LA) asked D how he would like to plead to the breach of conditional 
discharge the following exchange ensued:  
 
LA: Do you admit it? 
D: OK 
LA: Do you understand? 
D: OK 
LA: Do you admit or deny it? 
D: I deny it 
LA: You need to explain it to me [why you deny it], I don’t understand 
 
At this point the legal adviser explained to D that although he denied breaching the non-
molestation order, he had now been found guilty of this offence, and she was asking if he 
accepted that the date of the breach of non-molestation order took place within the period 
that the conditional discharge was active. He eventually responded: 
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D: I understand … I accept it 
LA: Does [the date of the breach of non-molestation order] fall within the 12 
month period from [the date of the conditional discharge]? 
D: OK  
 
Participation of this nature this echoes the findings of Carlen (1976: 24) who described the 
‘paralysing effect’ that a lack of familiarity with court environment and a lack of 
understanding of legal proceedings can have on the extent to which defendants engage 
with proceedings: 
 
‘Most defendants cause no trouble … After a long wait in the corridors or waiting 
room, many of them make an initial attempt to hear and follow the proceedings and 
then visibly give up the pretence of understanding or stare restlessly around the 
courtroom until … the formalities are over.’ (p. 32) 
 
It could be difficult to draw a distinction between ‘passive acceptance’ and ‘dull compulsion’ 
during observations because, in the absence of conducting an interview with the defendant, 
it was not always possible to ascertain their degree of alignment with the court process. 
However, generally speaking, ‘passive acceptance’ was characterised by a minimal degree of 
alignment, associated with a defendant’s acceptance of ‘their fate’ (Jacobson et al. 2015) 
and a resulting ‘submission to the court process’ (Bottoms and McClean, 1976:66).  A 
response of ‘dull compulsion’, in comparison, was motivated solely by instrumental 
compliance arising from the threat – or imposition – of a sanction. For example, case 
CCOH02 involved a defendant who had failed to attend court on the morning of his trial; he 
220 
 
arrived at the court later on in the day after being brought to court by the police. This is 
indicative of a weaker level of perceived legitimacy than the defendants who exhibited a 
‘passive acceptance’ of their predicament.  A response of ‘dull compulsion’ was also 
indicated by a defendant in a trial of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs (CCPT11) who, 
though participating by being present throughout the trial, did not visibly interact with 
other actors in the courtroom during the observed period. No evidence was presented in his 
defence; the defendant’s decision not to give evidence was communicated to the court via 
his advocate. The defendant’s lack of ‘voluntary participation’ (Owusu-Bempah, 2017: 45) in 
the court process was alluded to by his advocate, who stated to the jury during his closing 
speech that ‘all you know about him’ is his age. In other instances, defendants displayed 
their lack of alignment with the court process in a much more active, and often less 
compliant, manner. 
 
Resistant 
Defendants in around one fifth of observed cases participated in the court process in an 
‘active’ way; most of whom did so in an unaligned manner which often took the form of 
overt resistance to the court process.  One example of this was a Crown Court trial in which 
the defendant was alleged to have assaulted the complainant with a weapon (CCPT09). The 
defendant entered the courtroom at the beginning of his hearing and said ‘good afternoon’ 
to the room at large. He received no response. The first afternoon of the trial was taken up 
with legal argument; at various points during this the defendant – from his position in the 
secure glass dock – attempted to interject. At one point he stood up in the dock and was 
told to ‘sit down’ by the judge who said that he found this behaviour ‘distracting’. The 
defendant responded, ‘I’m offering assistance’; to which the judge replied ‘well don’t’. Later 
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in the afternoon when the court was in the process of finalising his bail conditions, the 
defendant’s continual interruptions led the judge to decide to place him on remand. As he 
was about to be taken to the cells the following exchanged ensued: 
 
D: ‘I stand before the court, innocent until proven guilty, why should I be 
punished?’  
 
 J: ‘You’ve got a defence advocate – he speaks on your behalf’ 
 
Interactions of this nature this reflect Carlen’s (1976: 29) argument that ‘[defendants] who 
do not know or accept their place have, physically, to be put in it’ and McBarnet’s (1981: 63) 
assertion that ‘the accused is often not so much silent in court – inarticulate, afraid or 
outside the game – but silenced in court for not obeying the rules of legal procedure’. 
 In a similar vein, a defendant in a Crown Court rape trial (CCPT05) appeared agitated at 
various points during the observed period of proceedings. This was particularly pronounced 
when he was giving evidence, to the point which his own advocate appeared frustrated with 
him.  The defendant and his advocate interrupted each other at various points during his 
evidence in-chief; he struggled to find the points of his statement that the advocate was 
referring to – holding the document very close to his face when trying to find the relevant 
points – and leaned over the witness box, gesticulating frequently. In her closing statement 
the advocate directly referred to this, telling the jury that ‘I know it’s difficult to understand 
what he says a lot of the time because he’s not listening and interrupting [but it is] because 
he’s anxious to get his point across’. Before beginning to sum up, the judge stated that the 
defendant ‘seem[ed] to be getting a better hang of that he needs to sit quietly and listen’ 
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but suggested – in the absence of the jury – that the advocate remind him that the case is 
summed up ‘on both sides’. The judge went on to pointedly note that there was an ‘easy 
solution’ available to the court should there be any ‘outbursts’ from the defendant.  
 
The above discussion illustrates how a defendant’s response to the court process can be 
perceived as resistant. Instances of resistance were also manifested at the point at which 
decisions were made upon the outcome of cases. One example of this occurred during a 
burglary trial (CCPT03) in which the defendant was alleged to have taken items from the 
property of his former partner. The defendant, whose engagement in earlier parts of 
proceedings observed could best be described as ‘passive acceptance’ or ‘dull compulsion’, 
displayed increasing signs of ‘resistance’ in the lead up to the verdict. This began on the 
morning of the final day of the trial while the jury were deliberating, when the prosecution 
and defence advocates – in the courtroom in the presence of the defendant – entered into a 
discussion of possible sentencing options should the defendant be found guilty. The 
defendant, from the dock, shouted to his advocate ‘I’m not doing community service’. 
Shortly afterwards, when the jury foreman announced a verdict of guilty, the defendant 
started muttering to the dock officer before loudly saying ‘f*** the jury, f*** this court’. The 
judge adjourned sentencing for an ‘all options’ pre-sentence report. The defendant exited 
the courtroom and kicked the door on his way out. A less pronounced form of resistance 
was displayed by the defendant in case MCSH03 who, upon being informed by the judge 
that he was to be sentenced to custody, argued against the decision, stating that he was 
‘trying really hard’ to address his substance misuse problems and that he would lose his 
accommodation if sentenced to custody. 
 
223 
 
Many of the above examples of resistance could perhaps be described as, at best, attempts 
to be heard (during the court process), or at worst as futile displays of hostility (at the point 
of outcome). This reflects the limited extent to which defendants are able to participate in 
proceedings, the relative ‘powerlessness’ (Baldwin and McConville, 1977: 87; Jacobson et al. 
2015:197) defendants have over decisions which are likely to have a significant impact upon 
their lives, and, in some instances, perhaps a ‘wider disaffection or alienation from the 
social order, which … may be intimately bound up with their offending’ (Jacobson et al. 
2015: 195-6).100 However, in one instance (case CCSH11), a defendant’s overt resistance to 
the process resulted in a further charge of contempt of court being added to the indictment 
against him. During an intermission in proceedings the defendant was overheard by an 
advocate making, what the judge described as, ‘very disparaging’ remarks about the court 
and admitting to taking photographs inside the courtroom. The defendant pleaded guilty to 
this offence. 
 
Importantly, as this Chapter has sought to illustrate, levels of engagement by an individual 
lay person do not necessarily remain constant throughout the court process. It was often 
the case among defendants who displayed resistance that efforts made by the court to limit 
this led to the defendant’s engagement becoming one of ‘dull compulsion’. The defendant 
who was remanded after frequently interrupting proceedings in CCPT09, displayed a very 
different demeanour in court the following day. He sat silently in the dock for most of the 
day – visible signs of participation were, in the main, limited to his writing notes that were 
subsequently passed to his advocate and sighing at several points during the evidence of the 
complainant. Likewise the defendant in the burglary trial (CCPT03), who kicked the door 
                                                     
100
 The latter is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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upon exiting, returned to the courtroom ten minutes later – seemingly after the 
intervention of a probation officer – and asked the court usher to ‘please tell the judge that 
I apologise for my actions when I left the courtroom’. In these instances, the shift in the 
defendant’s type of engagement occurred due, in the case of the former, to the imposition 
of a sanction and, in the latter, due to an apparent fear of sanction. Both cases highlight the 
way in which the courts’ reliance upon instrumental forms of securing compliance does not 
enhance the individual’s engagement in the process.  
 
Withdrawal 
A final form of participation among defendants is that of withdrawal. Defendants, due to 
the enforced nature of their engagement in the court process, are the lay person with the 
least ability to withdraw from proceedings and subsequently withdrawal among defendants 
was relatively uncommon, occurring in only a minority of observed cases. Nevertheless, it is 
important to bear in mind Baldwin and McConville’s (1977: 85) assertion that a defendant’s 
‘refusal to comply’ is their ‘only weapon’ and to briefly draw attention to instances in which 
withdrawal did occur. Withdrawal by defendants arose in a number of contexts and, as 
outlined in the below discussion, it was not always possible to discern whether a 
defendant’s absence from court proceedings was due to an explicit decision to withdraw or 
whether other factors were at play. However, ‘withdrawal’ that is motivated by the former 
is indicative of the weakest degree of perceived legitimacy in the criminal courts.  
 
There were several occasions in which a defendant placed on remand was not ‘produced’ to 
the court from prison, such as the defendant in MCFT16, described above. In one instance, 
the court was informed that defendants had not been produced because the prison van had 
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been delayed in leaving the prison; however in another it was stated that the defendant had 
refused to get into the van and had subsequently not been brought to the court. In the 
latter case the defence advocate explained that the reason for his client’s refusal to get in 
the van was, in his understanding, because the defendant did not want to be transferred 
from the remand prison in which he was residing to the prison local to the Crown Court 
upon being sentenced. ‘I’m afraid it isn’t a hotel system’, responded the judge, drily.  The 
case was adjourned, and the judge requested that the defendant be informed that the case 
would be heard in his absence if he did not attend on the next occurrence.  
 
On several occasions a defendant on bail did not attend court at the time of his or her 
scheduled hearing; the courts were not always able to ascertain the reason for a 
defendant’s absence. In some instances, the case was adjourned to a later date and/or a 
warrant was issued for the defendant’s arrest. An example of the former occurred in 
MCOH05, in which one of the defendants failed to attend court on the morning of the trial. 
His advocate informed the court that this was because he now lived outside the area in 
which the court was located and could not afford to travel to the court until he received his 
next benefits payment. In others the case took place in the defendant’s absence. One 
example was a case in which the defence advocate informed the court that the defendant 
had been receiving treatment for a condition relating to alcoholism that was ‘practically 
terminal’. It was noted by the court that defendant had also been absent during a previous 
hearing and had been informed that the case could go ahead in her absence. In a small 
number of contested cases involving allegations of speeding, the trials went ahead in the 
absence of the defendant. (Defendants in such matters are unlikely to be subject to bail and 
are thus not legally required to attend court.) In most of these cases the defendant was in a 
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high-income bracket, and court staff on occasion informally commented that the 
defendants were represented by solicitors’ firms known for dealing with ‘loop-hole’ cases.  
 
5.3.4 Characterising court user engagement: commonalities and differences across the 
sample 
 
The engagement of court users was examined separately in the preceding two sections to 
enable a focus upon the distinct ways in which engagement can be characterised between 
the different groups of court user; that is, complainants, prosecution witnesses and 
defendants. To bring this discussion to a close, this section draws attention to some of the 
main commonalities and differences across the court user sample as a whole. Before doing 
so it is necessary to note the limitations of making comparisons due to the qualitative 
approach adopted. The emphasis of this type of approach primarily rests on achieving depth 
rather than breadth and thus limits the extent to which making generalisations across 
variable type can be achieved (cf. Bryman, 2012). That is, it is very difficult to isolate the 
impact of a single variable upon a court user’s engagement in proceedings. This is 
particularly because multiple – and sometimes overlapping – factors are often at play.  It is 
thus perhaps unsurprising that Turner (1981: 264) noted the difficulty in attempting to ‘pin 
down’ comparisons between variables in qualitative research; a task for which, as he 
argued, quantitative research is better equipped.101 Nevertheless, a number of broad 
comparisons can be discerned from the data.  
 
                                                     
101
 In contrast, the element of grounded theory that necessitates ‘constant comparison’ concerns the process 
of saturating and refining categories – in this instance, the five types of engagement –  until they become 
distinct from one another (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Turner, 1981). 
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The main demographic characteristic that appears to have a bearing on a court user’s 
engagement in the process is socio-economic status. Due to the interplay between this and 
other factors relating to both the individual and the court process, this is examined in detail 
in Chapter 6 as part of a discussion about barriers to engagement in the criminal courts. It 
was not possible to detect any clear differences in how court users engaged with the court 
process based upon age or ethnicity. However with regard to the latter, it is necessary to 
note that, corresponding with national trends regarding the overrepresentation of 
individuals from BAME backgrounds in the criminal justice system (Lammy, 2017), 
defendants from BAME backgrounds were overrepresented in the observation sample.102  
Had a greater number of interviews been conducted with defendants, it may have been 
more possible to detect differences in engagement based upon ethnicity.  
 
Likewise, the small proportion of female defendants in the observed sample (less than one 
sixth of all cases), makes it difficult to draw comparisons based upon gender.103 Passivity 
was displayed by a higher proportion of female defendants than males; however this is set 
in the context of the high degree of passivity visible across the observed sample.  With 
regard to complainants and prosecution witnesses, it is possible to discern slightly weaker 
levels of engagement among women in comparison to men in the observed sample. This 
variation perhaps better reflects differing levels of engagement based upon offence type. As 
highlighted above, the majority of cases of alleged domestic abuse involved complainants 
                                                     
102
 It is estimated that just under one third of defendants in the 126 observed cases were from BAME 
backgrounds. However, exact proportions cannot be provided because classifications based upon demographic 
characteristics, including ethnicity, were often observed by the researcher rather than explicitly specified to 
the court. 
103
 This broadly reflects the national context in which, in 2017, females accounted for 26% of those prosecuted 
against and 5% of the prison population. This is in comparison to males who accounted for 74% of those 
prosecuted against and 95% of the prison population (Ministry of Justice, 2018d).  
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and/or prosecution witnesses whose engagement was characterised by ‘dull compulsion’, 
‘resistance’ or ‘withdrawal’; in all but one of these instances the complainant was female 
(and the defendant was male). This broadly corresponds with existing research which has 
pointed to the presence of ‘gender asymmetry’ in cases of domestic abuse (Hoyle, 2007: 
150).  
 
A further observed difference based upon offence type is that those appearing before the 
courts for driving offences displayed slightly higher levels of passivity than the overall 
sample. This is also likely to be bound up in type of hearing attended by the defendant. 
Passivity, in one form or another – ranging from ‘passive alignment’ to ‘dull compulsion’ – 
was visible among all defendants who attended a sentencing hearing for a driving 
offence.104 However, it would be a mistake to conclude from this that defendants in driving 
matters are indifferent to proceedings against them. Defendants in the cases observed 
often had a significant amount at stake in proceedings, even in those in which their overall 
response was one of passivity. This is because a conviction for a driving offence often led to 
a disqualification from driving and, for defendants without previous convictions, a potential 
loss of ‘good character’.  Either or both of these factors could negatively impact on the 
defendant’s current or future employment prospects.  
 
There were no clear differences in court user engagement based upon court type; that is, 
between the Crown and magistrates’ courts. Neither were clear differences visible in 
relation to types of engagement displayed by court users in Amber City in comparison to 
                                                     
104
 This corresponds with the broader observation that passivity was the dominant form of response by 
defendants attending court for a sentencing hearing. 
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Indigo Town. That is, the five different types of engagement emerged in each of the courts 
under study. This finding is significant for two reasons. This first is because it suggests that it 
may be possible, at least to some degree, to generalise the study findings beyond the four 
courts under study. The second is because it points to a degree of commonality between 
the Crown and magistrates’ court in terms of how court users engage with proceedings. This 
is perhaps useful given the absence of existing research with court users, particularly 
complainants and prosecution witnesses, in the magistrates’ court. For example, that court 
users find it difficult to express themselves – or ‘tell their story’ (Fielding, 2006) – during 
proceedings, fear the ‘unknown environment’ (Jacobson et al. 2015) of the courtroom, or 
find the legal conventions inherent in the court process bewildering, is well-established in 
empirical research of the Crown Court (cf. Rock, 1993; Fielding, 2006; Jacobson et al. 2015). 
However, as examples presented throughout this Chapter illustrate, similar experiences 
were also commonplace in the magistrates’ court, despite the arguably less formal nature of 
the setting. Court users’ engagement in proceedings can be influenced by a variety of 
operational constraints that exist in the Crown and magistrates’ courts alike, as will be 
explored further in the following Chapter. 
 
In a similar vein, no strong differences emerged in relation to levels of engagement based 
upon the type of adjudicator overseeing the case. Each of the different forms of 
engagement were visible in cases presided over by Crown Court judges, district judges and 
lay magistrates. District judges often appeared to be more interventionist in manner than 
lay magistrates – and thus tended to have more direct interaction with court users – 
however, this was by no means always the case. An arguably more prominent influence 
upon engagement concerns not the type of adjudicator, but the quality of interaction 
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between the adjudicator and individual court user. Box 5.4 provides an example of the steps 
taken by the chairing magistrate, and also the legal adviser, to facilitate the defendant’s 
engagement with proceedings. (It also highlights the degree of stake the defendant had in 
proceedings, despite the ‘low-level’ nature of the charge.) The impact of ‘procedurally just’ 
forms of communication upon the engagement of court users is discussed in further detail 
in Chapter 6.   
 
In sum, it is difficult to isolate the impact of specific demographic characteristics, such as 
age, gender and ethnicity, upon a court user’s engagement with the court process. 
Importantly, the presence of each form of engagement in each of the courts under study 
and across different types of adjudicator, points to the applicability of the continuum across 
the criminal courts. It also enables commonalities to be teased out as to the factors that can 
promote and inhibit engagement across the criminal courts; this is the focus of Chapter 6. A 
small number of distinctions can be drawn out of the above analysis. Firstly, engagement in 
the court process was found to be particularly weak among complainants and prosecution 
witnesses in cases involving domestic abuse, the majority of whom were female, and 
secondly that passivity is the archetypal response of defendants at the point of sentencing.   
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Box 5.4 Direct interaction between courtroom actors and an invested, yet unrepresented, 
defendant (MCFT10) 
 
This was a case of speeding in which the prosecution alleged that two police officers, while 
on patrol, had witnessed a vehicle speeding past their car. The officers followed the car and 
stopped the defendant’s (D) vehicle. When stopped, D, an off-duty taxi driver, stated that 
he did not think he had been speeding – he believed the police had stopped the wrong 
vehicle.  
 
D arrived in court, with a supporter, on the morning of his hearing. The legal adviser 
introduced herself to D, explained her role – ‘I’m neutral’, she stated – and described the 
roles and positions of different parties in the courtroom. The legal adviser directed D to the 
advocate’s bench and asked him if he would like a pen and paper to make notes. She also 
asked him to let her know if there were parts of proceedings that he did not understand. 
The defendant had brought various pieces of information with him, including highlighted 
copies of police statements and the CCTV of the incident.  
 
Shortly after the magistrates entered and the prosecutor had provided opening 
submissions, the defendant asked if ‘there was any chance to elaborate’. He outlined his 
account of the incident, including stating that he thought that the officers had stopped the 
wrong vehicle, before saying: ‘I’m not a barrister and I don’t know the nicest way of putting 
it but [the officer has] made it up … it is completely inaccurate’.  
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The two police officers involved in the incident gave evidence for the prosecution. The 
defendant cross-examined each witness but struggled to ask questions of the witnesses and 
instead made a number of statements. On a number of occasions he was informed by the 
legal adviser and the magistrate who was chairing the bench that he needed to ask the 
witnesses questions, rather than make statements or give evidence. For example, while 
cross-examining the first witness the magistrate stated: ‘As far as giving the rest of your 
story, you have the opportunity on oath, importantly, to say your story.’ Likewise, before 
the defendant began to cross-examine the second witness, the magistrate informed him 
that this was his opportunity to ask questions of the officer and stressed that ‘the format 
must be questions’. The defendant described finding this as ‘difficult’ – ‘I’m not a 
professional’, he said.   
 
The defendant later did give evidence. Upon doing so he was asked by the magistrate if he 
had anything further to add. The defendant stated that he had not been able to afford legal 
representation and apologised to the court – ‘I’m sorry if I’ve interrupted and done things 
wrong … I’ve done as much as he could … There’s nothing much more I can say other than I 
didn’t do it; I wasn’t guilty’. The defendant was subsequently found not guilty. 
 
 
 
5.4 Concluding thoughts 
 
This Chapter has argued that examining the extent to which lay participants engage with the 
court process represents the degree to which the individual regards the criminal courts as 
legitimate.  To do so it has presented a continuum of engagement that consists of two axes: 
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alignment and participation. Defining engagement in this manner enables engagement to 
act as a lens through which to view perceptions of legitimacy. This is because ‘alignment’ 
represents the extent to which ‘shared values’ exist between the courts and lay participants 
and ‘participation’ represents the extent to which individuals accord the courts ‘expressed 
consent’ to exert authority. In turn, shared values and expressed consent comprise two of 
the core features of legitimacy (see, for example, Tyler, 2011; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; 
Beetham, 2013; Jackson et al.; 2015).  
 
Five types of engagement have been outlined: ‘active alignment’, ‘passive alignment’, ‘dull 
compulsion’, ‘resistance’ and ‘withdrawal’. Engagement characterised by ‘active alignment’, 
represents the highest degree of engagement in the court process, while ‘withdrawal’ 
represents the lowest degree of engagement. It follows, therefore, that ‘active alignment’ is 
indicative of ‘true’ legitimacy whereas low degrees of engagement, such as ‘dull 
compulsion’, ‘resistance’ and ‘withdrawal’, are indicative of weaker forms of legitimacy.  
 
Engagement among lay magistrates can be largely described as ‘active aligned’. This is due 
to the high degree of voluntary cooperation afforded to the courts by magistrates, the 
presence of a degree of self-belief in the ‘moral rightness’ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012: 
162) of their adjudicatory role and their ability to actively participate in courtroom 
interaction. The engagement of court users is more dispersed throughout the continuum, 
with ‘active aligned’ being one of the least common forms of engagement.  
 
Only a small number of court users (both among interviewees and those in observed cases) 
engaged with the court process in a manner that could be described as ‘active aligned’.  The 
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vast majority of interviewees – complainants, prosecution witnesses and defendants alike – 
engaged in a ‘passive aligned’ manner; this included instances of ‘passive acceptance’. 
Engagement that is characterised by ‘passive alignment’ represents the presence of an 
‘implicit’ degree of legitimacy (Fielding, 2006: 7).  However, nearly two thirds of 
complainants and prosecution witnesses in the observed sample exhibited weak levels of 
engagement; that is ‘dull compulsion’, ‘resistance’ or ‘withdrawal’. Meanwhile, three 
quarters of defendants in the observed cases participated in a ‘passive’ manner. Without 
having also conducted interviews with these defendants, it was not always possible to 
discern whether or not their engagement was based upon ‘passive alignment’, ‘passive 
acceptance’ or ‘dull compulsion’, however, the latter two forms of engagement seemed to 
appear more frequently.  Furthermore, defendants who participated in an ‘active’ manner 
tended to display a weak degree of alignment with the court process; this was often 
manifested as overt ‘resistance’. Therefore, engagement characterised by either 
‘resistance’, ‘dull compulsion’ or ‘withdrawal’ was in no shortage of supply among court 
users. This requires further attention because the regularity of such forms of engagement 
suggests that weak forms of legitimacy pervade the criminal courts. It also points to areas of 
friction, strain or deficit within the ‘legitimacy dialogue’ (Bottoms and Tanekebe, 2012) 
between the courts (as power-holders) and court users (as the audience) that need to be 
addressed in order for the courts to continue to claim to hold legitimate authority. 
 
Elements of ‘resistance’,’ dull compulsion’ and ‘withdrawal’ are – to a degree – likely to be 
inevitable when an authority is responsible for wielding power over individual citizens. 
However, the closer levels of engagement can be said to be characterised by ‘active 
alignment’, the stronger the claim that power-holders can make as to holding ‘truly’ 
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legitimate authority (cf. Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012: 168).  In this vein, the final empirical 
Chapter aims to further disentangle the factors which are likely to contribute to weak levels 
of engagement. The second part of the Chapter considers how stronger levels of 
engagement can be cultivated and, in doing so, seeks to elaborate upon existing theoretical 
discussions of legitimacy. 
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Chapter 6: Fostering engagement in the criminal courts: from 
procedural justice to ‘unfinished’ legitimacy 
 
 
The previous Chapter outlined the ways in which the engagement of lay participants in the 
criminal courts can be characterised, with levels of engagement ranging from an ‘active 
alignment’ with the courts and their function to one of ‘withdrawal’. A lay participant’s 
degree of engagement, I argued, served to illustrate the extent to which the individual 
perceives the courts as legitimate. This is because the two dimensions which comprise 
engagement – alignment and participation – correspond with two of the central 
components of legitimacy: shared values and expressed consent, respectively. Further to 
this it was argued that weak levels of engagement, namely ‘resistance’, ‘dull compulsion’ 
and ‘withdrawal’, are indicative of areas of ‘legitimacy deficit’ that need to be addressed in 
order for the courts to be perceived as ‘truly’ legitimate in the eyes of those they serve (cf. 
Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). 
 
The aim of this Chapter therefore, in consideration of Research Question 4, is to examine in 
detail the existing barriers to promoting strong – that is, ‘active aligned’ – engagement and 
to think about how enhanced levels of engagement might best be cultivated. The main 
barriers to engagement comprise both operational constraints within the criminal courts 
and those which relate to the needs and circumstances of individual court users. Levels of 
engagement are often at their weakest when operational constraints coalesce with high 
levels of individual and social need among court users. Consistent with literature on the 
topic of procedural justice, I argue that the presence of considerate and inclusive 
237 
 
interactions can help to cultivate engagement in the criminal courts. However the strength 
of such claims, this Chapter concludes, should not be overstated because they form just one 
aspect of the ‘tissue of relations’ (Loader and Sparks, 2013) that shape perceptions of 
legitimacy.  
 
This Chapter focuses upon fostering engagement primarily among court users rather than all 
groups of lay participant, such as magistrates, jurors and Witness Service volunteers. This is 
because, as previously illustrated, the engagement of court users tends to be weaker than 
that of other lay participants. Nonetheless, the views of the magistrates and Witness Service 
Volunteers interviewed are drawn upon, where relevant. 
 
6.1 Barriers to engagement in the criminal courts 
 
In order to examine the ways in which court users’ engagement in the court process can be 
cultivated, it is first necessary to gain an understanding of the existing barriers to 
engagement. In this section it is argued that two interconnecting groups of barriers exist 
and coalesce to inhibit ‘active aligned’ engagement. These are operational constraints which 
are borne out of intersecting issues relating to structural, cultural and contextual issues 
within the courts and those relating to the personal and social circumstances of individual 
court users.  
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6.1.1 Operational constraints: structure, culture and context 
 
Paul Rock (1993) described in detail the ‘social world’ that characterises the operation and 
interactions of daily life in the Crown Court. This section seeks to illustrate how assorted 
operational constraints, borne out of structural, cultural and contextual dynamics within the 
‘social world’ of the criminal courts can inhibit engagement.  
 
It is first important to acknowledge and understand the ways in which the very nature of the 
criminal justice system can place legal limits on the extent to which the engagement of 
court users is possible. The development of the adversarial system, particularly the 
introduction of a system of public prosecutions – which led to the decreased role of the 
‘private victim’ (Rock, 2004) – and the introduction of legislation that afforded defendants 
the right to counsel, saw the previously more prominent role of court users fade and the 
role of the criminal advocate rise to an elevated position in criminal proceedings 
(Landsman,1990; Langbein, 2003; Hostettler, 2006; cf. Kirby, 2017a). The formal role of 
court users in adversarial proceedings is, therefore, largely limited to that of ‘information-
provider’ (cf. Edwards, 2004). For complainants and witnesses this in the main pertains to 
giving evidence during a trial;105 the same applies to defendants in contested cases who 
elect to give evidence. Defendants are also required to provide the court with personal 
information, such as an address and date of birth, and to enter a plea.106 A court user’s role 
is further constrained by the strict rules that govern criminal proceedings. In England and 
                                                     
105
 The other option, for complainants only, is to provide a Victim Personal Statement to the court (cf. 
Edwards, 2004). The impact of Victim Personal Statements on complainants’ engagement with the court 
process has not been focused upon during this study due to the presence of existing research of a similar 
nature (such as Roberts and Manikis, 2011).  
106
 As has been previously described, unrepresented defendants have an enhanced role in proceedings and 
may, for example, provide submissions or cross-examine witnesses in instances where this is legally permitted. 
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Wales this is largely regulated by the Criminal Procedure Rules.107  At the evidential stage 
individuals are required to give evidence in a manner prescribed by the courts that can limit 
the extent to which court users are able to ‘tell their story’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 83) or to 
‘say what really happened’ (Rock, 1993: 69).108 Moreover, a ‘careful distance’ (Rock, 1993: 
153) or ‘delicate separateness’ (Fielding, 2006: 53) is required between parties in 
proceedings in order to prevent potential contamination of evidence, or give rise to 
concerns about the impartiality of the decision-maker. The presence of such legal limits 
contributes to the ‘artificiality’ (Fielding, 2006: 53) of the legal setting within which court 
users are required to engage.  
 
The difficulties that these structural issues present to court users, particularly in terms of 
understanding and expression, have been outlined at length in existing research (such as, 
Rock, 1993; Fielding, 2006; Shapland and Hall, 2010; Jacobson et al. 2015) and, as indicated 
by several of the court user quotations presented in the previous Chapter, were clearly 
discernible during this study. Meanwhile others, including myself, have examined the 
barriers to engagement in criminal proceedings that are borne out of overarching cultural 
aspects of the court process, such as the ritual and formality inherent in proceedings or the 
‘them and us’ nature of the relationship between professionals and court users (Kirby, 
2017a). In a similar vein, contextual developments with the courts that have a bearing upon 
court users, such as the introduction of policy initiatives focused on efficiency, have been 
the subject of much academic interest (see, for example, McEwan, 2013; Ward, 2015).  This 
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 The most recent edition, The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2018, came into force in April 2018. 
See: https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/statutory-instruments [accessed 06.04.18]. 
108
 This includes, for example, only allowing individuals to discuss the specific alleged offences under 
consideration and preventing individuals from discussing any matters relayed to the court user by a third 
party. 
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section expands upon the above debates by arguing that issues of structure, culture and 
context intersect to act as a barrier to engagement. It does so by outlining four specific 
examples of operational constraints that emerged strongly in the findings of this study.109 
These are: i) the ways in which the ‘outer zones’ of the courts could act as sites of 
disengagement; ii) conundrums surrounding how to reduce delays and achieve ‘efficiency’; 
iii) issues relating to inter-professional dynamics between professional actors and sources of 
occupational strain; and iv) issues relating to the presence or absence of legal 
representation.   
 
Court ‘outer zones’ as sites of disengagement 
The findings of this study chime with existing research that has documented the negative 
impact of some aspects of court architecture upon court users’ engagement (see, for 
example, Carlen, 1976; Mulcahy, 2011, 2013; Jacobson et al. 2015). For instance, 
observations of court proceedings gave rise to a number of examples in which the dock 
appeared to exacerbate the passive role of the defendant.110  
 
However, some of the most striking findings are those which go beyond the courtroom walls 
and point to the ways in which the spatial-cultural dynamics of the wider court building 
contribute to engagement characterised by ‘dull compulsion’ or ‘resistance’. These ‘outer 
zones’, which include entrances and exits, waiting areas, staircases and canteens, are often 
spaces within which court users, who are prevented from access to the ‘inner circles’ of the 
courts, are largely confined (Rock, 1993).  
                                                     
109
 It should be stressed that these are by no means the only operational barriers to engagement in the 
criminal courts; they are merely examples of those that emerged prominently in this research.  
110
 The way in which the dock can serve to isolate defendants from proceedings is perhaps best illustrated in 
supporter Theresa’s description of the dock as being ‘the little room off the courtroom … with windows’. 
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The public waiting areas in each of the courts under study, to greater or lesser degrees from 
court to court, betrayed a lack of care. For instance, by the end of the fieldwork period none 
of the courts under study had a canteen that served hot food. This meant that those wishing 
to purchase refreshments – during, as will be described below, what could often be lengthy 
periods of waiting – were largely limited to using vending machines selling hot drinks and 
snacks, or were required to leave the court premises in order to purchase food and drink 
items. Meanwhile, conversations in the consultation rooms adjourning the courtrooms 
between advocates, defendants and supporters, could on occasion be clearly heard from 
waiting areas during quiet periods. The air of lack of investment, and in some instances, 
unkempt and decrepit, atmosphere of the courts – evident, for example, in broken down 
lifts or the hazard tape that marked broken seating in the less frequently used courts – was 
described by Zara and Irenka: 
 
‘Courts are always dirty …They are secured well and everything but they are just 
always really dirty.’ (Zara, complainant) 
 
‘I was absolutely freezing on the corridor; it was very, very, very cold … it was below 
a good temperature – I was freezing there for three hours.’ (Irenka, defendant) 
 
This should perhaps be viewed in the context of wider austerity measures affecting public 
services111 and ongoing court closures. Nevertheless, such spatial constraints are arguably 
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 Figures from the National Audit Office (2016) show that central government spending on the courts has 
reduced by 26% since 2010/11. 
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unconducive to cultivating a sense of investment, or ‘active aligned’ engagement, in 
proceedings. For example, in what is arguably a visible sign of disengagement from the 
court process, several defendants were observed lying down on the floor or across seats in 
waiting areas. 
 
The physical aspects of the ‘outer zones’ of the courts could also engender feelings of 
‘outsider’ status among court users (cf. Rock, 1993: 181). This was particularly acute when it 
occurred in tandem with perceived exclusionary treatment from professional actors. For 
example, several defendants described a lack of information or ‘customer service’ available 
to them upon entering the court building which could give rise to a perception that they 
were, in the words of defendant Holly, ‘looked down upon’ by court actors.  In a similar 
vein, the defendant Martin and his supporter Meg described how they perceived their 
treatment by security staff which, alongside the ‘daunting’ atmosphere of the court 
building, led to them feeling as though they were being treated with suspicion, or even 
hostility:  
 
Martin: It was very, very unwelcoming, the actual building was very 
unwelcoming ...  the security staff and whatever, I think they think 
everyone who comes in one side is a criminal and that’s how they 
treated us  
 
Meg: That’s how I felt, and I was only there supporting him.  I know it’s 
security … but it’s just daunting  
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Martin: … I’m not saying they should be warm and friendly, cuddly, fluffy 
places with a play-centre, but it should be a bit more welcoming … 
suitable for purpose. 
 
These quotations tie in with critical commentary surrounding what has been described as a 
preoccupation with a risk-management or managerialist ethos within the courts (see 
Mulcahy 2011; Mulcahy, 2013; Ward , 2017) and how the ‘them and us’ relationship 
between professionals and court users can serve to marginalise court users (Jacobson et al. 
2015; Kirby, 2017a). Taken together, they point to the ways in which issues of physical 
structure, culture and policy context can coalesce to inhibit ‘active aligned’ engagement and 
undermine the legitimacy of the courts. 
 
The conundrum of efficiency: A waiting game? 
Issues surrounding waiting and delay have permeated the courts in this jurisdiction and 
others for decades and have been subject to countless pieces of academic research and 
commentary (see, for example, Church, 1982; Rock, 1993; Duff and Leverick, 2002; Jacobson 
et al. 2015). The ‘organised yet chaotic’ (Jacobson et al. 2015: 111) way in which cases 
progress through the system has been described as one of the defining features of ‘court 
culture’ (Kirby, 2017a). However, efforts have been made by policy-makers over the years in 
order to minimise the impact of waiting and delays. The last decade, in particular, has 
witnessed concerted attempts by policy-makers to make court processes more ‘efficient’, 
particularly through court closures and the introduction of a number of technological 
reforms (Ministry of Justice, 2012; Ministry of Justice, 2013c; Ministry of Justice, 2018a). 
Such efforts have laudable aims in terms of seeking to reduce the impact of waiting and 
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delays on court users but have attracted criticism from scholars and practitioners who have 
questioned the impact that a focus on ‘efficient’ or ‘speedy’ justice, particularly when set in 
the context of austerity, can have upon procedural safeguards such as due process 
(McEwan, 2013; Ward, 2015; Ward, 2017; Soubise, 2017; The Secret Barrister, 2018). 
 
Findings from this study help to shed light upon the impact of recent efficiency-driven policy 
initiatives on longstanding issues regarding waiting and delay. Despite the plethora of 
reforms, issues of waiting and delay continue to impact on court users’ engagement with 
proceedings. Frustrations regarding waiting and delay were one of the most common issues 
referred to by all groups of lay participant under study across both types of criminal court. 
The below quotation from prosecution witness Jake illustrates how the protracted court 
process, alongside not feeling adequately reimbursed for the time he had involuntarily given 
up, contributed to the ‘dull compulsion’ that characterised his engagement: 
 
‘I was in there for the first day and waited from half nine in the morning until half 
three in the afternoon, then I was told that the main witness and the victim had so 
much evidence that no other witnesses would be able to give their evidence that day 
so we had to come back the next day. … I was annoyed because I was losing money 
for being there. … The expenses side of it should be improved. Judging by the 
[expense] form I can only claim back £60 per day for loss of income but … £60 is not 
even half a day’s wages to me … So, I’ve had to sack off the expenses and just take 
two days holiday so I get paid. I think they put the expenses at such a low rate so 
people do that, which is a joke … If you’ve lost a day’s wages due to being forced to 
come to court then they should expect to pay your full day’s wages no matter how 
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much you earn.’  
 
In fact, the findings indicate that in some instances the efforts aimed at promoting efficiency 
could have the paradoxical impact of adding to the experience of waiting and delay for court 
users. For example, time estimates for hearings were often used as a means by which to 
limit delay and were referred to regularly by members of the judiciary and court staff during 
observations.112 However, a perhaps unintended consequence is that it was not uncommon 
for delays to other cases to occur if cases listed at an early point in the day were not 
concluded in the time allocated to the hearing. In such instances court users, often to their 
bemusement, were asked to go home and return to court at a later date. (This could also 
happen in instances in which more than one case was listed to appear before the court in a 
given period.) This could increase the likelihood of engagement characterised by ‘resistance’ 
or even ‘withdrawal’. For example, there were a small number of instances in which, upon 
being told that the case would not proceed at the allotted time, a witness stated that they 
would not be willing to return to the court for the rescheduled hearing. As Witness Service 
volunteer, Rita, surmised when asked to describe the least satisfying aspects of her role:  
 
‘Having to try and reassure people who’ve sat here for the whole morning waiting 
for their case to come. … Explaining to people why the case is being adjourned for 
the third or fourth time, those are the things that are really frustrating. The whole 
system is so bad at that: the number of cases that get adjourned here every single 
                                                     
112
 However, efficiency is not the only reason for which time estimates are used. For example, in cases 
involving vulnerable witnesses time estimates can form part of ‘ground rules hearings’, which take place in 
advance of the trial, in order to contain the amount of time for which a witness is cross-examined (see Cooper 
and Farrugia, 2017). An example of the ways in which time estimates were used for this purpose is described 
in the case study of observation MCPT03 on pages 282-284.  
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time I volunteer. … People pysch themselves up to come, you’ve spent all that time 
reassuring them and then they are told to go away again and come back in three 
months’ time. And then you wonder why some of them don’t turn up.’  
 
The interlocking issues of waiting, delay and efficiency imperatives highlight the ways in 
which cultural aspects of the court process, such as the ‘organised chaos’ (Jacobson et al. 
2015) in criminal proceedings, can coincide with shifts in policy context and act as a barrier 
to court user engagement in proceedings. This is because they impact upon both an 
individual’s participation in proceedings and their degree of alignment with the courts.  
 
Inter-professional dynamics and occupational strain 
A third example of how constraints within the operation of the courts could impact upon 
engagement specifically relates to the dynamics that exist between professional court 
actors and associated tensions within the occupational climate of the criminal courts. The 
exclusionary impact of the ‘them and us’ relationship between legal actors and court users 
has been described in detail by Jacobson et al. (2015) and is regarded as one of the defining 
features of ‘court culture’ (Kirby, 2017a). While examples of this emerged in the Crown 
Courts during this study, it is perhaps more pertinent to pay close attention to the 
occupational cultures in the magistrates’ court which have been subject to considerably 
less, recent, academic focus and which this study helps to expand upon.   
 
Social interaction in the magistrates’ court was of an arguably different character than in the 
Crown Court. Life in the magistrates’ court, particularly in courts dealing with a long list of 
relatively short hearings, could be described as sharing some commonalities with a local 
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government office – albeit one with a very public face. Professional courtroom actors, such 
as district judges and legal advisers, tended to dominate or stage manage proceedings with 
a main imperative appearing to be to get through the daily list in a collegiate manner. 
Nevertheless, tensions between court staff and advocates, and between individual 
advocates, did occur. 113  This often seemed to be borne out of contextual factors relating to 
time pressures and competing inter-agency imperatives. A stark example of this occurred 
during a busy day in a trial court in one of the magistrates’ courts. On this occasion, which is 
described in detail in Box 6.1, a defence advocate in a burglary case argued with the 
prosecution advocate, legal adviser and magistrates overseeing the court at various points 
throughout the day and apologised, on more than one occasion, to the court for behaviour 
that in his words amounted to ‘getting excited’ and ‘carried away’.  
 
Box 6.1 Inter-agency working and competing priorities in a busy magistrates’ court 
(MCFT03) 
The court had two trials listed for the morning session with additional trials and other 
matters due to be heard in the afternoon. The two trials listed in the morning were 
for incidents involving alleged domestic abuse and burglary, respectively. At the 
beginning of the day, the defence advocate in the burglary case was informed that 
that domestic abuse case would be heard first because, in cases with multiple listings, 
the courts are required to prioritise cases with a ‘DV flag’. The domestic abuse-related 
case had a time-estimate of one and a half hours but ultimately lasted approximately 
                                                     
113
 See Ward (2017: 53) for a description of the ‘congested’ and ‘hectic’ nature of the magistrates’ courts and 
The Secret Barrister (2018: 76), who described the magistrates’ courts as ‘the accident and emergency 
department of criminal justice’. 
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two and a half hours. Due to proximity to the lunch period, the court dealt with a 
shorter hearing for the remainder of the morning. At the beginning of the afternoon, 
the court dealt with a second case involving domestic abuse; this case was listed for 
trial, however, the prosecution offered no evidence because the complainant did not 
attend.  
 
The defence advocate in the burglary case had entered and exited the court at 
various points during the morning and early afternoon in a harried fashion to check 
on the progress of his case. The trial eventually began at around 2.30pm, shortly after 
the defence advocate entered an unsuccessful application to adjourn because the 
defendant had not attended court. When the magistrates retired to consider their 
verdict the defence advocate went straight to the Youth Court to oversee a hearing 
he had been allocated to in that courtroom; ‘I understand the Youth Court are 
desperate for you’, the legal adviser overseeing the burglary case told the advocate as 
he released him.  
 
Twenty minutes later, the magistrates had reached a verdict in the burglary case, but 
the defence advocate was yet to return from the Youth Court. He eventually 
returned, however before the magistrates had entered the courtroom to deliver the 
verdict, the legal adviser in the youth case entered the courtroom and sternly 
reprimanded the advocate for seemingly trying to hurry the magistrates in the youth 
case along by ‘hammering on’ the door connecting the courtroom to the inner sphere 
of the court. ‘I was trying to be efficient!’ the advocate exclaimed in response.  
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It was not uncommon for advocates, both in the magistrates’ court and Crown Court, to be 
involved in more than one case on any given day in court. However, the above example 
conveys the conflicting imperatives, and associated tensions, that can occur between the 
different actors and agencies in bringing a case to fruition.  
 
As the above discussion seeks to illustrate, it became increasingly evident that the apparent 
strain upon the system was ingrained in the atmosphere of the courts. In the courtroom, 
during short breaks or adjournments in proceedings, advocates and court staff sometimes 
discussed economic pressures on the courts. A Crown Court advocate, during a discussion 
about the court being short-staffed, remarked ‘I’m sure [former Justice Secretary] Chris 
Grayling thinks we sit drinking port, I’m wandering around these corridors looking like Oliver 
Twist’ (case CCOH02). Likewise during mitigation, the defence advocate in case CCSH04 
commented that the decision by the magistrates’ court to send her client’s case for trial at 
the Crown Court was ‘irrational’ because his co-defendant, who it was agreed was the 
principal defendant, had been dealt with in the magistrates’ court. The judge agreed with 
the advocate commenting: ‘Yes, in this climate of public cuts you would have expected it to 
be the other way around.’  This is set in the context of debate surrounding the pressures 
faced by professional courtroom actors and is illustrated, for example, in strikes recently 
undertaken by members of the legal profession,114 reported difficulties in recruiting and 
retaining members of the judiciary (Thomas, 2017b; House of Lords Select Committee, 
2017), and in the reduction of 1,500 HMCTS staff between 2015 and 2017 (National Audit 
Office, 2018).115 This climate of occupational strain arguably has a ripple effect upon the 
                                                     
114
 See: https://www.criminalbar.com/resources/news/announcement-for-cba-members/ [accessed 01.06.18]. 
115
 For a frank description of the nature of contemporary strains on the criminal justice system from the 
perspective of a practising criminal barrister see The Secret Barrister (2018). 
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engagement of court users. For example, supporter Frank’s alignment with the court 
process was weakened by the fact that, in his view, the prosecutor had performed poorly 
because she had been given insufficient time to prepare for the case:   
 
‘Basically, I think there should have been more care taken over the matter – I think 
the solicitor should have had the case handed to her a couple of days [before] so she 
could read into it. … To me it just felt she was just put on the spot there and then – 
she read through it quickly and she wasn’t competent enough to put forward our 
case.’  
 
Frank’s dissatisfaction with the role played by the prosecutor can also be viewed in the 
context of structural barriers faced by prosecution witnesses and their supporters, such as a 
lack of access to legal representation.  
 
Representation 
A final operational constraint that can act as a barrier to ‘active alignment’ concerns the 
absence of legal representation. This impacts upon the engagement of both defendants and 
prosecution witnesses.  
 
Existing studies of the criminal courts have often used the ‘court as theatre’ analogy to 
describe the levels of participation of different actors. It has been argued that courtroom 
professionals – namely the judiciary and advocates – assume ‘starring roles’ in proceedings; 
defendants, meanwhile, take on the role of ‘ever-present extra’ due to the ways in which 
they can be isolated, or marginalised, from proceedings (Jacobson et al. 2015: 83). As has 
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been described during the course of this thesis, passivity among defendants manifests itself 
for a number of interconnected reasons. Findings from existing studies suggest that legal 
representation can even contribute to a defendant’s passivity (Baldwin and McConville, 
1977; McConville et al., 1994; Jacobson et al. 2015). Due to the small number of interviews 
conducted with defendants, it is difficult for this study to make any substantive assertions 
about the extent to which legal representation impacts upon a defendant’s engagement 
with the process. However, some of the observational data collected in this study – 
particularly that which was collected in the magistrates’ courts – provides useful insight as 
to the ways in which the absence of legal representation can impact upon engagement. This 
has the potential to be of particular value at a time in which, as a result of changes to legal 
aid provision (see Ministry of Justice, 2013b), the number of defendants in receipt of 
representation in the magistrates’ court is likely to have decreased (Gibbs, 2016; Owusu-
Bempah, 2018).116  Eighteen cases involving unrepresented defendants were observed as 
part of this study; all of which were in the magistrates’ court. This accounts for just under 
one fifth of all cases observed in the magistrates’ court and more than one quarter of trials 
observed in the magistrates’ court. Of these, six defendants were unrepresented at trial, six 
were unrepresented at the point of sentence and six were unrepresented during ‘other 
hearings’, such as, case management hearings.  
 
To continue with the ‘court as theatre’ analogy, the study findings suggest that 
unrepresented defendants move from the position of ‘ever-present extra’ (Jacobson et al. 
2015) to that which I shall term a ‘protagonist without a script’. That is, the defendant is 
                                                     
116
 The number of defendants appearing without representation in their first hearing in the Crown Court in 
2017 was 5 per cent (Ministry of Justice, 2018b); however, there is no data available regarding the number of 
defendants without representation at the magistrates’ court.  
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promoted to the position of lead actor but is not equipped with the necessary means to 
carry out the performance. Unrepresented defendants in this study often struggled to fulfil 
their ‘starring role’. They thereby displayed engagement characterised by a lack of 
alignment with the court process; that is, ‘resistance’, ‘dull compulsion’ or, in some 
instances, a combination of the two. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, it was 
not uncommon for unrepresented defendants to display a lack of familiarity with the court 
process. For example, Irenka, a defendant who represented herself in a trial in which she 
was alleged to have driven while using her mobile phone, described how she felt unused to 
the environment, and lacked understanding of the different parties in proceedings, when 
she arrived at court: 
 
‘[I was] nervous, terrified, vulnerable, I didn’t even know how to address the judge, 
where to sit, what evidence should I bring with me. How did I give evidence, what to 
say. So I had approaching zero information of what’s going to happen inside the 
courtroom so I was absolutely petrified. …They asked me to stand up and tell the 
story from my point of view, to defend my side. Then I was cross-examinated (sic.) 
by someone, who I don’t even know who that person is because I thought maybe she 
was the prosecutor, or is she just there to help me? I have no idea. I know who the 
judge is but I have no idea who the other people were in the courtroom. Was it just a 
clerk? Was it just a prosecutor? I have no idea.’ 
 
In addition to a lack of familiarity of courtroom actors, unrepresented defendants often 
displayed difficulties in understanding when and how they were required to communicate 
with the court. In several of the observed cases, defendants struggled to differentiate 
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between different aspects of the legal process such as entering a plea, cross-examining 
witnesses, giving evidence and making closing submissions. Examples of such difficulties in 
understanding and expression were provided in Box 5.4 in Chapter 5 (pp.231-232) with 
regard to the engagement of an unrepresented defendant in a speeding trial (case MCFT10). 
For example, the defendant struggled to asked questions of the witnesses and instead made 
a number of statements.  Furthermore, several unrepresented defendants encountered 
difficulties in understanding the meaning of specific legal concepts. The most striking 
example of this was in a trial of ‘taxi-touting’ (MCPT01). Upon the completion of the 
prosecution case, the district judge overseeing the trial explained to the defendant that it 
was now his opportunity to give evidence. She informed him that giving evidence was not a 
legal requirement but that it would be possible for her to draw ‘adverse inference’ if he 
chose not to. The defendant responded to this with the question – via the interpreter 
appointed to assist him – ‘I don’t understand, what does give evidence mean?’117   
 
A more complex example of this occurred in a case of domestic abuse (case MCOH14) in 
which the defendant seemingly failed to grasp the gravity of the legal argument regarding 
whether or not a witness’s evidence could be admitted as a statement rather than provided 
as live testimony the court.  The case appeared before the courts for a case management 
hearing after the defendant, and one of the complainants, had failed to attend court on the 
original trial date. The defendant stated that he had not received a notification of the 
original hearing date – 'there's no reason why I wouldn't have come', he told the court – and 
was informed by the legal adviser that if he entered a not guilty plea to breaching his bail 
                                                     
117
 An examination of the role of interpreters and their impact upon courtroom interaction is outside the remit 
of this study. However, a detailed discussion of this can be found in Aliverti and Seoighe (2017).  
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conditions by failing to attend court, he would be required to stand trial for this alongside 
trial for the original offence of using violence to obtain entry. During the hearing, the 
prosecutor entered an application to admit the evidence of one of the complainants as a 
statement because she would not be able to attend the trial on grounds of ill-health. The 
legal adviser informed the defendant that because he was unrepresented she would provide 
assistance by asking the prosecutor questions about the application.118 She also asked the 
defendant if he thought it would harm his defence if the magistrates granted the application 
to admit the complainant’s statement as evidence; explaining that this would mean that the 
complainant didn’t have to come to court. The defendant – who seemed more preoccupied 
by the breach of bail charge – replied ‘not really’. (The magistrates subsequently rejected 
the application.)  
 
These findings add contemporary weight to existing academic research into the 
participation of unrepresented defendants in the criminal courts, much of which was 
conducted around forty years ago (Carlen, 1976; Baldwin and McConville, 1977; McBarnett, 
1981). It also provides support to a small piece of recent research carried out by the charity 
Transform Justice, which found that unrepresented defendants could have a limited 
understanding of rules of evidence and experienced difficulties in conducting cross-
examination (Gibbs, 2016).  
 
                                                     
118
 It was common for the legal adviser to provide assistance to unrepresented defendants. This could take 
several forms, including helping the defendant to formulate questions during the cross-examination of a 
witness; informing defendants about aspects of the court process, such as the role of the legal adviser, 
prosecutor and magistrates; and providing assistance upon applications. The degree to which such assistance 
was provided tended to be dependent upon the individual legal adviser and the circumstances of the case.  
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Overall, the findings suggest that being unrepresented acts as a barrier to ‘active aligned’ 
engagement in criminal proceedings. This is in contrast to academic research conducted in 
the civil arena, which is known for its comparatively greater recourse to inquisitorial 
methods than the criminal courts. Adler (2008: 9-10) found that litigants who received pre-
hearing advice ‘fare[d] almost as well as those who are represented’, in part due to the 
‘active’, ‘enabling’ and ‘interventionist’ methods of tribunal proceedings (see also, Adler 
2009). This suggests that enhancing the engagement of unrepresented defendants may be 
more difficult to achieve within the confines of the criminal justice system, which arguably 
imposes tighter controls on the use of such methods. 
 
A different, yet related, set of issues arises with regard to representation among those who 
appear for the prosecution. The prosecution of alleged offending by the State means that 
complainants and prosecution witnesses are not considered as ‘parties’ (cf. Spencer, 2010; 
Fairclough and Jones, 2018); thus, they do not have access to legal representation and are 
not afforded formal decision-making roles in criminal proceedings (Edwards, 2004). Existing 
studies have drawn particular attention to how the absence of legal representation can 
contribute to complainants’ and prosecution witnesses’ ‘bit-part player’ or ‘walk-on’ role in 
proceedings (such as Shapland and Hall, 2010; Jacobson et al. 2015). Meanwhile there has 
been much discussion of the implications of the alleged victim being largely denied decision-
making roles in proceedings (Rock, 2004; Edwards, 2004; Doak, 2008; Spencer, 2010). A 
commonly cited line of argument in opposition to affording complainants such a role 
centres upon the view that, if given such power, complainants would use it in a retributive 
manner (see, for example, Rock, 2004; Roberts and Erez, 2010). However, the findings of 
this study shed some light on how alleged victims respond when their choice, and 
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subsequent level of engagement, is constrained for an alternative reason; that is in 
instances in which complainants do not support the prosecution.   
 
Examples of ‘resistance’ or ‘withdrawal’ among complainants presented in Chapter 5 
indicated a degree of ambivalence on the part of some as to the role of the State in the 
prosecution of cases. A central source of disengagement that arose on a number of 
occasions was when it became apparent that the interests of the State, as deemed by the 
CPS, were not aligned with those of the ‘private victim’ (Rock, 2004). This was particularly 
common in cases that involved bringing private offending into public view, such as those 
involving domestic abuse. This was not just in cases involving intimate partner violence but 
also those between family members such as parents and children, or siblings.  
 
The absence of shared values, or alignment, between the State and the individual does not 
necessarily mean that prosecutions should not occur in instances in which the individual 
complainant does not support, or no longer supports, the prosecution; particularly because 
there can be a multitude of reasons for this including fear of, and coercion by, the 
defendant (Kuennen, 2007; Shapland and Hall, 2010; Douglas, 2018). However, the 
apparent absence of ‘shared values’ highlights a source of ‘legitimacy deficit’ (Beetham, 
1991, 2013) between the State (as power-holder) and the individual (as the audience) and 
suggests that further ‘dialogue’ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012) is required in order for the 
State to be regarded as holding legitimate authority. This is specifically in relation to 
perceptions of the courts’ effectiveness in dealing with such cases, which includes ensuring 
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that the ‘interests’ of complainants and their families are adequately met.119 For example, it 
has been argued that the transfer of ‘conflict’ (Christie, 1977) from the individual to the 
State in the prosecution of cases simply perpetuates the problem of coercion because 
‘instead of the batterer compelling the victim to do something she does not want, the court 
does’ (Kuennen, 2007: 6).  An instance similar to this arose in case MCPT02 described in 
Chapter 5 in which the alleged victim, upon choosing to give evidence for the defence rather 
than the prosecution, stated that she had felt ‘badgered’ to give a statement by the police 
officer investigating the incident and described the experience of being interviewed by the 
officer as ‘coercive’.  
 
These arguments are in the context of extensive and long-standing assertions that the legal 
system is structured in such a manner that it can fail to meet the needs or interests of 
victims in cases of domestic abuse and sexual violence.120 This is well illustrated in Case 
MCOH29 (see Box 6.2), which shows that, despite being in support of the prosecution and 
seemingly making a number of attempts to engage with the process, the complainant’s role 
was extremely marginal. Moreover, it resonates with Shapland and Hall’s (2010: 169) critical 
assertion that the lack of clear and identifiable provisions for victims who attend court 
solely for the purpose of observing proceedings, rather than to give evidence, means that 
they ‘lack the essential umbilical cord connecting them with the internal world of the court.’ 
 
                                                     
119
 Holder and Daly (2018: 789) use the term ‘interests’ when discussing complainants in cases of domestic 
abuse because it ‘assumes that victims not only have a relationship with a violent person, but are also in a 
relation to state authorities’.   
120
 This includes recent debate which highlights the ways in which some perpetrators of domestic abuse can 
use the court process as a means by which to continue to engage in abusive behaviour (Walklate, 2018; 
Douglas, 2018). This has been described by Douglas (2018: 84) as ‘legal systems abuse’. 
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Box 6.2 A view from the gallery in a magistrates’ court bail hearing (MCOH29) 
 The defendant (D) was initially charged with assaulting his partner (C). D was released on 
police bail; one of the conditions of bail was that he was not allowed to attend C’s 
address. Shortly after his release, D attended C’s home, shouted at her and caused 
damage to her property. D was subsequently re-arrested and placed on remand to appear 
before the court when it next sat. 
 
On the morning of the hearing, C, who was pregnant, attended court along with her and 
D’s baby. The public gallery was separated from the main courtroom by a glass partition. 
She entered the gallery but struggled to get the baby’s pram through the doorway. Within 
minutes, a security guard entered and informed her that she must move the pram from 
the doorway because it was blocking access to the court. C moved the pram and returned 
to the courtroom with the baby in her arms. When the court began she was informed by 
the district judge overseeing the case that she could not remain in the public gallery with 
the baby. C left the public gallery but popped her head into and out of the gallery at 
numerous points over the course of the morning to check on the progress of the case. 
 
D’s case was heard shortly before the lunchtime adjournment, at which point he entered 
a guilty plea to criminal damage. The case was adjourned pending a pre-sentence report 
and D’s advocate successfully entered a bail application. During the hearing C returned to 
the courtroom and tried to attract D’s attention. D did not respond and C subsequently 
left the public gallery in tears. In granting bail to D, the judge firmly stated that he was 
being released on the condition that he did not contact C directly or indirectly until after 
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the sentencing hearing. Moreover, if she contacted him, the defendant was told that he 
must not respond. A restraining order was not imposed: the prosecutor informed the 
judge that C did not want one, however it was noted that C had a ‘DV officer’.  When the 
court adjourned for lunch, C was waiting outside the courtroom to speak to the probation 
officer who had been tasked with writing D’s pre-sentence report.  
 
The study findings therefore suggest that the absence of legal representation for 
complainants and prosecution witnesses can contribute to engagement characterised by 
‘resistance’, ‘dull compulsion’ and even ‘withdrawal’. Moreover, it points to an absence of 
alignment between the complainant and the prosecution as a specific source of legitimacy 
deficit. 
 
Overall, this sub-section has set out four ways in which operational constraints inherent in 
the criminal courts limit the court users’ alignment with, and participation in, proceedings. 
Such operational constraints are borne out of an interplay between structural, cultural and 
contextual dynamics within the court process.  
 
6.1.2 Court users: Individual needs and social context  
 
Operational constraints are, however, not the only barrier to engagement. The second half 
of this section focuses upon the ways in which factors relating to the individual and social 
needs of court users can also limit the extent to which ‘active aligned’ engagement can be 
achieved. Taken together it is argued that operational constraints can coincide with factors 
relating to the personal and social circumstances of individual court users in order to 
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produce weak forms of engagement in criminal proceedings. The needs of complainants and 
witnesses in comparison to those of defendants have been separated in the below 
discussion for simplicity. However, the level of need and vulnerability both within and 
between each group are overlapping, and in some instances, both the defendant(s) and 
prosecution witness(s) in the same case appeared to have a number of needs or 
vulnerabilities. This discussion should be situated within the context of broader debates 
surrounding the blurred or overlapping nature of offending and victimisation (see, for 
example, Fagan and Mears, 2008; Bottoms and Costello, 2010; Croall, 2017).  
 
Complainants and witnesses 
When thinking about how the individual needs of complainants and witnesses has a bearing 
upon their engagement, it is first necessary to consider the broader social context of 
offending and victimisation. Changing patterns of offending, and shifts in responses to 
offending and alleged offending, have contributed to a change to the caseload of the courts. 
National statistics show that there are now fewer cases coming before the courts.121 There 
are a multitude of possible reasons for this; including declining recorded crime rates over an 
extended period (see ONS, 2018a). However at the same time, statistical evidence and 
research data show that the cases now being brought before the courts are often of a more 
complex and serious nature, and include offences that involve ‘higher-harm’ (ONS, 2018a:3) 
than at previous times. In particular, there is an increased prominence of cases involving 
sexual and/or domestic abuse.122 Such offending often occurs in a private setting and was 
                                                     
121
 For example, between 2014 and 2017 the number of cases coming before the magistrates’ courts fell by 6 
per cent and the number of cases coming before the Crown Court fell by 17 per cent. In 2017 114, 347 cases 
came before the Crown Court; this is the lowest number since 2000 (see Ministry of Justice, 2018b, 2018c). 
122
 For example, police recorded crime figures show that recorded sexual offences increased by 23% in the 
year from September 2016 to 2017 and are currently at its highest rate since the National Crime Recording 
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thus excluded from the more public offending traditionally brought before the courts. For 
example, Rock (1993) in his study of a single Crown Court noted that the majority of 
offences committed were of a public nature, such as burglary, robbery and public order; 
meanwhile Bottoms and McClean (1976: 18) excluded sexual offences from their interview 
sample, in part because there were only a ‘small number’ of these cases coming before the 
courts under study. This is in stark contrast with the findings of this study and those of the 
Crime Survey for England and Wales which show that incidents of violence committed by 
‘strangers’ have decreased by 53% since 1995 (ONS, 2017c: 12). This shift highlights the 
ways in which offending that was previously regarded as ‘hidden’ (Maguire and McVie, 
2017; ONS, 2017a:3), as was often the case with domestic abuse and sexual violence, is now 
becoming increasingly prominent in the courts.123 Changes in patterns of recorded offending 
also reflect shifts in societal attitudes towards this type of offending (Jacobson and Hough, 
2018). For example, the ONS cites changes in police responses to historical sexual abuse – 
including high profile responses, such as Operation Yewtree – as a factor which may have 
contributed to an increased willingness of complainants to report this kind of offending 
(ONS, 2017c).  
 
While there is often discussion about the impact of changes in caseload upon the Crown 
Court (see Hunter, Jacobson and Kirby, 2018; The Secret Barrister, 2018), there has been 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Standard was introduced in 2002 (ONS, 2018a). It is difficult to assess the extent of domestic abuse because 
cases have only been recorded as involving domestic abuse since 2015 (see ONS, 2017a), however, the most 
recent data available suggests that approximately one third of violent offences are related to domestic abuse 
(ONS, 2017a: 12; see also Walby, Towers and Francis, 2016). Moreover, recent data from the CPS (2017) charts 
a 63 percent increase in convictions for offences involving allegations of sexual or domestic violence within a 
10-year period. 
123
 This is not to state that the prevalence of victimisation in crimes involving sexual and/or domestic abuse has 
stopped being ‘hidden’. It has long been argued that police recorded crime and the CSEW do not adequately 
capture the prevalence of such crimes (Maguire and McVie, 2017; ONS, 2017a). Moreover, Westmarland, 
Johnson and McGlynn (2018) recently documented the ‘widespread’ use of out of court resolutions by police 
forces in England and Wales in response to reported incidents of domestic abuse. 
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less focus on how this has shaped the caseload of the magistrates’ courts. The cases 
observed in the magistrates’ court in this study ranged from low level offences, such as 
speeding or cases brought by local councils, to much more serious ones including sexual 
assault, malicious communications and stalking (see Appendix xii for more detail). The 
changing profile of cases coming before the magistrates’ court was commented upon by 
legal professionals during court observations and by magistrates in interview. For example, 
during a break in proceedings in case MCFT04, a sexual assault trial involving allegations 
made by a woman against her former husband, the prosecutor remarked to the officer in 
the case: ‘it’s all sex [cases] at the moment … Don’t anyone commit burglary anymore?’ 
Meanwhile magistrate interviewee David spoke of noticing a change in caseload during the 
time in which he had served as a magistrate: 
 
‘When I first started there was quite a lot of routine completely non-CPS, non-
criminal work so it could be railways coming along, so non-payment of fares, or local 
government looking for liability orders or the education officer wanting to prosecute 
people for not sending their children to school … There is a lot of routine stuff that 
we are now seeing less of. So, the actual nature of the work we are doing is changing 
and therefore we are dealing with more difficult cases; we are getting a greater 
proportion of the more serious cases.’  
 
In line with such shifts, the study findings suggest that complainants and prosecution 
witnesses appeared in court in the context of a number of, and often overlapping, ‘needs’, 
‘vulnerabilities’ or ‘interests’ which could impact upon the extent to which they engaged 
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with proceedings.124 In some instances the experience of victimisation itself, it was deemed 
by the court at the point of sentencing, had in part stemmed from an offender taking 
advantage of a pre-existing vulnerability of the complainant, such as a physical disability; 
young or old age; mental health problem; or communication difficulty. In other instances, or 
even within the same case, complainants had needs and vulnerabilities arising from the 
offence being committed. This could be specifically in relation to fear or anxiety about the 
prospect of attending court or due to the impact of the (alleged) offence on the individual’s 
physical or mental well-being. This was often most evident among complainants giving 
evidence in cases involving sexual violence, domestic abuse or other violent offences.  
 
In such instances this vulnerability, and/or associated intimidation, was formally recognised 
by the courts in the granting of special measures applications.125 In many instances, 
prosecution witnesses gave evidence with the use of special measures such as via video-
recorded evidence-in-chief, via video-link, with the use of a screen or with the assistance of 
an intermediary. Other adjustments included entering and exiting the courtroom via a 
separate entrance, having a supporter – usually in the form of a Witness Service volunteer – 
sit with the individual in court and the use of a court-appointed advocate to cross-examine 
vulnerable witnesses in cases where the defendant was unrepresented.  
 
                                                     
124
 Debates surrounding the definition of, and most suitable terms to use to describe the individual and social 
issues faced by court users, span a number of disciplines including law, health, social work and psychology; a 
detailed examination of this is unfortunately outside the scope of this study. A comprehensive overview of 
vulnerability in the criminal justice system is provided in the edited collection by Cooper and Norton (2017). 
(See also, Jacobson, 2018.) The terms ‘needs’, ‘vulnerabilities’ and ‘interests’ are, however, used in the below 
discussion in a broad sense to describe the ways in which engagement of court users may be impacted upon 
by personal circumstances and social context. 
125
 Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
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Indeed, there are lots of ways in which adjustments can enhance engagement. For example, 
existing studies have highlighted the beneficial impact of special measures on the 
engagement of complainants and witnesses (see, for example, Hamlyn, Phelps, Turtle and 
Sattar, 2004; Hunter, Jacobson and Kirby, 2013; Baverstock, 2016). However, findings from 
this study also suggest that there remain some issues in relation to how levels of need and 
vulnerability among complainants and witnesses are identified and responded to by the 
courts. This provides a clear illustration of how operational aspects of the court process can 
intersect with the needs of court users in order to limit engagement in proceedings. 
Problems sometimes emerged with the implementation of special measures. This included 
practical issues that could mean that special measures applications were only granted on 
the day a witness was due to give evidence.126 For example, complainant Aylin described the 
impact of only finding out that her application for a screen had been successful half an hour 
before she was due to give evidence:  
 
‘I don’t know who was supposed to let me know but they could have let me know 
that I had the blind; that would have really helped me, even if it was the day before 
… I was relieved that I had it but I thought I wasn’t going to have it. I was getting 
anxiety attacks thinking “I’m not going to get the blind”. 
 
                                                     
126
 Burton et al. (2006) also found that special measures applications were often entered at a late stage, 
including on the day of trial. (See also, Hunter et al. 2013.) This appears to be contrary to the guidance 
provided in the Criminal Procedure Rules (2015) which state that special measures applications should be 
made no more than 28 days after the defendant enters a not guilty plea in the magistrates’ court, or, no more 
than 14 days after the defendant enters a not guilty plea in the Crown Court. 
 
127
 Witness anonymity requires a separate order, a Witness Anonymity Order, to be granted by the courts 
under Sections 86-97 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. However, in addition to this, CPS legal guidance 
outlines the ways in which a court can exercise either formal powers, such as those outlined in the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981, or common law powers to prevent the name and address of a witness being disclosed in 
open court. See: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/witness-protection-and-anonymity [accessed 
06.04.18]. 
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Issues also emerged when the apparent benefits of special measures, as perceived by court 
users, did not correspond with the ways in which measures were applied by the courts in 
practice. Prosecution witnesses Gemma and Jake – who gave evidence in separate cases at 
different courts – had both been granted the use of a screen when giving evidence. Both 
were of the understanding that the use of a screen would mean that they would be giving 
evidence ‘anonymously’ – that is, they would not be identifiable to the defendant – and 
were left feeling ‘pretty displeased’ (Jake) and ‘massively affected’ (Gemma) when they 
were required to provide identifiable details, such as their name or address, to the court. 
This is elaborated upon by Jake in the below quotation: 
 
‘I asked for the special measures to be put in place, because I knew the defendant in 
the case as well as the victim. … I asked for a screen to be put up, I asked for the 
defendant to leave the courtroom while I entered and exited, and then I also asked 
for my full name not to be read out. Now, the defendant did leave the courtroom 
and I did get a screen put up, but it felt extremely pointless because the first thing 
they asked me when I got in there was “what was my full name”. So, I was like all 
[the defendant has] got to do is go on Facebook, type in that name and then boom – 
there’s my picture and he knows exactly what I look like so the rest of it was 
pointless.’   
 
This points to a gap between perception and reality in relation to the use of screens which, 
as outlined in the YJCEA 1999 are designed to limit the impact of fear or distress upon the 
quality of a witness’s evidence, and do not necessarily come with the guarantee of 
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anonymity, and may reflect shortcomings in the way in which the use of special measures 
are communicated to court users.127 
  
Secondly, issues could arise in which the needs of individual court users could be under-
acknowledged, due to the fact that the individual was not formally recognised as 
‘vulnerable’ or ‘intimidated’ in the eyes of the law, or by those tasked with applying it.128 
Iumi a prosecution witness in a drink driving trial, who was not in receipt of special 
measures, described having had a sleepless night the day before he was due to give 
evidence due to feeling nervous. Moreover, when giving evidence in open court he 
described feeling intimidated by being under the defendant’s gaze: 
 
‘The most awkward part of the whole experience by a mile [was] the guy who I was 
talking against … was eyeballing me with the biggest eyeballs from the other side of 
the court. … He wasn’t blinking virtually.’  
 
In a similar vein, Suzie spoke of the contrast in the support she received when attending the 
same court as a prosecution witness in two separate cases. In the first instance, she 
described being in receipt of ‘so many measures’ as a complainant in a case of domestic 
abuse which included giving evidence behind a screen, being escorted through the court 
building and given access to a separate smoking area. On the second occasion she attended 
                                                     
127
 Witness anonymity requires a separate order, a Witness Anonymity Order, to be granted by the courts 
under Sections 86-97 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. However, in addition to this, CPS legal guidance 
outlines the ways in which a court can exercise either formal powers, such as those outlined in the Contempt 
of Court Act 1981, or common law powers to prevent the name and address of a witness being disclosed in 
open court. See: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/witness-protection-and-anonymity [accessed 
06.04.18]. 
128
 This may, in part, reflect the fact that there is at present no standard definition of ‘vulnerability’ in policy 
and practice guidance in relation to court users (Jacobson, 2018). 
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court to give evidence in an assault trial in which she had witnessed the incident but was 
not personally involved.129 She described finding this experience ‘dramatically different’ due 
to the more limited support available:  
 
 ‘[The first time] the way that it was run, all the special measures I had, the whole 
way the court system worked around, you know me and being a victim, I think it was 
very fair … at the time it was just this big world of scariness but yeah I think I was 
treated fairly and I was updated very quickly when the case was over… [The second] 
time when I went out to have a vape … the defendant spoke to me! And I was like 
“this is awkward, and probably not right”. So, I just kind of went “Mmmhmm” and 
then walked off. Whereas obviously last time, I was allowed to smoke somewhere 
different and it was all a little bit more closed off. But I did feel a bit [like] it just 
wasn’t … protecting the public.’  
 
These examples highlight the ways in which the mere experience of attending court, even in 
cases in which the offence is regarded as relatively low-level or involves prosecution 
witnesses who do not overtly display specific needs or vulnerabilities, can induce 
‘vulnerable moments’ (Jacobson, 2018) among court users. They also provide support for 
Jacobson’s (2018: 224) assertion that:   
 
‘Drawing a line between individual court users who are “vulnerable” and those who 
are “not vulnerable” [is] an increasingly difficult and arbitrary process. A further 
                                                     
129
 Despite attending court on the morning of the hearing, she was not ultimately required to give evidence 
because the defendant entered a late guilty plea. 
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question that arises is whether, to the extent that any such line is drawn, those who 
are deemed “not vulnerable” might be disadvantaged by the fact that special 
provision is made available to those deemed “vulnerable”’. 
 
Defence witnesses are one group whose needs may be particularly overlooked. They are not 
legally bound to attend court, unlike prosecution witnesses, and therefore do so in a 
voluntary capacity. Interviews with Witness Service volunteers highlighted the ways in 
which the needs of defence witnesses could be under-appreciated. This is described by 
volunteer, Daphne: 
 
‘They don’t know what is happening, more so than the prosecution witnesses … 
[they] are just absolutely clueless because the lawyers aren’t really focusing on 
them; they are focusing on the defendant. [Defence witnesses] don’t know what is 
going on ... So, I think a lot for them is the not knowing and obviously natural 
anxiousness [about appearing at court] and things like that.’  
 
The remit of the Witness Service includes provision for both prosecution witnesses and 
defence witnesses130 and the volunteers interviewed tended to be of the view that the 
needs of defence witnesses were ‘the same’ as prosecution witnesses. However, several 
volunteers spoke of the difficulties they had experienced in identifying defence witnesses to 
whom to provide support.131 This is perhaps due to the absence of a formal mechanism for 
                                                     
130
 However, in 2015-16, 97% of those supported by the Witness Service were prosecution witnesses (Wood, 
2016). 
131
 The potential difficulties involved in identifying defence witnesses was one of the reasons why defence 
witnesses were not included in the sample for this study. This is not withstanding the interview with supporter 
Gloria, who also gave evidence as a defence witness.  
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informing the Witness Service of the presence of defence witnesses and, conversely, for 
informing defence witnesses about the support available from the Witness Service.132  
 
Defendants 
Though data on the demographic characteristics of court users is largely absent (Jacobson, 
2018), existing research suggests that defendants are likely to have a number of needs (see, 
for example, Jacobson with Talbot, 2009; McEwan, 2013; Carlile, 2014; Ward, 2017). The 
findings from this study add weight to such claims because they indicate that much 
offending, and alleged offending, brought before the courts occurs in the context of pre-
existing, and often multiple, needs and vulnerabilities. This includes, but is not limited to, 
learning difficulties or disabilities; mental health difficulties; experience of victimisation; 
physical disabilities or illness; substance misuse; homelessness or recent bereavement.  
 
Magistrates’ courts dealing with relatively short hearings such as sentencing hearings, bail 
hearings and case management hearings often acted as a site within which the various 
needs and vulnerabilities of defendants involved in lower-level offending, or alleged 
offending, were manifest. The high level of need displayed can be illustrated by 
summarising the cases heard before one of the courtrooms in Amber City magistrates’ court 
during a day’s observation. The court heard fifteen133 cases (see MCSH39-47; MCOH20-25) 
among which needs or vulnerabilities of the defendant were identified in seven cases, 
                                                     
132
 However, while the study was underway Citizens Advice launched an initiative aimed at raising awareness 
of the role of the Witness Service in providing support to defence witnesses (see Wood, 2016; Leptos, 2017). 
133
 In addition to this a further case was heard in chambers (closed court) and therefore not observed, and a 
second case was adjourned because the defendant had not been produced from the local prison. 
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usually by the defence.134 Four of the defendants were identified as having problems with 
substance misuse, and three of the four were identified as having interrelated mental health 
difficulties. This included a defendant who was sentenced for assaulting a police officer 
whilst under the influence of alcohol. She was homeless at the time of the offence and 
suffering from severe anxiety and depression, which had since been diagnosed by a GP. In 
two further cases, the defendant’s mental health was subject to additional investigation. 
The first case involved a defendant who was alleged to have committed assault and 
threatened to harm himself in a take-away restaurant less than a week after having been 
released from a mental health hospital; in the second, a defendant with schizophrenia was 
alleged to have committed criminal damage in the property that he rented. Both cases were 
adjourned pending psychiatric reports. A final defendant, who was sentenced for driving 
while under the influence of alcohol, had crashed his vehicle at the time of the offence and 
spent several months in hospital due to the injuries sustained, which included a brain injury.  
 
Caseloads such as this were commonplace, rather than unusual, in the daily life of the 
magistrates’ court and are arguably part of the social fabric of cases coming before the 
court. Crucially, they help to illustrate why engagement among defendants can be weak. 
This is because they highlight the ways in which individual needs or circumstances may 
impact upon a court user’s ability to engage with proceedings. None of the defendants 
described in the observation above could have been said to have engaged in an ‘active 
aligned’ manner; for the majority their engagement was characterised by ‘passive aligned’ 
at best or ‘dull compulsion’ at worst.  
                                                     
134
 Furthermore, one defendant who had been remanded in police custody overnight for the non-payment of 
fines was unrepresented and appeared to find it difficult to answer the questions posed by the magistrates. 
The Chair spoke slowly and clearly to the defendant who was pale and dishevelled in appearance. 
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A final, related, factor to consider is that of social disadvantage. In addition to the multiple 
and overlapping individual needs described above, were signs of high levels of socio-
economic deprivation among court users under study.135 Again, this was often most evident 
among defendants appearing in the magistrates’ courts. For example, common among 
observed cases were applications for reduced court costs due to the defendant’s low 
income, or income that was reliant upon employment or disability benefit, and there were a 
number of occasions in which defendants were brought back before the courts to account 
for failing to keep up with the payment of fines. The socio-economic difficulties 
encountered by court users, defendants and prosecution witnesses alike, was commented 
upon by several of the magistrates interviewed:  
 
‘People say “he’s done that terrible thing and he’s only been fined £300” … [But] 
what we have to do is look to the ability to pay. So, £300 to somebody who is on 
benefits is an astronomical amount of money.’ (David) 
 
 ‘There are a lot of people who struggle. When you look at the demographics and 
you look at poverty, I don’t know how much support people get. So, if [a witness] 
say[s], “I haven’t got any money” is there anything that allows Witness Support – 
have they got a kitty? 136 When we were local justice we used to have a fund, all of us 
                                                     
135
 This is in line with the plethora of existing research which highlights that those appearing before the courts, 
particularly defendants, are likely to come from socially disadvantaged backgrounds (see, for example, Carlen, 
1976; McBarnet, 1981; Jacobson, Bhardwa, Gyateng et al. 2010; Tonry, 2010; Ward, 2017; Lammy, 2017).  
136
 The Witness Service manager at one of the Crown Courts under study had taken to collecting promotional 
food vouchers offered by the local McDonalds in order to give to witnesses who hadn’t brought, or weren’t 
able to afford, lunch while they were waiting at court. This is because, although prosecution witnesses were 
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would put in £10 every six months or whatever, and then if we had somebody that 
evidently hadn’t eaten, we had a fund were we could say “Go and get yourself a 
sandwich”, or whatever. Or if you had someone that had been in the cells overnight, 
and had no money, we could give them the bus fare home in essence.’ (Jennifer) 
 
Socio-economic deprivation or disadvantage among court users is an important factor to 
consider when thinking about engagement because it is associated with debates regarding 
levels of exclusion from wider society (see Young, 1999; Croall, 2017). It is necessary to 
consider what role low levels of engagement in wider society, such as those described by 
Putnam (1995), are reflected in an individual’s level of engagement with the court process. 
Court performance can act as a site in which the myriad of issues experienced by court 
users, and the wider social context within which these are situated, are brought into striking 
view. The ways exclusion from wider society could come under the bright spotlight of the 
courtroom stage is highlighted in Case Study CCPT05, below. This included allusions by 
professional courtroom actors to the ways in which the lives of the complainant and 
defendant (‘them’), were fundamentally different to that of their own, the jury and society 
at large (‘us’) (cf. Jacobson et al. 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
able to enter expense claims to cover the cost of refreshments and transport incurred due to their court 
appearance, this could only be done on an ad hoc basis.  
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Box 6.3: Societal exclusion inherent in the narrative of a Crown Court rape trial 
(CCPT05) 
The defendant (D) was a self-admitted drug dealer; the complainant (C) was a self-
admitted drug user. On the night of the incident, C went to a flat with D to use crack 
cocaine upon which it was alleged that D raped her. Shortly after the incident, C 
reported the alleged offences to the police, at which point she was arrested for an 
offence that she had previously committed and spent several months in custody. The 
defence alleged that C had consented to sex in exchange for drugs. C had no 
previous convictions for sex work. 
 
The trial took place after C’s release from custody. C gave evidence behind a screen. 
D was on bail and appeared in court in casual dress. He was accompanied to court by 
his partner who observed the case from the public gallery. At various points during 
breaks in proceedings, D and his supporter could be seen lying on the floor hugging 
in a conference room adjacent to the courtroom. 
 
C’s longstanding drug use, alongside D’s previous convictions and troubled 
childhood, were referred to on a number of occasions. During the trial both the 
prosecution and defence appeared to develop a narrative that drew upon the 
‘otherness’ of the lives of C and D. For example the prosecutor, during her closing 
speech, told the jury that despite C ‘perhaps living on the edge of society’, it did not 
mean that she should not be believed. She also stated that C had reported the 
alleged offences despite the fact that she may have feared that the police response 
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would be one of ‘you’re a horrible druggy, go away, you’ve made this up.’ Likewise, 
during the defence closing speech, D’s advocate referred to the case as being 
‘unsavoury, horrible, nasty and unpleasant to listen to’ and on various occasions 
likened the responses of C and D to each other. This included describing C and D as 
‘argumentative’, ‘chaotic’ and not always able to listen to the question asked. 
Meanwhile the judge during the summing up, referred to the jury having heard 
‘evidence about people’s lives that are very different to your own’ and spoke of the 
‘difficult and sad circumstances all round’ of C and D.  
 
Weak levels of engagement in the court process were arguably most pronounced among 
court users who appeared to have least connection to, or stake in, wider society. In the 
above Case Study, for example, the defendant’s level of engagement was characterised as 
‘resistant’. This was, in part, as described in Chapter 5 (pp. 221-2) due to his tendency to 
interrupt proceedings. Moreover, the Case Study helps to further illustrate the ways in 
which factors relating to the individual court user, in this case social exclusion, could 
coalesce with operational constraints, such as exclusionary practices inherent within the 
structure and culture of the courts, to limit the engagement of court users. It also raises 
questions about the extent to which macro factors, such as social deprivation, have a 
bearing upon perceptions of legitimacy (cf. Loader and Sparks, 2013). Such questions are 
perhaps particularly relevant in view of Ewick and Silbey’s (1998: 234) assertion that ‘social 
marginality’ is strongly associated with the ‘counterhegemonic consciousness’ displayed by 
those who resist legal power. 
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6.1.3 Summary: the interplay between operational constraints and individual circumstances 
 
Overall, this section has sought to outline the various existing barriers to engagement in the 
criminal courts. These barriers, it has been argued, are of two main types. Firstly, a core set 
of barriers are borne out of operational aspects of the court process which reflect structural, 
cultural and contextual constraints in the criminal courts. The second part of this section 
sought to convey how factors relating to the circumstances of individual court users, such as 
personal needs arising from the experience of victimisation or the impact of social 
deprivation, could contribute to weak forms of engagement in proceedings. Crucially, it has 
been argued that both sets of barriers can coalesce to limit the extent to which an individual 
is able to engage in an ‘active aligned’ manner. Levels of engagement, it would appear, are 
often at their weakest when operational constraints coincide with high levels of individual 
and social need among court users. The implications of this with regard to perceptions of 
legitimacy are examined in the following section.   
 
 
6.2 Cultivating engagement in the criminal courts: procedural justice and ‘beyond’  
 
 
This section moves from examining the barriers to engagement to considering the factors 
which can be said to cultivate engagement in the criminal courts. In doing so, it takes 
forward the discussion of legitimacy provided in the previous Chapter. This is possible 
because, as outlined, the extent to which an individual engages in the court reflects the 
degree to which the individual perceives the courts as legitimate. The two dimensions which 
comprise engagement – alignment and participation – correspond with two of the central 
components of legitimacy: ‘shared values’ and ‘expressed consent’, respectively. In line with 
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existing theorisations, I argue that the presence of procedurally just treatment, in the form 
of considerate and inclusive interactions, can promote engagement and enhance overall 
perceptions of legitimacy in the criminal courts. However, procedural justice forms just one 
aspect of the rich ‘tissue of relations’ (Loader and Sparks, 2013) that contribute to audience 
legitimacy.  Examining legitimacy from a dialogic perspective, thus, facilitates a more 
‘intricate’ (Harkin, 2015) consideration of the myriad of factors which shape perceptions of 
legitimacy.  
 
6.2.1 Considerate and inclusive interactions in cultivating engagement: the role of 
procedural justice  
 
Theorists have sought to emphasise the role of procedural justice in shaping perceptions of 
legitimacy. Specifically, it has been argued that the experience of fair and respectful 
treatment can enhance perceptions of legitimacy in institutions (see, for example, Tyler, 
2006; Hough et al. 2013).  The findings of this study do indeed provide some support for this 
view. Being treated with consideration and respect by court actors who were in a position of 
authority (such as, the judiciary, legal professionals and court staff) emerged as an 
important means of promoting engagement among court users. This is because the 
experience of such treatment could enhance both an individual’s ability to participate in 
proceedings, for example by aiding understanding and expression, and the individual’s 
alignment with the courts. This is illustrated in the following quotations from defendant 
Irenka, when describing her interaction with the judge in her case, and prosecution witness 
Dominic, when discussing his communication with the Witness Service and court staff: 
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 ‘The judge was asking, you know, very straightforward questions … [such as] “Can 
you tell me precisely how it happened?” So, it was very brief, you know a good 
speed; I was very satisfied with it.’ (Irenka) 
 
‘[When] I went to reception, [a Witness Service volunteer] came to greet me – really 
friendly – asked “Is this your first time?”, and because I was there quite early they 
actually had a map of the court and showed me round. So, I had an idea, I guess, of 
where people would be sitting. You don’t really get the idea of the content and the 
size and the dimensions of the size or how small it is and that type of stuff 
[otherwise]… The staff were amazing … The usher [who] came and fetched me was 
lovely – she was really, really friendly.’ (Dominic)  
 
Efforts by courtroom practitioners, such as members of the judiciary, court staff and – to 
varying degrees, advocates – to foster supportive and respectful interactions with court 
users were evident in observed cases in both of the Crown Courts and magistrates’ courts 
under study. Judges and magistrates often spoke directly to court users, for example by 
greeting individuals and explaining aspects of the decision-making process.  In interview, 
magistrate Jennifer described the steps that she takes to explain the process to court users: 
 
‘Say for instance I’m doing a trial … I would say “We are the magistrates and we are 
listening to all of the evidence and we will be making a decision. This person is our 
legal adviser who makes sure we don’t go off doing something that we shouldn’t. 
This person is our list caller. You’ve met your lawyer but this person from the Crown, 
they bring the case and they will ask you some questions” … I think we as 
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magistrates can make the court experience better by explaining who we are and 
what we are doing. And I feel quite passionate about that … it only takes 3 minutes - 
it’s no big deal.’  
 
There were also signs of efforts by advocates, court staff and members of the judiciary both 
to modify styles of questioning and to communicate with court users in an understandable 
manner. This ties in with recent research which has noted signs of ‘cultural shift’ in how 
courtroom actors conduct cross-examination, particularly that which involves vulnerable 
court users (Henderson, 2015; Henderson, 2016; Kirby, 2017a; Hunter et al. 2018). However, 
the study findings suggest that these shifts extend beyond cross-examination towards more 
day-to-day court-based interactions and are being applied– to greater or lesser degrees 
from case to case – to the full range of court users; that is, not only to those who have been 
classified as ‘vulnerable’. 
 
Importantly, such treatment can promote ‘active aligned’ engagement with the court 
process. This could be by improving the engagement of a court user who had previously 
displayed weak levels of engagement or by bolstering the engagement of a court user who 
could already by described as ‘active aligned’.  Moreover the comments of a small number 
of interviewees suggest, in line with arguments presented by Tyler et al. (2013), that 
inclusive interactions can also strengthen individual-level engagement in wider society. For 
example, prosecution witness Iumi described how being thanked for attending court by the 
officer in the case challenged an ingrained perception he had regarding contact between 
members of his local community and the police:  
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‘I mean in the ‘hood, in [my local area], it’s like “it’s the police and us”, that’s the 
kind of vibe that is there. But when Officer [X] came and was just saying “Oh thank 
you for coming”, I felt really like it wasn’t “them and us”. It’s a them and us kind of 
vibe that flies around, you know, in deprived [areas]. At that point it disappeared 
completely. …. So that felt really nice that he came, it meant a lot to me, basically.’  
 
Efforts to interact with court users in a considerate and inclusive manner thus point to the 
role that procedural justice can play in enhancing perceptions of legitimacy. Experience of 
procedurally fair forms of treatment, such as being treated with consideration and respect, 
can contribute to enhanced levels of engagement among court users. The findings of this 
study, therefore, support the existing research in the field of policing which has illustrated 
the role that the experience of procedurally fair treatment can play in promoting 
perceptions of legitimacy in criminal justice institutions (see, for example, Sunshine and 
Tyler, 2003; Hough et al, 2013; Jackson et al., 2012; Tankebe, 2013). 
 
6.2.2 The ‘intricate’ and ‘unfinished’ character of legitimacy  
 
Though procedural justice can play an important role in enhancing perceptions of legitimacy 
in the criminal courts, the strength of this role is open to debate. In this section it is argued 
that although procedural justice plays its part, it is only one aspect – along with others such 
as the use of lay adjudicators in criminal proceedings –  of the ‘tissue of relations’ (Loader 
and Sparks, 2013) that shape perceptions of legitimacy. The benefits of being treated in a 
‘procedurally just’ manner do not necessarily outweigh the myriad of other factors that can 
weaken engagement, and associated perceptions of legitimacy, in the court process.  
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Thinking about procedural justice in tandem with the previously discussed barriers to 
engagement helps to illustrate this. Considerate and inclusive interactions are likely to 
mediate some of the operational constraints described in Section 6.1.1, particularly by 
helping to foster normative cooperation with the courts. This is also likely to reduce the 
courts’ need to rely upon instrumental forms of securing compliance which, as highlighted 
in the previous Chapter, can be a specific source of legitimacy deficit.  For example, 
increased efforts of security staff to treat court users with neutrality and respect may help 
to reduce some of the feelings of exclusion court users can experience when occupying the 
‘outer zones’ of the court; likewise, the provision of regular, clear and up-to-date 
information may help to lessen the negative impact of waiting and delay (cf. Jacobson, 
Hunter and Kirby, 2014b; Kirby, 2017a). However, the presence of procedurally just styles of 
communication is likely to have much less impact upon several of the other operational 
constraints identified, particularly those which pertain to systemic issues within the criminal 
courts, such as limits to the availability and provision of legal representation and funding 
constraints. Moreover, there were instances in which the experience of polite and 
respectful treatment appeared to have little, or negligible, impact upon court users’ feelings 
about the process. For example, when asked whether she felt she was treated politely and 
respectfully by the magistrates overseeing the case, prosecution witness Gemma 
responded:  
 
‘Yeah, yeah … Well, I think they were just there to do their job. …Their behaviour 
wasn’t anything other than I would have expected so that’s why I think they were 
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fine … they did their job and they weren’t impolite at all or anything like that so… 
[trails off].’ 
 
Her affirmative, yet arguably nonplussed, response highlights the limited role that 
procedural justice can play in promoting perceptions of legitimacy. Feeling as though she 
was listened to and treated politely was regarded by Gemma as being simply part of the 
‘job’ of a magistrate and was not enough to mitigate against other aspects of her 
experience, such as being legally compelled to give evidence, which contributed to the ‘dull 
compulsion’ that characterised her overall engagement with the court process.   
 
Following on from this, as illustrated in Section 6.1.2, there were instances in which the 
individual needs of court users were so acute that procedurally just forms of interaction 
could only go so far. The Case Study in Box 6.4, below, provides an example in which the 
courts took a number of steps to accommodate the needs of a vulnerable defendant, which 
included the use of an intermediary throughout the trial; regular breaks in proceedings; 
time-estimates in relation to the evidence and cross-examination of the defendant; and the 
use of an interpreter because English was not his first language. In addition to this, 
throughout the hearing the district judge overseeing the case communicated with the 
defendant in a manner that could be described as polite, respectful and inclusive. However, 
the case arguably highlights that, despite these efforts, the defendant’s level of need was 
such that he struggled to engage with proceedings. This is indicated by several of the 
comments made by the defendant as the case progressed, which are described below.137   
                                                     
137
 It is outside the scope of this study to examine whether or not the needs and vulnerabilities of court users 
are being adequately met by the courts, however an examination of this and other aspects relating to the 
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Box 6.4: Steps taken to assist a vulnerable defendant in a magistrates’ court trial 
(MCPT03) 
 
This case involved a defendant (D) who was alleged to have assaulted his former 
partner and caused criminal damage to an item of furniture in their living room. D 
was represented and appeared in court with the assistance of an intermediary, who 
had prepared a report of the hearing, and an interpreter. It was stated by the 
defence advocate that D had a physical disability and associated mental health 
problems. D was seated in the open-dock in the courtroom; the intermediary and 
interpreter sat next to him in the dock. 
 
The prosecution witnesses gave evidence in the morning and the defence case 
began in the afternoon. During a discussion between the defence advocate, D and 
the intermediary about whether or not D wanted to give evidence, D stated ‘I want 
to go to sleep’. He ultimately decided to give evidence. D moved from the dock to 
the witness box. There was only room for two people in the witness box, so the 
intermediary stood next to D in the witness box and the interpreter stood just 
outside it. The intermediary informed the judge that D was taking medication and 
was feeling ‘quite fatigued’. The judge informed D that he could sit down if he 
wished (he did so) and asked the intermediary to let him know if D required a break. 
Moreover, the judge reminded the defence advocate that there was a time-limit of 
25 minutes for D’s evidence-in-chief.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
participation of court users in the courts and tribunals is currently being undertaken by Cooper and colleagues. 
See: http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/vulnerability-courts-research-and-policy-project [accessed 13.04.18]. 
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When giving evidence, D’s speech was slurred, he appeared to struggle with some of 
the questioning and often replied, or interrupted, with a raised voice. On several 
occasions the intermediary asked D to listen to the question before responding.  
During one instance in which D interrupted, the judge said to him: ‘I appreciate you 
may have a number of things to say … I know it’s difficult for you in your particular 
position, but do your best to listen.’ The interpreter did not frequently respond on 
behalf of D but sometimes translated the advocates’ questions. At one point during 
evidence-in-chief, D stated ‘I’m getting a panic attack, give me a punch’; the judge 
offered D a break, which he declined. A few minutes later he said that he had taken 
extra medication to come to court: ‘That’s why I don’t know what to do, what to 
say’. The judge, with 10 minutes of evidence-in-chief remaining, again suggested a 
break; D said he wanted to continue – ‘No, no, I want to finish and go … I don’t want 
to come back again … I [would] prefer to go to jail’. The judge and the intermediary 
agreed that there should be a short break. 
 
When D resumed his evidence approximately 45 minutes later, the defence advocate 
asked a small number of questions. D was then cross-examined by the prosecutor. D 
responded to cross-examination in a similar manner to his evidence-in-chief; his 
voice remained raised throughout. The intermediary interrupted at an early point 
during cross-examination to state that, in contrary to guidance provided by the 
Advocate’s Gateway, D had been asked a number of tagged questions and 
statements. The prosecutor rephrased his most recent question and proceeded to 
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ask D questions. Cross-examination lasted approximately 25 minutes. 
 
D was acquitted of assault but found guilty of criminal damage. Upon sentencing D 
to a conditional discharge and issuing costs and a compensation order, the judge 
said to D: ‘I’m sorry if that seems complicated but I have no doubt that your lawyer 
will go over that with you.’ The judge also thanked D for ‘sitting through a lengthy 
day’s trial’. 
 
In sum, while procedural justice may help to soften the impact of some of the operational 
constraints that can contribute to ‘resistance’, ‘dull compulsion’ and ‘withdrawal’, the 
degree to which it can do so is limited and highly dependent upon the response, and 
circumstances, of individual court users.  
 
A final point of note is the impact that limited engagement in wider society has upon 
perceptions of legitimacy. The discussion in Section 6.1.2 provided a small window into the 
complex social context that surrounds offending and victimisation and illustrates how levels 
of engagement among court users are difficult to separate from wider social problems. This 
is indicative of the limits to procedural justice in cultivating perceptions of legitimacy.  
 
Emergent criticism of the concept of legitimacy has focused upon the ways in which existing 
theoretical and empirical discussions have failed to connect with the ‘intricate’ (Harkin, 
2015) and complex social terrains in which relationships between power-holders and 
audiences are set (Loader and Sparks, 2013). It is of little doubt, as highlighted in Section 
6.2.1, that procedural justice has much to offer in terms of addressing debates about how 
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perceptions of legitimacy can be enhanced within the court process and of the impact that 
such interactions can have upon an individual’s engagement, and inclusion, in wider society. 
However, it has also been argued that a focus on ‘micro’ legitimacy theorisations have 
largely failed to connect with ‘macro’ discourses, such as that of crime control, and vice 
versa. That is, while procedural justice theorists have been preoccupied with the minutia of 
interactions within criminal justice settings, crime control theorists – for example, Garland 
(2001) and Wacquant (2009) – have been more concerned with the broader discourses 
about societal shifts, such as the reduced role of the ‘supporting’ arm of the social State and 
associated expansion of the ‘penal’ arm of the State and the advent of penal populism (cf. 
Loader and Sparks, 2013). As Loader and Sparks (2013: 113) neatly surmise: 
 
‘Perspectives that focus too exclusively on the … procedural/micro side of this 
division stand at risk of treating legitimacy as a self-contained, even self-explanatory 
product: legitimacy is sustained by legitimacy-sustaining behaviour. On the other 
hand, there is a risk of evacuating the question of legitimacy properly so-called in 
some of the more sweeping interpretations of penal/criminological transformations: 
legitimacy is sustained by legitimacy-sustaining ideological work.’ 
 
Instead, scholars have sought to move ‘beyond’ procedural justice (Bottoms and Tankebe, 
2012) and focus upon the ‘social and cultural dynamics’ (Loader and Sparks, 2013: 111) 
surrounding the ‘dialogic’ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012) or ‘conversational’ nature of 
legitimacy (cf. Loader and Sparks, 2013). Drawing on the work of political theorist 
Rosanvalon (2011) Loader and Sparks (2013), contend that examining the ‘tissue of 
relations’ (p. 119) between power-holders and audiences provides a means by which the 
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‘missing middle’ (p. 106) of debates on legitimacy and crime control can be properly 
addressed. Importantly, they have argued that this extends the remit of legitimacy outside 
the boundaries of the criminal justice system, and criminal justice actors, and point to the 
ways in which viewing legitimacy as ‘unfinished’138 (p. 105) allows criminal justice issues to 
connect with those in society at large. This is a ‘conversation’ that will be returned to in the 
concluding Chapter. 
 
6.3 Concluding thoughts 
 
 
Overall, this Chapter has examined how court users’ engagement with the criminal courts 
can be fostered. This has necessitated an exploration of the barriers to engagement. A 
number of these arise in the operation of the courts, particularly in relation to the 
structural, cultural and contextual aspects of the court process that can limit engagement. 
Alongside this, factors relating to the needs and circumstances of individual court users act 
as a further barrier to engagement in proceedings. It has been argued that these 
operational constraints and individual factors can intersect and contribute to weak forms of 
engagement, such as that which is characterised by ‘dull compulsion’, ‘resistance’ and 
‘withdrawal’.   
 
After examining these barriers, this Chapter focused upon how engagement within the 
criminal courts might be cultivated. In doing so it aimed to further develop the discussion of 
legitimacy which began in the preceding Chapters. Considerate and inclusive interactions, it 
was argued, could help to enhance engagement in criminal proceedings. This corresponds 
                                                     
138
 Loader and Sparks (2013) borrowed the term ‘the unfinished’ from Mathiesen (1974) who coined this 
during his research into the Norwegian prison system. 
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with existing research which has pointed to the role that procedural justice can play in 
strengthening perceptions of legitimacy. However, it was asserted that procedural justice is 
only one factor at stake in the ‘tissue of relations’ (Loader and Sparks, 2013) that shape 
perceptions of legitimacy. Situating this discussion within theoretical debates regarding the 
importance of bridging the ‘missing middle’ (Loader and Sparks, 2013) of the discourses of 
legitimacy and crime control provides a clear imperative for the courts and wider branches 
of the State, including those comprising its ‘supporting hand’, to focus on both enhancing 
court users’ levels of engagement in the courts and also in wider society. Moreover, the 
study findings elaborate upon the growing body of research surrounding the ‘dialogic’ or 
‘conversational’ elements of legitimacy – particularly in the lesser researched terrain of the 
criminal courts –  and point to the value of examining perceptions of legitimacy in the 
broader social context in which power relations are set.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
This study explored the under-researched terrain of the criminal courts (Rock, 1993); firstly 
by examining court users’ levels of understanding and perceptions of the use of lay 
adjudicators and secondly by examining how lay participants engaged with the court 
process.  The concept of ‘legitimacy’ provided a useful framework for this examination 
because its proponents (such as, Tyler, 2006; Jackson et al. 2012) have argued that in order 
for institutions to operate effectively, they need to hold legitimate authority in the eyes of 
the citizens that they serve. Underpinning these theorisations is the assertion that the 
presence of legitimacy enhances normative forms of cooperation with institutions, rather 
than those that seek to secure compliance through instrumental means, such as incentive, 
threat or sanction (Tyler, 2011; Tyler et al. 2013; Hough and Sato, 2011; Hough et al. 2013; 
Beetham, 2013). Exploring perceptions of the criminal courts from the perspective of lay 
people who come into direct contact with the courts thus permitted an examination of the 
degree to which the courts can claim to hold legitimate authority.  This was thought to be of 
value because, although the study of legitimacy in other criminal justice institutions, 
particularly the police, is common (Harkin, 2015), few scholars have examined perceptions 
of legitimacy in the criminal courts – with the magistrates’ courts being especially under-
researched (cf. Darbyshire, 1997). 
 
The study adopted a qualitative approach, involving interviews with 43 lay participants and 
observations of 126 hearings at four courts (two Crown Courts and two magistrates’ courts) 
in England. The use of such an approach, though limited in terms of generalisability due to 
its small-scale nature, was regarded as the most valuable means of generating 
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understanding of the subjective realties of those engaging with the court process. This 
approach was befitting of the ethnographic tradition adopted by a number of established 
studies of the criminal courts, while at the same time being a more novel approach to adopt 
for a study of legitimacy.139 This means that the findings of this study offer a potentially 
unique contribution to theorisations on legitimacy. This is because the focus on the minutia 
of interactions between lay participants and the courts, facilitated by the use of a qualitative 
approach, enabled Bottoms and Tankebe’s (2012) influential concept of ‘dialogic legitimacy’ 
to be elaborated upon. This coincides with an emerging body of research in the field of 
policing which has pointed to the value of examining perceptions of legitimacy ‘in situ’ 
(Loader and Sparks, 2013); that is, in the context in which interactions take place (Skinns et 
al. 2017; see also Harkin, 2015).   
 
7.1 Main findings 
 
This study set out to examine court users’ levels of understanding and perceptions of lay 
adjudication in the criminal courts. Of principal interest was the extent to which lay 
adjudication, in the form of juries and lay magistrates, could contribute to court users’ 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal courts. Despite the historic and widespread use 
of lay adjudicators in the administration of justice in England and Wales, there remained an 
absence of existing research which had sought to examine perspectives of lay adjudication 
from the viewpoint of those with the least power and most at stake in the criminal justice 
process; that is, court users (cf. Benesh and Howell, 2001). 
                                                     
139
 The study of legitimacy is almost synonymous with the use of quantitative methods; a useful critique of this 
is provided by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) and Harkin (2015). Some exceptions to this include Liebling’s 
(2004) study of prisons and their moral performance, Jacobson et al.’s (2015) study of the public’s experiences 
of the Crown Court and Skinns et al.’s (2017) study of ‘soft power’ in police custody suites. 
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In order to fully examine court users’ perceptions of legitimacy regarding the use of lay 
adjudicators it was first important to examine the extent to which court users were aware 
of, and understood, the roles of juries and magistrates, respectively (Research Question 1). 
The findings from interviews with court users, presented in Chapter 4, suggested that levels 
of understanding of the two types of lay adjudicator varied. Court users were, in the main, 
well-aware of the basic role, function and composition of juries. A strong degree of 
understanding of the function of the jury was displayed by court users across a range of 
demographic characteristics and between both types of criminal court. This suggests that 
the role of the jury is well within the public consciousness and holds a ‘symbolic’ value 
(Darbyshire, 1997; Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas, 2000; Roberts and Hough, 2011) in the eyes 
of court users. In contrast, but nonetheless in line with existing research carried out with the 
general public (such as Roberts et al. 2012), knowledge and awareness of the magistracy 
was much weaker. Court users often struggled to describe the magistrate role and were 
often not aware of some of the core aspects of the role, such as that it is carried out on a 
voluntary basis and that a legal qualification is not required in order to perform the role. 
The findings indicate low levels of understanding of the magistracy even among citizens 
with direct experience of attending the criminal courts; this includes those who have 
attended the magistrates’ court, specifically. Therefore, in contrast to the symbolic value 
held by the jury, it would seem that magistrates’ justice is much less ‘visible’ to the public 
(Sanders, 2001).  
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With regard to the degree to which lay adjudication can confer legitimacy on the criminal 
courts (Research Question 2), interviews with court users suggest that there are a number of 
interlinking factors at play that mean that the use of lay adjudicators accords with the 
‘shared values’ of court users and the courts, and thus enhances the legitimacy of the 
criminal courts. Lay adjudication was regarded as an important feature of the criminal 
justice system by court users: more than two thirds of interviewees stated that it is 
important for the courts in England and Wales to have magistrates; an even higher 
proportion (more than three quarters) held this view about juries. Court users were 
particularly supportive of the perceived value of group decision-making by a cross section of 
society due to the view that it could contribute to impartial and independent decision-
making. Lay adjudication was also regarded as an important means by which the ‘voice’ of 
society could be represented in criminal justice decision-making and thus provide a 
‘democratic bridge’ (Sanders, 2002: 326-327) between the State and wider society. The role 
of lay magistrate was regarded to be of specific value in achieving ‘summary justice’ due to 
the perceived cost-effectiveness of having magistrates deal with lower-level cases.  
 
However, the findings also suggest that there are several factors that limited the extent to 
which lay adjudication could confer legitimacy upon the courts; particularly with regard to 
the degree to which the stated benefits of lay adjudication are visible in practice. Concerns 
were raised about whether or not lay adjudicators possessed the required level of 
knowledge or expertise to carry out the role; particularly regarding juror levels of 
understanding in complex cases.  Interviewees were sensitive to scope for bias in the lay 
adjudicator role. With respect to juries, this concerned the ways in which prejudices of 
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individual jurors could impact upon decision-making; with regard to magistrates this 
pertained to suspicions about the motivations underlying the decision to undertake the role. 
In line with this, interviewees displayed an awareness of limits to achieving a representative 
composition of juries and magistrates. This was in relation to commonly cited areas of 
under-representation among juries and magistrates, such as socio-economic status and 
ethnicity, but also less commented upon characteristics such as religion and culture.  Lastly, 
court users’ were particularly ambivalent about the degree of power afforded to lay people 
in criminal justice decision-making. This is reflected in the low levels of interest expressed by 
court users with regard to performing the role of lay adjudicator themselves. Overall, 
however, the findings suggest that despite challenges arising from the visibility of the 
perceived benefits of lay decision-making in practice, the use of both types of lay 
adjudicator could largely be said to confer legitimacy on the criminal courts.  
 
Crucially, as the study progressed it became clear that the perceived legitimacy of lay 
adjudication could not be considered in isolation from the perceived legitimacy of the wider 
court process. That is, perceptions of lay adjudication are just one of a number of factors 
that impact on overall perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal courts. This led to a 
broadening of the aims of the research towards a focus upon ‘engagement’ and specifically 
involved the introduction of Research Question 3, which concerned an examination of how 
lay participants’ levels and types of engagement in the court process could be characterised.  
In view of this, I argued that audience legitimacy was best illustrated by examining how lay 
participants engaged with the court process. This is because audience legitimacy – also 
known as ‘empirical legitimacy’ – is widely regarded to require both the presence of ‘shared 
values’ between a power-holder (such as the courts) and their audience (such as lay 
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participants) and the ‘specific actions’ that an individual takes to express their acceptance of 
the authority, known as ‘expressed consent’ (cf. Beetham, 2013: 91; Bottoms and Tankebe, 
2012; Jackson et al. 2015). The concept of engagement, therefore, enabled an examination 
of ‘shared values’ and ‘expressed consent’, which together form two of the core 
components of legitimacy. 
 
Chapter 5 outlined a two-dimensional continuum of engagement based upon lay 
participants’ levels of alignment with, and participation in, the criminal justice process.  A 
focus on alignment, it was argued, served to provide an indication of the extent to which 
‘shared values’ existed between the courts and lay participants; while an examination of 
participation provided an indication of the extent to which individuals afford the courts 
‘expressed consent’ to govern. Defining engagement in this manner provided a lens through 
which to examine perceptions of legitimacy. Further to this, an examination of the degree to 
which individuals engaged with the courts illustrated the ‘dialogic character’ of legitimacy 
and enabled further distinction to be made between ‘true’ and ‘weak’ forms of legitimacy 
(cf. Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Five types of engagement were identified: active 
alignment, passive alignment, dull compulsion, resistance and withdrawal. ‘Active 
alignment’ represents a high degree of engagement in the court process and is indicative of 
a strong degree of perceived legitimacy; ‘passive alignment’ is best associated with the 
notion of ‘implicit legitimacy’, which has been described as an overall ‘accept[ance] [of] the 
authority of the courts’ (Fielding, 2006: 6-7). ‘Dull compulsion’, ‘resistance’ and ‘withdrawal’ 
denote lower degrees of engagement that are indicative of weak degrees of perceived 
legitimacy, or ‘legitimacy deficits’.  
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Generally speaking, engagement among magistrate interviewees, who tended to display a 
degree of ‘self-belief’ (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012) in the legitimacy of their own power-
holder role and the wider power of the courts, was largely characterised as ‘active aligned’. 
Court users’ engagement, however, was spread across the five categories outlined in the 
continuum; only a small proportion of court users could be described as engaging in an 
‘active aligned’ manner. The vast majority of interviewees engaged in a ‘passive aligned’ 
manner – this included instances of ‘passive acceptance’ – which represents the presence of 
an ‘implicit’ degree of legitimacy (Fielding, 2006: 7).  However, nearly two thirds of 
complainants and prosecution witnesses in the observed sample exhibited weak levels of 
engagement; that is ‘dull compulsion’, ‘resistance’ or ‘withdrawal’. Meanwhile, three 
quarters of defendants in the observed sample participated in a ‘passive’ manner; this 
included engagement based upon ‘passive acceptance’ and ‘dull compulsion’. Most 
defendants who participated in an ‘active’ manner displayed a weak degree of alignment 
with the court process, which often manifested itself as ‘resistance’. Therefore engagement 
characterised by either ‘resistance’, ‘dull compulsion’ or ‘withdrawal’ was not uncommon 
across the different groups of court users. It was suggested, that this points to areas of 
friction, strain or deficit within the ‘legitimacy dialogue’ (Bottoms and Tanekebe, 2012). 
These deficits need to be understood, and where possible, addressed in order for the courts 
to continue to claim to hold legitimate authority.  
 
In view of this, Chapter 6 sought to elaborate upon the factors most likely to act as a barrier 
to engagement and those which might enhance it, with a view to gaining a better 
understanding of the factors that support and undermine court users’ perceptions of 
legitimacy (Research Question 4). An individual’s engagement with the court process could 
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be inhibited in various interlocking ways. There are a number of ways in which operational 
constraints within the court process could act as a barrier to engagement. Four examples 
were outlined, these included: the ways in which the ‘outer zones’ of the courts could act as 
sites of visible disengagement; conundrums surrounding how to reduce delays and achieve 
‘efficiency’; issues relating to inter-professional dynamics between professional actors and 
sources of occupational strain; and issues borne out of the absence of legal representation.  
Moreover the specific needs of court users, and the associated social context in which 
victimisation and offending occurs, also had a bearing on the extent to which individuals 
engaged with the process. It was thus argued that factors relating to the ‘social world’ 
(Rock, 1993) or ‘machinery’ (Jacobson et al. 2015) of the criminal courts, and those 
concerning the individual and social needs of court users, can intersect and impact upon the 
degree to which court users engage with the process.  
 
Nevertheless, the study findings suggested that engagement, and associated perceptions of 
legitimacy, could be cultivated in several ways. In addition to the ways in which the use of 
lay adjudicators could confer legitimacy on the criminal courts, the study findings indicate 
that the experience of procedurally just forms of treatment from court-based actors could 
enhance perceptions of legitimacy in the court process. This is because stronger degrees of 
engagement were often associated with higher degrees of inclusion within the court 
process. This was manifested in the presence of considerate and respectful interactions 
between lay participants and courtroom actors. Procedural justice is also likely to help 
overcome some of the specific ‘legitimacy deficits’ which concern the courts’ reliance upon 
instrumental means of seeking compliance from court users. This is because ‘procedurally 
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just’ methods of communication promote normative cooperation among citizens (Tyler, 
2011; Hough and Sato, 2011). 
 
However, the findings of this study, along with others set in a qualitative tradition, highlight 
the difficulty in separating factors relating to the experience of procedurally just interactions 
from other factors which impact upon perceptions of legitimacy. For example, in their study 
of the public’s experience of the Crown Court, Jacobson et al. (2015) outlined a number of 
factors that contributed to court users’ perceptions of legitimacy. These included those set 
in the procedural justice framework, such as ‘fair decision-making’ and ‘respectful 
treatment’, and those set in the distributive justice framework, namely ‘positive outcomes’. 
However, they concluded that ‘respondents’ overarching sense of the legitimacy of the 
court process tended to reside in differing combinations of the[se]… factors …. but very 
rarely, if ever, in all of them simultaneously’ (p. 168).  
 
Therefore, when examining factors that enhance engagement, in line with the stance 
outlined by Loader and Sparks’ (2013), this study stressed the value of seeking to 
understand the ‘tissue of relations’ that exists between court users, criminal justice agencies 
and wider society and which shape perceptions of legitimacy, rather than seeking to 
distinguish issues of ‘process’ from those of ‘outcome’.  In order to fully examine 
perceptions of legitimacy, there is a need to look not only at the specific institution that an 
individual is required to interact with but beyond it towards some of the ‘macro’ issues in 
society. As Loader and Sparks (2013: 112-114) asserted: 
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‘We need to analyse and imagine the kinds of inclusive dialogue that democratic 
legitimacy might conceivably require across different crime and justice sites. … This 
orients inquiry not only to the police and prisons but to the range of social and 
political institutions that act upon (or may act upon) crime.’  
 
Overall, the examination of court users’ understanding and perceptions of a specific aspect 
of the criminal justice process – that is, the use of lay adjudicators – alongside an 
exploration of the ways in which lay participants engaged with the criminal courts has 
provided a means of understanding the ‘dialogic’ and ‘in-situ’ nature of legitimacy. The 
study has also illustrated the value of seeking to cultivate perceptions of legitimacy by 
moving beyond the confines of the courtroom walls and towards thinking about the ways in 
which issues in wider society shape the experiences of court users. Moreover, the findings 
highlight the vital role that qualitative research can play in enhancing the ‘analytic density’ 
(Fielding, 2009) of the legitimacy ‘conversation’ (Loader and Sparks, 2013) and give weight 
to Flood’s (2005) assertion that ethnographic methods, in particular, are of prime value to 
the advancement of socio-legal research.   
 
7.2 Implications 
 
A number of implications arise from this study. They can be grouped under the two 
headings that reflect the principal aims of the study. These are those which regard the use 
of lay adjudication in the criminal courts and those which concern the broader focus upon 
engagement.  
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7.2.1 Lay adjudication in the criminal courts 
 
The study findings indicate that the overriding premise of lay adjudication, in the form of 
juries and magistrates, is accepted by court users and can help to confer legitimacy on the 
criminal courts. This is particularly so at trials, when group decision-making by a cross-
section of society was, generally speaking, held in high regard by court user interviewees. 
This underlying support for lay adjudication provides fertile ground for the further 
‘cultivation’ by the State, and those tasked with its operation, regarding the aspects of lay 
adjudication that can undermine perceptions of legitimacy. This is discussed below with 
particular reference to instances in which some of the theoretical justifications for lay 
adjudication are less visible in practice.  
 
A primary issue worth further consideration concerns public awareness of juries and lay 
magistrates. Levels of understanding of the role of juries is relatively strong, however this is 
heavily shaped by media depictions of jury trials. This contributes to inaccuracies and 
misconceptions of the function and operation of the jury; for example, in relation to the 
limits of the preemptory challenge in this jurisdiction. As with previous research, levels of 
awareness of the magistracy appear to be weak. Importantly, the study findings suggest this 
to be the case even among those with direct experience of the criminal courts. 
Cumulatively, these findings point to an ‘invisibility’ (cf. Sanders, 2001) or opacity in 
magistrates’ justice. This has the potential to juxtapose the ‘open justice’ principle of the 
criminal courts and suggests that the magistracy may encounter difficulties in meeting 
several of its purported aims in practice. For example, if members of the public are not 
aware that magistrates are volunteers drawn from the communities they serve, this raises 
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questions about the extent to which they are likely to perceive that magistrates’ justice 
embodies the principles of ‘trial by peers’ or the bringing of ‘community norms’ into the 
decision-making process. Moreover, the apparent juxtaposition between societal 
perceptions surrounding the ‘summary’ nature of magistrates’ justice and apparent shifts in 
caseload towards more complex or serious matters, suggests that now might be a 
particularly prudent time to address the longstanding concern raised by McBarnet (1981: 
189) about the ‘ideology of the triviality’ that inheres magistrates’ justice (see also, Ward, 
2017). Increased efforts to heighten the visibility of magistrates’ justice may be particularly 
valuable in light of the finding that experience of attending the magistrates’ courts seemed 
to have a positive impact upon court users’ perceptions of the magistracy. 
 
Efforts made to promote awareness of the jury and lay magistracy, particularly through the 
medium of formal education, are required in order to ensure that members of the public 
are fully informed about the nature of lay adjudication. Increased levels of education about 
the function of the criminal justice system are also likely to encourage critical debate and 
may contribute to the fostering of dialogic legitimacy between the State and the public. 
Nevertheless, more targeted efforts are required by the various criminal justice agencies 
responsible for the operation of the criminal courts in order to ensure that the nature, and 
prominence, of the role carried out by lay adjudicators is ‘visible’ to members of the 
public.140  
 
                                                     
140
 It would appear that there is some appetite for this. For example, the Ministry of Justice (2018e: 1) recently 
published research findings which noted the potential benefits of increasing the ‘visibility’ of criminal justice 
processes to court users.  
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Closely related to the role of education in fostering awareness of lay adjudication are 
implications arising from the composition of juries and the magistracy.  The high level of 
support afforded to group decision-making conducted by a cross-section of society suggests 
that efforts should be made to ensure that the composition of juries and the magistracy are 
truly representative of the populations that they serve along a range of demographic 
dimensions such as: gender, age, ethnicity, socio-economic status, sexuality, religion and 
culture. Levels of awareness of the process for jury selection – that is via the electoral 
register – were low among court users; this suggests that efforts are required to promote 
awareness of the mechanisms used to select jurors, in order to contribute to enhanced 
levels of representation. This is notwithstanding the potential difficulties in ensuring a fully 
representative composition, particularly due to concerns highlighted both by existing 
research and among court user interviewees, regarding levels of representation among 
some sections of society, particularly those from lower socio-economic backgrounds. 
 
Of perhaps more pressing concern, and a matter which has been subject to long-standing 
debate, is achieving a representative composition of the magistracy. This study adds to the 
growing body of research which points to public support for the use of lay magistrates in the 
administration of justice (see Morgan and Russell, 2000; Roberts et al. 2012). This suggests 
that the time is ripe for concerted recruitment efforts aimed at achieving a representative 
bench. However, at present the magistracy is shrinking and undergoing a crisis in morale 
(House of Commons Justice Committee, 2016); this is something which is likely to make it 
increasingly difficult to build representative benches. Before meaningful efforts to increase 
the representativeness of the magistracy can be made, more understanding is required of 
the reasons why the magistracy has fallen so sharply. A number of arguments have been put 
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forward for this which include: recruitment freezes (Gibbs, 2014a); the lack of support that 
prospective magistrates receive from employers in joining the magistracy (Gibbs, 2014a); 
falling caseloads (Judicial Office, 2018); an aging magistrate population (Gibbs, 2014a); and 
problems with morale (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2016).  This has, as yet, 
received surprisingly little detailed consideration from the government, the media and 
academia alike.   
 
A final set of implications arise in relation to the role of lay adjudicators and that of the paid 
judiciary. Findings from this study suggest that both lay and ‘professional’ forms of 
adjudication are highly valued by court users, which is indicative of an overriding perception 
of legitimacy of the decision-making processes adopted by the criminal courts. However, the 
implications of the complex interplay between the use of lay and professional decision-
making from the perspective of court users is worthy of scrutiny. Firstly, although group 
decision-making by a cross-section of lay people can contribute to perceptions of legitimacy, 
this study also found that such perceptions were at their weakest when concerns arose 
about the lack of ‘expertise’ of lay decision-makers. For juries, this was in relation to 
concerns around individual jurors being able to adequately understand proceedings, 
particularly in complex fraud trials; for magistrates this tended to be about the level of 
responsibility afforded to those without legal expertise. At the same time, the decision-
making capacity of the ‘professional’ judiciary was spoken of highly by court users, 
particularly at the point of sentencing.141 The positive regard with which members of the 
public hold the paid judiciary is supported by existing empirical research (such as Fielding, 
                                                     
141
 The use of a single decision-maker at the point of trial was not generally supported by court user 
interviewees.  
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2006; Jacobson et al. 2015) and is salient in a climate in which populist media portrayals 
have depicted public mistrust of experts, including members of the judiciary.142  
 
Taken together these findings suggest potential support for hybrid decision-making in the 
criminal justice process that involves both lay and professional adjudication.  This has 
received attention at various points in time, most notably in the Auld Review (2001), but is 
yet to be firmly established in policy or practice and has been subject to little empirical 
attention.143 The findings of the present research suggest that now may be a fruitful time for 
renewed attention of this among policy-makers and academics alike.  
 
 
7.2.2 Bringing engagement from the ‘shadows’ to the ‘centre-stage’ 
 
One of the main claims put forward by this thesis is that, although the use of lay 
adjudicators can help to promote perceptions of legitimacy in the criminal courts, this is just 
one of a number of factors associated with court users’ perceptions of legitimacy. It has 
been argued that a court user’s engagement in the court process acts as a representation of 
the extent to which the individual regards the courts as legitimate.  Higher levels of 
engagement are indicative of stronger degrees of legitimacy afforded to the courts; while 
lower levels of engagement are indicative of weak levels of legitimacy, or even, ‘legitimacy 
deficits’ (cf. Beetham, 1991). While magistrate interviewees’ levels of engagement were 
strong, only a small number of court users displayed a level of engagement that could be 
                                                     
142
 The most striking example of this is arguably depicted in the Daily Mail’s front page headline in November 
2016 which branded three members of the senior judiciary ‘Enemies of the People’ (Slack, 2016) in response 
to their ruling that the government would require the consent of parliament to give notice to Brexit.   
143
 See also Sanders (2002). 
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described as ‘active aligned’. Aside from the obvious benefits that efforts to promote 
engagement can bring to court users, the central implication arising from existing 
theorisations on legitimacy is that the courts and the government are also likely to benefit 
from putting increased efforts into cultivating ‘active aligned’ engagement among court 
users. 
 
Due to the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system in England and Wales, it is 
perhaps understandable that the issue of engagement has not previously been given high 
priority, particularly due to the likelihood of concerns arising that enhanced levels of 
engagement may compromise the ‘delicate separateness’ (Fielding, 2006: 53) required to 
maintain the sanctity of the judicial process. However, eliciting higher degrees of 
engagement among court users, for example by making increased efforts to foster levels of 
voluntary cooperation and enhanced levels of participation, does not have to come at the 
expense of due process and ensuring the interests of opposing parties are protected: if 
anything, eliciting high degrees of engagement among court users is likely to strengthen 
both of these principles (cf. Doak, 2008; Owusu-Bempah, 2017). 
 
The present climate in which the criminal courts operate suggests that now is an optimum 
time for the engagement of lay participants to become a central imperative of the courts. 
This is because the courts are currently undergoing changes that may fundamentally 
‘transform’ (cf. Ministry of Justice, 2013b; 2016c; 2018a) the ways individuals engage with 
the court process. Falling levels of recorded crime and increased use of out-of-court 
disposals in recent years have contributed to a decline in the use of the courts (see ONS, 
2018a; Ward, 2017; Judicial Office, 2018). This, set in the policy context of national fiscal 
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austerity, has culminated in a wide-scale court closure plan that has resulted in the closure 
of 121 courts and tribunal centres across the court estate (Ministry of Justice, 2018a) and 
coincides with changes to the provision of legal aid (Ministry of Justice 2013b). Closely tied 
to this are reforms which are likely to create sustained shifts in the operation of the courts 
and the very nature of court-based interaction. These are centred around programmes 
focused on promoting ‘efficiency’ in criminal proceedings and those aimed at making 
greater use of digital technology. This includes technological innovations such as the use of 
digital case management systems, routine use of video-enabled technology – such as that 
which allows court users to appear before the courts from a remote location – and plans to 
allow defendants to enter pleas online (Ministry of Justice, 2016c; Ministry of Justice, 
2018a). The latter set of proposals come with an overall aim of reducing the number of 
cases heard in ‘physical courtrooms’ by 2.4 million cases per year by 2023 (National Audit 
Office, 2018).  These changes may bring about the laudable aim of reducing unnecessary 
waiting and delay and enhancing access to justice for court users who may have not 
otherwise been able to participate in the court process.  Nevertheless, careful consideration 
is required to ensure that such programmes avoid the unintended effect of making the 
courts metaphorically, as well as physically, remote from the populations that they serve 
(see JUSTICE, 2016).  
 
Broader societal shifts that are manifest in the cases appearing before the courts provide 
further impetus for promoting engagement among court users. This includes the ways in 
which changing patterns of offending and alleged offending have contributed to a shift in 
the nature of offences coming before the courts. There are now fewer cases coming before 
the courts (Ministry of Justice, 2018b, 2018c), but those that do appear before the courts 
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appear to be more complex (Hunter et al. 2018; The Secret Barrister 2018) and comprise 
cases involving ‘higher-harm’ (ONS, 2018a:3) than at previous times. Specifically, the 
previous dominance of ‘public’ or ‘stranger’ related-offending has altered due to increasing 
volumes of ‘private’ or ‘hidden’ offending, including historic offending, being brought into 
view (see, for example, ONS, 2018a; CPS, 2017).144 At a wider level are the shifts in context 
associated with greater levels of fragmentation and exclusion in wider society (see, for 
example, Putnam, 1995; Young, 1999). This provides further imperative for cultivating 
engagement in criminal proceedings because, as Tyler et al. (2013) have argued, promoting 
inclusive practices in criminal justice institutions has associated benefits for enhancing 
inclusion in wider society.  
 
Overall, enhancing levels of engagement in the criminal courts is likely to be of immediate 
benefit to court users and the courts, and to the government and wider society. The way in 
which the courts deal with allegations of domestic abuse, in particular those which involve a 
complainant whose engagement is characterised by ‘dull compulsion’, ‘resistance’ or 
‘withdrawal’, acts as a strong case in point. If people, especially those who are likely to be in 
most need of support, are not using or turning away from the courts as an arbiter of justice, 
the legitimacy of the courts is called into question. This is because it is symbolic of the 
absence of ‘expressed consent’ (cf. Beetham, 1991) for the authority of the courts. It also 
has crucial implications for social justice, especially in terms of the level of harm that can 
potentially be caused to victims, perpetrators and their families by deficiencies in the State’s 
ability to effectively administer justice in these circumstances. These are issues which 
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 Jacobson and Hough (2018: 183) have argued that such shifts reflect ‘a decline in levels of social tolerance’ 
of such behaviour.  
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extend far beyond the remit of the criminal justice system and suggest the need for more 
coordination between the ‘supporting’ arm and the ‘penal’ arm of the State in addressing 
these legitimacy deficits (cf. Wacquant, 2009; Loader and Sparks, 2013).  
 
In this vein, the remainder of this section considers potential ways in which the engagement 
of lay participants can be cultivated. This includes by considering those which involve 
procedural justice principles and those which extend ‘beyond’ it (cf. Bottoms and Tankebe, 
2012).  Firstly, the engagement of court users might be promoted by a greater consideration 
of how the courts could create, or make better use of, accessible spaces within the court 
building. There is a growing body of interdisciplinary research involving legal scholars, 
human geographers, architects and campaigners which argues that reforms are necessary to 
ensure that the courts are accessible to the communities they serve (see Mulcahy, 2011; 
JUSTICE, 2016, Jeffrey, 2017).  Building upon existing studies which have highlighted the 
‘marginalising’ effect of the physical environment of the courts (such as Carlen, 1976; 
Mulcahy, 2011; Jacobson et al. 2015), this study has highlighted particular issues regarding 
how the conditions of waiting areas within court buildings impacts upon engagement. In 
light of the shrinking court estate and technological reforms, it might be useful for the 
government to ensure that the court buildings that do remain are as accessible and inclusive 
as possible to members of the public.145 This could be done, for example, by ensuring that 
all court users have access to necessary refreshment facilities and functional waiting spaces. 
This includes ones which provide suitable protection from encountering members of the 
                                                     
145
 Encouragingly, this is reflected the HMCTS’ recent commitment to ‘hav[e] fewer, better buildings, that are 
well-located … welcoming, easy to use and in good condition’ (Ministry of Justice, 2018a: 3). 
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opposing party146 and which facilitate the provision of information about the court process, 
including the progress of their case.147   
 
Existing research has highlighted the ways in which ‘court culture’ can adversely impact on 
court users’ engagement with the court process (Kirby, 2017a). In particular it has been 
argued that the often complex and antiquated language adopted by courtroom actors 
alongside overt displays of camaraderie between legal professionals and the presence of 
aggressive cross-examination techniques can generate a sense of exclusion among court 
users (Jacobson et al. 2015; Kirby, 2017a). This study contributes to the growing body of 
research that suggests that the presence of considerate and inclusive interactions between 
courtroom actors and lay participants can enhance engagement in the court process. This 
includes a piece of recent research conducted on behalf of HMCTS (Ministry of Justice 
2018e) which found that ‘being listened to’ was the most influential factor impacting on 
court users’ experience of the court process.  This suggests that continued efforts to adopt 
‘procedurally just’ styles of communication should be promoted by the courts and related 
agencies. This includes approaches which involve the use of straightforward language; 
allowing court users to express their views within the confines of the adversarial system; 
and ensuring that all court users are treated in a polite and respectful manner, including 
while under cross-examination (see Gold Lagratta, and Bowen, 2014; Jacobson et al. 2014b; 
Jacobson et al. 2015; Kirby, 2017a).  
 
                                                     
146
 This has also been cited as an issue in previous research (such as Fielding, 2006; Jacobson et al. 2015). 
147
 This includes, for example, individuals who do not fall into the neat categorisation of ‘defendant’ or 
‘prosecution witness’, such as defence witnesses or defendant ‘supporters’ who are also the alleged victim.   
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Great strides have been made in the last thirty years with regard to increasing engagement 
among vulnerable court users, particularly vulnerable complainants and prosecution 
witnesses.148 However, the findings from this study suggest that there are still areas of 
unmet need with regard to the ways in which levels of need and vulnerability are defined, 
identified and responded to. Notably, this study has highlighted the limitations of decision-
making about vulnerability and need being primarily done through the lens of whether or 
not the individual is entitled to legislative provision, such as special measures.   
 
It may be worth taking heed of the principles put forward by scholars in the field of 
therapeutic jurisprudence and desistance who advocate the use of ‘person-centred’ 
approaches meeting the needs of individuals (Copps-Hartley, 2003; McNeill, 2006; Ward, 
2014). Such approaches often include a focus upon the physical, psychological and social 
needs of individuals and may help to enhance engagement in the court process. This may 
include ensuring that the plethora of agencies involved in the administration of justice are 
able to develop forms of communication to ensure that the needs of court users are met 
and further consideration at the national level of the extent to which the principles applied 
in specialist ‘problem-solving’ courts (see Ward, 2014; Bowen and Whitehead, 2016), such 
as those which deal with domestic abuse or substance misuse, can be applied to the 
mainstream court estate.  
   
Finally, this study has sought to highlight that the courts act as an arena in which pressing 
issues in wider society are brought into sharp focus and, crucially, that we must recognise 
that those coming before the courts can comprise those most excluded from society at large 
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 See Cooper and Norton’s (2017) edited collection on vulnerability in the criminal justice system. 
309 
 
(see, for example, Jacobson et al. 2010; Tonry, 2010; Ward, 2017; Lammy, 2017). Efforts to 
enhance engagement in the court process, therefore, go beyond the remit of the immediate 
court environment and require greater efforts to ensure that public services such as health, 
education, social care and criminal justice agencies are able to adequately work together to 
promote inclusion and ultimately strengthen the quality of lives of the members of the 
public that they serve. Considering the potential for the discussion of engagement to extend 
beyond the penal arm of the State and into the remit of wider society creates scope to 
bridge the ‘missing middle’ between the discourses of legitimacy and crime control (cf. 
Loader and Sparks, 2013). This is because it highlights the benefits that may be brought 
about by a concerted focus upon strengthening perceptions of legitimacy between power-
holders and audiences across institutions, rather than at the individual, and perhaps insular, 
organisational-level.   
 
 
7.3 Future research 
 
The findings from the study point to a number of areas in which further research is likely to 
be beneficial; some of which include small scale research aimed at helping to fill specific 
gaps highlighted by this research, while others are of a more long-term and large-scale 
nature.  
 
Firstly, as has been outlined on a number of occasions, one of the main limitations to this 
study was that only a small number of defendants were interviewed. Moreover, the study 
did not include any interviews with members of the prison population. Future research on 
perceptions of lay adjudication carried out with members of the custodial population would 
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help to address this gap and generate insight into how those who have experienced a 
deprivation of liberty perceive lay decision-making. Theorisation of the continuum of 
engagement could further be strengthened by conducting interviews with a larger volume 
of defendants, including those with experience of custody, in order to assess the extent to 
which the continuum holds when a greater proportion of defendants are included in the 
sample. This is likely to generate further insight as to the degree to which an individual’s 
engagement is influenced by demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, ethnicity and 
socio-economic status and across a greater range of offence types. 
 
In a similar vein, though this study contributed to the growing body of research on power-
holder perceptions of legitimacy by conducting interviews with lay magistrates, the sample 
size was relatively small. Conducting research with a larger sample of lay magistrates to see 
if similar findings occur on a broader scale would be beneficial. Research which examines 
juror perceptions of ‘self-legitimacy’ would help to further understanding of power-holder 
perceptions of legitimacy among lay adjudicators. Unfortunately, the aforementioned 
restrictions outlined in the Contempt of Court Act 1981 mean that the scope for conducting 
research of this nature is slim. However, the research carried out by scholars such as 
Matthews et al. (2004) and Thomas (2010) shows that, under the right circumstances, jury 
research is possible. Research into juror perceptions of self-legitimacy may be worth 
particular consideration given that court user interviewees in this study, though generally 
very supportive of the use of juries, indicated a degree of ambivalence about undertaking 
jury service themselves.   
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I have argued that this study contributes to theorisations on legitimacy in the under-
researched terrain of the criminal courts and specifically helps to address gaps in research 
on the magistrates’ courts. In addition to the plethora of studies on police legitimacy there 
is now an emerging body of research which has examined legitimacy in other criminal 
justice institutions, such as the courts (such as, Jacobson et al. 2015) and prisons (such as 
Liebling, 2004). However, as yet, there appears to be an absence of research that has 
examined perceptions of legitimacy across the criminal justice system as a whole; for 
example, across a range of institutions including the police, the courts, prisons and 
probation. A programme of future research in this arena might help to generate further 
understanding of the ‘tissue of relations’ that exists between the State and the public and 
help to bridge the ‘missing middle’ between theorisations surrounding legitimacy and crime 
control (cf. Loader and Sparks, 2013). 149 Such a programme might benefit from the use of a 
mixed methods approach which involves both quantitative and qualitative methods – these 
are, generally speaking, conspicuously absent from existing studies of legitimacy – 
particularly since existing research has illustrated the value of both types of approaches in 
generating understanding of legitimacy. The bringing together of the competing 
philosophical positions which underlie quantitative and qualitative methods, to the extent 
that this is possible, may indeed help to generate a ‘richer account’ (Fielding, 2009: 443) of 
the study of legitimacy.    
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 This may be particularly valuable due to the increasingly limited availability of Office for National Statistics 
data on public perceptions of criminal justice agencies (see ONS, 2018b). 
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APPENDIX I  
 
Research on people’s understanding and perceptions of juries and magistrates: 
 
WITNESS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Introduction 
My name is Amy Kirby and I am a PhD student at the University of Surrey. I would 
like to invite you to take part in a study that is exploring people’s understanding and 
views of juries and magistrates. Before you decide whether or not to take part you 
should understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please 
take the time to read the following information carefully and ask questions about 
anything you do not understand. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The research wants to find out what people who attend court know about juries and 
magistrates and what they think about the use of juries and magistrates in court 
proceedings. As part of the study I am carrying out interviews with witnesses, 
defendants and with those who have accompanied others to court in order to hear 
their views. I will also be observing court proceedings in some cases. The study is 
being carried out in order to gain a better understanding of people’s thoughts, 
understanding and views on this topic. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This study has been organised by the University of Surrey and is funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). The ESRC is an organisation which 
provides research funding and training on economic and social issues. This is an 
independent study; however the Ministry of Justice has given the researcher 
permission to visit a number of courts and invite individuals to take part in the study. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study? 
You are being asked to take part in an interview because you have attended court as 
a witness and I would like to hear your views. If you would like to participate, you will 
be interviewed at a time and place convenient to you (it is possible for interviews to 
be carried out over the telephone). If you would prefer to be interviewed today, 
please let the researcher know and this can be arranged.  
 
What will I have to do? 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to read and sign a consent form. During 
the interview you will be asked about your experience of juries and/or magistrates; 
what you understand about the role of juries and magistrates; and what you think 
about the use of juries and magistrates within the court process. The interview will 
last around 45 minutes. With your consent, the interview will be digitally recorded 
and then transcribed. A copy of the transcript will be provided to you, if you wish. 
 
If you would like to take part please complete the attached reply slip and give it to the 
researcher. Alternatively, you can return the reply slip at a later time using the 
enclosed pre-paid envelope. 
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Do I have to take part? 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You should only take part if you 
want to, and you are free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. You 
do not have to answer all the questions that you are asked. If you decide to withdraw 
from the study all identifiable data, such as the interview recording and transcript, 
along with any personal data you have provided, will be withdrawn from the study.  
 
Will anyone know that I have taken part? 
The interview is confidential. The researcher will not tell anyone that you have 
taken part in this study. However, if you disclose that you or someone else is at risk 
of harm then the researcher may need to report this to an appropriate authority. This 
would be discussed with you first.  
 
The results of the study will be published, but nothing that could identify you will be 
included in any publication. Your name, or any other details that could be used to 
directly identify you, will not be included in any report on the study. Personal data 
will be handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Research data will 
be securely retained for a minimum of 10 years in line with University of Surrey 
policy.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during the 
course of the study will be addressed; please contact the researcher’s supervisor, 
Professor Nigel Fielding using the contact details listed below. If your concern cannot 
be dealt with by the research team, please contact Dr Rachel Brooks, Head of the 
Department of Sociology, at r.brooks@surrey.ac.uk or 01483 686987.  
 
Contact details of the research team 
If you have any questions or would like to know more about this study, please 
contact Amy Kirby at a.l.kirby@surrey.ac.uk  or on 07920 761369. If you have any 
concerns about the research, you may also contact the researcher’s supervisor, 
Professor Nigel Fielding at n.fielding@surrey.ac.uk or 01483 68 6967. 
 
Contact details for external organisations 
If you would like any further information or support about your experience at court, 
please contact Citizens Advice https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/  
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
This study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) 
from the University of Surrey Ethics Committee.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Research on people’s understanding and perceptions of juries and magistrates: 
Participant Consent Form 
 
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the study on people’s understanding and views of juries 
and magistrates.                                         
 
I have read and understood the Information Sheet (v.3, 02/11/15) provided.  
 
I have been given a full explanation by the researcher of the nature, purpose, location and likely duration 
of the study, and of what I will be expected to do. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on 
all aspects of the study and have understood the advice and information given as a result.                                                                                                             
 
I understand that my participation in the study is completely voluntary. I understand that I am free to end 
the interview at any time without needing to justify my decision, and that I do not need to answer all the 
questions. 
 
I am happy for the interview to be conducted in the proposed location. (NB This is not applicable for 
interviews being conducted over the telephone.) 
 
I understand that the interview is confidential.* The researcher will not include anything that could directly 
identify me in any study publication.  
 
I give consent for the interview to be audio recorded.  
 
I understand that my name, or any other details that could directly identify me, will not be included in the 
interview transcript. 
 
I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet (v.3, 02/11/15), being 
used for this study.  I understand that all personal data relating to volunteers is held and processed in 
the strictest confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). 
 
*I understand that the researcher is required to report: 
 
 Any stated intention to harm myself or others 
 
 Any information about serious crimes unknown to the police. 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in this study. I 
have been given adequate time to consider my participation. 
 
Name of volunteer (BLOCK CAPITALS) ……………...................................................... 
  
Signed  ...................................................... Date ...................................................... 
 
Researcher’s Statement: 
I confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and foreseeable risks (where applicable) of 
the proposed study to the interviewee. 
 
Name of researcher (BLOCK CAPITALS)  …….................................................... 
 
Signed .................................................... Date ……………………………………..
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APPENDIX III  
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - COURT USERS 
 
Introduction:  
 Reiterate the main points from the Information Sheet, including the voluntary and 
confidential nature of the study.  
 Check that participant is happy for the interview to be recorded.  
 Ask if participant has any questions. 
 If telephone interview, let participant know that it is OK to pause so that they have sufficient 
time to reflect upon their answer. 
 Switch recorder on. 
 
 
Background 
 
 Please can I ask for some background details about you?  
 - How old are you? 
- How would you describe your ethnicity? 
- Are you currently working? [Prompt about nature of employment] 
 
 What type of hearing have you been at court for today? 
Prompt:  - Trial/sentencing hearing/other hearing.  
 
 Have you ever been to court previously? 
- In what role? [Witness/defendant/observer/juror/magistrate] 
- How many times have you been to court before?  
- Which courts have you been to previously? [Crown 
Court/magistrates’ court/civil courts] 
 
Direct experience 
 
I’m now going to ask you a few questions about your recent experience of court and about 
your experience of the jury/magistrates. [Tailor accordingly based on previous experience 
e.g. ask participants about magistrates only if they only have experience of the magistrates’ 
court.] 
 
 How did you feel about attending court? 
 
 Please can you talk me through what happened when you arrived at court? 
Prompt: -      What happened when you arrived at court? 
- Roughly, how long were you waiting before you entered the 
courtroom? 
- How did you feel during the waiting period? 
 
 Can you tell me who was in the courtroom?  
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Prompt:  -      Judge, lawyers, court staff, jury/magistrates, any others? 
- Who did you speak to?  
- Was there anyone who you didn’t recognise/know why they were 
in the courtroom? 
- What happened when you went into the courtroom? 
- [Witnesses]: Roughly how long were you in the courtroom for? 
- [Defendants]: Roughly how long did your hearing last?  
- [Supporters]: Roughly how long did the hearing last?  
 
 What did you think of the jury/magistrates who heard the case? 
- Do you think that the jury/magistrates did a good job? (Why/why 
not?) 
 
 For magistrates’ court cases: How do you think you were treated by the magistrates? 
[For supporters tailor these questions accordingly e.g. Do you think that your 
friend/family member was listened to?] 
- Do you think that you were listened to? (Why/why not) 
- Do you think that you were treated politely/with respect? 
(Why/why not) 
- Do you think that you were treated fairly? (Why/why not) 
 
 For Crown Court cases: Did you feel as though the jury listened to you/the evidence? 
- Why/why not 
- Do you think that the jury were able to understand everything? 
(Why/why not) 
- Do you have any other thoughts about the jurors in your case?  
 
 Was there a mix in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, class of the jury 
members/magistrates? 
 
 How does this experience compare with any previous experience of juries or 
magistrates? 
 - What was better/worse about it? 
 
 Before we move on, do you have any other comments about your experience of 
being at court? 
 
I’d now like to move on from talking about your most recent experience of court and ask you 
about your thoughts about juries and magistrates more generally.  
 
 
Understanding and perceptions of juries 
 
 Can you tell me what you understand a jury to be? [Please be aware that this is not a 
‘test’; I’d just like to know a bit more about what people are aware of and what they 
aren’t in relation to juries and magistrates.] 
- What is the role of a jury? 
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- What does a jury do? 
- Who sits on a jury? 
- How many people sit on a jury? 
- How are jurors selected? 
- Is there anyone that can’t sit on a jury? 
 
[Show/read out Information Card A] 
 
 Is there anything on the information card that comes as a surprise to you? 
- Is there anything on the card that you weren’t already aware of? 
- Is there anything on the card that you think most people would or 
wouldn’t already know? 
- How does the description on the card compare with your 
experience of the jury today/recently? 
- If the information did not come as a surprise to you, where do you 
think your knowledge about the jury comes from? 
 
Generally speaking:   
 
 Do you think that it is important for courts in England and Wales to have juries? 
- Why/why not? 
 
 How do you think you would feel if you were asked to do jury service? 
- Is it something that you would want to do? (Why/why not) 
- [To those who have been jurors:] how did you feel when you were asked to 
be a juror?  
 
 Do you think that juries are made up of people from a variety of backgrounds? 
- Why/why not 
- In terms of age, gender, ethnicity, class 
- Refer back to present experience 
 
 
Understanding and perceptions of magistrates 
 
 
 Can you tell me what you understand a magistrate to be? [Please be aware that this 
is not a ‘test’; I’d just like to know a bit more about what people are aware of and 
what they aren’t in relation to juries and magistrates.] 
- What do magistrates do? 
- Who can be a magistrate? 
- How many people sit on a panel of magistrates? 
- How are they selected? 
- Is there anyone who can’t be a magistrate? 
- Could you be a magistrate? 
- Do you know anyone that is a magistrate? 
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[Show/read out Information Card B] 
 
 Is there anything on the information card that comes as a surprise to you? 
- Is there anything on the card that you weren’t already aware of? 
- Is there anything on the card that you think most people would or 
wouldn’t already know? 
- How does the description on the card compare with your 
experience of the magistrates today/recently? 
- If the information did not come as a surprise to you, where do you 
think your knowledge about magistrates comes from? 
 
Generally speaking:   
  
 Do you think that it is important for courts in England and Wales to have 
magistrates?  
- Why/why not 
 
 Would you ever think about applying to be a magistrate? (Why/why not) 
 
 Do you think that magistrates come from a variety of backgrounds?  
- Why/why not 
- In terms of age, gender, ethnicity, class 
- Refer back to present experience 
 
Overall perceptions 
 
 Overall, what do you think about the idea of involving members of the public in the 
criminal justice system? 
- Is it a good idea/bad idea? (Why/why not?) 
- As jurors? 
- As magistrates? 
 
 If you had the choice, who would you prefer trials to be heard by? 
- Juries 
- Magistrates 
- A judge sitting alone 
- It depends 
- Refer back to present experience 
- Is there anything that you have learned during the interview that makes a 
difference to your thoughts about this?  
 
 If you had the choice, who would you prefer sentencing to be decided by? [If 
necessary, explain what is meant by sentencing i.e. decisions about whether the 
defendant receives a prison sentence, a community sentence or another penalty and 
the length/conditions attached to this.] 
- A panel of three magistrates 
- A judge sitting alone 
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- Anyone else 
- It depends 
- Refer back to previous experience 
- Is there anything that you have learned during the interview that makes a 
difference to your thoughts about this?  
 
 Overall, if you could make one change to the way that the courts work, what would 
you suggest? 
 
 Do you have any other comments? 
 
Thank you for taking part. Ask participant if they would like to choose their own 
pseudonym and if they would like to receive a summary of findings. 
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APPENDIX IV  
 
INFORMATION CARDS – COURT USERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
150
 Note, the upper age limit of jurors has since changed to 75 years. See: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/jury-age-limit-to-be-raised-to-75-in-england-and-wales [accessed 
26.09.18]. 
151
 Note, this guidance has since been revised, see HMCTS (2017) or https://www.gov.uk/jury-service 
[accessed 27.09.18]. 
 
Information Card A – the jury 
 
 There are two levels of criminal court: the Crown Court and 
magistrates’ court.  
 
 In Crown Court trials 12 jurors are selected to hear the case.  
 
 Jurors are members of the public who are selected completely at 
random from the electoral register to ensure that a jury represents a 
cross-section of society. 
 
 Anyone on the electoral register who is between 18 and 69 is liable 
for jury service and could be called at any time.150  
 
 Some people are disqualified from serving on a jury; for example 
those who have recently been to prison or served a community 
sentence.  
 
 Jurors are asked to consider all the evidence presented during the 
trial and then decide whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of 
the offence they have been charged with.  
 
 If the jury finds the defendant guilty, the judge is responsible for 
passing the sentence. 
 
Derived from: ’Your role as a juror’ (Ministry of Justice, 2012) and ’Guide to Jury Summons’; both 
available at:  https://www.gov.uk/jury-service/overview [accessed 24/05/15].
151 
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Information Card B - the magistracy 
 
 There are two levels of criminal court: the Crown Court and magistrates’ 
court. 
  
 Most criminal cases are dealt with at the magistrates’ courts.  
 
 In magistrates’ courts many decisions are made by members of the 
public who have been appointed as magistrates. 
 
 Magistrates sit in court in panels of three, and are helped by a legally 
qualified advisor.  
 
 Magistrates are unpaid members of the public who receive regular 
training to sit in court. 
 
 Magistrates can come from all walks of life, and include young people, 
employed people and retired people.  
 
 Magistrates make decisions about whether defendants are guilty or not 
guilty, and about what sentences should be passed.  
 
 
Adapted from: ‘Appendix A: Extract of Information about the Magistracy’ in Roberts, J.V., Hough, M., Jackson, 
J. and Gerber, M. (2012) ‘Public opinion towards the lay magistracy and the Sentencing Council guidelines’, 
British Journal of Criminology, 52: 1072-1091. 
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APPENDIX V 
 
Research on lay participation in the criminal courts  
 
MAGISTRATE INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Introduction 
My name is Amy Kirby and I am a PhD student at the University of Surrey. I would 
like to invite you to take part in a study that is exploring lay participation in the 
criminal courts. Before you decide whether or not to take part you should understand 
why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read 
the following information carefully and ask questions about anything you do not 
understand.  
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The research wants to generate understanding about lay participation within the 
criminal courts. There are several types of lay participants within the criminal courts 
including lay magistrates, witnesses, defendants and volunteers from charitable 
organisations. 
 
As part of the study I am carrying out interviews with witnesses, defendants and with 
those who have accompanied others to court in order to hear their views. I will also 
be observing court proceedings and conducting interviews with lay magistrates. The 
study is being carried out in order to gain a better understanding of people’s 
thoughts, understanding and views on this topic. Interviews with magistrates are 
designed to elicit views on a variety of topics including: motivations for joining the 
magistracy, the benefits and challenges of the role and how the role of magistrates is 
understood and perceived by witnesses and defendants. Interviews are designed to 
give voice to the views of magistrates and enable the perspectives of magistrates to 
be compared and contrasted with those of witnesses and defendants. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This is an independent study organised by the University of Surrey and funded by 
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). The ESRC is an organisation 
which provides research funding and training on economic and social issues. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study? 
You are being asked to take part in an interview because you are a lay magistrate 
and I would like to hear your views. If you would like to participate, you will be 
interviewed at a time and place convenient to you. (It is also possible for interviews 
to be carried out over the telephone.) 
 
What will I have to do? 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to read and sign a consent form. During 
the interview you will be asked to reflect upon the benefits that you feel your role 
brings to the justice system and the associated challenges. You will also be asked 
for your thoughts on how witnesses and defendants perceive and understand your 
work; however you will not be asked to identify any specific cases. The interview will 
last around 45 minutes. With your consent, the interview will be recorded and the 
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recording will be transcribed. A copy of the transcript will be provided to you, if you 
wish. 
 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You should only take part if you 
want to, and you are free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason up 
until the point at which the study is published. You do not have to answer all the 
questions that you are asked. If you decide to withdraw from the study all identifiable 
data, such as the interview recording and transcript, along with any personal data 
you have provided, will be withdrawn from the study.  
 
Will anyone know that I have taken part? 
The interview is confidential. The researcher will not tell anyone that you have 
taken part in this study. The results of the study will be published, but nothing that 
could identify you will be included in any publication. Your name, or any other details 
that could be used to directly identify you, will not be included in any report on the 
study. All interview audio-recordings and transcripts will be held securely on a 
password-protected computer or laptop. Interviewee consent forms will be stored in 
a locked filing cabinet at the University of Surrey. Personal data will be handled in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Research data will be securely 
retained for a minimum of 10 years in line with University of Surrey policy. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during the 
course of the study will be addressed; please contact the researcher’s supervisor, 
Professor Nigel Fielding using the contact details listed below. If your concern cannot 
be dealt with by the research team, please contact Professor Jon Garland, Head of 
the Department of Sociology, at j.garland@surrey.ac.uk or 01483 682829. 
 
Contact details of the research team 
If you have any questions or would like to know more about this study, please 
contact Amy Kirby at a.l.kirby@surrey.ac.uk or on 07920 761369. If you have any 
concerns about the research, you may also contact the researcher’s supervisor, 
Professor Nigel Fielding at n.fielding@surrey.ac.uk or 01483 68 6967. 
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
This study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) 
from the University of Surrey Ethics Committee.  
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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APPENDIX VI 
 
Research on lay participation in the criminal courts 
Lay Magistrate Consent Form 
 
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the study on lay participation in the criminal 
courts.                                                       
 
I have read and understood the Information Sheet (v.5, 30/03/17) provided.  
 
I have been given a full explanation by the researcher of the nature, purpose, location and likely 
duration of the study, and of what I will be expected to do. I have been given the opportunity to 
ask questions on all aspects of the study and have understood the advice and information given 
as a result.                                                                                                             
 
I understand that my participation in the study is completely voluntary. I understand that I am free 
to end the interview at any time without needing to justify my decision, and that I do not need to 
answer all the questions. 
 
I am happy for the interview to be conducted in the proposed location. (NB This is not applicable 
for interviews being conducted over the telephone.) 
 
I understand that the interview is confidential. The researcher will not include anything that could 
directly identify me in any study publication.  
 
I give consent for the interview to be audio recorded.  
 
I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet (v.5 
30/03/17), being used for this study.  I understand that all personal data relating to volunteers is 
held and processed in the strictest confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
(1998). 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in this 
study. I have been given adequate time to consider my participation. 
 
 
Name of volunteer (BLOCK CAPITALS) ……………...................................................... 
 
  
Signed  ...................................................... Date ...................................................... 
 
Researcher’s Statement: 
I confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed study to the interviewee. 
 
Name of researcher (BLOCK CAPITALS)  …….................................................... 
  
Signed .................................................... Date …………………………………….. 
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APPENDIX VII  
 
Interview schedule - Lay magistrates 
 
Introduction:  
 Reiterate the main points from the Information Sheet, including the voluntary and 
confidential nature of the study.  
 Check that participant is happy for the interview to be recorded.  
 Ask if participant has any questions. 
 If telephone interview, let participant know that it is OK to pause, so that they have 
sufficient time to reflect upon their answer. 
 
1. Can you remember how you first became aware of the role of the lay magistrate? 
 
2. When you were thinking about applying to be a magistrate, what motivated you to 
apply for the position? 
 
3. Have you ever held, or thought about applying for, any other voluntary positions, in 
the criminal justice system or elsewhere? If so, please describe these. 
 
4. What would you say are the main benefits to having a lay magistracy? 
 
5. What, if any, would you say are the drawbacks to having a lay magistracy? 
 
6. To what extent do you think that members of the public are aware of and 
understand the role of the lay magistracy? 
 
7. How do you think the role of the magistracy is perceived by members of the public in 
the community? 
 
8. To what extent do you think court users (that is, witnesses and defendants), 
specifically, are aware of and understand the role of the lay magistracy? 
 
9. What, if anything, do you think court users tend to find most difficult about 
appearing in the magistrates’ court?  
 Why are these things difficult? 
 What, if anything, can be done to address these difficulties? 
 
10. What, in your view, are the most satisfying aspects of being a magistrate? 
 
11. What, in your view, what are the least satisfying aspects of being a magistrate? 
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12. Please can I ask for some background details about you?  
 How old are you? 
 How would you describe your ethnicity? 
 Are you currently working?  
o Prompt about nature of employment: full-time/part-time, nature of 
role/length of time in role. If retired, ask for occupation prior to retirement. 
 When did you join the magistracy? 
 
Thank you very much for taking part. Ask participant if they would like to choose 
their own pseudonym and if they would like to receive a summary of findings.
V. 2, 14/11/16 
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APPENDIX VIII 
 
Research on lay participation in the criminal courts  
 
WITNESS SERVICE VOLUNTEER INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Introduction 
My name is Amy Kirby and I am a PhD student at the University of Surrey. I would 
like to invite you to take part in a study that is exploring lay participation in the 
criminal courts. Before you decide whether or not to take part you should understand 
why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read 
the following information carefully and ask questions about anything you do not 
understand.  
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The research wants to generate understanding about lay participation within the 
criminal courts. There are several types of lay participants within the criminal courts 
including witnesses, defendants, lay magistrates and volunteers from charitable 
organisations. 
 
As part of the study I am carrying out interviews with witnesses, defendants and with 
those who have accompanied others to court in order to hear their views. I will also 
be observing court proceedings and conducting interviews with Witness Service 
volunteers and lay magistrates. The study is being carried out in order to gain a 
better understanding of people’s thoughts, understanding and views on this topic. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This is an independent study organised by the University of Surrey and funded by 
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). The ESRC is an organisation 
which provides research funding and training on economic and social issues. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study? 
You are being asked to take part in an interview because you are a Witness Service 
volunteer and I would like to hear your views. If you would like to participate, you will 
be interviewed at a time and place convenient to you. (It is also possible for 
interviews to be carried out over the telephone.) 
 
What will I have to do? 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to read and sign a consent form. During 
the interview you will be asked to reflect upon your motivations for volunteering for 
the Witness Service and about your thoughts. You will also be asked for your 
thoughts on how witnesses find the criminal justice process; however, you will not be 
asked to identify any specific cases. The interview will last around 45 minutes. With 
your consent, the interview will be recorded and the recording will be transcribed. A 
copy of the transcript will be provided to you, if you wish. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You should only take part if you 
want to, and you are free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason up 
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until the point at which the study is published. You do not have to answer all the 
questions that you are asked. If you decide to withdraw from the study all identifiable 
data, such as the interview recording and transcript, along with any personal data 
you have provided, will be withdrawn from the study.  
 
 
Will anyone know that I have taken part? 
The interview is confidential. The researcher will not tell anyone that you have 
taken part in this study. The results of the study will be published, but nothing that 
could identify you will be included in any publication. Your name, or any other details 
that could be used to directly identify you, will not be included in any report on the 
study. Personal data will be handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
1998. Research data will be securely retained for a minimum of 10 years in line with 
University of Surrey policy. 
 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with during the 
course of the study will be addressed; please contact the researcher’s supervisor, 
Professor Nigel Fielding using the contact details listed below. If your concern cannot 
be dealt with by the research team, please contact Professor Jon Garland, Head of 
the Department of Sociology, at j.garland@surrey.ac.uk or 01483 682829. 
 
Contact details of the research team 
If you have any questions or would like to know more about this study, please 
contact Amy Kirby at a.l.kirby@surrey.ac.uk or on 07920 761369. If you have any 
concerns about the research, you may also contact the researcher’s supervisor, 
Professor Nigel Fielding at n.fielding@surrey.ac.uk or 01483 68 6967. 
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
This study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) 
from the University of Surrey Ethics Committee.  
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
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APPENDIX IX 
 
Research on lay participation in the criminal courts 
Witness Service Volunteer Consent Form 
 
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in the study on lay participation in the criminal 
courts.                                                 
 
I have read and understood the Information Sheet (v.2, 14/11/16) provided.  
 
I have been given a full explanation by the researcher of the nature, purpose, location and likely 
duration of the study, and of what I will be expected to do. I have been given the opportunity to 
ask questions on all aspects of the study and have understood the advice and information given 
as a result.                                                                                                             
 
I understand that my participation in the study is completely voluntary. I understand that I am free 
to end the interview at any time without needing to justify my decision, and that I do not need to 
answer all the questions. 
 
I am happy for the interview to be conducted in the proposed location. (NB This is not applicable 
for interviews being conducted over the telephone.) 
 
I understand that the interview is confidential. The researcher will not include anything that could 
directly identify me in any study publication.  
 
I give consent for the interview to be audio recorded.  
 
I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet (v.2 
14/11/16), being used for this study.  I understand that all personal data relating to volunteers is 
held and processed in the strictest confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
(1998). 
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in this 
study. I have been given adequate time to consider my participation. 
 
 
Name of volunteer (BLOCK CAPITALS) ……………...................................................... 
 
  
Signed  ...................................................... Date ...................................................... 
 
Researcher’s Statement: 
I confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and foreseeable risks (where 
applicable) of the proposed study to the interviewee. 
 
Name of researcher (BLOCK CAPITALS)  …….................................................... 
  
Signed .................................................... Date ……………………………………..
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APPENDIX X  
 
Interview schedule - Witness Service volunteers 
 
Introduction:  
 Reiterate the main points from the Information Sheet, including the voluntary and confidential nature of the 
study.  
 Check that participant is happy for the interview to be recorded.  
 Ask if participant has any questions. 
 If telephone interview, let participant know that it is OK to pause, so that they have sufficient time to reflect  
upon their answer. 
 Switch recorder on. 
 
1. Please can I ask for some background details about you?  
 How old are you? 
 How would you describe your ethnicity? 
 Are you currently working?  
o Prompt about nature of employment: full-time/part-time, nature of role/length of time in 
role. If retired – occupation prior to retirement. 
 When did you join the Witness Service? 
 
2. What made you first think of becoming a Witness Service volunteer, and what motivated you to 
apply for the position? 
 
3. Have you ever held, or thought about applying for, any other voluntary positions, in the criminal 
justice system or elsewhere? If so, please describe these. 
 
4. Have you ever thought of leaving the role?  
 If so, why – and what has made you stay?  
 
5. If asked what it’s like to go to court, what kinds of things do you think a witness is most likely to 
say? 
 
6. What, if anything, do you think prosecution witnesses tend to find most difficult about appearing in 
at court?  
 Why are these things difficult? 
 What, if anything, is done or can be done to address these difficulties? 
 Have these difficulties changed over time? In what ways? 
 Do you think that the range of support and information offered to prosecution witnesses is 
adequate? 
 What, if any, further support or information could be offered to improve the court process for 
prosecution witnesses? 
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7. What, if anything, do you think defence witnesses tend to find most difficult about appearing at 
court?  
 Why are these things difficult? 
 What, if anything, is done or can be done to address these difficulties? 
 Have these difficulties changed over time? In what ways? 
 Do you think that the range of support and information offered to prosecution witnesses is 
adequate? 
 What, if any, further support or information could be offered to improve the court process for 
defence witnesses? 
 
 
8. What, in your view, are the most satisfying aspects of being a Witness Service volunteer? 
 
9. What, in your view, what are the least satisfying aspects of being a Witness Service volunteer? 
 
10. Do you have any further comments you would like to make about the topics discussed during the 
interview? 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking part. Ask participant if they would like to choose their own 
pseudonym and if they would like to receive a summary of findings. 
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APPENDIX XI  
COURT USER INTERVIEW ANNEX 
 
List of court user interviewees; some details have been masked for the purposes of anonymity.  
Pseudonym Age group Ethnic group Occupation Role Type of court  Type of hearing attended 
Peter 25-34 White British Teaching assistant Complainant Crown Court Trial 
Natalie 25-34 White British Recruitment consultant Complainant Crown Court Trial 
Suzie 25-34 White British Administrator Complainant Magistrates’ Court Trial 
Zara 25-34 Mixed ethnicity  Facilities management Complainant Magistrates’ Court Trial 
Belle 18-24 White British Student Complainant Magistrates’ Court Trial 
Aylin  25-34 White British  Carer Complainant Magistrates’ Court Trial 
Dominic 35-44 White British Manager, large company Prosecution witness Crown Court Trial 
Geoff  45-54 White British Retired police officer Prosecution witness Crown Court Trial 
Sian 35-44 White British Housing manager Prosecution witness Crown Court Trial 
Anita 45-54 White British Secretary Prosecution witness Crown Court Trial 
Viv  55-64 White British Housekeeper Prosecution witness Crown Court Trial 
Jake  25-34 White British Mechanic Prosecution witness Crown Court Trial 
Sandrine 45-54 White British Designer Prosecution witness Crown Court Trial 
Candice 35-44 White British Company supervisor Prosecution witness Crown Court Trial 
Evelyn  35-44 Black British Secretary Prosecution witness Magistrates’ Court Trial 
Gemma  25-34 White British Midwife Prosecution witness Magistrates’ Court Trial 
Iumi 35-44 Asian British  Chauffeur Prosecution witness Magistrates’ Court Trial 
Jon 25-34 White Other  Hospitality service Defendant Crown Court Trial & sentencing hearing 
Connor  18-24 Black British Car dealer Defendant Crown Court Trial & sentencing hearing 
Holly  25-34 White British Full-time mother Defendant Magistrates’ Court Sentencing hearing 
Irenka 35-44 White Other  Courier Defendant Magistrates’ Court Trial & sentencing hearing 
Martin  55-64 White British Railway worker Defendant Magistrates’ Court Trial 
Usman 35-44 Asian British Company Director Defendant Magistrates’ Court Trial 
Alex* 35-44 Mixed ethnicity Music industry Defendant Both Sentencing hearings 
Theresa 65+ White British Retired Supporter  Crown Court Trial 
Gloria  65+ Black Caribbean Retired Supporter  Crown Court Trial 
Frank 45-54 White British Maintenance engineer Supporter Magistrates’ Court Trial 
Meg  55-64 White British Financial services Supporter  Magistrates’ Court Trial 
*Pilot interview with former defendant who had appeared at the Crown and magistrates’ courts on several occasions a number of years previously. 
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APPENDIX XII  
OBSERVATION ANNEX 
 
List of Crown Court observations 
 
NB Cases involving alleged domestic abuse (DA) are indicated as such in parentheses after the alleged main offence. 
Name  (Alleged) main offence(s) Main outcome of hearing* 
Crown Court Full Trial 01 
(CCFT01) 
Assault occasioning actual bodily harm 
(ABH) 
The defendant (D) was found not guilty. 
Crown Court Partial Trial 
01 (CCPT01) 
Racially aggravated assault & criminal 
damage 
D was found guilty on both counts. He received a suspended sentence order (SSO). 
CCPT02 Possession with intent to supply Class A 
drugs, assault & poss. Class A drugs. 
D was found not guilty on all counts except for possession of Class A drugs. 
CCPT03 Burglary D was found guilty; the case was adjourned for a pre-sentence report (PSR).  
CCPT04 Burglary D was found guilty and received a community order. 
CCPT05 Rape D was found not guilty. 
CCPT06 Possession of a firearm D was found guilty on both counts. He received a mandatory custodial sentence of 5 years. 
CCPT07 Harassment (DA) D was found guilty of harassment; he received a 14 month custodial sentence and a restraining 
order. 
CCPT08 Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) D was found not guilty. 
CCPT09 Poss. offensive weapon & ABH D was found guilty and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. 
CCPT10 Indecent assault (multiple counts) D was found not guilty on all counts. 
CCPT11 Conspiracy to supply Class A drugs There were two defendants in this case. D1 was found guilty of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs; 
the jury could not reach a verdict in relation to D2 and a re-trial was ordered.  
CCPT12 Fraud (multiple counts) D was found guilty on all counts and received a 12 month custodial sentence. A confiscation order 
to the total value of money obtained was also issued. 
Crown Court Sentencing 
Hearing 01 (CCSH01) 
Robbery D was sentenced to 20 months custody. 
CCSH02 Poss. offensive weapon D was sentenced to 12 months custody. 
CCSH03 Dangerous Driving D was sentenced to an SSO and was disqualified from driving for approximately 2 years. 
CCSH04 Aggravated vehicle taking D received a community order and was disqualified from driving for 12 months. 
CCSH05 Sexual assault D received an SSO. 
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CCSH06 Driving whilst disqualified; breach of SSO The judge activated the SSO; D was sentenced to 6 months custody.  
CCSH07 Handling stolen goods D was given a 2 year conditional discharge. 
CCSH08 Handling stolen goods D received a community order. 
CCSH09 Sexual assault & indecent assault D was sentenced to 6 years custody. 
CCSH10 Breach of prevention of sexual harm 
order 
D received an SSO. 
CCSH11 Contempt of court & dangerous driving D received a short custodial sentence. 
Crown Court Other 
Hearing 01 (CCOH01) 
Assault (DA) The case was scheduled for trial but was adjourned after the complainant (C) failed to attend.  
CCOH02 Possession of a firearm The case was listed for trial but D entered a late guilty plea shortly after the prosecution case began. 
D received an SSO. 
 
 
List of magistrates’ court observations 
 
Name  (Alleged) main offence(s) Type of 
adjudicator 
Main outcome of hearing* 
MCFT01 Assault Magistrates  D was found guilty and sentenced to 20 weeks custody; compensation was awarded to C.  
MCFT02  Breach of non-molestation order (DA) Magistrates  D was found guilty and was given a fine and a restraining order. 
MCFT03 Burglary Magistrates  D was found guilty; sentencing was adjourned for two weeks in order that D could be present.  
MCFT04 Sexual assault (DA) Magistrates  D was found not guilty.  
MCFT05 Handling stolen goods Magistrates  D was found guilty; the case was sent to the Crown Court for sentencing. 
MCFT06 Use of threatening, abusive or insulting 
words or behaviour.  
District 
judge (DJ) 
D was found guilty; sentencing was adjourned for a PSR.  
MCFT07 Assault, criminal damage & using 
violence to gain entry (DA) 
Magistrates  D was found guilty; sentencing was adjourned for a PSR.  
MCFT08 Driving with alcohol level above limit 
(hereafter, ‘drink driving’) 
Magistrates  D was found guilty and sentenced to a driving disqualification and a fine. 
MCFT09 Stalking (x 2) Magistrates  D was found guilty on both charges and was sentenced for this along with other matters. D received 
community order with a rehabilitation requirement and a restraining order against each C. 
MCFT10 Speeding Magistrates  D was found not guilty. 
MCFT11 Assault & criminal damage (DA) Magistrates D was found not guilty of assault but found guilty of criminal damage. D was given a fine and issued 
with a restraining order and a compensation order. 
MCFT12 Assault Magistrates  D was found not guilty. 
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MCFT13 Driving whilst disqualified DJ D was found guilty. D was sentenced to a community order with a rehabilitation requirement, a 
curfew and compensation. He was disqualified from driving for 12 months. 
MCFT14 Driving whilst using a mobile phone DJ D was found guilty; she received a fine and 3 penalty points.  
MCFT15 Failure to give information as to  identify 
of driver after being issued with a 
speeding ticket  
DJ D was found guilty; he received a fine and 6 penalty points. D’s licence was already endorsed with 9 
penalty points. D, therefore, received an automatic driving disqualification of six months. 
MCFT16 Assault (DA) DJ D was found guilty; sentencing for this matter and a further conviction for theft was adjourned to 
the following week. 
MCFT17 Handling stolen goods DJ D was found guilty; sentencing was adjourned pending the outcome of D’s upcoming trial for 
another matter.  
MCFT18  Assault (DA) Magistrates  A Galbraith submission (‘no case to answer’) entered by the defence, at the end of the prosecution 
case, was granted. The case against D was dropped. 
MCPT01 Touting for car hire services DJ D was found guilty; he was sentenced to a fine and given a 12 month driving disqualification.  
MCPT02 Assault by beating (DA) Magistrates  D was found guilty and sentenced to a fine. 
MCPT03  Common assault & criminal damage 
(DA) 
DJ D was found guilty of criminal damage (only) and was sentenced to a conditional discharge. He was 
also issued with a compensation order.  
MCPT04 Assault & criminal damage (DA) Magistrates  At the end of the prosecution case D successfully entered a Galbraith submission of ‘no case to 
answer’; this was granted by the magistrates. The charges against D were dropped.  
MCSH01 Driving w/o due care & attention Magistrates  D entered a guilty plea and received a fine and 3 penalty points. 
MCSH02 Poss. bladed article Magistrates  D received a one year community order with 100 hours of unpaid work. 
MCSH03 Theft & failure to appear DJ D received a 20 week custodial sentence. 
MCSH04 Assault DJ D received an SSO with an unpaid work requirement and was issued with a compensation order. 
MCSH05 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a fine and a 3 year driving disqualification.  
MCSH06 Theft DJ D received a community order with a rehabilitation activity requirement. 
MCSH07 Driving with drug level above specified 
limit; poss. cannabis 
Magistrates  D received a 12 month driving disqualification and a fine. 
MCSH08 Drink driving Magistrates  D received an 18 month driving disqualification and a fine. 
MCSH09 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a 12 month disqualification and a fine. 
MCSH10 Poss. with intent to supply cannabis  Magistrates  D received a community order with a rehabilitation activity requirement and a curfew. 
MCSH11 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a 12 month disqualification and a fine. 
MCSH12 Drunk and disorderly Magistrates  D received a conditional discharge. 
MCSH13 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a 36 month driving disqualification and a fine. 
MCSH14 Going equipped for theft Magistrates  D received a community order with unpaid work. 
MCSH15 Racially aggravated assault Magistrates  D received a community order, a fine and a compensation order. 
MCSH16 Theft & breach of SSO Magistrates  D received an SSO and unpaid work. 
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MCSH17 Assault Magistrates  D received a fine. 
MCSH18 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a 20 month disqualification and a fine. 
MCSH19 Drunk and disorderly Magistrates  D received a conditional discharge. 
MCSH20 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a 12 month driving disqualification and a fine. 
MCSH21 Use of threatening, abusive or insulting 
words or behaviour & criminal damage. 
Magistrates  D received a conditional discharge, a fine and a compensation order. 
MCSH22 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a driving disqualification of approximately 2 years and a community order. 
MCSH23 Assault by beating & crim. damage (DA) Magistrates D received a conditional discharge and a fine. 
MCSH24 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a 12 month driving disqualification and a fine. 
MCSH25 Breach of Criminal Behaviour Order Magistrates  D received an SSO. She had a number of outstanding fines which were remitted by the court. 
MCSH26 Drink driving Magistrates  D was disqualified from driving for approximately 2 years. He also received a community order with 
a rehabilitation activity requirement and a fine. 
MCSH27 Speeding Magistrates  D received a fine and his licence was endorsed with 4 penalty points. 
MCSH28  Breach of Criminal Behaviour Order & 
SSO 
Magistrates  D’s SSO was activated; D was taken into custody. 
MCSH29 Failure to notify the council of change in 
circs. in relation to housing benefits 
Magistrates  D received a conditional discharge. 
MCSH30 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a 12 month driving disqualification and a fine.  
MCSH31 Assault & breach of community order Magistrates  D received a fine. 
MCSH32 Poss. firearm w/o a licence Magistrates  D received a fine. 
MCSH33 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a 12 month driving disqualification and a fine. 
MCSH34  Assault Magistrates  D received a community order with a rehabilitation requirement and a compensation order. 
MCSH35 Assaulting a police officer; drunk & 
disorderly 
Magistrates  D received a community order with a curfew and unpaid work; he also received a fine. 
MCSH36 Theft & racially aggravated disorderly 
behaviour 
Magistrates  D received a fine and a compensation order. 
MCSH37 Assault by beating Magistrates  D received a fine and a compensation order. 
MCSH38 Theft & poss. Class A drugs Magistrates  D received a fine. 
MCSH39 Theft Magistrates  D received a conditional discharge. 
MCSH40 Poss. Class C drugs Magistrates  D received a conditional discharge. 
MCSH41 Assaulting a police officer; drunk & 
disorderly 
Magistrates  D received a conditional discharge. 
MCSH42 Poss. Class B drugs Magistrates  D received a conditional discharge. 
MCSH43 Theft, criminal damage & breach of 
community order 
Magistrates  D received a 6 month custodial sentence. 
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MCSH44 Poss. Class A & Class B drugs Magistrates  D received a small fine; this was remitted because he had spent the night in custody. D was 
released. 
MCSH45 Breach of Criminal Behaviour Order Magistrates  D received a fine. 
MCSH46 Drink driving Magistrates  D received a driving disqualification and a fine. 
MCSH47  Poss. Class B drugs & driving offences Magistrates  D received a fine and a conditional discharge. 
MCOH01 Assault by beating (DA) Magistrates  The case was scheduled for trial but C failed to attend; the prosecution offered no evidence. 
MCOH02 Outraging public decency Magistrates  The case was scheduled for trial but D entered a late guilty plea; the case was adjourned for a PSR. 
MCOH03 Assault and criminal damage (DA) Magistrates  The case was scheduled for trial but C failed to attend; the remaining prosecution witnesses either 
did not attend or stated that they did not want to give evidence. The prosecution offered no 
evidence. 
MCOH04 Malicious communications (DA) Magistrates  The case was scheduled for trial but C failed to attend. The case was adjourned for 3 weeks in order 
to enable C to attend. 
MCOH05 Aggravated vehicle taking Magistrates  The case was scheduled for trial but one of the defendants failed to attend; the case was adjourned 
until the following week. 
MCOH06 Harassment (DA) Magistrates  The case was scheduled for trial but D entered a late guilty plea; the case was adjourned for a PSR. 
MCOH07 Not specified  DJ This was a review hearing seemingly arranged for the purpose of DJ checking D’s progress post-
sentencing. A further review hearing was scheduled for 6 weeks’ time; DJ requested that D produce 
two consecutive negative drug tests for the next hearing. 
MCOH08 Drink driving Magistrates  This was a first hearing; D entered a not guilty plea and the case was adjourned for trial (in the 
magistrates’ court). 
MCOH09 Drink driving Magistrates  This was a first hearing; D entered a guilty plea and the case adjourned for PSR.  
MCOH10 Non-payment of fines Magistrates  D appeared in court in relation to a dispute in relation to the non-payment of fines. The remainder 
of the fines were remitted. 
MCOH11 Att. to steal & criminal damage DJ This was a first hearing; D entered a not guilty plea and the case was adjourned for trial at the 
Crown Court. 
MCOH12 Driving w/o due care and attention DJ This was a first hearing; D entered a not guilty plea and the case was adjourned for trial (in the 
magistrates’ court). 
MCOH13 Sexual offences against a child Magistrates  This was a first hearing; the magistrates’ court declined jurisdiction and the case was sent to the 
Crown Court for a case management hearing. 
MCOH14 Using violence to obtain entry (DA) & 
breach of bail 
Magistrates  This was a case management hearing scheduled after D and one of the complainants failed to 
attend court on the day of trial. D entered a not guilty plea to breaching bail. A new trial date was 
set. 
MCOH15 Arson and criminal damage (DA) Magistrates  This was a first hearing; D entered guilty pleas. The case was adjourned for a PSR and a medical 
report. 
MCOH16 Breach of supervision order Magistrates  D appeared before the court having been recalled on licence for failing to attend probation 
appointments and for committing a further offence. D was sentenced to 2 weeks’ custody. 
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MCOH17 ABH, common assault & criminal 
damage 
Magistrates  This was a first hearing; D entered not guilty pleas to all charges. The case was adjourned for (trial in 
the magistrates’ court). 
MCOH18 Stalking & malicious communications 
(DA) 
Magistrates  This was a first hearing; the magistrates’ declined jurisdiction and the case sent to the Crown Court 
for a case management hearing. 
MCOH19 Breach of domestic violence prevention 
notice (DA) 
Magistrates  D was remanded in custody the previous day for breaching a domestic violence protection notice. A 
domestic violence protection order was granted when he appeared before the court; D was 
released from custody. 
MCOH20 Assault & criminal damage Magistrates  This was a first hearing; D entered a guilty plea to criminal damage and a not guilty plea to assault. 
The case was adjourned for trial (in the magistrates’ court). 
MCOH21 Non-payment of fines Magistrates  D was remanded in custody the previous day for the non-payment of fines. D was sentenced to 1 
day’s custody; because this had been served overnight D was released.  
MCOH22 Assault & threatening behaviour Magistrates  This was a case management hearing; the case was adjourned pending a psychiatric report 
regarding D’s state of mind at the time of the incident.  
MCOH23 Criminal damage x 3 Magistrates  This was a first hearing; D pleaded guilty to all charges and the case was adjourned for a PSR. 
MCOH24 Drink driving Magistrates  This was a first hearing; D entered a not guilty plea and the case was adjourned for trial at the 
magistrates’ court. 
MCOH25 Criminal damage Magistrates  This was a case management hearing; the case was adjourned for psychiatric reports, including in 
relation to D’s fitness to plead.  
MCOH26 Non-payment of fines DJ D did not attend the hearing having contacted the court to state the he could not attend due to 
illness. The case was adjourned on the basis that a warrant would be issued if D failed to attend the 
next hearing. 
MCOH27 Speeding  DJ This case was scheduled for trial but the matter was adjourned because the court did not have 
access to the relevant documents and because an interpreter had not been booked for D. 
MCOH28 Theft DJ This was a first hearing; D pleaded guilty and the case was adjourned for a PSR and to enable D to 
undertake a drug treatment assessment. 
MCOH29 Criminal damage (DA) DJ This was a first hearing; D pleaded guilty and the case was adjourned for a PSR and to enable D to 
undertake an alcohol treatment assessment.  
MCOH30 Assaulting a police officer & violent 
behaviour at a police station 
DJ This was a first hearing; D pleaded guilty to the charges but was awaiting trial for another matter in 
the magistrates’ court. Sentencing was adjourned until the outcome of D’s upcoming trial.  
MCOH31 Failure to sign the sex offenders register 
& violent behaviour at a police station 
DJ This was a first hearing; D pleaded guilty to the first charge but not guilty to the second charge. The 
case was adjourned for trial.  
*Further outcome details are provided where known. Orders to pay court costs and the Victim Surcharge have not been included due to the regularity with which they 
occurred.
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